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 Examining the Dutch in early America only through the prism of New 
Netherland is too limiting. The historiography inevitably follows a trajectory that leads 
to English takeover. This work explores how Dutch merchants fostered and nurtured 
trade with early American colonies at all levels and stages – from ship owners to 
supercargos to financiers – and over the varied geographical and political terrains in 
which early American commodities were grown, hunted, harvested, and traded.  
Chapters are organized geographically and chronologically and survey how Dutch 
trading networks played out in each of early America’s three major regions – New 
England, the Middle Colonies, and the Chesapeake and later the Lower South from 
1624 through 1750.   
 Chronicling Dutch trade also serves to emphasize that participants in early 
America were rooted in global – as well as in local, regional, and imperial – 
landscapes.  Accordingly, while each of the chapters of this work is regional, they are 
also integrated into something larger.  In the end, this is a study that thinks across the 
Atlantic world yet explores various commodities or individual merchants to 
understand markets and networks. 
 This narrative also demonstrates how profoundly Dutch capital, merchants, and 
 iv 
goods affected early America. It confirms stereotypes about the intimacy of the Dutch 
with commerce or capital, about the character of Dutch merchants who thrived in a 
competitive commercial atmosphere, about the proliferation of Dutch trade throughout 
the Atlantic world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By examining 
Dutch trade, we develop a more nuanced and vivid understanding of commerce in 
early America.  
 
  v 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Kim Todt received her B.A. in History and Government from Cornell University.  She 
attained an M.A. with High Honors in History from Yale University in 2005.  She 
received her M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Cornell University in 2009 and 2012, 
respectively.  
  vi 
To 
 Ewan  
  vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 The research for this dissertation was made possible by the generous support of 
many institutions.  I would like to thank The Manuscript Society for the Maass 
Memorial Research Grant, the Quinn Foundation for a Quinn-Library Fellowship at 
the New York State Library, The American Association for Netherlandic Studies for 
its Research Scholarship, Het Scheepvaartmuseum in Amsterdam for the Prof. J.C.M 
Warnsinck Fellowship, and the New York State Archives for the Larry Hackman 
Research Residency. 
 In addition, Cornell University and the Cornell History Department funded 
much of this project with fellowships and travel grants.  I am grateful to the Einaudi 
Center and the Society of the Humanities for travel grants.  As well, early in the 
exploration of material for this project I received an American Studies Grant that was 
crucial for me to view archival materials in New York City and Albany and to 
formulate the general research questions for the thesis.   
 I am appreciative of the many libraries and archives that opened their doors to 
me, in particular the Stadsarchief Amsterdam, the Stadsarchief Rotterdam, the 
Nationaal Archief in The Hague, the National Archives in Kew, the New York State 
Archives, the New York State Library, the New-York Historical Society, and the New 
York Public Library.  In addition, I would like to thank the staff and librarians of 
Cornell’s many libraries including Olin, Uris, and Africana. 
 This project has introduced me to many wonderful people, all of whom have 
contributed in different ways to its evolution.  I would like, first of all, to express my 
  viii 
gratitude towards my advisor, Mary Beth Norton.  She accepted a phone call from me 
a number of years ago in which I asked to assist her with one of her research projects.  
I had hoped to undertake research for an established historian to determine whether I 
wanted to pursue graduate school as a career change.  While she initially hesitated, my 
offer to work for a “peppercorn” helped to persuade her.  Upon meeting at the end of 
the summer, she asked whether I had enjoyed my research on seventeenth and 
eighteenth century early American newspapers.  I replied that I had had a “blast.”  Her 
only response was that I was “hooked.”  Indeed, I was, and continue to be, “hooked” 
on history.  I am appreciative to Mary Beth for all of our conversations, her patience, 
her guidance, her sense of humor, and her support. I have learned from her the practice 
of history and how to be an effective teacher in the classroom. I have indeed been 
fortunate to work with someone of such intelligence, rigor, and integrity.  I will be 
forever grateful to her for answering her phone. 
 My additional committee members, Rachel Weil, Robert Travers, and David 
Hancock, have provided input and council and encouraged me to expand my thinking 
about the dissertation in a way that is intellectually exciting and challenging.  Their 
scholarly contributions to this thesis are immeasurable and I am sure my thesis would 
have been less rigorous and less interesting without them. 
 Aside from my official committee, I was fortunate to benefit from an informal 
committee of friends and colleagues.  My academic home away from home while in 
Amsterdam was Het Scheepvaartmuseum.  There, I was able to share many of my 
ideas, meals, and delightful moments with my fellow “fellow” Ron Brand, Remmelt 
Daalder, Henk Dessens, Anton Oortwijn, Joost Schokkenbroek, Elizabeth Spits, and 
  ix 
Diederick Wildeman.  The other significant portion of my time in Amsterdam was 
spent at the Stadsarchief Amsterdam.  The archivists and staff were welcoming and 
provided many resources and ideas for my project.  In addition, I benefited from the 
“regulars” at the archives, not all of whom were historians, but each of whom loved 
history and offered their own moral support and suggests for my research. 
 In New York, I was fortunate to have the assistance of the respective staffs at 
the New York State Archives and the New York State Library.  Paul Mercer and Vicki 
Weiss provided encouragement and their unparalleled knowledge about the archival 
collection.  In addition, Christine Beauregard, Helen Weltin, Fred Basset, Bill 
Gorman, Nancy Horen, and Jim Folts offered guidance and perseverance in tracking 
down material. 
 Of the many friends we made in Amsterdam, none were so dear as Pauline, 
Marcel, and little Silver Metz.  They welcomed us into their lives and home. 
 I have been fortunate to have the friendship of Martha Dickinson Shattuck.  
While we were asked to work on an article together, we soon found we had much in 
common.  Distance between our geographical locations was never an issue as long as 
the batteries on our respective phones could hold out for marathon discussions. I have 
sought Martha’s counsel throughout my research and writing. My thinking about this 
project has benefited from her years of scholarship. It is a personal and professional 
friendship I cherish and will always do so. 
 Research and writing is a solitary endeavor.  I have been fortunate to have two 
companions always nearby.  My scholarly Labradors, Floyd and Zeppie, have 
provided constant laughter, understanding, and distraction.  
  x 
 My parents, Mary Lou and Ron Todt, have provided their love and support 
throughout this project.  Both stepped in at crucial moments during my graduate 
studies to assist with childcare, to listen to my concerns, and to encourage me to keep 
my focus.  I am thankful for my mother’s wisdom throughout the years.  Though she 
is no longer with us, I hear her laughter still, remember her kindnesses, and hold in my 
heart her unfailing belief in me.  I am proud of my father for stepping up and stepping 
in whenever I have needed him. His moral compass never waivers and for that I am 
grateful. 
 Last, but far from least, I am so grateful for my son, Ewan.  When I began 
graduate school, he was a preschooler.  Now, he is ready to embark on the next phase 
of his academic career, as I embark on mine.  But we do it together.  He has been my 
joy and inspiration for all of these years.  He is, and shall always be, my greatest 
accomplishment.  I am so proud to be his mother.  He has lived with my dissertation 
for the majority of his young life.  It is to him whom this dissertation is dedicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  xi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract          iii 
Author Biography          v 
Acknowledgments        vii 
Introduction           1 
Chapter 1          30 
Chapter 2          84 
Chapter 3         120 
Chapter 4         163 
Chapter 5         202 
Chapter 6         235 
Conclusion         268 
Bibliography         278
  
 xii 
  
 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 Too often historians have viewed early American history exclusively through 
Anglo eyes, when in fact it had multiple temporalities and narratives, many of them 
beginning in Europe.  My dissertation seeks to recapture the parameters of cross-cultural 
trading networks in early America originating with Dutch merchants.  It is a history 
sensitive to the multiple experiences of the marketplace and will strive to show how the 
global mercantile culture of the Dutch Republic, with its laws and customs, coexisted 
with highly localized and segmented social and legal trading arrangements in early 
America.  It focuses less on the concept of identity than on social networks, power, and 
institutions.  It is concerned with intertwined networks of communities, partial 
acculturation, and cultural accommodation.  
 Examining the Dutch in early America only through the prism of New Netherland 
is too limiting. The historiography inevitably follows a trajectory that leads to English 
takeover. Instead, I adopt a circum-Atlantic approach to probe how Dutch merchants 
interacted with the early American colonies across an extended chronological period. 
 This study focuses on Dutch trading networks in early North America from 1624 
to 1750.  I examine three geographical regions, New England, the Middle Colonies, the 
Chesapeake/Carolinas, over two chronological periods, 1624 to 1664 and 1664 to 1750, 
to reveal the commercial, political, and social interconnectedness of Dutch and English 
merchants in early America.   
 The pursuit of profit was a powerful means of bringing merchants into contact, 
making them familiar to one another, and sometimes turning them into reliable business 
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allies.  And yet neither the day-to-day commercial relations nor the government policies 
that encouraged business interaction among the Dutch and English in the American 
colonies has ever been examined beyond predictable geopolitical boundaries. Nor has any 
examination gone beyond a cursory inclusiveness of activities in Europe.    
 What new insights are generated by a history of Dutch trading networks in early 
America and, as a consequence, an altered lens through which to view transatlantic 
commerce?  I propose several answers to this question. By thinking about the Dutch we 
develop a more nuanced and vivid understanding of commerce in early America. This 
history is crucial, complicated, and unexpected.  One of the more striking aspects of the 
story of commerce in early America is the visibility and influence of Dutch merchants to 
the very survival of English colonies during key periods. This finding is surprising partly 
because it has not commanded the attention of scholars of English colonialism or the 
Atlantic world and partly because of its conspicuousness for the historical actors 
involved.  Yet attention to Dutch merchants’ involvement in trading networks in early 
America demonstrates how commerce was achieved on the quotidian and individual 
level. 
 A history of Dutch trading networks in early America may move us away from 
the tropes that have framed, unified, and chronologically structured early American 
commercial history – the themes of commodity pricing and economic policies and labor 
costs.  I am interested in circumventing such themes. In their place, I point to an 
alternative historical path: one that integrates the understanding of commercial history in 
a manner that more accurately reflects how it occurred in the first place.   
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Historiographical Context 
 The influence of Dutch merchants on early American commerce and early 
American merchants remains largely unstudied.  There are some exceptions, however, 
that have provided important insight into how Dutch merchants traded in New Netherland 
and in the context of the broader Atlantic World.  
 Some previous scholars have viewed Dutch commercial endeavors in North 
America and focused specifically on New Netherland, and later, New York.  Thomas 
Condon in New York Beginnings: The Commercial Origins of New Netherland focused 
on the activities of the private traders, the West India Company, and the colonial settlers 
of New Netherland.  Condon undertook a narrative that had not previously been written – 
one that restricted itself to the study of the commercial influence of New Netherland 
rather than a history of the colony.  By doing so, he reoriented historians to the endeavors 
of the West India Company, rather than the traditional trope of the Company’s neglect of 
the colony.  As well, he stressed how early settlers viewed the colony as a place for quick 
profit, rather than long-term investment.  
 While Condon provided foundational work for understanding trade and commerce 
in New Netherland, he also created the impression that the Dutch colony was no more 
than an isolated phase in American history, leaving no discernable traces subsequent to 
the English takeover in 1664.  This thesis takes issue with Condon’s impression about the 
Dutch mercantile endeavors leaving no discernable trace after 1664.  Rather, I argue, the 
Dutch never left early America and were invaluable for the economic survival of 
individual colonies through the eighteenth century. 
 To understand the commercial history of New Netherland from both the 
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perspective of the West India Company and from private traders, historians have 
considered Oliver A. Rink’s Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of 
Dutch New York the standard text.  Rink discussed the institutional framework of the 
company and described rivalries in the Dutch Republic as they related to trade and 
colonization.  He then capitalized on the notarial records in Amsterdam to understand the 
commercial ventures of traders in Holland who, he argued, came to dominate traffic with 
New Netherland.  Rink rightly contended that the last twenty years of the colony’s 
existence as a Dutch possession witnessed not only a growing population, but also a 
rising trade in provisions, fur, hides, tobacco, and timber. Centered on his analysis of 
voyages to New Netherland (based on 129 bottomry bonds drawn up by notaries in 
Amsterdam), Rink maintained that the trade to New Netherland was dominated by a 
small number of merchants in Amsterdam, who allowed no room for indigenous colonial 
traders.  The merchants of Amsterdam controlled the transoceanic traffic, set prices for 
European goods sold in the colony, and exploited the colonists.  Once the English took 
over New Amsterdam, according to Rink, their acts regulating trade and shipping 
eliminated Amsterdam competitors from the carrying trade. 
 My research also uses the Amsterdam notarial archives.  However, rather than 
focusing on such a selective group of notarial records, I looked at thousands of records 
associated with North American trade by the Dutch over a longer chronological period.  
My conclusions contradict many of Rink’s assertions.  There were many Dutch 
merchants who traded to New Netherland and not just from Amsterdam.  As well, many 
merchants combined voyages to the West Indies with an additional trading expedition to 
the Chesapeake, New Netherland, or New England.  Additionally, depending on the 
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commodity and the time period, merchants from Amsterdam did not always control 
transoceanic traffic between the Dutch Republic and New Netherland.  Finally, and 
importantly, once the English took over New Netherland, they did not eliminate 
Amsterdam competitors from the carrying trade.  In fact, Dutch merchants remained a 
strong and vital presence in many colonial economies causing concern for English 
policymakers for decades to come. 
 The literature on early American merchants usually focuses on the richest and 
most successful merchants and concentrates on the years from 1750 to the Revolutionary 
Period.  Cathy Matson, in Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York, 
examined the entire New York merchant community across the entire colonial period. 
This was an important development in understanding not only merchant behavior, but 
also in understanding how merchant networks transcended artificial chronological 
markers often used by historians.  Matson, much like her merchants, left the geographical 
barriers of New York to understand the development of the West Indian trade and the 
lucrative dry goods trade with London.  She also used merchant correspondence and 
account books extensively to understand the key contributions made by them to New 
York’s ideological development by rejecting the dichotomy between free trade and 
mercantilism in favor of a mercantilism controlled locally rather than in London, and thus 
more responsive to their interests. Of course, many of the merchants about whom Matson 
wrote were of Dutch ancestry. 
 Matson’s work provided a model for my own – to leave the geographical confines 
of New Netherland/New York and to look at merchant behavior over a long 
chronological period.  By doing so, I have been able, much like Matson, to understand 
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the contributions made by Dutch merchants, both living in early and colonial America 
and in patria to the commercial framework of various colonies and merchant behavior.1 
 Even less understood are the trading networks Dutch merchants developed with 
commercial trading partners in England’s North American colonies. 
 When Bernard Bailyn published The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth 
Century his work established the bar for future historians in providing a comprehensive 
picture of the multifarious activities of the men who founded the New England 
mercantile empire. Bailyn sought to picture the merchants in relation to the whole society 
in which they lived.  Thus, Bailyn presented a concise and lucid account of the 
beginnings of New England commerce: the early and futile concentration on the fur trade, 
the attempts to establish some kind of local manufactures, the beginnings fo the all-
important trade in English manufactured goods, and the eventual emergence of an export 
trade in agricultural provisions, fish, and lumber products sent to the West Indies and the 
Wine Islands in the Atlantic to help to pay for imports from England.  
 Nevertheless, Bailyn only gave passing mention to Dutch merchants.2 In fact, no 
study exists examining Dutch trading activities in New England. Yet, my research, 
particularly in Dutch archives, suggests that without Dutch shipping, credit, and 
consumer goods, particularly during the seventeenth century, New England would have 
suffered stunted economic growth.  The Dutch Republic was an important trading 
                                                1	  Thomas	   J.	   Condon,	  New	   York	   Beginnings:	   The	   Commercial	   Origins	   of	   New	  Netherland	   (New	   York:	  New	  York	  University,	  1968);	  Oliver	  A.	  Rink,	  Holland	  on	  the	  Hudson:	  An	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  of	  
Dutch	  New	  York	   (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1986);	  Robert	  Ritchie,	  The	  Duke’s	  Province:	  A	  
Study	  of	  New	  York	  Politics	  and	  Society,	   1654-­‐1691	   (Chapel	   Hill:	   University	   of	   North	   Carolina	   Press,	  1977);	   Dennis	   J.	   Maika,	   “Commerce	   and	   Community:	   Manhattan	   Merchants	   in	   the	   Seventeenth	  Century”	   (PhD	  diss.,	  New	  York	  University,	   1995);	   Cathy	  Matson,	  Merchants	  and	  Empire:	  Trading	   in	  
Colonial	  New	  York	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  2	  Bernard	   Bailyn,	   The	   New	   England	   Merchants	   in	   the	   Seventeenth	   Century	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1979).	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entrepôt for New England merchants and, likewise, Dutch merchants were normally 
welcomed at New England’s ports.  This thesis pays particular attention to Dutch trading 
activity outside of New Netherland and New York to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the importance of Dutch commerce to early America. 
 April Lee Hatfield, the author of Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in the 
Seventeenth Century, sought to recreate the intercolonial, international, and transatlantic 
connections that constituted the Atlantic world, one that emerged around the movement 
of goods.  Hatfield chose to emphasize the activities of intercolonial boundary crossers, 
particularly those between the Chesapeake and New Netherland. She noted, in particular, 
how merchants had scant regard for the political boundaries in North America that had 
been drawn up in Europe. This marked in important step in the historiography of the 
Dutch in early America. 
 But Hatfield’s merchants are insular and she downplayed the importance of 
merchants who cultivated and maintained commercial connections with Europe. In part, 
this was because she worked from the documentary perspective of Virginia records and 
did not include archived material in the Netherlands.3 My thesis argues that in order to 
have a comprehensive understanding of Dutch trade in early America trade must be 
viewed from a circum-Atlantic perspective. That is, commercial networks flowed in more 
than one direction and it is vital to recognize and follow their movements. 
 As the field of Atlantic world history has developed, historians’ perspectives have 
enlarged and understood the broader scope of commercial activity by seventeenth and 
eighteenth century merchants.  Christian Koot, the author of Empire at the Periphery: 
                                                3	  April	  Lee	  Hatfield,	  Atlantic	  Virginia:	  Intercolonial	  Relations	  in	  the	  Seventeenth	  Century	  (Philadelphia:	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2004).	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British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-
1713, argued against the standard presentation of competing empires, and instead focuses 
on the degree to which the Dutch played a key role within the new British empire.  In 
part, he suggests, this role arose from their conquest and incorporation of Dutch colonies, 
notably New Amsterdam, which became New York.  Koot also contends that the Dutch 
and British worlds became closely integrated in the late seventeenth century, notably as a 
result of the Glorious Revolution and the accession of William III to the English throne.  
He concludes that the profound Dutch influence on the development of the British 
Atlantic appeared in the commercial culture of the colonists, one that clashed with the 
attempt by officials to focus on metropolitan interests, particularly the Navigation Acts.4 
 While Koot’s work took a macro perspective on merchants’ behavior within 
empires, my thesis seeks to understand the quotidian commercial behavior of seventeenth 
and eighteenth century Dutch merchants in North America.  By doing so, I believe we 
will have a better understanding of how the earliest commercial activities of Dutch 
merchants in early America impacted the development of commercial institutions, norms, 
and practices for years to come. 
 While early American scholarship has touched upon the importance of Dutch 
merchants and Dutch commercial ideology to the colonies of North America, scholarship 
has not linked Dutch activity in North America with the broader Dutch Atlantic world.   
While it is generally recognized that the Dutch played a prominent part in the world 
economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most studies of Dutch long-
distance shipping and trade have focused on Asia and neglected the Atlantic region. 
                                                4	  Christian	  J.	  Koot,	  Empire	  at	  the	  Periphery:	  British	  Colonists,	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  Trade,	  and	  the	  Development	  
of	  the	  British	  Atlantic,	  1621-­‐1713	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2011).	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Recently, edited volumes and journal articles have begun to address this topic, albeit with 
limited focus. For instance, in Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic 
Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817, edited by Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven, 
numerous chapters demonstrate that Dutch trade in the Atlantic was far more extensive 
and valuable than has generally been assumed, and exceeded the trade with Asia at that 
time.5 
 Historians have failed to recognize the continuing presence of Dutch merchants in 
early America beyond the seventeenth century. In fact, the metanarrative of American 
history suggests that once the Dutch lost New Netherland in 1664, they distanced 
themselves from the American colonies until Dutch merchants provided clandestine or 
indirect aid to Americans during the American Revolution.  
 Our understanding of Dutch merchants trading throughout the North American 
colonies also has been tempered by colonial leaders’ histories.  More political than social 
or economic, such histories reflected an elitist perspective of men in power establishing 
their own legacies. Because historians, for instance, have relied so heavily on William 
Bradford’s narrative of early Plymouth, often taking his account virtually at face value, 
they generally have missed or ignored the relationship of Plymouth colonists to Dutch 
culture. But, Bradford’s Of Plymouth Plantation, is defensively dismissive of Dutch 
culture and the Pilgrims’ relationship to it. 
 One of the reasons why Dutch merchants such as Isaac Allerton, who lived in 
various early American colonies, have been seen largely as peripheral figures in early 
America is closely related to this dismissiveness. Allerton adapted to the shifting global 
                                                5	  Johannes	  Postma	  and	  Victor	  Enthoven,	  Riches	  from	  Atlantic	  Commerce:	  Dutch	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  
and	  Shipping,	  1585-­‐1817	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2003).	  
  
 10 
geography of trade as early American commerce transformed and his personal position 
was altered. He, like many other Dutch merchants, ignored political boundaries and 
forged commercial relationships and alliances in the various colonies. Allerton’s 
endeavored to transfer his skills to the trans-Atlantic market, thereby capitalizing on 
Dutch trading networks. In so doing, Allerton bridged the three contexts explored in this 
work – New England, the Middle Colonies, and the Chesapeake and Lower South – at the 
same time facilitating alliances in the West Indies and across the Atlantic in London and 
Amsterdam.6  
 Because early American history has traditionally been colony-centered and 
because Allerton lived in so many different colonies (Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, New Netherland, and New Haven Colony), it is difficult to see clearly the 
dimensions of his relationship with a particular colony. Once Allerton left a certain 
colony, historians have lost sight of his continued trading activities. Yet, Allerton’s 
mobility, like that of other Dutch merchants trading to North America, is also a marker of 
interpretive opportunity.  Accordingly, the experience of an individual like Isaac Allerton 
provides an entrance point from which to investigate this long-understudied area of early 
modern European and American history – in other words – approaching trading networks 
in early America from an Atlantic world perspective.   
 Historiographic conventions have made Dutch trading networks irrelevant.  First, 
                                                6	  See,	   e.g.,	  Walter	  A.	  Allerton,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Allerton	  Family	   in	  the	  United	  States,	  1585-­‐1885,	  and	  A	  
Genealogy	  of	  the	  Descendants	  of	  Isaac	  Allerton	  (New	  York,	  1888),	  revised	  by	  Samuel	  Walters	  Allerton	  (Chicago,	   1900);	   Cynthia	   J.	   Van	   Zandt,	   “The	  Dutch	   Connection:	   Isaac	  Allerton	   and	   the	  Dynamics	   of	  English	   Cultural	   Anxiety	   in	   the	   Gouden	   Eeuw,”	   in	   Rosemarjin	   Hoefte	   and	   Johanna	   Kardux,	   eds.,	  
Connecting	  Cultures:	  The	  Netherlands	   in	  Five	  Centuries	  of	  Transatlantic	  Exchange	  (Amsterdam:	   Free	  University	   Press,	   1994),	   51-­‐76;	   Robert	   S.	   Wakefield	   and	   Margaret	   H.	   Stover,	  Mayflower	   Families	  
through	  Five	  Generations:	  The	  Family	  of	  Isaac	  Allerton	  (Plymouth,	  MA:	  General	  Society	  of	  Mayflower	  Descendants,	  1998),	  17:2;	  Cynthia	  J.	  Van	  Zandt,	  Brothers	  among	  Nations:	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Intercultural	  
Alliances	  in	  Early	  America,	  1580-­‐1660	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008).	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historians of early American trade have privileged the relationship between England and 
its colonies.  The binary nature of this paradigm obscures the extended and extensive 
trading networks that developed between colonial merchants in each of the English 
colonies and with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. A study of a single 
nation’s relationship to early American trade falls in the as yet untheorized interstices of 
early American commercial history and early modern Dutch commercial history. 
Historians have paid attention to the agricultural developments and marketing of 
commodities such as tobacco or rice. Yet, they have failed to interrogate the involvement 
of non-English or non-British trading communities or diasporas in the shaping of 
individual commodity chains. Historians of early American commerce and its 
relationship to the Atlantic world, for their part, have neglected Dutch trading networks 
as a category of analysis. 
 By interrogating the connections between the Dutch and their commercial activity 
in North American colonies we may develop a more textured sense of how individuals 
arbitrated transatlantic trade and on a quotidian level.  To produce precise historical 
insights about the Dutch and early American commerce, we must dispel the continued 
associations linking the Dutch only with New Netherland and to a limited chronological 
period. 
 This approach presents an alternative rather than an additive to the history of early 
American commerce, highlighting as it does the centrality of a particular nation and 
mercantile group in transatlantic trade.  In certain moments and commercial contexts, 
“being Dutch” functioned as the glue that bound together regional and inter-regional 
markets that transcended national borders. The term “being Dutch” refers to many of the 
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acknowledged clichés of Dutch merchants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – 
the lust for profit, opportunistic, and speculative.  Yet the same clichéd characteristics of 
Dutch merchants brought them to early America to trade and provide vital commercial 
services. 
 
Dutch Merchants 
 The story of Dutch merchants’ participation in early American trade is not the 
same story one would tell about their relationship to commerce generally, or in another 
geographical region or commercial niche more specifically. The scale of commerce in 
early America required Dutch merchants to conduct business in new regions, with new 
partners including indigenous peoples, and in distinctive manners. The interaction of 
colonial governments and merchants with individual Dutch merchants and their 
commercial networks proved crucial to the shaping of interdependent colonial economies 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 The Dutch also brought certain elements of human capital to trade with early 
American colonies: practical skills acquired through education and training; backgrounds 
in industries such as tobacco and the fur trade; contacts of familial and non-familial 
trading networks within and across diasporas and political and oceanic boundaries; 
supportive economic policies from state authorities within the Dutch Republic; shared 
languages with trading partners; responsive relationships with colonial authorities who 
recognized the need for Dutch merchants in their local economy; geographic mobility; 
and, no less important, economic perseverance. Such factors rendered Dutch merchants 
available to pursue commercial activities in the colonies and, in turn, they proved crucial 
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to the expansion and profitability of early America as a whole. Because Dutch traders 
were not part of English economic protectionist policy, they brought the economic 
realities of global commodity chains to early America.    
 Colonization afforded the Dutch a vibrant cultural network in New Netherland.  It 
also facilitated Dutch involvement in intercolonial and trans-regional commerce.  It 
allowed Dutch merchants to rely on mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, or cousins, with 
whom they shared a language as well as familial or commercial ties, to participate as 
business partners in Amsterdam, New Amsterdam/New York, London, and other urban 
centers.  Dutch success in early American trade also depended on the exchange of bodies 
and capital between Europe and colonial America.  The Dutch wrote letters back home, 
sent trade goods to family members, and visited - sometimes permanently returning to the 
Dutch Republic.  The resulting movements created business opportunities for Dutch 
merchants throughout colonial America. 
 The Dutch were masters of discovering or creating trade opportunities. Their 
commercial involvement in early America was no different – rarely did they allow 
religion, nationality, or ethnicity to dissuade them from commercial pursuits or creating 
new links in trading networks. Although the notion of Dutch merchants willing to trade 
with anyone else is a trope created by historians and in literature, it is also true.  More 
than the English, French, or Spanish in early America, Dutch merchants traded with 
merchants of any religion, nationality, or ethnicity.  Good trade transcended any such 
cultural or social boundaries.  
 Amsterdam was a commercial bridge between Europe and the early American 
colonies.  More specifically, Amsterdam was New Netherland’s principal trading partner, 
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and by extension, a significant trading partner for all of England’s colonies. Early 
American merchants, regardless of English legislative proscriptions, looked to the city’s 
shipping, markets, and capital investment to support their businesses.    
 No trade or commodity ever remains unchanged. Dutch merchants, for the most 
part, responded to developments fluidly: by segueing into new trading niches, by moving 
to production sources to manage harvests, and by providing capital rather than carriage.  
Strikingly, the merchants’ reactions were enabled by the commercial skills and diasporic 
contacts the Dutch possessed. Commercial diversification was prudent in times of success 
and a necessity when a single commodity’s appeal waned. 
 Dutch merchants, indeed, traded throughout all of the early American colonies 
and across a broad range of commodities. To many observers, Dutch trading activities 
were threatening or conspiratorial, rather than a result of historical conditions or 
commercial competitiveness. For instance, some in the New England colonies saw Dutch 
trade with local Indians as possibly creating the means for uprisings against English 
settlers.7 In their reports, however, Dutch merchants emphasized that their commercial 
advantage in English colonies arose not from dishonest practices, but from knowledge of 
local customs, languages, and commercial practices.  Then, too, the Dutch, more often 
than not, offered higher rates for commodities from planters and lower fees for shipping.  
  
The Forms of Dutch Cross-Cultural Trade in Early America 
 There were two distinct forms of cross-cultural trade by Dutch merchants in early 
America.  While the founding of New Netherland was based on commerce and only later 
                                                7	  See	  Kim	  Todt,	  “Trading	  between	  New	  Netherland	  and	  New	  England,	  1624-­‐1664,”	  in	  Early	  American	  
Studies:	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  Journal,	  9	  (Spring	  2011),	  374-­‐5.	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accommodated Dutch settlement, the colony provided a physical presence for the Dutch 
in North America.  Additionally, Dutch merchants established trading networks with 
merchants throughout the English colonies of New England, the Chesapeake, and, later, 
the Lower South. 
 The Dutch were a nation of traders, not settlers.8 Characteristically, they chose to 
follow that same paradigm with New Netherland.  The trading posts in New Netherland 
were meant as sites at which Native Americans could bring their peltries to trade with the 
Dutch.  But the physical presence of English settlements to the north and south of New 
Netherland, jurisdictional disputes about the entire area, and the promise of lucrative 
trade from the colony, compelled the establishment of a more permanent settlement.  
Here, Dutch merchants settled and not only learned the languages, the customs, and the 
commercial ways of their primary trading partners in the region – Native Americans – but 
their settlements became cross-cultural trading centers encouraging trade among the 
Dutch, Native Americans, English, and others who moved along trade routes.   
 Although the States General hoped the establishment of the West India Company 
would follow similar successes as the tightly controlled trade diaspora of its East India 
Company, eventually the costs of colonizing became too high.  The West India Company 
was forced to relinquish its fur trading monopoly in North America and the Company’s 
grip on trade in North America never recovered.  As a consequence, hundreds of 
independent Dutch merchants operating out of Amsterdam and other Dutch urban centers 
would ply the Atlantic in search of commercial opportunities in the North American 
                                                8	  Generally,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  encourage	  Dutch	  emigration	  from	  patria.	   	  Colonizing	  entities,	  whether	  the	   government	   or	   trading	   companies,	   had	   to	   offer	   land,	   transportation,	   and	   reduced	   taxes	   to	  encourage	   settlement.	   	   One	   notable	   exception	   in	   Dutch	   colonization	   was	   South	   Africa,	   which	   was	  settled	  in	  1652.	  	  For	  more	  Dutch	  men	  were	  willing	  to	  take	  employment	  aboard	  ships	  than	  to	  embark	  from	  them	  and	  establish	  farms	  or	  practice	  occupations	  in	  another	  land.	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colonies. 
 Dutch settlements in New Netherland, and particularly that of New Amsterdam, 
became a new radial for merchants to add to their trade networks. The result was a 
loosely related set of commercial communities forming the Dutch trading network in the 
West Indies and North America.9 
 As New Amsterdam became an early American entrepôt, it drew merchants of 
various nationalities. What once was a commercial bridge to Amsterdam between 
kinsmen or trusted fellow-countrymen acting as agents, subsequently saw a variety of 
other agents become available.  Cross-cultural commercial differences disappeared, as 
did cross-cultural brokers. 
 With the takeover of New Netherland by the English in 1664, Amsterdam 
dropped out of the political hierarchy for its former colony. Yet, for both its former 
colony and the other English colonies, it still remained at the top of the economic 
hierarchy for some decades to come. Dutch merchants residing in New Netherland did 
not withdraw to the Dutch Republic subsequent to 1664. This, too, was a reason that 
Amsterdam retained its economic importance to early America as trading networks 
continued without disruption.  Merchants of Dutch ancestry in the renamed colony of 
New York accepted English citizenship, became founding members of the newly 
instituted political establishments, and continued their trading activities with patria.  
Additionally, becoming English citizens allowed the same merchants to legally trade with 
                                                9	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  call	  this	  a	  “trading	  diaspora”	  under	  the	  more	  traditional	  use	  of	  the	  term.	  The	  term	  “trading	  diaspora”	  originated	  with	  the	  anthropologist	  Abner	  Cohen,	  who	  defined	  it	  as	  “a	  nation	  of	  socially	  interdependent,	  but	  spatially	  dispersed	  communities.”	  Most	  Dutch	  colonies	  did	  not	  exhibit	  social	   interdependence.	   	   Rather,	   they	   seemed	   independent	   of	   each	   other,	   and	   often	   of	   the	   Dutch	  Republic	   itself.	   See	  Abner	  Cohen,	   “Cultural	   Strategies	   in	   the	  Organization	  of	  Trading	  Diasporas,”	   in	  Claude	  Meillassoux,	   ed.,	   The	  Development	   of	   Indigenous	   Trade	   and	  Markets	   in	  West	   Africa	   (Oxford:	  International	  African	  Institute,	  1971),	  267.	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English merchants and to access English ports with their own vessels. 
 
Notaries and the Dutch Notarial Archives 
 My research on trade and trading networks has examined Dutch notarial 
documents.10  One significant reason for such an approach is the wealth of information 
contained in notarial minutes about commercial transactions and networks.11 They have 
been an underutilized source in understanding early American commercial history.  
 By the late sixteenth century, commercial letter books (or copy books) had 
developed as a popular form for preserving outgoing and inward correspondence 
connected to trade.  Ledger books, accounts, and commercial journals were also well 
established in commercial practice to evidence trade and business networks. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty with correspondence and other business ledgers was how they 
were subsequently preserved. Such material had an ephemeral quality that rarely 
exceeded beyond the lives of the merchants who produced them. Consequently, much of 
                                                10	  Notarial	  protocols,	  or	  ledgers,	  became	  part	  of	  the	  historical	  record	  of	  various	  Dutch	  cities	  through	  practice	   and	   then	   through	   official	   decree.	   Prior	   to	   1656,	   there	  was	   no	   requirement	   of	   notaries	   to	  submit	  protocols	  to	  the	  city	  clerk.	  In	  1656,	  it	  became	  mandatory	  for	  the	  heirs	  of	  a	  notary	  to	  deliver	  the	  deceased	  notary’s	  protocols	   to	   the	   clerk’s	  office.	   	   In	  1675,	   legislation	   required	   the	  protocols	  of	  deceased	  notaries	   in	   the	  possession	  of	   other	  notaries	   to	  be	  delivered	   to	   the	   clerk’s	   office.	   	   See	  A.I.	  Bosma,	  Repertorium	  van	  Notarissen:	  Residerende	  in	  Amsterdam	  Amstelland,	  Ambachtsheerlijkheden	  en	  
Geannexeerde	  Gemeenten	  (Amsterdam:	  Gemeentearchief	  Amsterdam,	  1998),	  20-­‐1.	  11	  Notaries	  enjoyed	  a	  special	  relationship	  to	  the	  truth.	  They	  were	  expected	  to	  witness	  acts	  and	  then	  to	  shape	   the	  specifics	  of	  each	  event	   into	   the	  proper	   form	   to	  be	  committed	   truthfully	   to	   the	  page.	  The	  most	  routine	  transactions	  are	  full	  of	  formulaic	  professions	  of	  the	  notary’s	  faithfulness	  and	  appeal	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  he	  was	  there	  –	  present	  at	  the	  scene,	  a	  trustworthy	  eyewitness	  –	  properly	  equipped	  to	  register	  what	  mattered.	  We,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  accept	  notaries’	  words	  without	   inquiring	  into	  the	  practices	   and	   relationships	   that	   shaped	   the	   records	  on	  which	  we	   rely.	   For	  purposes	  of	  my	  work,	   I	  have	   relied	   upon	   the	   notarial	   records	   to	   research	   commercial	   relationships	   between	   individual	  merchants,	  to	  piece	  together	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  trading	  networks,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  ignored	  political	  boundaries	  to	  pursue	  trade.	  	  Under	  such	  parameters,	  I	  have	  assumed	  the	  validity	   of	   the	   recorded	   information.	   	   A	   typical	   notarial	   record	   included	   the	   name	   of	   the	   notary,	   a	  specific	  date,	  the	  name	  of	  the	  parties,	  the	  title	  of	  the	  document,	  and	  the	  signatures	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  document.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  document,	  some	  were	  preprinted	  and	  specific	  information	  filled	   in	  by	  hand	  by	   the	  notary	  –	  date,	  name	  of	  parties,	   values,	   etc.	   	  Other	  documents	   required	   the	  notary	  to	  write	  the	  parties’	  agreement	  or	  testimony.	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the material directly generated by early modern merchants has been lost through the 
centuries.12   
 The same cannot be said about notarial documents.  Notaries made a living by 
producing such records and held various degrees of proprietary rights over them.  In their 
role as a notary, they combined aspects of public officials and self-employed 
professionals. Subsequent legislation required notarial records to be turned over to city 
officials upon the death of a notary.  As a consequence, preservation of such documents 
left the control of individuals and became institutionalized.  Dutch notarial records have 
been lost due to fire, flooding, or military conflict.13 Yet, such records have survived in 
more substantial quantities than those retained by individuals and their heirs.  
 
 Notaries 
 By the mid-fifteenth century, individuals engaged notaries from a range of 
commercial and personal matters.  In 1524, the Dutch government began to exert greater 
control over notaries.  Officials in cities throughout Holland and West Friesland received 
complaints about the competency of notaries.  As a consequence, in an edict of Charles V 
of 1524, it was determined that in every city schepenen and burgemeesters – local 
officials – would appoint notaries.  A person wishing to become a notary made an 
application, provided character references, underwent an examination, swore an oath, and 
became registered by the specific locale.  The edict banned all others exercising the 
functions of a notary without proper registration.14   
                                                12	  See,	   e.g.,	   James	  Daybell,	  The	  Material	  Letter	   in	  Early	  Modern	  England:	  Manuscript	  Letters	  and	   the	  
Culture	  and	  Practices	  of	  Letter-­‐Writing,	  1512-­‐1635	  (London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012).	  13	  Bosma,	  Repertorium	  van	  Notarissen,	  23.	  14	  Ibid.,	  4-­‐8.	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 Upon admission, the notary promised to perform his office honestly and faithfully 
conform to the law.  If he failed in this, he and his petitioners (community members who 
had put forth his name as a notary) paid damages to any party suffering prejudice, the 
amount determined by local officials.  He also swore to allow inspection of his books. 
Finally, the notary agreed that his heirs and executors would surrender his books to the 
clerk within sixty days of his death.15 
 Over time, the number of notaries increased.  For instance, in 1682 Amsterdam 
had 76 notaries. This reflected the volume of commercial activity conducted in the city.  
In the seventeenth century, notarial activity underwent increasing professionalization.16 
Amsterdam city officials recognized that notaries required commercial and empirical 
acumen beyond the examination requirement.  As early as 1664, officials established a 
minimum age of 25 to become a notary.17  
 
 Merchants’ Use of Notaries    
 Notaries originated in medieval Europe in nations such as Italy where commerce 
developed rapidly alongside the expansion of Roman law.18 As commerce advanced, a 
new appreciation of written evidence, which included the use of notaries, was fostered 
under civil law. Contrary to common law, in civil law written evidence prevailed over 
oral evidence.  Thus, if a document provided support to a claim, the judge would accept 
                                                15Ibid.,	  10-­‐12.	  16	  See,	  e.g.,	  H.E.	  van	  Gelder,	  Notarieele	  Protocollen	  van	  1597	  tot	  1811,	  opgenomen	  in	  het	  Archiefdepot	  
der	   Gemeente’s-­‐Gravenhage	   (The	   Hague,	   1911);	   Alice	   C.	   Carter,	   “The	   Dutch	   Notarial	   Archives,”	  
Bulletin	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Historical	  Research,	  26	  (1953):	  86-­‐91;	  A.	  Fl.	  Gehlen,	  Notariële	  Akten	  uit	  de	  
17e	  en	  18e	  eeuw:	  Handleiding	  voor	  gebruikers,	  Werken	  der	  Stichting	  tot	  Uitgaaf	  der	  Bronnen	  van	  het	  Oud-­‐Vaderlandse	  Recht,	  no.	  12	  (Zutphen,	  1986).	  17	  Bosma,	  Repertorium	  van	  Notarissen,	  9-­‐13.	  18	  Laurie	   Nussdorfer,	   Brokers	   of	   Public	   Trust:	   Notaries	   in	   Early	   Modern	   Rome	   (Baltimore:	   Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  1-­‐6.	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the document into evidence as “testimony.” While notaries never became fundamental to 
the common law system in England or its North American colonies, the same cannot be 
said of notaries in New Netherland.19  The Dutch brought over their civil law system to 
their North American colony.20  
 Did every transaction require a notary? The short answer is no, not every 
commercial matter required a notary. Though, parties to a business transaction often 
availed themselves of a notary to create documentation to which they might have 
recourse should the occasion arise.  The parties did not necessarily want to leave a record 
of their particular transaction.  As was often the case in business transactions, the 
knowledge, and often secrecy, associated with a particular transaction (e.g., a new 
location for trade or a better quality of a type of good) were a means by which 
commercial power and profit was gained and maintained.  Rather, they were interested in 
being able to prove, should it become necessary, for instance, that they had the right to 
enforce certain terms: to collect on a bottomry loan, to receive a specified amount of a 
commodity, to be paid a stipulated sum for the sale of a ship.  Without physical evidence, 
such as documentation, a merchant might not have been able to receive what was due to 
him. Merchants wanted records from a notary that anticipated litigation.21 
 Parties may also have gone to a notary because of new commercial relationships.  
                                                19	  See,	   e.g.,	   Theodore	   F.T.	   Plucknett,	   A	   Concise	   History	   of	   the	   Common	   Law,	   (London:	   Butterworth,	  1956),	   227.	   	   For	   a	   discussion	   about	   notaries	   in	   early	   America,	   see	   John	   E.	   Seth,	   Notaries	   in	   the	  
American	  Colonies,	   32	   J.	  Marshall	  L.	  Rev.	  863	   (1999).	  Two	  extant	  volumes	  of	  notarial	   records	   from	  New	  England	  are:	  	  William	  Aspinwall,	  A	  Volume	  Relating	  to	  the	  Early	  History	  of	  Boston:	  Containing	  the	  
Aspinwall	  Notarial	  Records	  from	  1644	  to	  1651	   (Boston:	  Municipal	  Print.	  Office,	   1903);	   and,	  Thomas	  Lechford,	  Note-­‐book	  Kept	  by	  Thomas	  Lechford,	  Esq.,	  Lawyer,	   in	  Boston,	  Massachusetts	  Bay,	   from	  June	  
27,	  1638,	  to	  July	  29,	  1641	  (Cambridge:	  J.	  Wilson,	  1885).	  	  Aspinwall’s	  and	  Lechford’s	  records,	  however,	  provide	  invaluable	  information	  about	  trading	  practices	  in	  early	  Massachusetts.	  20	  Martha	  Dickinson	  Shattuck,	  “A	  Civil	  Society:	  Court	  and	  Community	  in	  Beverwijck,	  New	  Netherland,	  1652-­‐1664”	  (PhD	  diss.,	  Boston	  University,	  1993),	  4-­‐5.	  21	  By	   providing	   a	   record,	   independent	   of	   other	   records	   such	   as	   court	   records,	   notarial	   records,	   in	  some	  cases,	  have	  preserved	  information	  where	  the	  court	  record	  itself	  has	  not	  survived.	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Early modern trading partners were often related through family, religion, or nationality. 
Through such groups, individual merchants developed reputations for trustworthiness. If 
a merchant’s reputation was damaged because of actions deemed unacceptable to fellow 
merchants, he would suffer economic loss.  Thus, honest and ethical behavior was 
considered profitable behavior.22  Still, the Atlantic World provided opportunities for new 
trading partners, outside of traditional trading groups.  One means of providing some 
security to a new trading relationship was to use a notary who would memorialize the 
terms of trade.  Perhaps it would only require one or two transactions with a new trading 
partner until that merchant was deemed trustworthy and the use of a notary was no longer 
required.  
 It is difficult to estimate how much trade was conducted between parties without 
the use of notaries.  What is often seen in notarial records is a commercial transaction that 
has failed for some reason and one or both parties seek the assistance of a notary to create 
a record of the events leading up to the dispute.  Nevertheless, the “failed” transactions 
provide an invaluable glimpse into early modern trade.  
 
 Notarial Procedures  
 If a notary drafted a document, it was done in duplicate. One copy went to the 
parties involved and was termed the average. The duplicate remained at the notary, and 
was called the minute. All the minutes together formed the protocol, the archives of the 
notary. A notary made a chronological arrangement of all the documents he created on 
                                                22	  See,	   e.g.,	   Francesca	  Trivellato,	   “Jews	  of	   Leghorn,	   Italians	  of	   Lisbon,	   and	  Hindus	  of	  Goa:	  Merchant	  Networks	   and	   Cross-­‐Cultural	   Trade	   in	   the	   Early	   Modern	   Period,”	   in	   Diogo	   Ramada	   Curto	   and	  Anthony	   Molho,	   eds.,	   Commercial	   Networks	   in	   the	   Early	   Modern	  World	   (San	   Domenico:	   European	  University	  Institute,	  2002),	  59-­‐89.	  
  
 22 
behalf of others, subsequently providing a code, which entailed a description of the 
records and the numbers assigned.  
 Notaries undertook a variety of functions. They were competent to draft and 
execute legal documents. They recorded depositions of individuals for later use in court.  
Additionally, they often made copies of writings or legal documents.  
Notaries undertook their work in their own writing chambers, in their dwelling houses, 
and in private houses.  Generally, however, mobility was a major advantage for the 
notary and he recorded business in a wide range of places.   
 There were many types of instruments. Some commercial examples included: 
attestation or declaration (attestatie of verklaring); lease (pacht); estate inventory 
(boedelinventaris); will  (testament); interrogation (ondervraging); contract (contract); 
protested foreign bills of exchange that had been dishonored (wisselprotest); chartering 
agreement (bevrachting overeenkomst); bills of sale (koopbrieven); bottomry bonds for 
vessels (bottomerij obligaties), bills of lading (cognossementen), powers of attorney for 
merchants in foreign trade (volmachten), and ship protests which detailed the 
circumstances under which a ship or its cargo had been damaged (schip protesten).   
 As men with the acknowledged ability to write, notaries were employed simply 
for that reason alone.  But notaries, as independent public officials, were also able to 
attest a range of facts and to fulfill a number of social needs. The notary might similarly 
be equated with a recording device.  The evidence from protocol books indicates the 
range of circumstances in which a notary might be needed.  
 Amsterdam was the commercial center for Europe.  Whether through 
administrative decree or recognition of opportunity, Amsterdam notaries were able to 
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offer their services in a variety of languages including English.23  From the English 
colonies, merchants and ships’ captains from New England most often used the services 
of an English speaking/literate notary.  Merchants from New Netherland, later New York, 
the middle colonies, and the Chesapeake region most often used and had minutes written 
in Dutch. 
 
Documentary Interruptions 
 My dissertation covers the chronological period of 1624 through 1750.  The 
notarial archives provide extensive resources with which to provide an analysis of Dutch 
trading networks in early America. Yet, the archives of the Dutch Republic, and later the 
Netherlands, have suffered many losses, some accidental due to bombardments and 
resulting fires, other quite deliberate. 
 The Dutch Republic was not immune to events in Europe during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. The Nine Years War24 and the War of the Spanish Succession25 
                                                23	  For	   the	   period	   of	   1624	   through	   1750,	   numerous	  minutes	  were	   drafted	   by	   notaries	   proficient	   in	  English	   including	   Joseph	   Steijns	   (1626-­‐1652);	   Benedictus	   Baddel	   (1630-­‐1658);	   Johannes	   d’Amour	  (1647-­‐1692);	  Pieter	  Schabaelje	  (1692-­‐1732);	  Mr.	  Willem	  Jan	  van	  Midlum	  (1701-­‐1733);	  Philippe	  de	  Marolles	   (1708-­‐1737);	   Adriaan	   Baars	   Jansz.	   (1715-­‐1741);	   Jan	   Barels	   de	   jonge	   (1716-­‐1753);	  Hermanus	   de	   Wolff	   (1717-­‐1763);	   Isaac	   Costerus	   (1728-­‐1743);	   and,	   Daniel	   van	   den	   Brink	   (1734-­‐1785).	  24	  The	  Nine	  Years’	  War	  (1689-­‐97)	  remains	  somewhat	  obscure,	  especially	  outside	  of	  Europe.	   It	   took	  place	   shortly	   before	   the	  more	   prominent	  War	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Succession.	   Some	   of	   the	   unresolved	  issues	  from	  the	  Nine	  Years'	  War	  motivated	  the	  Succession	  wars.	  The	  Nine	  Years'	  War	  was	  quite	  large,	  quite	  deadly,	  and	  had	  a	  global	  reach,	  including	  King	  William's	  War/La	  Première	  Guerre	  intercoloniale	  in	   North	   America	   between	   the	   English,	   the	   French,	   and	   their	   local	   allies,	   ranging	   in	   area	   from	  modern-­‐day	  Massachusetts	  to	  Quebec.	  It	  also	  included	  the	  Williamite/Jacobite	  War,	  clashes	  between	  the	  French	  and	   the	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	   alliance	   at	   several	   locations	   in	   India,	   and	  numerous	  battles	   in	   the	  Caribbean.	  See	  Milja	  van	  Tielhof,	  The	  Mother	  of	  All	  Trades:	  The	  Baltic	  Grain	  Trade	  in	  Amsterdam	  from	  
the	  Late	  16th	  to	  the	  Early	  19th	  Century	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2002),	  234.	  25	  The	   War	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Succession	   (1701–14)	   was	   fought	   among	   several	   European	   powers,	  including	  a	  divided	  Spain,	  over	  the	  possible	  unification	  of	   the	  Kingdoms	  of	  Spain	  and	  France	  under	  one	   Bourbon	   monarch.	   Unification	   would	   have	   altered	   the	   European	   balance	   of	   power.	   Forces	  supporting	  the	  unification,	  the	  Spanish	  loyal	  to	  Philip	  V,	  France,	  and	  the	  Electorate	  of	  Bavaria	  fought	  against	   those	  opposing	  unification,	   the	  Spanish	   loyal	   to	  Archduke	  Charles,	   the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire,	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severely interrupted Dutch trade. Additionally, the Great Northern War dislocated 
regional and international trading networks.26  The wars stimulated some sectors of the 
European international economy, temporarily annihilated others, and distorted or re-
directed still others.  For historians, this is most evident in the dearth of archival material 
evidencing trade, particularly notarial documents, available for the period 1695 through 
1710.  Certainly, there are commercial records available through the 1690s suggesting a 
continued trade with the North American colonies. Nevertheless, the number of records 
available is significantly less than the preceding decade.  From approximately 1695 
through 1710, documents evidencing trade by Dutch merchants with the English colonies 
are lacking in the Amsterdam archives.   
 The only exception to the deficiency of notarial records is the colony of New 
York.  Existing trade networks continued to operate and ships traveled between 
Amsterdam and New York.  Nevertheless, whether because of the risks of war, the lack 
of vessels available, or associated costs versus anticipated profits, trade between the two 
ports diminished as well. 
 Despite the diminution of Dutch trade to the English colonies in this period, trade 
continued to flourish in the various Caribbean Dutch entrepôts.  Characteristically, the 
region often became a neutral ground for commercial rivals, particularly when there was 
disruption because of war.  Merchants from the English colonies, in ships built in the 
                                                                                                                                            Great	  Britain,	   the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  Portugal,	  and	   the	  Duchy	  of	  Savoy.	  The	  war	  was	   fought	  mostly	   in	  Europe	   but	   included	  Queen	  Anne’s	  War	   in	  North	  America.	   	   See	   P.C.	   van	  Royen,	  Zeevarenden	  op	  de	  
Koopvaardijvloot:	  Omstreeks	  1700	  (Amsterdam:	  Bataafsche	  Leeu,	  1987),	  62-­‐5.	  26	  The	  Great	  Northern	  War	  (1700-­‐1721)	  broke	  out	  as	  Russia’s	  Peter	  the	  Great	  attacked	  Sweden	  (with	  assistance	  from	  Poland	  and	  Denmark)	   in	  his	  quest	   to	  establish	  a	  Russian	  trading	  port	  on	  the	  Baltic	  during	   the	   reign	   of	   Charles	   XII	   on	   the	   Swedish	   throne.	   During	   this	   series	   of	   conflicts,	   Sweden	   lost	  much	  of	   the	   territories	   it	   had	   originally	   controlled	   around	   the	   southern	   and	   eastern	  Baltic	   shores.	  	  For	  most	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  tried	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  conflicts	  in	  the	  Baltic,	  but	  from	  1710	  onwards,	  Dutch	  shipping	  was	  nevertheless	  hindered	  by	  the	  war.	   	  See	  Jaap	  R.	  Bruijn,	  De	  Nederlandse	  
Oorlogsvloot	  in	  de	  Zeventiende	  en	  Achttiende	  Eeuw	  (Amsterdam:	  Batans,	  1998),	  125.	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colonies and thus not requisitioned for European conflicts, utilized such vessels for the 
furtherance of trade.27   
 
Dissertation Summary 
 This study aims to understand one critical aspect of the commercial growth of 
early America – how Dutch merchants, from Europe and in America, established cross-
cultural trading networks, integrated geographically their own business operations, and 
shaped their commercial environment by their presence and activities.  In doing so, such 
merchants actively abetted what Adam Smith called America’s rise to “wealth and 
greatness,” even as they enriched themselves.28  
 To uncover the story of the Dutch trade in early America, we – like the merchants 
whose courses we follow- must move back and forth through colonial and transatlantic 
landscapes.  This work explores how Dutch merchants fostered and nurtured trade with 
early American colonies at all levels and stages – from ship owners to [supercargos] to 
financiers – and over the varied geographical and political terrains in which early 
American commodities were grown, hunted, and harvested.  Chapters are organized 
geographically and chronologically and explore how Dutch trading networks played out 
in each of early America’s three major regions – New England, the Middle Colonies, and 
the Chesapeake and later the Lower South.   
                                                27	  See,	   e.g.,	   Johannes	   Postma,	   “Suriname	   and	   Its	   Atlantic	   Connections,	   1667-­‐1795,”	   in	   Riches	   from	  
Atlantic	  Commerce:	  Dutch	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  and	  Shipping,	  1585-­‐1817,	  ed.	  by	  Johannes	  Postma	  and	  Victor	  Enthoven	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2003),	  299.	  28	  Adam	   Smith,	   An	   Inquiry	   into	   the	   Nature	   and	   Causes	   of	   the	   Wealth	   of	   Nations	   (London:	   George	  Routledge	  &	  Sons,	  Limited,	  1893),	  150.	  	  Smith	  wrote,	  “Were	  the	  Americans,	  either	  by	  combination,	  or	  by	  any	  other	  sort	  of	  violence,	  to	  stop	  the	  importation	  of	  European	  manufactures,	  and,	  by	  thus	  giving	  a	  monopoly	   to	   such	   of	   their	   own	   countrymen	   as	   could	   manufacture	   the	   like	   goods,	   divert	   any	  considerable	  part	  of	   their	   capital	   into	   this	   employment,	   they	  would	   retard,	   instead	  of	   accelerating,	  the	  further	  increase	  in	  the	  value	  of	  their	  annual	  produce,	  and	  would	  obstruct,	  instead	  of	  promoting,	  the	  progress	  of	  their	  country	  towards	  real	  wealth	  and	  greatness.”	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 This narrative also serves to emphasize that participants in early America were 
rooted in global – as well as in local, regional, and imperial – landscapes.  Accordingly, 
while each of the chapters of this works is regional, they are also integrated into 
something larger.  In the end, this is a study that thinks across the Atlantic world yet 
explores various commodities or individual merchants to understand markets and 
networks. 
 This narrative also demonstrates how profoundly Dutch capital, merchants, and 
goods affected early America. It confirms stereotypes about the intimacy of the Dutch 
with commerce or capital, about the character of Dutch merchants who thrived in a 
competitive commercial atmosphere, about the proliferation of Dutch trade throughout 
the Atlantic world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is also a story about 
how elusive – and historically contingent – profit and commercial dominance was. 
 This study is divided into two parts.  Part One (Chapters One through Three) 
examines the initial period of European settlement and commercial beginnings in early 
America through 1664.  Part Two (Chapters Four through Six) chronicles Dutch 
commercial activity in early America until 1750 as political boundaries changed, 
populations increased, and the Atlantic economy continued to strengthen.  None of the 
chapters stands alone.  Readers will encounter many of the same individuals in multiple 
chapters. Throughout is the continued unfolding of Dutch trading networks in early 
America. 
 Chapter One identifies the trade and commercial networks that developed 
between merchants in New England and Dutch merchants from their earliest contact with 
each other through 1664. New England’s nascent economies needed to facilitate 
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commerce and they encouraged and accommodated trade with the Dutch.  For 
seventeenth century merchants in New England, trade with the Dutch Republic and New 
Netherland supplied necessary sustenance, expanded merchant networks, and presented 
opportunities for profit. 
 Chapter Two acknowledges the importance of trade to the founding and continued 
existence of New Netherland.  In the writings concerning New Netherland’s economy, 
historians have placed emphasis on the colony’s economic significance for the Dutch 
Republic. This chapter contends that the colony had an equal, if not greater significance 
for early America. The colony and, in particular, New Amsterdam, became the export 
and import center for early America.  And, because merchants in the Dutch Republic and 
their agents in New Netherland maintained a close correspondence with each other about 
commodities, supply and demand, prices, and political events, the colony became a 
valued transshipment point for information.  In addition, commercial practices, long 
established in the Dutch Republic, were transplanted to New Netherland and 
subsequently became part of early America’s commercial behavior. 
 Long considered the exclusive domain of the English, Dutch merchants 
established a foothold in the Chesapeake that they never quite relinquished.  Chapter 
Three describes the willingness of Dutch merchants to pay high prices for tobacco, the 
need of Chesapeake planters to have economical and available shipping, and the 
partnerships that developed between Dutch and English merchants in London and 
Rotterdam, as well as the immigration and assimilation of Dutch men and women into the 
planter culture of the Chesapeake.  Dutch men and women immigrated to the Chesapeake 
to protect plantation investments and to establish additional radials in Dutch commercial 
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trading networks. 
 Following the English Restoration in 1660, King Charles II sought to streamline 
the administration of the New England colonies and began a process that brought a 
number of the colonies under direct crown control. One reason for the policymaking was 
the cost of administration of individual colonies; another significant reason was the 
regulation of trade.  Chapter 4, chronicling the period 1664 through 1750, examines how 
New England coped with the passage of the various Navigation Acts to regulate the trade 
of the colonies. Colonists resisted the laws, particularly in Massachusetts and the other 
New England colonies. The English colonies had established significant trading networks 
not only with other English colonies, but also with the Dutch. The laws made some 
existing New England practices illegal (effectively turning merchants into smugglers), 
and the payment of additional duties would have significantly increased their shipping 
costs.  Despite the illegality of trade with the Dutch, merchants continued to do business 
with established networks and to form new trading networks. The disastrous Dominion of 
New England and an agitated merchant population only served to reinforce trading 
patterns with the Dutch.  The demise of the Dominion saw a return to trade with Dutch 
merchants who continued to provide goods, credit, and capital to New England 
throughout the period. 
 The takeover of New Netherland by the English in 1664 did not result in an 
exodus of Dutch-speaking peoples from the region. Rather, they acquiesced politically by 
becoming English citizens, but continued to maintain familiar trading networks with 
family and business associates in the Dutch Republic. Chapter 5 examines the 
continuation of trading networks through 1750, as well as Dutch commercial forays into 
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the newly established colonies of Pennsylvania and the Jerseys. 
  Finally, Chapter Six undertakes the continued examination of Dutch trading 
activity in Virginia and Maryland until the mid-eighteenth century.  In addition, with the 
establishment of English colonies in the Carolinas, Dutch merchants reconnected with 
former Caribbean plantation owners and established new trading networks despite 
institution of the Navigation Acts.  
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Chapter 1 
 
“Their Private Business Let Them Agree, 
the Dutch for Him, the Englishman for Me”: 
Trade Networks between New England and the Dutch, 
 1624-166429 
 
 
 Tracing the movements of early American merchants usually suggests 
ascertaining their primary residence.  Historians have assumed an allegiance that tied a 
merchant to a particular colony throughout their trading careers.  Thus, a merchant’s 
importance in any particular colony would seem clear.  Men and women who traded to 
several different colonies tend to fall out of a study devoted to a single settlement upon 
leaving a community.  But what if we look beyond a particular colony for commercial 
relationships by the same individual merchants in other colonies? Would the dimensions 
of their relationship with any one particular colony be less clear? Or, would a merchant’s 
mobility offer an interpretive opportunity about how he or she actually conducted trade 
and a broader perspective about inter-colonial relationships? 
 Isaac Allerton exemplifies one early American merchant unfettered by the 
political and cultural boundaries of New England.  Because Allerton lived in so many 
different colonies, it is more difficult to see clearly the dimensions of his relationship 
with a particular colony.  Yet, Allerton’s mobility, like other Dutch merchants trading to 
North America, is also a marker of interpretive opportunity.  The difference between the 
wide-ranging entrepreneurial Allerton and his more restricted English colleagues 
provides a window into the commercial world of Dutch merchants trading to early 
                                                29	  The	  title	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  taken	  from	  a	  play	  entitled	  Amboyna,	  or	  the	  Cruelties	  of	  the	  Dutch	  to	  the	  
English	  Merchants	  written	  by	  John	  Dryden	  in	  1673	  about	  the	  massacre	  of	  Englishmen	  by	  the	  Dutch	  that	  took	  place	  on	  Ambon	  Island	  in	  1623.	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America.30   
 Allerton was born in England in 1586. He separated from the Church of England 
as a young adult and moved to Leiden joining fellow Separatists.  He married and began 
raising a family in the Dutch city.31  Life in Leiden provided employment and religious 
freedom, but as immigrants the Separatists faced ongoing economic difficulties.  William 
Bradford later wrote of the community’s struggles: 
 For these & other reasons they removed to Leyden, a fair & bewtifull citie, 
 and of a sweete situation, but made more famous by ye universitie wherwith 
 it is adorned, in which of late had been so many learned man. But wanting  that 
 traffike by sea which Amsterdam injoyes, it was not so beneficiall for their 
 outward means of living & estats. But being now hear pitchet they fell to such 
 trads & imployments as they best could; valewing peace & their spirituall 
 comforte above any other riches whatsoever. And at length they came to raise a 
 competente & comforteable living, but with hard and continuall labor.32 
 
 As well, the religious community’s leadership felt continued exposure to Dutch 
culture jeopardized their own children’s English identity, language, and culture.   
 Allerton, like many Separatists, chose to leave the Dutch Republic to establish a 
new settlement in North America in 1620.  Histories of the Pilgrim community in New 
England reflect the leadership roles Allerton assumed.  He served as assistant to 
Governor William Bradford during the colony’s first decade.  He returned to England and 
the Dutch Republic on the colony’s behalf at least four times – obtaining an enlarged 
colony patent to Kennebeck River land in Maine, renegotiating the Colony’s 
indebtedness to London merchants, bringing additional settlers from Leiden to Plymouth 
                                                30	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  stereotype	  Dutch	  merchants.	  	  But	  even	  the	  English	  were	  admiring	  of	  Dutch	  merchants	  and	   their	   entrepreneurial	   approach.	   The	   English	   economist,	   Sir	   Josiah	   Child,	   attributed	   the	  superiority	  of	  the	  Dutch	  in	  trade	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  customs,	  institutions,	  and	  patterns	  of	  economic	  behavior	  and	  laws,	  particularly	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  centuries.	  Child	  argued	  the	  English	  had	   not	   achieved	   the	   same	   level	   of	   superiority	   during	   the	   same	   period.	   	   See	   Josiah	   Child,	   A	  New	  
Discourse	  of	  Trade	  (1751),	  xxi.	  31	  Robert	   S.	   Wakefield	   and	   Margaret	   H.	   Stover,	  Mayflower	   Families	   through	   Five	   Generations:	   The	  
Family	  of	  Isaac	  Allerton	  (Plymouth,	  MA:	  General	  Society	  of	  Mayflower	  Descendants,	  1998),	  17:2.	  32	  William	  Bradford,	  Of	  Plimouth	  Plantation	  (Boston:	  Wright	  &	  Potter,	  1898),	  23.	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Colony, and provisioning Massachusetts Bay Company settlers.  Allerton acted as 
Plymouth Colony’s agent in England.   In addition, Allerton founded a cod-fishing 
enterprise in Marblehead, Massachusetts in 1631.33   
 The former tailor began to create a trading network that eventually reached from 
Nova Scotia to the Caribbean.  Allerton’s activities came under scrutiny by others, 
including William Bradford, within the colony.  Perhaps he had assimilated many aspects 
of Dutch culture, particularly the aspects relating to trade and cultural accommodation of 
trading partners.   
 In 1637, Edward Winslow reported to John Winthrop about Allerton’s trading 
activities. He criticized his “old neighbor Isaac, whose head is always full of such 
projects, and hath too great familiarity with our common adversaries.”34  The adversaries 
to whom Winslow referred were the French and Dutch.35 It is unknown whether Allerton, 
like Winslow and Winthrop, had political concerns about either the French or the Dutch 
and their activities in North America. Still, Allerton’s trading activities suggest that he 
saw commercial opportunities in engaging with individual merchants from New France 
or New Netherland, as well as English merchants trading in the New World.36 
                                                33	  Cynthia	  J.	  Van	  Zandt,	  “The	  Dutch	  Connection:	  Isaac	  Allerton	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  English	  Cultural	  Anxiety	   in	   the	  Gouden	  Eeuw,”	   in	  Rosemarjin	  Hoefte	   and	   Johanna	  Kardux,	   eds.,	  Connecting	  Cultures:	  
The	   Netherlands	   in	   Five	   Centuries	   of	   Transatlantic	   Exchange	   (Amsterdam:	   Free	   University	   Press,	  1994),	  51-­‐76.	  34	  Caleb	  H.	  Johnson,	  The	  Complete	  Works	  of	  the	  Mayflower	  Pilgrims	  with	  Selected	  Works	  by	  Those	  Who	  
Knew	  Them,	  or	  Who	  Visited	  Early	  Plymouth	  Colony	  (Vancouver,	  Washington:	  2003),	  459.	  35	  In	  1630,	  Emmanuel	  Downing	  wrote	   to	  William	  Bradford	  of	  Allerton’s	  exploration	  of	  surrounding	  regions.	  	  He	  described	  Allerton’s	  journey	  to	  New	  Netherland,	  “If	  yt	  be	  trew	  that	  Mr.	  Allerton’s	  reports	  of	  Hudson’s	  river,	  there	  is	  noe	  place	  comparable	  to	  yt	  for	  a	  plantačion,	  and	  t’will	  quitt	  cost	  for	  you	  to	  remove	  thither,	   though	  all	  be	   lost	   in	   the	  place	  where	  you	  are,	   for	  he	  sayth	  that	  Hudsons	  river	  goes	  into	  Canada	  and	   those	  2	  make	  New	  England	  an	   Iland…”	  See	  William	  Bradford,	  History	  of	  Plymouth	  
Plantation,	  1620-­‐1647,	  ed.,	  W.C.	  Ford	  (Boston:	  Houghton	  Miflin,	  1912),	  2:63-­‐4.	  36	  Allerton	  traded	  with	  the	  French	  under	  Charles	  Menou	  D’Aulnay	  at	  Pentagoet/Penobscot.	  	  See	  John	  Winthrop,	   Journal	   of	   John	  Winthrop,	   1630-­‐1649,	   eds.,	   Richard	   S.	   Dunn,	   James	   Savage,	   and	   Laetitia	  Yeandle	   (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap/Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  172.	   	  Allerton’s	   activities	  with	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 By the mid-1630’s, Allerton’s extensive commercial activities in New 
Netherland, along with disputes with the leadership in New Plymouth, provided an 
incentive to relocate from New England.  But Allerton’s receptivity to trade with the 
Dutch, despite the anxiety expressed by others in New England, provided a necessary 
commercial nexus for all of the New England colonies in the years to come. 
 In time, others would expand the networks Allerton created and reimagine new 
opportunities between the Dutch and New England colonies.  Writing in 1655, Adriaen 
van der Donck noted, “Canada and New England are within brief sailing time along 
coastal waterways.  New Netherland already trades with those territories, and in time, and 
with a growing population, trade can expand still more.”37 
 The archival materials relating to trade between the Dutch, both in patria and 
New Netherland, and between the New England colonies reveal the existence of a lively, 
steady commerce.  While the fur trade with Europe preoccupied the attention of many 
merchants and provided substantial profits, trade among Dutch and English traders in 
North America was, nevertheless, considerable in volume and diversified in content.  
 The first part of this chapter reviews the initial commercial contacts of New 
England’s colonies with the Dutch Republic and New Netherland.  Rather than rebuking 
contact, the English expressed interest in trading arrangements.  The English colonists 
lacked substantial support from their home country. As well, the Dutch had the capital 
infrastructure the English sought.  While the Dutch had a smaller geographical presence 
                                                                                                                                            the	  Dutch	  are	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  2.	   	  For	  Allerton’s	  trade	  with	  the	  English	  at	  Pemaquid,	  Maine,	  see	  Winthrop,	  Journal	  of	  John	  Winthrop,	  172.	  37	  Adriaen	   van	   der	  Donck,	  A	  Description	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  eds.	   Charles	   T.	   Gehring	   and	  William	  A.	  Starna,	  trans.	  Diederik	  Willem	  Goedhuys	  (Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	  2008),	  140.	  	  Van	  der	  Donck	  held	   the	  position	  of	  schout	   (a	   combination	  of	   sheriff	   and	  prosecutor)	   for	   the	  patroonship	  of	  Rensselaerswyck.	  	  He	  also	  became	  involved	  in	  petitioning	  the	  Dutch	  West	  India	  Company	  for	  a	  more	  liberal	  form	  of	  government	  for	  New	  Netherland.	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and fewer inhabitants than the English in North America, in the seventeenth century the 
Dutch were the world’s greatest trading nation.  As such, the Dutch could provide certain 
commercial opportunities to New England’s colonies with respect to trade.  
 The second portion of this chapter examines trade during the 1640s through the 
First Anglo-Dutch War (1652 – 1654) between New England’s colonies and Dutch 
merchants both in patria and New Netherland.  The colonies of each nation were more 
firmly established and trading networks had formed.  While individual colonies 
occasionally suspended or threatened Dutch trading networks, colonial leaders in New 
England never lost sight of the importance to their respective economies of their 
commercial arrangements with the Dutch.  So, despite disputes over geographical 
boundaries, tariffs and duties, and Dutch sales of guns to Indians, trade continued. 
 Finally, the third section of the chapter continues an examination of the 
commercial relationship between the Dutch and New England from the conclusion of the 
First Anglo-Dutch War through the events of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665 – 
1667).  During this period, substantial trade occurred despite the fact the Dutch lost their 
political presence on the North American mainland after the English takeover New 
Netherland in 1664.   
 
Meeting Your Neighbor: New Netherland as the Focal Point of Trade 
 Early in English Settlement 
 Early records reveal trading activities of an inter-colonial nature. In 1622, 
Emmauel Altham wrote to his brother describing the general prospects for profit in 
Plymouth Colony.  He described a planned voyage “southward into Hudson’s River, 
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where the Dutchmen have all their skins of the savages.  We hope there to get good store 
of beaver’s, otter’s and martin’s skins, as also fox skins and raccoon skins – all of which 
will yield money good store in England.38 The planned voyage most likely traveled to 
Fort Nassau (site of present day Albany, New York) and the trading post there. 
 In New Netherland, Isaac de Rasière, secretary of the colony, was a shrewd 
analyst of trade and market conditions in the New World.  In imagining a commercial 
center for the fur trade, he envisioned New Amsterdam at the nucleus drawing in French 
Indians and spoiling the trade of other nations.  In constructing such a design for New 
Amsterdam, De Rasière suspected competing trade interests from the English, even from 
the small Puritan settlement’s inhabitants in Plymouth.  In 1626, De Rasière wrote of his 
plans to spoil the trade of the “Brownists of New Plymouth” by “outbidding them with 
duffels or hatches, in order that they themselves would have to come to us to get 
wampum.”39 
 Peter Minuit tried a more conciliatory tack in 1627 when he suggested in a letter 
to Governor William Bradford that the two colonies establish regular trade.  The letter 
reaffirmed Anglo-Dutch friendship “against our common enemy the Spaniard.”  
                                                38	  See	  Sydney	  V.	  James,	  Jr.,	  ed.,	  Three	  Visitors	  to	  Early	  Plymouth:	  Letters	  about	  the	  Pilgrim	  Settlement	  in	  
New	   England	   During	   Its	   First	   Seven	   Years	   (Bedford,	   Mass.:	   Applewood	   Books,	   1997),	   26	   (Altham	  complained	  in	  1623/4	  after	  a	  trip	  to	  the	  southward	  of	  New	  England	  that	  there	  “are	  great	  store	  of	  furs	  which	   now	   the	  Dutchmen	   get	   because	   our	   Company	   of	  New	  England	  have	   not	   sent	   by	   us	   so	   good	  trucking	  stuff	  as	  they	  should	  have,	  and	  so	  have	  disappointed	  themselves	  much.”	  Ibid.,	  36.	  39	  A.J.F.	   van	   Laer,	   Documents	   Relating	   to	   New	   Netherland,	   1624-­‐1626,	   in	   the	   Henry	   E.	   Huntington	  
Library	  (San	  Marino,	  Cal.:	  The	  Henry	  E.	  Huntington	  Library	  and	  Art	  Gallery,	  1924),	  171-­‐251,	  260-­‐76	  (Letter	   from	   De	   Rasière	   to	   Amsterdam	   Chamber,	   September	   23,	   1626);	   William	   Bradford,	  
Correspondence	  between	  the	  Colonies	  of	  New	  Netherlands	  and	  New-­‐Plymouth,	  From	  the	  Letterbook	  of	  
William	   Bradford,	   Governor	   of	   New-­‐Plymouth,	   &c.	   (Boston:	   Massachusetts	   Society	   of	   Mayflower	  Descendants,	   1906),	   29-­‐30,	   34-­‐6.	   	   For	   De	   Rasière’s	   description	   of	   Plymouth	   Colony	   see	   J	   Franklin	  Jameson,	   ed.,	  Narratives	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  1609-­‐1664	   (New	  York:	   Charles	   Scribner’s	   Sons,	   1909),	  102-­‐15	  (Letter	  of	  Isaack	  De	  Rasière	  to	  Samuel	  Blommaert,	  1628)	  and	  for	  more	  details	  on	  De	  Rasière	  see	  Sydney	  V.	   James,	   Jr.,	  ed.,	  Three	  Visitors	  to	  Early	  Plymouth:	  Letters	  about	  the	  Pilgrim	  Settlement	  in	  
New	  England	  During	  Its	  First	  Seven	  Years	  (Bedford,	  Mass.:	  Applewood	  Books,	  1997).	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However, the remainder of the letter more directly got to the point of trade.  The Dutch 
offered “any goods that comes to our hands from our native countrie, [which] may be 
serviceable unto you, we shall take ourselves bound to help and accomadate you ther 
with.” If the Dutch lacked commodities of interest to the Plymouth colonists, the Dutch 
would purchase “if you please to sell us any beaver, or otter, or such like comodities as 
may be usefull for us, for ready money…we shall depute one to deale with you, at such 
place as you shall appointe.”40   
 Bradford soon responded with thankfulness for the “good and curteous entreaty 
which we have found in your countrie” and for the prospect of future trade.  He agreed 
that “we doubte not but in short time we may have profitable comerce & trade together.”  
Nevertheless, Bradford replied that the colony had sufficient supplies of all necessaries, 
but he suspected that the colonies could trade with each other if the Dutch had 
“reasonable” rates.  Shrewdly, Bradford queried as to the terms of trade: “And therefore 
when you please to send to us againe by any of yours, we desire to know how you will 
take beaver, by ye pounds, & otters, by ye skine; and how you will deale per cent. for 
other comodities, and what you can furnishe us with.  And likewise what other 
commodities from us may be acceptable unto you, as tobacco, fish, corne, or other things, 
and what prises you will give, &c.”41 
 Bradford reported the correspondence between himself and De Rasière/Minuit to 
Plymouth Colony’s English investors.  In conciliatory language, Bradford explained how 
the Dutch had initiated the contact and how he had informed the Dutch that the 
Manhattan plantation stood on territory belonging to England.  Bradford’s 
                                                40	  Bradford,	  Governor	  William	  Bradford’s	  Letter	  Book,	  29-­‐30.	  41	  Ibid.	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correspondence in 1627 sought to reassure the investors that the colony’s commercial 
allegiances (and any profits) were still with them, rather than being siphoned off to the 
Dutch. Bradford wrote: 
 We well knew likewise, that this dealing and friendship with the Dutch (though it 
 was wholly sought of themselves) yet it would procure us envy from others in the 
 land, and that at one time or other, our enemies would take occasion to raise 
 slanders and frame accusations against us for it; therefore, to prevent their malice, 
 as also to shew the sincerity of our dealing and our loyal and dutiful respect to his 
 Majesty and the Honourable Council for New England; we sent their first letter 
 (with our answer thereto and their reply to the same) unto the Council as may 
 appear more particularly by our letters following.42 
 
 Bradford’s formal correspondence belies the fact that the Plymouth colonists had 
extensive contact with the Dutch while living in the Dutch Republic and that the Dutch 
had traded along the North American coastline since establishing trading posts in New 
Netherland subsequent to 1609.43 
 Bradford’s caution soon eased and the two colonies developed commercial 
networks.  Bradford admitted in his History that the colonists “traded profitably together 
for several years, till other things interrupted it.”44  Traders in Plymouth supplied the 
Dutch with various skins, along with corn, wheat, fish, and the first efforts of a much 
hoped for tobacco industry.  In return, the Dutch traded a variety of exports from the 
Dutch Republic and Europe, including sugar, clothe, arms, and ammunition.  De Rasière 
never realized his ambitions to spoil the trade of the Brownists of New Plymouth. 
Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Chesapeake colonies soon politically and 
economically overshadowed Plymouth and the Dutch turned their attention to the 
opportunities there.   
                                                42	  Ibid.,	  34-­‐5.	  43	  Ibid.,	  224-­‐5.	  44	  William	   Bradford,	  History	   of	   Plymouth	  Plantation,	  ed.,	   Charles	   Deane	   (Boston:	   Little,	   Brown	   and	  Company,	  1856),	  222-­‐3;	  Hosmer,	  Winthrop’s	  Journal,	  1:130f.	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 As well, it was the Dutch who introduced the Plymouth colonists to the use of 
wampum, or sewant, in the Indian trade.  Bradford’s acknowledgement perhaps lacked 
sufficient recognition for the importance of this introduction to the economic survival of 
Plymouth Colony.  The Dutch received their supply of wampum from the Narragansets 
and the Pequots.  De Rasière sold a supply of wampum to the Plymouth colonists for £50 
intending that the Dutch would supply the Plymouth colonists with wampum.  De Rasière 
wanted to exclude them from directly engaging in trade with the Narragansets and 
Pequots and entering the fur trade of Long Island Sound.  Instead, the ever-conniving De 
Rasière suggested that the Plymouth colonists should enter the fur trade at Kennebec 
(Maine) diverting their attention away from Long Island Sound.  He convinced them that 
without the use of wampum, the Plymouth colony would not have a substantial means to 
engage in trade and increase their limited supply of trading goods.  Once in possession of 
wampum supplied by the Dutch, the Plymouth colonists could engage in the fur trade, 
particularly on the Kennebec and on the Penobscot in Maine.  A supply of beaver was in 
itself currency to trade with London merchants or the Dutch at New Amsterdam for 
required commodities. 
 
 Trading Basics 
 It was perhaps fortunate for the New England colonies that the Dutch colony of 
New Netherland was in relative close proximity and that it so openly welcomed trading 
relationships with each New England colony.  Certainly, England’s North American 
colonies could not count on England for economic support.  The earliest English 
settlements proved that. The idea of colonizing the New World turned out to be more 
  
 39 
difficult than just claiming land on behalf of the English crown to create an empire.  It 
required operating capital that the crown and the various sponsoring trading companies 
were not yet prepared, or perhaps even able, to provide.  But the Dutch were different.  
They possessed a commercial toolbox for the establishment of a successful trading 
entrepôt.  Time after time, the Dutch had established burgeoning commercial 
marketplaces remote from patria.  Although the Dutch could not claim that its North 
American trading center, New Netherland, had a commercial viability similar to many 
Dutch East India Company trading posts, it was better equipped than the New England 
colonies to survive economically.  New Netherland could rely upon the commercial 
institutions in, and stability of, Amsterdam.  The Dutch Republic’s vast trading empire 
meant that Amsterdam, as its commercial center, was better prepared to temper the 
storms of uneven profits associated with new trading ventures.45  Amsterdam had banks 
that developed the easy transfer of bank credits, a bourse (stock exchange) that engaged 
in the speculative trade in shares, a leading shipping center, an established insurance 
market, vast commercial warehouses, and a distribution network that helped to distribute 
colonial American products throughout Europe. 
 The Dutch establishment of New Amsterdam as a trading entrepôt interested New 
England’s merchants. 46   The settlement had commodities and trading networks 
                                                45	  One	  of	   the	  earliest	  historians	   to	   examine	   capitalism	   in	   the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  Violet	  Barbour	  noted	  while	   “the	   great	   merchant	   houses	   preferred	   an	   empire	   of	   trade,	   snug	   monopolies,	   and	   the	  expectation	   of	   quick	  profits	   to	   the	   unpredictable,	   uncontrollable	   returns	   from	   colonization,”	  Dutch	  merchants	   still	   sought	   new	   commercial	   ventures	   and	   opportunities.	   	   Violet	   Barbour,	  Capitalism	   in	  
Amsterdam	  in	  the	  Seventeenth	  Century	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1950),	  139.	  46	  The	  other	  significant	  trading	  center	  in	  New	  Netherland	  was	  Beverwijck.	  	  Janny	  Venema	  maintains	  New	   England	   traders	   sought	   opportunities	   there	   during	   the	   trading	   season.	   	   Janny	   Venema,	  
Beverwijck:	   A	   Dutch	   Village	   on	   the	   American	   Frontier,	   1652-­‐1664	   (Albany:	   State	   of	   New	   York	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  99,	  177.	  	  Donna	  Merwick	  suggests	  Beverwijck	  could	  draw	  non-­‐Dutch	  traders	  because	   of	   the	   sophistication	   of	   its	   commercial	   structures,	   particularly	   third-­‐party	   debt.	   	  Merwick	  also	  suggests	  that	  Beverwijck’s	  New	  England	  trading	  networks	  were	  created	  by	  former	  Dutch	  West	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unavailable to them.  In addition to European goods, New Netherland provided 
subsistence commodities and other raw materials.  The colony also became the leading 
market for New England merchants to trade their own goods.47 
 New England merchants pursued trade in New Netherland because the colony 
offered an opportunity for profit and minimal barriers of entry to conduct trade.  A 
successful trading entrepôt had political, commercial, and legal infrastructures that 
recognized the importance of trade to its economy.  Dutch colonists had transplanted such 
infrastructures for commercial transactions from the Dutch Republic to New Netherland, 
while New England’s colonies lacked them or had not yet developed them extensively.48  
The incorporation of the laws and ordinances of the states of Holland and access to 
Amsterdam capital allowed New Netherland’s merchants to create a local credit system 
that did not discriminate based on nationality.49 The immediate incorporation of Dutch 
                                                                                                                                            India	   Company	   soldiers	   of	   English	   and	   Scottish	   origin	   who	   remained	   in	   the	   colony	   and	   “who	  established	  mercantile	  ties	  with	  New	  England	  more	  readily	  than	  Dutch-­‐speaking	  burghers.”	   	  Donna	  Merwick,	  Possessing	  Albany,	  1630-­‐1710:	  The	  Dutch	  and	  English	  Experiences	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  128.	  While	  I	  agree	  that	  former	  soldiers	  established	  mercantile	  ties,	  I	  disagree	  that	   they	   established	   them	   more	   easily	   than	   Dutch-­‐speaking	   burghers	   did.	   	   The	   Dutch	   never	   let	  language	  interfere	  with	  trading	  opportunities.	  47	  New	  Netherland	  occasionally	   turned	   to	  New	  England	   for	   foodstuffs.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  A.J.F.	  van	  Laer,	  ed.,	  
New	   York	   Historical	   Manuscripts:	   Dutch:	   Council	   Minutes,	   1638-­‐1649	   (Baltimore:	   Genealogical	   Pub.	  Co.,	  1974),	  4:203.	  	  On	  accommodating	  New	  England	  merchants,	  David	  Peterson	  de	  Vries	  noted	  in	  his	  journal	   that	   Director-­‐General	   Willem	   Kieft	   “told	   me	   that	   he	   had	   now	   had	   a	   fine	   inn…in	   order	   to	  accommodate	   the	   English	  who	   daily	   passed	  with	   their	   vessels	   from	  New	  England	   to	   Virginia…and	  who	  might	   now	   lodge	   in	   the	   tavern.”	   	   David	   Peterson	   de	   Vries,	   Voyages	   from	  Holland	   to	   America,	  
1632-­‐1644,	  trans.	  Henry	  C.	  Murphy	  (New	  York,	  1853),	  36.	  48	  Bills	  of	   lading,	   charter	  contracts,	   insurance	  contracts	  and	   the	   like,	  all	  had	  pre-­‐existing	   formats	   in	  the	   Dutch	   Republic	   adopted	   by	  merchants	   and	   notaries	   in	   New	   Netherland,	   particularly	   after	   the	  Dutch	   West	   India	   Company	   in	   1640	   permitted	   private	   individuals	   to	   engage	   in	   commercial	   and	  maritime	  activities	  between	  Europe	  and	  New	  Netherland,	   including	   the	   fur	   trade.	   	  Of	  necessity	   the	  legal	  and	  political	  systems	  of	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  were	  quickly	  transported	  to	  New	  Netherland.	  	  See,	  Oliver	  A.	  Rink,	  Holland	  on	  the	  Hudson:	  An	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  of	  Dutch	  New	  York	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  136-­‐7.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Rhode	  Island,	  as	  late	  as	  1647,	  had	  to	  legislate	  to	  impose	  some	  sort	  of	  regulation	  on	  commercial	  transactions.	  	  John	  Russell	  Bartlett,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  the	  
Colony	   of	   Rhode	   Island	   and	   Providence	   Plantations,	   in	   New	   England	   (Providence:	   A.C.	   Greene	   and	  Brother,	  1856),	  1:176.	  49	  Like	   other	   North	   American	   colonies,	   New	   Netherland	   suffered	   from	   limited	   amounts	   of	   hard	  currency	   and	   merchants	   used	   money	   substitutes	   including	   beaver	   skins,	   tobacco,	   or	   wampum	   in	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laws and ordinances in the colony provided a familiar framework for merchants, both 
merchants residing in the colony and their counterparts trading from patria.  Traditional 
commercial practices such as the use of resident notaries public recorded commercial 
arrangements between parties.50 Further, a stable and impartial court system existed that 
allowed commercial disputes to be resolved. 
 Commercial practices in New Netherland influenced how merchants conducted 
inter-colonial trade.  Receipts, bills of lading, accounts, daybooks, and 
acknowledgements had become standardized in language and, in certain instances, were 
available in pre-printed formats.  Certainly, a seventeenth century Amsterdam court 
would have expressed surprise had a merchant demanded payment without any of the 
requisite documentation to prove a contract or delivery of goods.  Courts in New 
Netherland were no less surprised.  The commercial behavior required in New 
Netherland filtered throughout the English colonies in North America.  English 
merchants recognized that to have a viable claim in a New Netherland court, they would 
have to come prepared with appropriate documentation.  In time, commercial practices in 
New England changed to reflect this common usage. 
 To facilitate further trade, New Amsterdam’s council in 1656 appointed a “Broker 
to the Merchants” who spoke both Dutch and English.  Jan Peecq was to “regulate 
himself by the laudable custom of our Fatherland’s City of Amsterdam, in force in the 
                                                                                                                                            many	  credit	  arrangements.	  	  Curtis	  P.	  Nettels,	  The	  Money	  Supply	  of	  the	  North	  American	  Colonies	  Before	  
1720	  (New	  York:	  A.M.	  Kelley,	  1964),	  202-­‐28.	  	  The	  Burgomasters	  and	  Schepens	  in	  New	  Amsterdam	  in	  1658	  requested	  the	  introduction	  of	  silver	  coin	  in	  place	  of	  sewant	  and	  beaver	  as	  the	  colony’s	  currency.	  	  Berthold	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam	  from	  1653-­‐1674	  (Baltimore:	  Genealogical	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1976),	  3:17.	  50	  Aspinwall,	  Aspinwall	  Notarial	  Records,	  April	  3,	  1646,	  58;	  June	  13,	  1646,	  66;	  July	  28,	  1647,	  68.	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matter of brokerage.”51  Traditionally, merchants in the Dutch Republic sought out 
brokers because of the brokers’ networks and independence, rather than their knowledge 
of specific commodities or goods.  As intermediaries, they created opportunities for 
merchants by moving commodities between parties.  New Amsterdam’s council adapted 
the traditional use of this post as a means to bring together parties that, because of 
language differences, may not otherwise have transacted business together.52 
 Commercial infrastructures also afforded ancillary or supplemental services 
essential to merchants.  To illustrate, New Amsterdam became a point of brokerage, 
repair, and provisioning for ships.  Numerous contractual actions involving New England 
merchants found their way to the courts, including the matter brought by Jan Evance 
[John Evans], a merchant in New Haven, who demanded delivery of the ship Abigael 
according to the terms of his contract with Jan Wilcocx.53  An earlier case saw Jan 
Schepmoes and Claes Veringh request a declaration from the former owner of a sloop, 
Captain Teyler [Taylor], that “there is no one in New England who has any claim on the 
aforesaid sloop.” 54  Governor-General Stuyvesant sold a former Dutch West India 
Company ship to Thomas Broughton of Boston in 1647.  A 1659 dispute in the Colony of 
New Haven involved a ship, The Black Eagle, which Richard Raymond of Salem had 
purchased in New Amsterdam.  In October 1662, Manhattan burgher Dirk Jansen of 
Oldenburgh sold his sloop, the Hoop, to Deliverance Lamberton, an English merchant of 
                                                51	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  2:45.	  52	  For	   a	   general	   discussion	   about	   brokering	   in	   Amsterdam,	   see	   Th.	   Stuart,	   De	   Amsterdamsche	  
makelaardij,	   bijdrage	   tot	   de	   Geschiedenis	   onzer	   handelswetgeving	   (Amsterdam:	   C.A.	   Spin	   &	   Zoon,	  1879).	  53	  Van	  Laer,	  ed.,	  New	  York	  Historical	  Manuscripts,	  4:337.	  54	  Van	  Laer,	  ed.,	  New	  York	  Historical	  Manuscripts,	  1:58-­‐9.	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New Haven, for 2000 lbs of tobacco.55  Dutch ship owners also hired out their vessels to 
merchants and captains from New England.  One New England captain noted, “being at 
Stamford, he hired a Duch vessel.”  The ease with which merchants in the area engaged 
Dutch ships suggests a commonplace occurrence that was mutually beneficial to the 
parties.56 
 As well as providing the infrastructure to undertake private trade, New 
Amsterdam, like many early modern cities, established a weekly market day and an 
annual market.57  The Council opened the market to both foreigners and inhabitants and 
provided stalls for merchants to sell goods using Dutch weights and measures.58  In 1656, 
Governor-General Stuyvesant and the Council established a second market in New 
Amsterdam held on Saturdays devoted exclusively to farm products.  Stuyvesant 
instituted semiannual fairs at New Amsterdam in 1658, one for lean cattle throughout the 
month of May and another for fattened cattle in autumn.  Additionally, to encourage the 
importation of livestock, the Burgomasters authorized placards in English sent to towns 
                                                
55 Stuyvesant saw opportunity to charter underutilized Company ships should the opportunity arise. In 
1648, he provided the ship, de Liefde, for charter to Barbados to John Evanc, a New Haven merchant. Van 
Laer, ed., New York Historical Manuscripts, vol. 3, 56-8.  For the Abigael see Van Laer, ed., New York 
Historical Manuscripts, vol. 4, 337. For confirmation of ownership, see Van Laer, ed., New York Historical 
Manuscripts, vol. 1, 58-9. For the Broughton sale, see Van Laer, ed., New York Historical Manuscripts, 
vol. 2, 401-2. Regarding the Black Eagle, see Charles J. Hoadly, Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of 
New Haven, from May 1653, to the Union (Hartford: Case, Lockwood and Company, 1858), 334-7. For the 
Jansen/Lamberton sale, see Berthold Fernow, trans. and ed., Minutes of the Orphanmasters of New 
Amsterdam, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Francis P. Harper, 1907), 30-1 (Register of Walewyn Van Der Veen). 56	  Hoadly,	   Records	   of	   the	   Colony	   or	   Jurisdiction	   of	   New	  Haven,	   from	  May,	   1653,	   to	   the	   Union,	  334-­‐6	  (February	  1659).	  57	  It	  is	  important	  to	  define	  “private	  trade”	  in	  relationship	  to	  New	  Netherland.	  	  During	  the	  1620s	  and	  1630s,	   the	   Dutch	   West	   India	   Company	   sought	   to	   control	   the	   New	   Netherland	   fur	   trade	   and	   to	  prohibit	  private	  traders	  at	  Fort	  Orange	  and	  throughout	  the	  colony.	  	  In	  1639,	  the	  Company	  opened	  the	  trade	  to	  private	  individuals	  provided	  that	  they	  pay	  a	  duty	  on	  all	  goods	  brought	  into	  or	  taken	  out	  of	  the	  colony.	  	  Thus,	  private	  trade	  came	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  any	  trade	  not	  with	  the	  Company.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Oliver	   A.	   Rink,	   “Company	   Management	   or	   Private	   Trade:	   The	   Two	   Patroonship	   Plans	   for	   New	  Netherland,”	  New	  York	  History,	  59	  (1978),	  5-­‐26.	  58	  O’Callaghan,	  Laws	  &	  Ordinances	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  86-­‐9.	  
  
 44 
in Connecticut, New Haven, and Long Island to advertise the fairs.59 
 Considerable evidence suggests that trade in New Amsterdam influenced regional 
prices for commodities.  Nevertheless, how did merchants determine prices?  We know 
legislation set the price for some commodities, such as bread and beer.  We are also 
aware of the existence of price courants in Amsterdam during this period and courts 
referencing the same.60  The price courant provided merchants with average prices on a 
vast array of commodities exchanged on the Amsterdam market.  It is likely, given the 
regular shipping between the Dutch Republic and New Amsterdam, the courts and 
merchants accepted price courants from the Dutch Republic as evidence of current 
commodity pricing, or at the very least, a benchmark upon which to base local value. 
 The notarial records also recognized the commercial links that tied New England 
to New Amsterdam through currency pricing.  Because of a lack of coinage, beaver 
became a standard form of currency used in commercial transactions.  As such, this 
currency needed some form of regulation.  New Amsterdam’s market price informally 
determined the value of beaver for the region.  For example, in 1648 John Cromwell 
admitted his indebtedness to Jonathan Brewster of Connecticut according to “the price as 
comonly it goes at Manhatas” for “Bever mooskins & some deere skins.”  Massachusetts 
passed a special act to regulate the currency of the Dutch coin in 1643.  The General 
Court noted “the oft occasions wee have of trading wth the Hollanders at the Dutch 
                                                59	  Ibid.,	  251,	  364.	  	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam	  form	  1653-­‐1674,	  7:215-­‐6.	  	  An	  earlier	  fair	  for	  cattle	  had	  been	   established	   in	   1641.	   	   O’Callaghan,	  Laws	  &	  Ordinances	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  29.	   	   It	   appears	   that	  “smaller	   animals,	   such	   as	   mutton,	   veal,	   goats’	   flesh,	   &c.,	   had	   been	   sold	   from	   the	   baskets	   of	   the	  producers,	  at	  the	  Market-­‐Place	  at	  the	  Strand.”	  	  See	  Thomas	  F.	  De	  Voe,	  The	  Market	  Book:	  Containing	  a	  
Historical	  Account	  of	  the	  Public	  Markets	   in	  the	  Cities	  of	  New	  York,	  Boston,	  Philadelphia,	  and	  Brooklyn	  (New	  York:	  1862),	  1:44.	  60	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  2:36.	   	  Price	  courants	  provided	  a	  comparative	  view	  of	  the	  market	  by	  their	  differentiation	  of	  major	  commodities	  according	  to	  origin,	  quality,	  etc.	   	  See	  Nicolaas	  Wilhelmus	  Posthumus,	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  History	  of	  Price	  in	  Holland	  (Leiden,	  1946),	  volume	  1.	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plantation & otherwise, do therefore order, that the Hollander ducatour, worth 3 gilders, 
shalbee currant at 6s in all paymts wthin or jurisdiction, & the rix dollar, being 2 ½ gilders, 
shalbee likewise currant at 5s, & ryall of 8 shalbee also currant at 5s.”61 
 New Amsterdam’s favorable commercial infrastructure even attracted the 
settlement of New England merchants.  Numerous English merchants began their lives or 
careers in an English colony, only to subsequently move to New Amsterdam to conduct 
trade.  Many merchants relocated permanently.  Other merchants chose to maintain a 
residence in New Amsterdam as well as one in an English colony.  Merchants from New 
England colonies, who came to New Amsterdam only to trade, but not to settle, did not 
need to become burghers.  Yet, if a merchant chose to remain in New Amsterdam, he was 
required to apply for the burgher right to engage legally in trade.62 
 Commercial infrastructure provided the framework to impose governmental fiscal 
policy as a means to raise revenue.  In addition, one of the most vexing issues in any 
“free trade” port in the seventeenth century was the imposition of duty.63  Although early 
legislation embodied an open door policy to trade with foreign merchants, New 
Netherland struggled with the issue of duties.64  Both the West India Company and New 
Netherland’s council imposed customs duty as an indirect tax on goods of international 
trade.  Import and export taxes were levied on consignments regardless of point of origin.  
                                                61	  Ibid.,	  October	  28,	  1647,	  154;	  Nathaniel	  B.	  Shurtleff,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  
Massachusetts	  Bay	  in	  New	  England,	  1642-­‐1649	  (Boston:	  William	  White,	  1853),	  2:29.	  62	  For	  examples	  of	  Rhode	   Island	  merchants	  who	  moved	   to	  New	  Amsterdam,	   see	  Carl	  Bridenbaugh,	  
Fat	   Mutton	   and	   Liberty	   of	   Conscience:	   Society	   in	   Rhode	   Island,	   1636-­‐1690	   (Providence:	   Brown	  University	   Press,	   1974).	   	   For	   an	   instance	   in	   New	  Haven,	   see	   Charles	   J.	   Hoadly,	   ed.,	  Records	   of	   the	  
Colony	  and	  Plantation	  of	  New	  Haven	  from	  1638	  to	  1649	  (Hartford:	  Case,	  Tiffany	  and	  Company,	  1857),	  27.	  63	  Aside	  from	  disputes	  in	  Connecticut	  and	  Long	  Island,	  there	  were	  attempts	  by	  New	  England	  colonies	  to	   impinge	  upon	  New	  Netherland’s	   territory	  and	   ignore	   its	   trade	   laws	  and	  regulations.	   	  See	  Adrian	  van	   der	   Donck,	   The	  Representation	   of	  New	  Netherland	   Concerning	   its	   Location,	   Productiveness,	   and	  
Poor	  Condition,	  ed.,	  Henry	  C.	  Murphy	  (New	  York:	  Bartlett	  &	  Welford,	  1849),	  23.	  64	  O’Callaghan,	  Laws	  &	  Ordinances	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  88.	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Thus, while free to engage in trade in New Netherland, local laws required all merchants, 
regardless of nationality, to comply with the Dutch colonial government’s tax 
assessment. 
 For instance, in 1642, New Netherland levied an import duty of ten percent upon 
all goods for which a merchant had not paid an import duty in the Dutch Republic.65  This 
included goods brought in to New Netherland by English merchants.  Governor-General 
Stuyvesant, an astute and commercially minded administrator, sought to continue this 
policy established by his predecessor.  Despite the fact that English merchants paid eight 
percent less in import duty than their Dutch counterparts did, English merchants 
complained to Stuyvesant about the excessiveness of the import duty.  Stuyvesant 
responded in 1649 by suspending all duties paid by English merchants conducting trade 
in New Netherland.  Dutch merchants promptly complained of special treatment accorded 
to English merchants and asked for exemptions.  In reply, the Dutch West India 
Company’s directors imposed an import duty of sixteen percent on goods brought in by 
merchants from New England and Virginia but removed the export duty on goods from 
New Netherland to New England.  Further amendments reduced the import duty on 
goods from patria to New Netherland from sixteen percent to ten percent, placed 
provisions and other raw goods from New England on the duty-free list at New 
Amsterdam, and implemented an additional reduction of the duty upon other merchandise 
                                                65	  Prudent	   fiscal	  policy	   recognized	   that	   to	   tax	  a	   foreign	  merchant	  on	  goods	  brought	   into	   the	  Dutch	  Republic,	   and	   most	   likely	   shipped	   on	   a	   Dutch	   bottom,	   and	   to	   then	   tax	   those	   same	   goods	   in	   New	  Netherland	  was	  neither	  wise	  nor	  commercially	  prudent.	  	  Thus,	  if	  a	  merchant	  could	  show	  payment	  of	  an	  import	  duty	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  he	  was	  exempt	  from	  paying	  the	  import	  duty	  in	  New	  Netherland	  on	  the	  same	  goods.	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from New England.66  In the end, Dutch administrators recognized the value of trade with 
New England to the overall economy of New Netherland and made fiscal concessions to 
ensure continued commercial activity. 
 And, again, demonstrating the importance of trade with its New England 
neighbors and responsiveness by the New Netherland government, in 1656, a group of 
English traders petitioned the Burgomasters and Schepens “concerning the export duty 
now imposed on wine and beer.”  The Burgomasters and Schepens resolved to present 
the petition to the Director-General and Council.  What is significant is that English 
traders were allowed to petition a foreign government and their petition was given 
consideration at the highest levels of New Netherland’s administration.67 
 New Netherland’s fiscal policy included licensing as a means to monitor and 
regulate the traffic in certain commodities traded with New England.  Thus, officials in 
New Amsterdam granted Thomas James, a Maryland trader, a license in 1639 “to export 
corn and trade with the New England colonies.”  Isaac Allerton agreed not to sell duffels 
cloth received from the Dutch West India Company “to any English people or inhabitants 
of New England except Indians.” In September 1647, Govert Aertsen requested 
permission to go to New Haven to purchase goods from a newly arrived ship and to sell 
them in New Netherland, on which he promised to pay sixteen percent duty.68  The 
council particularly monitored the import and export of foodstuffs.  Especially in its 
earliest years, New Netherland was cautious about any sort of dependency pertaining to 
                                                66	  On	   custom	   duties	   levied	   in	   New	   Netherland	   see	   O’Callaghan,	   Laws	   and	   Ordinances	   of	   New	  
Netherland,	  1638-­‐1674,	  31,	  126,	  343,	  348;	  Hoadly,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  and	  Plantation	  of	  New	  Haven	  
from	  1638	  to	  1649,	  514-­‐6,	  520-­‐2,	  532-­‐5;	  David	  Pulsifer,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  New	  Plymouth	  in	  
New	  England	  (Boston:	  William	  White,	  1859),	  9:107-­‐8,	  113-­‐5.	  67	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  2:94.	  68	  Frederick	  W.	  Bogert,	   “Inter-­‐Colony	  Trading,”	  de	  Halve	  Maen,	  LV,	  No.	  1	   (1980):	  21;	  Van	  Laer,	  New	  
York	  Historical	  Manuscripts,	  4:434.	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grains or other provisions.  Requiring a license to export corn, for instance, meant the 
colony could review stockpiles of a vital commodity, and deny a license, if necessary, to 
ensure enough food for its own inhabitants.  The council also closely monitored trade 
goods for the fur trade brought over by the West India Company.  If the council allowed 
the sale of trade goods to English colonists, it would deplete the wares available for the 
Dutch to trade.  As well, it would provide English colonists with valuable commodities of 
their own to barter with the Indians to the detriment of the West India Company.  
Moreover, requiring a license to import goods was a means to track the arrival of 
commodities, oversee the collection of duty, and minimize smuggling.  While New 
Netherland’s officials encouraged free trade, certain limitations existed to protect the 
colony’s grain supply and economic foundations. 
 Even with significant compliance in payment of duties and requests for licenses, 
New Netherland’s government could not ignore smuggling, particularly the export of 
furs, by either its own inhabitants or “those of other nations.”  In a 1647 proclamation, 
officials argued that smugglers had defrauded the colony of export duties on furs and 
import duties on English goods and merchandise.  The Director-General and Council thus 
commanded “that no one of them shall presume to sell, barter, trade, or remove, or ship, 
or export…without due entry being first made of such merchandise.”  Any furs had to be 
marked or stamped to demonstrate the payment of export duty before the furs could be 
sent to “New England, or to the Swedes in the south, to Virginia, or to the fatherland.”  
Failure to comply meant forfeiture of the goods and the imposition of a fine.69  In spite of 
the diversified trade and its continued growth, colonial officials fixated on the fur trade 
                                                69	  Van	   Laer,	   New	   York	   Historical	   Manuscripts,	   4:386.	   	   The	   government	   also	   prosecuted	   for	   illegal	  smuggling	  of	  other	  commodities.	  Ibid.,	  204-­‐5,	  501.	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and how that trade constituted New Netherland’s raison d’etre.  
 Although England sought to impose trade restrictions on its colonies, merchants 
from New England often ignored them.  They continued to carry Virginia tobacco to New 
Amsterdam in ever-increasing quantities.70  Even the Navigation Act of 1660 and its list 
of enumerated products that included tobacco only temporarily curtailed tobacco 
shipments to New Amsterdam.71  The Court of Burgermasters and Schepens heard several 
actions in which a New England merchant admitted his obligation to deliver tobacco to 
New Amsterdam, but sought amendment to the terms of the agreement.72  With the 
complicity of New Netherland’s courts, in order to simultaneously fulfill their contractual 
obligations with a particular Dutch merchant and nominally comply with English law, 
New England merchants would carry tobacco from the Chesapeake to a New England 
port, or a Long Island port under English jurisdiction, and from there to New 
Amsterdam.73  For New England’s merchants, trading opportunities with the Dutch were 
worth the additional expense and time. 
 Along with its commercial infrastructure, New Netherland had a legal 
infrastructure that reinforced commercial transactions, delivered speedy and impartial 
                                                70	  E.B.	  O’Callaghan,	  ed.,	  Laws	  and	  Ordinances	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  1638-­‐1674	  (Albany:	  Weed,	  Parsons	  and	  Company,	  1868),	  139-­‐40,	  189,	  307-­‐8;	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  the	  Colonial	  History	  of	  
the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  14:225,	   371,	   400.	   	   Virginia	   and	  New	  Netherland	   entered	   into	   a	   commercial	  treaty	   in	   1653	   and	   another	   in	   1660,	   largely,	   because	   of	   the	   tobacco	   trade.	   	   Similar	   commercial	  relations	   existed	   between	   Maryland	   and	   New	   Netherland.	   	   Frances	   Gardiner	   Davenport,	   ed.,	  
European	  Treaties	  Bearing	  on	  the	  History	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  Dependencies	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	  1917-­‐37),	  2:55-­‐6.	  71	  See	  Lawrence	  A.	  Harper,	  The	  English	  Navigation	  Laws:	  A	  Seventeenth-­‐Century	  Experiment	  in	  Social	  
Engineering	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1939).	   	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  1:45;	  7:225-­‐6.	  72	  See,	  e.g.,	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  4:298,	  303;	  5:34.	  73	  Trade	  with	  the	  Dutch	  troubled	  the	  Privy	  Council.	   	  A	  Minute	  of	  Council	   in	  August	  1662	  expressed	  concern	  about	  “a	  secret	  trade	  driven	  by	  and	  with	  the	  Dutch,	  for	  Tobacco	  of	  the	  Growth	  of	  the	  English	  Plantacons…by	   carrying	   the	   same	   to	   New	   England	   and	   other	   Plantacons	   and	   thence	   shipping	   the	  same	  in	  Dutch	  bottoms….”	  O’Callaghan,	  ed.,	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  the	  Colonial	  History	  of	  the	  State	  of	  
New	  York,	  3:44.	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judgments, and sought to accommodate foreign merchants.74  Numerous cases from New 
Netherland’s legal records convey a sense of the porousness between the colonies 
regarding trade.  For instance, Eduard Leake, an English merchant living in New 
Amsterdam, brought an action against Ritzert Airy in 1661 for the payment of monies 
owed when Airy hired Leake’s ship, Providence.  The parties had entered into the 
original contract in Boston.  The Burgomasters and Schepens denied Airy’s subsequent 
request to try the matter in New England.75  Leake also sought redress against Nicolas 
Boot, who had agreed to pay the freight on twenty to thirty hogsheads of tobacco from 
Virginia to New Amsterdam.  Leake accompanied the ship to Virginia and back in 1662.  
After he disembarked from the ship in New Amsterdam, Boot decided to risk sailing to 
New England for the prospect of higher profits.  Unfortunately, not only did Boot fail to 
sell the tobacco, but also the ship ran aground on its return from Boston and the tobacco 
was ruined.76 
 In another example, Hatton Atkins, a Boston merchant, demanded delivery of 
tobacco and hides held by Jan Kulpeper.  Kulpeper claimed Jan Foort of Boston shipped 
the goods to him.  Atkins alleged that the case was more properly settled in Boston and 
offered security for what Foort owed Kulpeper.  The court determined that Kulpeper 
could not establish that the tobacco and hides shipped to him by Foort actually belonged 
to him and ordered the tobacco and hides turned over to Atkins.77  As long as the court 
                                                74	  While	  the	  commercial	  and	  legal	  infrastructure	  was	  initially	  established	  to	  support	  the	  Dutch	  West	  India	   Company’s	   fur	   trade,	   all	   trade	   was	   protected	   by	   the	   infrastructures	   brought	   over	   from	   the	  Dutch	  Republic.	  75	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  3:350.	  76	  Salomon	  Lachaire,	  The	  Register	  of	  Salomon	  Lachaire,	  Notary	  Public	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  1661-­‐1662,	  E.B.	   O’Callaghan,	   trans.,	   eds.	   Kenneth	   Scott	   and	   Kenn	   Stryker-­‐Rodda	   (Baltimore:	   Genealogical	   Pub.	  Co.,	  1978),	  50,	  197,	  213-­‐5.	  77	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  4:228.	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could derive a legal nexus with New Netherland (that is, either one of the parties was 
resident in New Netherland or the good were located in the colony), it undertook to 
render an impartial decision on disputes as a commercial tribunal, that is, as an institution 
equipped with an understanding of the mercantile world. 
 Given the amount of trade that occurred between the colonies of different nations, 
how did colonies ensure that commercial and legal chaos did not ensue?  Long before the 
issue of legal reciprocity, or comity, was formally recognized, the Dutch colony of New 
Netherland and the English colonies of New England acknowledged the need to accept 
and be bound by legal judgments made in another jurisdiction.78  To not do so would have 
jeopardized the trading networks and dependencies that had developed between the 
colonies.  In 1649, New Haven’s Governor Eaton wrote to Governor-General Stuyvesant 
about a cow condemned by an English court and the dispute that arose between a resident 
of New Netherland and a resident of New Haven.  While the dispute concerning the cow 
was of immediate concern, Eaton asked, “how justice may have a due course hereafter in 
these neighbour jurisdictions, without disturbance & offence, is of higher consideration 
then the vallew of the debt or price of the cowe.”  The answer, of course, was through the 
acknowledgement of and respect accorded to each colony’s laws and judicial decisions.  
 Aside from contracts, one of the most common legal instruments that received the 
recognition of reciprocity was wills.  Wills often provided direction to executors about 
the testator’s trading debts.  As a result, executors would initiate suit in court to claim 
                                                78	  The	   seventeenth	   century	  Dutch	   jurist,	   Ulrich	  Huber,	   first	   proposed	   the	   principle	   of	   legal	   comity.	  	  Comity	   refers	   to	   legal	   reciprocity—the	   legal	   principle	   that	   one	   jurisdiction	   will	   extend	   certain	  courtesies	   to	   other	   nations	   (or	   other	   jurisdictions	   within	   the	   same	   nation),	   particularly	   by	  recognizing	  the	  validity	  and	  effect	  of	  their	  executive,	  legislative,	  and	  judicial	  acts.	  The	  term	  refers	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  courts	  should	  not	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  demeans	  the	  jurisdiction,	  laws,	  or	  judicial	  decisions	  of	  another	   jurisdiction.	  Part	  of	   the	  presumption	  of	  comity	  was	  reciprocity	   -­‐	   that	  other	   jurisdictions	  will	  reciprocate	  the	  courtesy	  shown	  to	  them.	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payment.  Wills also provided direction to executors about the trading debts owed to an 
estate.  For instance, Claes Cater, a resident of New Amsterdam, directed his executors to 
collect debts owed to him in New Haven and Milford.  Despite geographical boundaries, 
executors would pursue monies owed an estate and sue if necessary either in New 
Amsterdam or in the colony where the other party was resident.79 
  
 Merchants conducting business in New Netherland also favored resolving 
disputes through arbitration.  With the court’s approval, disputing parties chose senior 
members of the community, often merchants themselves, to act as arbitrators.  When a 
commercial dispute involved non-Dutch residents, effort was made to include non-Dutch 
residents as arbitrators.80  As an example, in a long-standing matter between Cornelis 
Steenwyck and James Mills for payment of debt, Steenwyck demanded “that sd Mills be 
ordered to chuse three men from the Virginias, also three men from New England, before 
whom he shall render due a/c [account] and explanation of his estate and effects.”81  The 
Burgomasters and Schepens granted the request.  Whether the court granted the request 
out of fairness to the non-Dutch residents or because substantive procedural differences 
existed between the colonies in account keeping, in a colony populated with people of 
dissimilar nationalities, the court’s inclusiveness more likely bound the parties to any 
                                                79	  Hoadly,	  Records	  of	   the	  Colony	  and	  Plantation	  of	  New	  Haven	   form	  1638	   to	  1649,	  532;	   This	   type	   of	  comity	   or	   legal	   reciprocity	   occurred	   frequently	   between	   the	   New	   England	   colonies	   and	   New	  Netherland.	   	   Contracts	   made	   in	   one	   jurisdiction	   were	   recognized	   by	   the	   other	   jurisdiction.	   	   This	  speaks	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   trade	   between	   the	   colonies.	   	   Otherwise,	   without	   this	   recognition,	   all	  trade	  would	  have	  broken	  down.	  80	  April	  Lee	  Hatfield	  has	  observed,	   “The	  court	  attempted	  to	  chose	  arbitrators	  who	   included	  at	   least	  one	   countryman	   of	   any	   foreign	   seaman	   involved.”	   	   April	   Lee	   Hatfield,	   “Mariners,	   Merchants,	   and	  Colonists	   in	  Seventeenth-­‐Century	  English	  America,”	   in	  Elizabeth	  Mancke	  and	  Carole	  Shammas,	  eds.,	  
The	  Creation	  of	  the	  British	  Atlantic	  World	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  154.	  	  The	  same	  held	  true	  for	  any	  trade	  disputes	  between	  parties	  from	  English	  and	  Dutch	  colonies.	  81	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  4:267-­‐8.	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ultimate resolution. 
 New England merchants were free to trade in New Netherland and with the West 
India Company, as long as they paid duties and sought any requisite permission.  
Nevertheless, they were not relieved of any financial obligations to private individuals or 
the West India Company if they left the colony.  The Company engaged agents residing 
in English colonies to pursue debtors and, if necessary, initiate actions in court.82  So, too, 
did individual merchants.  Cornelis Steenwyck trusted “his loving friend” Joseph Swett, a 
Boston mariner, to collect debts in tobacco owed to him by Samuel Smith, also of 
Boston.83  Dutch merchants were in trade to make a profit.  As long as a means existed to 
receive payment on a debt owed, they would pursue such means. 
 The numerous legal actions and matters between residents of the different 
colonies obscure the question of how merchant-litigants communicated with each other 
given the language differences.  Did litigants from outside New Netherland have 
confidence that such differences would not prohibit a fair decision?  The key to 
communication lay with the notaries public.  Certainly, in the Dutch Republic, some 
notaries were known for their abilities in a particular language.  The bi-lingual or multi-
lingual competence of notaries to translate declarations and testimony from English into 
Dutch carried over to New Netherland.84  Further, communication between merchants in 
                                                82	  See,	  e.g.,	  Van	  Laer,	  New	  York	  Historical	  Manuscripts,	  1:53-­‐4.	  83	  Lachaire,	  The	  Register	  of	  Salomon	  Lachaire,	  131.	  84	  Salomon	  Lachaire	  provided	  translation	  and	  interpretation	  services	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  Edward	  Leake	  vs.	  Nicolas	  Boot.	   	  Lachaire,	  The	  Register	  of	  Salomon	  Lachaire,	  54-­‐5,	  82,	  126,	  205-­‐7,	  212-­‐6,	  218.	   	  For	  Amsterdam	   notaries	   see	   A.I.	   Bosma,	   Repertorium	   van	   Notarissen	   Residerende	   in	   Amsterdam	  
Amstelland,	   Ambachtsherrlijkheden	   en	   Geannexeerde	   Gemeenten:	   1524-­‐1810	   (Amsterdam:	  Gemeentelijk	   Archief	   Amsterdam,	   1998).	   	   The	   council	   employed	   an	   English	   translator,	   George	  Bacxter,	   in	   1642	   and	   reappointed	   him	   in	   1647	   because	   of	   the	   official	   correspondence	   from	   New	  England	  and	  “non	  of	  the	  Company’s	  officers	  here	  can	  readily	  read	  and	  write	  English…”	  Van	  Lear,	  ed.,	  
New	  York	  Historical	  Manuscripts:	  Dutch,	  4:179,	   378.	   	   The	   testimony	   of	   English	  witnesses	  would	   be	  translated	  by	  order	  of	  the	  court.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam,	  1:163.	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various colonies, whether directly or through intermediaries such as translators, seems to 
have been common both to initiate trade and to resolve differences through arbitration or 
in court. Such imperceptible cross-cultural interactions between merchants shared Dutch 
commercial ideas and business practices with English colonial culture and were 
assimilated through the works of translators. 
 New England merchants entered a sophisticated trading world when they chose to 
trade with merchants from New Netherland.  Lawsuits, arbitration, commercial 
documentation, and price courants were all part of daily life of New Netherland.  Though 
political disputes existed between the governments of New Netherland and the English 
colonies of New England, such disputes little interfered with trade and the commercial 
networks that developed between merchants from New Netherland and New England.  
Through trade with New Netherland, New England engaged in more regional commerce.  
It tapped in to a well-established maritime commercial system. 
  
 The Proximity of Trading Partners 
 Despite boundary disputes with Connecticut, merchants in Connecticut found 
opportunities for trade with the Dutch and the records of Connecticut contain numerous 
references to commercial transactions involving the Dutch from New Netherland or the 
Dutch Republic.  As well, Connecticut’s merchants looked for new plantation locations, 
in part, on locations best situated “on the coast for trade with the Indians and the 
Dutch.”85  Connecticut merchants created zones of trading opportunity along Long Island 
                                                85	  In	   a	   rare	   instance	   in	  which	   the	  New	  Netherland	   government	   prohibited	   trade,	   the	   Director	   and	  Council	   passed	   an	   ordinance	   in	   1642	   prohibiting	   the	   purchase	   of	   produce	   raised	   near	   Fort	   Hope	  because	   of	   English	   usurpation	   of	   Dutch-­‐claimed	   territory	   in	   the	   area.	   	   See	   O’Callaghan,	   Laws	   and	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Sound. 
 Not to be outdone by their male counterparts, trade to Connecticut offered 
opportunities for New Netherland’s women.  They, too, were not constrained by 
geographical boundaries of trade.  Women in New Netherland engaged in inter-colonial 
trade to the New England colonies often involving complex multilateral trading networks.  
For instance, Maritie Jans Joncke, widow of Cornelis van Langevelde, had trading 
ventures in Connecticut.  In childbed and ill with chickenpox in 1663, she declared an 
inventory of debt owed to her before the notary public, Walewyn van der Veen.  She 
stated Jan Koopal, the younger, “living in Stamfort in New England” owed her for half a 
yacht valued at fifty pounds sterling “payable in New England value on which is paid a 
tub of butter of about 56 lbs., English weight, and 5 bushels of maize.”  Nathaniel Mason, 
the miller, “at Narrewack [Norwich] in New England,” owed her twelve bushels of 
maize.  Moreover, from her partnership with Albert Albertsen, she expected to receive a 
hogshead of prunes, bushels of maize, and butter, allocated in “Stamfort.”86 
 While New Amsterdam’s merchants often plied the waters of Long Island Sound, 
merchants from Beverwijck ventured down the Hudson and into the Sound as well.  The 
court records of an extraordinary session held at Fort Orange in 1658 tell of one such 
trading trip along the Connecticut River.  We learn of the journey only because one 
                                                                                                                                            
Ordinances	   of	   New	  Netherland,	  29-­‐30.	   	   For	   plantation	   locations,	   see	   Frances	   Manwaring	   Caulkins,	  
History	  of	  New	  London,	  Connecticut	  (New	  London:	  H.D.	  Utley,	  1895),	  42.	  86	  Fernow,	   Minutes	   of	   the	   Orphan	   Masters	   Court	   of	   New	   Amsterdam,	   2:34-­‐6.	   	   Women’s	   trading	  activities	   in	   the	  Dutch	  Republic	  were	  well	   known	   to	   the	  English.	   	   Roger	  Coke	  noted	   in	   1670,	   “The	  Dutch	  generally	  breed	  their	  youth	  of	  both	  Sexes	  in	  the	  Studies	  of	  Geometry	  and	  numbers,	  especially	  more	  than	  the	  English	  do.”	   	  These	  subjects	  being	  some	  of	   the	   foundational	   tools,	   in	  his	  opinion,	   for	  success	  in	  trade.	  	  See	  Roger	  Coke,	  A	  Discourse	  of	  Trade	  (London:	  Printed	  for	  H.	  Brome	  and	  R.	  Horne,	  1670).	   	   Dutch	   society	   legally	   acknowledged	   women’s	   roles	   in	   trade.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Danielle	   van	   den	  Heuvel,	   Women	   &	   Entrepreneurship:	   Female	   Traders	   in	   the	   Northern	   Netherlands,	   c.	   1580-­‐1815	  (Amsterdam:	  Aksant,	  2007).	  	  Fur	  a	  fuller	  examination	  of	  women’s	  trading	  activities	  and	  legal	  rights	  in	  New	   Netherland,	   see	   Martha	   Dickinson	   Shattuck,	   “A	   Civil	   Society:	   Court	   and	   Community	   in	  Beverwijck,	  New	  Netherland,	  1652-­‐1664”	  (Ph.D.	  diss.,	  Boston	  University,	  1993).	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member of the journey sued another for defamation.  Ida Claessen brought the action 
against Dirck Carstensen alleging that Carstensen called her a thief.  The seven 
Beverwijck traders had traded beaver pelts and goods across the Sound and into the 
Connecticut River.  The court found for Claessen.  Given the Dutch attitude toward 
women in trade, the court had no difficulty with Claessen’s trading.87 
 The Bay Colony also sought to encourage foreign vessels to trade at Boston.  
Winthrop was a keen observer of the arrival of foreign ships laden with goods for trade.  
There was a particular need for subsistence commodities early in the colony’s existence.  
The Dutch accommodated this need.  In 1631, a Dutch pinnace brought Virginian corn to 
Salem.  A Dutch ship in 1632, again from Virginia, brought two thousand bushels of 
corn, “which was sold at four shillings sixpence the bushel.”  In May 1633, a Dutch pink 
arrived in Boston that had been trading southward.  A Dutch ship of one hundred and 
sixty tons arrived at Marblehead in May 1635 carrying 140 tons of salt and “ten thousand 
weight of tobacco.”  The ship had come from St. Christopher Island, an English colony.  
In June of that year, two Dutch ships arrived with livestock.  They carried “twenty-seven 
Flaners mares, at £34 a mare, and three horses; sixty-three heifers, at £12	  the	  beast;	  and	  eight-­‐eight	  sheep,	  at	  50s.	  the	  sheep.	  	  They	  came	  from	  the	  Tessel	  [Texel]	  in	  five	  weeks	  three	  days,	  and	  lost	  not	  one	  beast	  or	  sheep.”	  	  Winthrop	  wrote	  in	  1636	  “Divers	  of	  the	  
                                                87	  Van	  Laer,	  Minutes	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Fort	  Orange	  and	  Beverwyck,	  2:146-­‐8.	  	  Given	  the	  number	  of	  women	  trading	  in	  New	  Netherland	  and	  elsewhere,	  it	   is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Dutch	  attitude	  toward	  trade	  was	  that	  good	  trade	  transcended	  gender.	   	  The	  Englishman	  Josiah	  Child	  wrote	  that	  one	  of	  the	  things	  that	  increased	   the	   wealth	   of	   the	   Northern	   Netherlands,	   was	   “the	   education	   of	   their	   Children,	   as	   well	  Daughters	   as	   Sons;	   all	  which,	   be	   they	   of	   never	   so	   great	   quality	   or	   estate,	   they	   always	   take	   care	   to	  bring	   up	   to	  write	   perfect	   good	   hands,	   and	   to	   have	   the	   full	   knowledge	   and	   use	   of	   Arithmetick	   and	  Merchant-­‐Accounts.”	   	   Dutch	   children	   grew	   up	   to	   have	   “an	   ability	   for	   Commerce	   of	   all	   kinds.”	  	  According	   to	  Child,	   in	   the	  Netherlands,	  parents	   raised	  both	  sons	  and	  daughters	   to	  be	  able	   to	   run	  a	  business,	   even	   in	   the	   lower	   strata	   of	   society.	   	   Josiah	   Child,	   A	   new	   discourse	   of	   trade:	   wherein	   is	  
recommended	  several	  weighty	  points	  relating	  to	  companies	  of	  merchants,	  etc.	  (London,	  1693),	  4.	   	  The	  processes	  of	  trading	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  were	  repeated	  in	  New	  Netherland,	  supported	  by	  the	  laws,	  and	  society’s	  acceptance	  that	  enabled	  women	  to	  engage	  in	  trade.	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ships	  this	  spring,	  both	  out	  of	  the	  Downs	  and	  from	  Holland,	  came	  in	  five	  weeks.”88	  	  As	  time	   passed,	   the	   demand	   for	   subsistence	   commodities	   subsided	   and	   the	   Dutch	  brought	  commodities	  to	  satisfy	  consumer	  demands.	  	   Trade	  between	  the	  Dutch	  and	  the	  New	  Haven	  colony	  both	  prospered	  because	  of	  proximity	  and	  suffered	  because	  of	  political	  disputes	  over	   territorial	  boundaries.	  	  Court	  records	  provide	  evidence	  of	  Dutch	  merchants	  who	  traded	  in	  the	  New	  Haven	  colony	  from	  its	  earliest	  days,	  as	  well	  as	  Dutchmen	  who	  settled	  there.	  	   When	  Theophilus	  Eaton	  in	  1638	  purchased	  land	  from	  local	  Indians	  in	  order	  to	   settle	  what	  would	  become	   the	  New	  Haven	  colony,	   the	  Dutch	  protested	   that	   the	  settlers	  were	  “violators	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  his	  Lords	  for	  being	  soe	  bould	  as	  to	  meddle	  att	  Newhaven	  within	  the	  Limitts	  of	  New	  Netherland.”	   	  The	  English	  argued	  that	  the	  Dutch	  had	  failed	  to	  people	  and	  plant	  the	  land	  and,	  therefore,	  did	  not	  have	  any	  claim	  to	   the	   land.	   	   Political	   disputes	   and	   geographical	   boundaries	   failed	   to	   deter	   Dutch	  traders	  from	  trading	  in	  New	  Haven.	  	  Trade	  saw	  a	  welcome	  reception	  from	  most	  New	  Haven	   residents	   and	   governmental	   figures.	   	   Certainly,	   some	  New	  Haven	   colonists	  had	  previous	  contact	  with	  the	  Dutch	  in	  patria.89	  	   The Dutch were early travelers to Rhode Island as well.90 After exploring Long 
Island Sound, the Housatonic River, and the Connecticut River in 1614, the Dutch 
                                                88	  Hosmer,	  ed.,	  Winthrop’s	  Journal,	  1:56	  (Salem	  corn),	  76	  (Virginia	  ship	  with	  corn),	  102	  (Dutch	  pink),	  151	  (St.	  Christopher	  Island	  ship),	  152	  (livestock	  ship).	  89	  David	   Peterson	   de	  Vries	  wrote	   in	   1639	   about	  meeting	   the	   governor	   of	   the	   English	   fort	   at	   Fresh	  River	   [Connecticut	   River],	   Lion	   Gardiner,	   “who	   had	   had	   a	   Netherland	   wife	   from	  Worden,	   and	   he	  himself	  had	  formerly	  been	  an	  engineer	  and	  working-­‐baas	  in	  Holland.	  	  De	  Vries,	  Voyages	  from	  Holland	  
to	  America,	  125.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  first	  settlers	  of	  New	  Haven	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  as	  well.	  90	  The	   name	   “Rhode	   Island”	   is	   said	   to	   be	   derived	   from	   the	  Dutch	   “Roode	   Eylandt”	   or	   “Red	   Island”	  because	  of	  the	  color	  of	  its	  cliffs	  as	  noted	  by	  Adriaen	  Block.	  	  Others	  attribute	  the	  name	  to	  Giovanni	  da	  Verrazzano,	   the	   sixteenth	   century	   Italian	   explorer,	  who	   noted	   similarities	   to	   the	   Island	   of	   Rhodes.	  	  See,	   e.g.,	   Capers	   Jones,	   The	   History	   and	   Future	   of	   Narragansett	   Bay	   (Boca	   Raton,	   FL:	   Universal	  Publishers,	  2006),	  81.	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explorer Adriaen Block left the Sound and charted Block Island, which is named after 
him, and Narragansett Bay.  Block’s activities in the Hudson River area and in Long 
Island Sound opened the areas to Dutch traders.91 
 For the Dutch, the lucrative fur trade with the Narragansetts was the initial interest 
in trade in the region of what would become Rhode Island.  The Dutch West India 
Company developed this trade prior to English settlement, supplying trading ornaments 
and firearms to the Indians.  Despite protests by the Pilgrims in Plymouth, the Dutch 
traded at Manomet, at the head of Buzzard’s Bay.  By 1636/7, the Dutch West India 
Company had gained title from the Narragansetts and established a trading post on 
Quotenis Island in Narragansett Bay.  A Company employee, Abraham Pietersen, 
supervised operations there.  Pietersen also obtained title to another island lying near the 
Pequot (later Thames) River.  Even after English settlement, Rhode Island continued to 
be known as “Dutchman’s Island” or “Dutch Island.”  The trading post of Dutchman’s 
island provided a ready catchment for trade with the Narragansetts, including European 
goods, cloths, implements, and liquors for the Indians’ furs.  As well, it was a place for 
the Rhode Islanders to trade and obtain suitable trade goods for their own use and for 
their trade with the Narragansetts.92  By the mid-1650s, it was intolerable to English 
residents of Rhode Island to have the Dutch so close.  A consortium of approximately one 
hundred buyers purchased Dutch Island and reserved it for common use.  We can only 
                                                91	  Simon	  Hart,	  The	  Prehistory	  of	  the	  New	  Netherland	  Company	  (Amsterdam:	  City	  of	  Amsterdam	  Press,	  1959),	  48-­‐52.	  92	  Moloney,	   Traders	   of	   the	   Narragansett	   Country,	  40-­‐2.	   	   The	   early	   years	   of	   the	   Dutch	   fur	   trade	   in	  Narragansett	  Bay	  saw	  annual	  returns	  of	  approximately	  £20,000.	  	  See	  also,	  Arnold,	  History	  of	  the	  State	  
of	   Rhode	   Island	   and	   Providence	   Plantations,	   (New	   York:	   D.	   Appleton	   &	   Company,	   1859),	   1:82;	  Brodhead,	  History	  of	  New	  York,	  1:268.	  	  Pietersen,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  Abraham	  Pietersen	  van	  Deursen,	  had	   come	   to	  New	  Netherland	   from	  Haarlem.	   	   By	  1638,	   he	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   first	  miller	   in	  New	  Amsterdam	  and	  later	  serves	  on	  the	  colony’s	  council.	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surmise about the extent of trade conducted at Dutchman’s Island as the transactional 
nature of the trade is lost to history and, typically, there are no surviving accounts for the 
trading post.   
 
The Strengthening of Trade: New England and the Dutch, c. 1640-1652 
 Developing Trade  
 The notarial records in Amsterdam, as well as the Aspinwall Notarial Records 
from Boston, suggest that merchants in the Dutch Republic saw Boston as an important 
trading center.  From pipes of wine from Madeira, to the consignment of furs and tobacco 
by an English merchant to a Dutch agent, or a Boston merchant to an English agent in the 
Dutch Republic, to an agreement regarding insurance on a voyage to Boston, to a ship’s 
charter contract for a trading voyage from Amsterdam to Boston, merchant 
correspondence, notarial records, and court cases demonstrate how merchants in 
Amsterdam ignored the Dutch West India Company’s monopoly in North America and 
merchants in Boston ignored the English Navigation Acts.93 
 As well, the Aspinwall Notarial Records are filled with insight into the trading 
networks that developed between Boston and New Netherland.  From appointments as 
                                                93	  See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   5075/2278	   III,	   June	   14,	   1650,	   56-­‐8;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   5075/1097,	   June	   7,	  1651,	   162,	   162v,	   169;	   Aspinwall	   Notarial	   Records,	   August	   1645,	   16;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   5075/900,	  September	  2,	   1651,	   795;	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   5075/1539,	   June	  13,	   1658,	   196.	   	  Notarial	   records	  were	  also	  a	  means	  to	  record	  amendments	  to	  agreements.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Aspinwall,	  Aspinwall	  Notarial	  Records,	  October	   6,	   1649,	   243	   (Christopher	   Johnson	   [Christoffel	   Jensen],	   master	   of	   the	   Orangetree	   from	  Amsterdam,	  and	  a	  charter	  agreement	  to	  Virginia).	   	  For	  the	  period	  1644	  to	  1652,	  William	  Aspinwall	  was	   the	  notary	  public	   for	  Boston.	   	  Aspinwall	   had	   immigrated	   to	  Massachusetts	  with	   the	  Winthrop	  Fleet.	   	   Although	   not	   a	   notary	   public,	   Thomas	   Lechford	   kept	   a	   letter	   book	   filled	   with	   commercial	  documents.	  	  For	  an	  instance	  of	  Boston	  merchants	  ignoring	  the	  Navigation	  Acts	  see	  Charles	  T.	  Gehring,	  trans.	   and	   ed.,	   Curacao	   Papers,	   1640-­‐1665	   (Interlaken,	   N.Y.:	   Heart	   of	   the	   Lakes	   Pub.,	   1987),	   167	  (March	  4,	  1660,	   the	  ship	  Den	  Bloesem	   coming	  out	  of	  New	  England	  under	  Captain	   John	  Alen	  carried	  sugar,	   peas,	   cod,	   tobacco,	   salted	  meat,	   bacon	  which	  were	   all	   sold	   to	   the	  Dutch	   at	   Fort	  Amsterdam,	  Curacao.).	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attorney to seeking recovery of debts owed to a deceased’s estate, to the 
acknowledgement of debts owed by a New Netherland trader to Boston merchants, to 
articles of agreement between a captain and a ship’s owner, the notarial records recorded 
the most mundane of transactions to the transactions of a more complex nature.94 
Nevertheless, the key word is “record.”  The parties recognized the need for some type of 
written memorialization that would serve not only as a reminder of the terms of the 
transaction, but if a dispute arose, the notarial record could be presented in a court of law 
as evidence.  The notary typically drafted a document that set out the terms of agreement 
between the parties.  The parties signed the document, had it witnessed, and the notary 
kept a copy in his register that became part of a colony’s public record.  Some notarial 
records were in the form of testimony about an event or dispute.95 
 Like New Amsterdam, Boston became a trading center attracting merchants from 
various colonies.  It also had a commercial infrastructure that allowed merchants to 
acknowledge the terms of their agreements.  For instance, in 1649, Jacob Haey of 
“Monhatoes in the New Netherlands” agreed to pay Edmund Leach of New Haven “the 
summe of foure hundd & fourty guilders in good merchantable bever in coate at six 
guilders the pound, or skin at four guilders the pound.”  Adam Mott, also “of 
Manhatoes,” similarly acknowledged his indebtedness to Edmund Leach for 535 guilders 
under similar terms.  In addition, Peter Anderson, alias Scoftepheger, acknowledged his 
                                                94	  Aspinwall,	  Aspinwall	  Notarial	  Records,	  April	   3,	   1646,	   58	   (appointment	   of	   attorney	   for	  deceased’s	  estate);	   June	   13,	   1646,	   66	   (acknowledgement	   of	   debt);	   July	   28,	   1647,	   68	   (ship’s	   articles	   of	  agreement).	  95	  While	   we	   may	   never	   know	   the	   true	   extent	   of	   commerce	   between	   Massachusetts	   and	   New	  Netherland	   (or,	   for	   that	  matter,	  between	  any	  other	  New	  England	  colony	  and	  New	  Netherland),	   the	  Aspinwall	  Notarial	  Records	  let	  us	  look	  at	  transactions	  closer	  to	  the	  point	  of	  origin,	  so	  to	  speak,	  rather	  than	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   a	   court	   record.	   	   One	   reason	   we	   may	   never	   know	   the	   full	   extent	   of	  commerce	  between	   the	   colonies	   is	   because	   so	  many	  of	   the	   transactions	  did	  not	  warrant	   seeking	   a	  notary	  or	  other	  documentation.	  	  If	  a	  transaction	  failed,	  a	  merchant’s	  reputation	  was	  locally	  impacted.	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debt to Edmund Leach to be paid “at the Manhatas” for two pipes of wine.  In this 
instance, the parties agreed more detailed payment terms that included “the summe of 
fyve hundd & fifty guilders to be paid in good merchantable Bevers at eight guilders the 
skin at or before the 15th day of May next, or also fyve hundd guilders for the said wine in 
pound bever, in skin bever at foure guilders the pound, or els in Coate bever at six 
guilders the pound.”96 
 The notarial records also recognized the commercial links that tied Boston to New 
Amsterdam through currency pricing.  Because of a lack of coinage, beaver became a 
standard form of currency used in transactions.  Nevertheless, currency needed some 
form of regulation.  Although there was no formal acknowledgement that New 
Amsterdam determined the value of beaver against a specified coinage, there does seem 
some tacit acknowledgement by other colonies.97 
 Inter-colonial commercial transactions in the seventeenth century were conducted 
either in person or via correspondence. Yet, when it came time to collect for debts 
outstanding, merchants sought to ensure payment by appointing attornies to collect their 
debts.  Attornies were often family members, friends, or business associates who the 
creditor could rely upon to fully advance a creditor’s interests.  The creditor gave his 
attorney all the powers he held to collect the debt including bringing an action in court. 
The notarial records in Boston have several instances of powers of attorney given to 
                                                96	  Aspinwall,	   Aspinwall	   Notarial	   Records,	  August	   19,	   1649,	   218	   (Haey);	   September	   15,	   1649,	   217	  (Mott);	  July	  24,	  1649,	  218	  (Anderson).	  97	  In	  1648,	  John	  Cromwell	  admitted	  his	  indebtedness	  to	  Jonathan	  Brewster	  according	  to	  “the	  price	  as	  comonly	   it	  goes	  at	  Manhatas”	   for	   “Bever	  mooskins	  &	  some	  deere	  skins.”	   	  The	  colony	  also	  passed	  a	  special	  act	  to	  regulate	  the	  currency	  of	  Dutch	  coin	  in	  1643.	  	  The	  General	  Court	  noted	  “the	  oft	  occasions	  wee	  have	  of	  trading	  with	  the	  Hollanders	  at	  the	  Dutch	  plantation	  &	  otherwise,	  do	  therefore	  order,	  that	  the	  Hollander	  ducatour,	  worth	  3	  gilders,	  shalbee	  currant	  at	  6s	  in	  all	  payments	  within	  our	  jurisdiction,	  &	  the	  rix	  dollar,	  being	  2	  ½	  gilders,	  shalbee	  likewise	  currant	  at	  5s,	  &	  the	  ryall	  of	  8	  shalbee	  also	  currant	  at	   5s.	   	   Ibid.,	   October	   28,	   1647,	   154;	   Shurtleff,	   ed.,	   Records	   of	   the	   Governor	   and	   Company	   of	   the	  
Massachusetts	  Bay	  in	  New	  England,	  2:29.	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collect debts in New Amsterdam for transactions between Boston merchants and Dutch 
merchants resident in New Netherland.98 
 Fiscal policy also encouraged foreign vessels to trade at Boston.  Parliament in 
1642 removed any custom or duty for merchandise carried either inward or outward from 
England to New England.  This would have encouraged English goods to be shipped in 
Dutch bottoms.  By 1645, the colony collected a tax of 6d per ton on all foreign vessels 
who had sold merchandise, as well as a 10s fee for defence of the harbor (6s 8d for 
foreign ships under 200 tons).  English ships paid no customs or impost, but only a fee 
for defence of the harbor.  Political extingencies also dictated how open Boston’s port 
would be to foreign vessels.  
 Given the correspondence between Massachusetts and New Netherland, 
Massachusetts made provision for a Dutch translator.  In 1660, the General Court 
formally recognized the efforts of Mr. Symon Lynde and “his redines from tjme to tjme 
to attend to the Court & serve them therein, as neede maybe.”  The Court granted Lynde 
two hundred acres of land.  But, importantly, administrators in Massachusetts recognized 
the advantages that would incur to local merchants in providing a Dutch translator.99 
 As shipbuilding developed as a means of producing revenue for the colony, Dutch 
travelers availed themselves of the ship carpenters in Boston.  During his second voyage 
to America, David Peterson de Vries asked New Netherland’s director-general, Wouter 
                                                98	  Aspinwall,	  Aspinwall	  Notarial	  Records,	  August	  21,	  1647,	  67	   (Thomas	  Broughton	  gives	  a	  power	  of	  attorney	  to	  William	  Paddy	  of	  New	  Plymouth);	  1647,	  68	  (Adam	  Winthrop	  constitutes	  Isaac	  Allerton	  of	  New	   Haven	   his	   attorney);	   1650,	   250	   (Thomas	   Broughton	   grants	   a	   power	   of	   attorney	   to	   Thomas	  Willet	  of	  Plymouth).	  	  See	  also	  Thomas	  Lechford,	  Note-­‐Book	  Kept	  by	  Thomas	  Lechford,	  Esq.,	  Lawyer,	  in	  
Boston,	  Massachusetts	   from	  1638-­‐1641	   (Cambridge:	   John	  Wilson	   &	   Sons,	   1885),	   60	   (Peter	   Garland	  granted	  a	  power	  of	  attorney	  in	  1638	  to	  Isaac	  Allerton	  of	  New	  England	  to	  collect	  debts	  owed	  to	  him	  at	  the	  Dutch	  Plantation).	  99	  Shurtleff,	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  in	  New	  England,	  4:424.	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van Twiller, whether carpenters were available to repair De Vries’s ship.  De Vries’s ship 
had sustained damage and he had been unable to repair it in the English Virginias.  De 
Vries told Van Twiller that if carpenters were not available “I would sail to New 
England.”  Whether because of labor or supply costs, Boston became financially 
attractive to facilitate ship repairs.100 
 In an effort to create industries that would generate revenue and to compensate for 
a loss of iron products from England, Massachusetts encouraged the discovery of mines 
and numerous residents invested in an ironworks at Saugus in 1646.  The production and 
availability of iron products generated interest throughout the region.  One resident of 
New Amsterdam, David Provoost, had twenty-five bars shipped from Boston in 1649.  
The iron bars were most probably sued for ballast in ships.101 
 The records of New Haven and New Netherland provide glimpses of merchants 
who evaded political and geographical disputes between the colonies to engage in trade.  
The disputes failed to interfere with, for example, the agreement made between Jan 
Harmensen of Manados (Manhattan) with Pieter Anthony “an inhabitant and trader here 
(New Netherland) to obtain from the New Haven, Conn., magistrates three pipes of 
brandy” and ship them to New Amsterdam in 1649.  Nor did disagreement between the 
colonial ruling powers deter Richard Lord “living on the Connecticut River” from 
shipping a cargo of fresh pork for the Dutch West India Company in 1647.  In exchange, 
                                                100	  De	  Vries,	  Voyages	  from	  Holland,	  109.	  101	  The	  ironworks	  at	  Saugus	  developed	  out	  of	  necessity.	   	  As	  fewer	  ships	  came	  to	  New	  England	  from	  England,	  iron	  products	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  scarcer	  and	  more	  expensive.	  	  John	  Winthrop,	  Jr.,	  was	  at	  the	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  of	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   the	   iron	   industry	   in	   Massachusetts.	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   with	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  regarding	  mineral	   deposits,	  Winthrop	   also	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   to	   England	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   in	   his	   “Company	   of	  Undertakers	   of	   the	   Iron	  Works	   in	  New	  England.”	   	   For	   the	   legislation	   encouraging	   the	  discovery	   of	  mines,	  see	  Shurtleff,	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  in	  New	  England,	  1:327.	  	  For	  Provoost’s	  purchase,	  see	  New	  York	  Historical	  Manuscripts,	  3:116,	  202-­‐3.	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Lord received salt – half of it to be delivered to Lord and the other half to Boston.  Robert 
Martin brought suit in New Haven against Thomas Baxter of Manadoes for a debt of nine 
pounds, which Baxter was to pay in merchantable winter beaver.  John Evanc, another 
inter-colonial trader, testified to giving Baxter notice of his debt.102 
 The Dutch also provided ships to New Haven merchants.  Peter Stuyvesant sold 
the West India Company ship, the Swol, in 1647 to Stephen Goodyear, deputy governor 
of New Haven, for nine thousand guilders to be paid in provisions and wampum.103  
Dutch vessels were also available for hire regardless of nationality.  One captain noted, 
“being at Stamford, he hired a Duch vessel.”  The ease with which merchants in the area 
were able to engage Dutch ships suggests a commonplace occurrence that was mutually 
beneficial to the parties.104 
 In a unique series of letters between Governor-General Peter Stuyvesant and New 
Haven’s Governor Theophilus Eaton and Deputy Governor Stephen Goodyear, we learn 
about various trade concerns and practical transactions of commodities between the 
colonies.  Despite occasional differences, the officials transacted trade between New 
Haven and New Netherland.  In an undated letter, but around October 1647, Goodyear 
wrote to Stuyvesant “to send me 50 or 100 skipples of salte, and to fetch your beefe and 
porke.”  In return, Goodyear promised to send more wheat once men were found for 
thrashing.  New Haven also provided opportunity for Stuyvesant to source cattle and 
other provisions for the colony and for Curacao.  In a letter dated 1647, Goodyear 
explained that he was obliged to furnish cattle he had set aside for trade with Barbados to 
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  ed.,	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  1649-­‐1662	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  New	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  1917),	  1:76-­‐7.	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  Van	  Laer,	  ed.,	  New	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  Historical	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  4:140.	  104	  Hoadly,	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  or	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  of	  New	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fulfill an agreement he had made with Stuyvesant.  Perhaps the Dutch market offered a 
better price or more demand.  Later in 1651/52, Goodyear wrote about Stuyvesant’s 
desire for some provisions “(and my owne desire being to settle a trade with you if I 
might upon a Just & equall way of dealing) If you please to write a few lynes of what you 
desire I hope I shall furnish you with such a quantity.”105 
 Governor Eaton sought confirmation, and perhaps expressed some anxiety, about 
English traders’ ability to trade at Manhattan.  He acknowledged “Wee know wee have as 
full libertie to trade with Dutch merchants within our harbors & to admit Dutch 
inhabitants into our plantacions as you the English.”  In a subsequent letter, he stated “All 
in the English collonies may anchor where they themselves see good, in reference to 
theyre safetie and convenience, whence I conceive that in all respects they shall finde the 
Manhataes, both in theyre trade there, & in theyre passage to and froe, as open & free as 
the English harbours have hitherto bynne to the Dutch.”  Stuyvesant’s reply attempted to 
relive Eaton’s anxieties.  He asserted “although upon request I never denyde any of your 
countriemen libertie to anchor where they pleased after they shewne theyre obedience to 
the said order.”106  As a means to encourage trade, Stuyvesant informed Easton that he 
had suspended the ten percent duty previously demanded of English merchants wishing 
to trade in New Netherland. 
 It was a pressing issue for Easton and one that suggests how valuable trade with 
New Amsterdam had become for New Haven.  To Stuyvesant’s letter regarding the 
                                                105	  Hoadly,	   Records	   of	   the	   Colony	   and	   Plantation	   of	   New	  Haven	   from	   1638	   to	   1649	   (Hartford:	   Case,	  Tiffany	  and	  Company,	  1857),	  511-­‐2,	  517.	  	  Fernow,	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  the	  Colonial	  History	  of	  New	  
York,	  14:158-­‐9,	  184.	  	  Goodyear	  offered	  pork	  and	  beef,	  and	  had	  already	  loaded	  malt	  and	  bran.	  	  He	  was	  awaiting	  wheat	  and	  peas	  to	  send	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  to	  Stuyvesant.	  106	  Stuyvesant	   tried	   to	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   the	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   of	   English	   traders	   wishing	   to	   trade	   in	   New	  Netherland.	  	  While	  he	  had	  suspended	  the	  ten	  percent	  duty,	  it	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  English	  traders	  could	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  New	  Netherland’s	  laws	  and	  tariffs.	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suspension of duties, Eaton asked “Wheather the English in there trading att the 
Manhataes, and in theyre passing by to and from Deleware, Virginia &c. may expect a 
full freedome from all recognition, imposition or charge, by what name soeuer called, 
both for goods imported and exported, or what duties, restraints or confiscations they 
must paye and submit unto, & upon what grownds, that the merchant seing his waye, may 
walke safelie.”  Somewhat exasperated, Stuyvesant replied to Easton “Whereas yow 
write to me concerning your counriemens trading heere, and passing to and from Virginia 
and Deleware, &c. I have allready written & graunted as much as I can or dare doe, untill 
I have further order from my souereignes and masters, and am not to be responsible to 
any but them, nor regulated by any but them.”107  The correspondence demonstrates the 
unique position of both men.  Each was charged with the administration of a colony and 
answerable to a government thousands of miles away.  At the same time, each man was 
cognizant of his colony’s need for trade and the demands of merchants who he governed. 
 Rhode Island also saw advantages of trade with the Dutch.  On September 19, 
1642, the General Court meeting in Newport ordered the establishment of a regular trade 
with the Dutch in New Amsterdam.  The General Court decreed, “the Governour and 
Deputie shall treat with the Governour of the Dutch to supply us with necessaries, and to 
take our commodities at such rates as may be suitable.”108  Rhode Island’s leaders felt 
compelled to open up trade with the Dutch for because of the outbreak of the English 
Civil War and the curtailing of commercial shipping to the colonies. 
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  Hoadly,	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  of	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  Colony	  and	  Plantation	  of	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  from	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  to	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   trans.	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 Trade Disputes 
 Despite the trading relationships that developed between merchants in the New 
England colonies and their Dutch counterparts, disputes did arise.  One dispute that 
carried through this period concerned the Dutch sale of guns and ammunition to Indians. 
 The earliest dispute arose with the colonists of Plymouth, who despite the Dutch 
provision of needed commodities, attempted to protect their trade with the Indians 
residing within their jurisdiction and prohibited the Dutch from engaging in trade with 
them. This protectionist attitude had only limited success.  In the initial exchange with De 
Rasière, Bradford Asked that the people of New Netherland “would forebear to trade 
with the natives in this bay, and river of Narragansett…which is (as it were) at our 
doors.”109 
 A cause of vexation for Connecticut was the sale of firearms by the Dutch to 
Indians residing within the colony.  As early as 1642, Connecticut prohibited the sale of 
firearms to Indians by any persons.110  This did not appear to have stopped prominent 
New Amsterdam merchant Govert Loockermans from engaging in trade with the Indians 
for such items.  In May 1649, Loockermans failed to appear at a court in Hartford to 
answer charges of illegal trading and forfeited his substantial recognizance bond.  
Loockermans later appeared in court that September professing “his innocency in not 
selling any powder or shott to Indians, but onely the quantity of a pound wch hee once 
                                                109	  Bradford,	  Governor	  Bradford’s	  Letter	  Book,	  30.	  110	  The	   prohibition	   arose	   because	   of	   a	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   about	   Indian	   uprisings	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   European	   settlers.	  	  While	   the	  Dutch	  were	   often	   targeted	   as	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   perpetrators	   for	   the	   sale	   of	   firearms	   to	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   tribes	   in	  exchange	  for	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  this	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  Dutch	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gave to a Sachem….”111 
 Despite court proceedings against Loockermans, Dutch merchants continued to 
ply the waters of Long Island Sound to trade with the Indians.  By 1649, Connecticut 
restricted all trade with the Indians, by specifically excluding “any Frenchman, 
Dutchman or person of any other forraigne nation, or any English living amongste them 
or under the government of them or any of them.”  A General Court meeting in 1650 then 
prohibited for one year all trade by foreigners within Connecticut and by any Connecticut 
resident selling goods belonging to a foreigner.  In 1651, Augustine Herriman (to the 
Dutch known as “Herman”), a Dutch merchant from New Amsterdam, forfeited both his 
vessel and goods in contravention of the law.  Herriman had engaged in trading coats 
with Indians near Seabrooke (Saybrook).112  The pursuit of profit outweighed the risk of 
seizure.  How many commercial ventures succeeded in trading with the Indians we will 
never know.  It is certainly not something that a prudent merchant would have committed 
to correspondence or discussed beyond his most intimate of associates. 
 Like Connecticut, trade with the Indians by the French and Dutch became a point 
of contention for the Bay Colony.  In 1650, the General Court prohibited any person of 
any foreign nation, or any Englishman living in a foreign nation, to trade with the 
                                                111	  J.	   Hammond	   Trumbull	   and	   Charles	   J.	   Hoadly,	   eds.,	   Public	   Records	   of	   the	   Colony	   of	   Connecticut	  (Hartford:	   Brown	   &	   Parsons,	   1850),	   1:79,	   184,	   198.	   	   Fernow,	   Documents	   Relative	   to	   the	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History	   of	  New	  York,	  14:94.	   	   Govert	   Loockermans	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   the	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   and	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   similar	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  in	  Rhode	  Island.	  	  In	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  Stuyvesant	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  Amsterdam	  in	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   acted	   initially	   as	   agent	   for	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  New	  Netherland.	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Indians.  Should they be found guilty of trading with the Indians within the jurisdiction of 
Massachusetts, they would have their goods and vessels confiscated.113  The records do 
not disclose any prosecution of a resident of New Netherland or the Dutch Republic for 
trading with the Indians. 
 Rhode Island enacted similar prohibitions about trade with the Indians by the 
Dutch.  By 1647, the General Court imposed trading barriers on the Dutch and other 
European nations trading in Rhode Island.  Merchants from such nations, including “any 
Englishman inhabiting among them,” had to pay customs and duties “as we doe among 
them.”  The only imported commodity excluded from the legislation was beaver.  Nor 
were merchants from such nations allowed to trade with the Indians within Rhode Island 
“upon paine of forfeiture of Shipp and Goods.”  The order further decreed that a letter 
should be written to the Dutch governor conveying this information.114  While Rhode 
Islanders had established trade inland with the Indians for furs, the real intention of the 
act was to curtail the extensive coastal trading by the Dutch, which continued as late as 
1647 with the Dutch occupation of Dutchman’s Island.115  Despite the prohibition on 
trading with Indians, Govert Loockermans faced accusations of trading powder and lead 
with Rhode Island Indians as well.116  For the Dutch, the acquisition of furs merited the 
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  place	  where	   “the	  natives	   could	   lay	   in	  a	   supply	  of	  strong	   waters	   sufficient	   to	   keep	   an	   Indian	   village	   in	   an	   uproar,”	   as	   well	   as	   purchasing	   firearms	  despite	  efforts	  of	  Rhode	  Island	  to	  legislate	  against	  this.	  116 	  Council	   Minutes	   of	   New	   Netherland,	   May	   2,	   1648.	   	   Govert	   Loockermans	   represented	   the	  Amsterdam	  merchant	  house	  of	  Seth	  and	  Gillis	  Verbrugge.	  	  Loockermans’s	  trading	  activities	  provided	  difficulties	  for	  another	  of	  New	  Netherland’s	  merchants	  trading	  in	  Rhode	  Island.	  	  Govert	  Aertsen	  faced	  threatened	  imprisonment	  in	  Rhode	  Island	  because	  of	  a	  case	  of	  mistaken	  identity	  with	  Loockermans.	  	  In	  1648,	  Aertsen	  “requested	  a	  certificate	  of	  the	  honorable	  director	  general	  and	  council,	  to	  be	  shown	  to	  the	  magistrates	  in	  New	  England,	  that	  his	  name	  is	  Govert	  Aertsz	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risk of forfeiture. 
 Dutch aggression in continued trading with the Indians prompted a further order 
from the General Court of Rhode Island in May 1652.  In an order specifically directed at 
the Dutch, the Court legislated, “that all Dutchmen, except inhabitants amongst us, are 
prohibited to trade with the Indians in this Collonie.”  Forfeiture of goods and vessels was 
the penalty to be imposed for any transgression.117  What differentiated this legislation 
from similar legislation in Connecticut and Massachusetts was the exclusion of Dutch 
inhabitants living in Rhode Island.  Did they provide a vital link to New Netherland and 
trade goods there?  Again, the “Dutch Governor of the Menadoes [Manhattan]” was to be 
given notice about the prohibition of trade with the Indians.118 
 Aside from trade restrictions that arose in time of war and the constraints with 
respect to Indians, Plymouth and Massachusetts imposed general trade restrictions. 
Plymouth imposed trade restrictions because of its poor agricultural prospects.  The 
General Court ordered in 1626 that no corn, beans, or peas could be sold out of the 
colony without the governor and assistants’ permission.  In 1633, the Court declared that 
“no sheep be sold out of the colony, under penalty of forfeiting their due value.” This 
later expanded to include livestock.  The colonial government’s attempt to regulate and 
control all aspects of the colony’s economy thereby inhibited economic growth.  The 
Court had to acknowledge its disparity with regard to the other English colonies when in 
1644/45 “a motion is made this Court for a genall trade wth the other governments in 
confederacon wth us, wee do thankfully acknowledge their love and respect to us therein; 
but we conceive such a disproportion in our estates to theirs, and so many thousands 
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required therein, the wch wee are not able to reach unto….”119 The trade restrictions 
certainly curtailed the ordinary trade that the Dutch would have undertaken with 
Plymouth Colony. 
 While Massachusetts investors were building industries, the General Court there 
attempted to control many facets of the local economy, particularly during the 1630s.  It 
ordered the rate to be paid for beaver, prohibited the purchase from any trading vessel of 
corn or any other provision or merchantable commodity without prior permission of the 
Governor or an Assistant, regulated the assignment of debts, and prohibited the removal 
of money or beaver from the colony without the Governor’s permission.  The General 
Court also sought to prevent “the loss of time, and drunkenness…and the excessive prices 
of commodities” when merchant ships entered port to trade.  It ordered the appointment 
of one person from each town to purchase for the entire community who would then sell 
his purchases within twenty days.  Winthrop stated the measure was a failure.120  In 
essence, the colony wanted to control the free trade aspects of commercial behavior. 
Though, the regulations did not put off the Dutch from trade with Massachusetts. 
 Aside from trade disputes, of all the New England colonies, Connecticut had the 
most contentious relationship with the Dutch of New Netherland.  Disputes between the 
colonies over geographical boundaries took place on Long Island’s north shore, the South 
River, and on the Connecticut River.  The political dispute between Connecticut and New 
Netherland affected trade relations.  The issue of the lucrative fur trade reached a climax 
in 1650.  Prohibition of fur trade participation by the Dutch or French, prompted 
Stuyvesant to attend a conference in Hartford to meet the Commissioners of the United 
                                                119	  Shurtleff,	  The	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  New	  Plymouth	  in	  New	  England,	  1:13;	  2:82.	  120	  John	   Noble,	   Records	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   Assistants	   of	   the	   Colony	   of	   Massachusetts	   Bay,	   1630-­‐1692	  (Boston:	  Rockwell	  and	  Churchill	  Press,	  1904),	  2:8,	  16,	  18,	  21.	  	  Hosmer,	  Winthrop’s	  Journal,	  152.	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Colonies and settle their differences.  The Treaty of Hartford, which resulted from the 
conference, settled the boundary between New England and the Dutch territories, but did 
not concede the Dutch any trading privileges that had been prohibited in 1649.121 
 
 The First Anglo-Dutch War 
 War is disruptive, even if it being fought thousands of miles away.  Reaction to 
the First Anglo-Dutch War among the various colonies in North America was varied. 
 When news of the Anglo-Dutch war reached the shores of North America, the 
Massachusetts General Court issued orders prohibiting trade with the Dutch.  Any person 
within Massachusetts was prohibited from “carrying provissions, as corne, beefe, pease, 
bread, or porke.”  If convicted, the offender would pay treble the value of the traded 
items.  A special warning was given to all ships and smaller vessels to comply with the 
order.  They were required to give a caution, or bond, to the secretary to ensure 
compliance with the order.  In the wake of legislation prohibiting trade with the Dutch, 
prosecutions were made and the government confiscated vessels and goods.  In May 
1654, Captain Jacobson was accused of trading with the Dutch and not giving caution to 
the secretary.  Pursuant to the law, his bark was forfeited.  Within three months after the 
conclusion of the war in 1654, the Court repealed the law prohibiting trade with the 
Dutch.122 
 In New Haven, the Anglo-Dutch War brought about discussions by the New 
                                                121	  See	   Jaap	   Jacobs,	  New	  Netherland:	   A	  Dutch	   Colony	   in	   Seventeenth-­‐Century	  America	   (Leiden:	   Brill,	  2005);	  Jaap	  Jacobs,	  “The	  Hartford	  Treaty:	  A	  European	  Perspective	  on	  a	  New	  World	  Conflict,”	  de	  Halve	  
Maen	  68	  (1995),	  74-­‐9.	  122	  Shurtleff,	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  in	  New	  England,	  4:120-­‐1,	  189,	  197.	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England Confederation about whether to engage in war on New Netherland.123  The 
proposal disrupted trade and subjected New Haven merchants to scrutiny with regard to 
their own trading activities.  Joshua Atwater, a merchant in New Haven, “was 
complained of for tradeing with the Duch jurisdiction.”  Atwater confessed he had traded 
with another merchant at Hempsted [Long Island] for sugar, liquor, and candles.  Others 
were reported, including Lieutenant Robert Seely and Sergeant Thomas Jeffery.  
Moreover, reports came in from outlying towns about Dutchmen who “knew our order 
had traded at Stamford.”  Officials sought guidance from the court about how to 
proceed.124  Complaint was also made against Captain John Manning, who was accused 
of trading with “the Dutch at the Munnadoes this last winter.”  Officials in Milford made 
the initial examinations in which Manning denied any trade with the Dutch.  In a lengthy 
examination, Manning later admitted to the New Haven authorities that he had been to 
Manhattan to sell provisions to the Dutch and had carried tobacco from Virginia to 
Manhattan as well for them.  He did so, he confessed to the court privately, as part of a 
plot devised in England and known to the Virginians to “make discovery at and of the 
Munnadoes, that he might take advantage to surprise it.”  The court did not believe 
                                                123	  Established	   in	   1643,	   the	   New	   England	   Confederation	   was	   a	   political	   and	   military	   alliance	   of	  Massachusetts,	   Plymouth,	   Connecticut,	   and	   New	   Haven.	   	   Rhode	   Island	   was	   excluded	   from	  membership.	   	   Despite	   discussions	   about	   war	   against	   New	   Netherland,	   and	   some	   preparation,	  Massachusetts	   declined	   to	   participate.	   	   Dexter,	   Ancient	   Records,	   1:181,	   185.	   	   Town	   meetings	   at	  Stamford	   and	   Fairfield,	   voted	   to	   “raise	   volunteers	   to	   goe	   against	   the	   Duch.”	   	   What	   caused	   this	  aggression	  toward	  the	  Dutch	  in	  New	  Netherland,	  particularly	  given	  trading	  relationships,	  e.g.,	  private	  traders,	   weekly	   markets	   in	   New	   Amsterdam?	   Hoadly,	   Records	   of	   the	   Colony	   or	   Jurisdiction	   of	   New	  
Haven,	  from	  May	  1653	  to	  the	  Union,	  47-­‐8.	  124	  Ibid.,	  200.	  	  Hoadly,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  or	  Jurisdiction	  of	  New	  Haven,	  from	  May	  1653	  to	  the	  Union,	  43.	  	  Perhaps	  Seely	  had	  established	  Dutch	  contacts	  in	  an	  earlier	  incident.	  	  Seely,	  in	  1651,	  was	  one	  of	  a	  group	   of	   approximately	   fifty	   men	   who	   sailed	   from	   New	   Haven	   Colony	   to	   the	   Delaware	   region	   to	  establish	   a	   colony.	   	  When	   Stuyvesant	   heard	   of	   the	   proposed	   peopling	   by	  New	  Haven	   colonists,	   he	  threatened	  to	  use	  force	  against	  any	  English	  who	  should	  invade	  Dutch	  territory.	  	  When	  Seely	  and	  the	  others	  landed	  at	  New	  Amsterdam,	  Stuyvesant	  had	  them	  arrested	  and	  only	  released	  them	  when	  they	  promised	   to	   abandon	   the	   undertaking.	   Concerning	   the	   Dutch	   trade	   at	   Stamford,	   the	   Court	   took	   a	  mitigating	   approach	   offering	   the	   parties	   the	   opportunity	   to	   “excuse	   or	   mitigate	   the	   offence”	   and	  apply	  to	  the	  court	  of	  magistrates	  for	  a	  hearing.	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Manning and ordered the sale of his vessel.125 
 Like other English colonies in this period, New Haven prohibited trade with the 
Dutch until 1653 until further notice. 126   Stuyvesant expressed concern about the 
disruption in trade between the colonies and sought to maintain “that love & peace & 
friendlie Compliance” with his New Haven neighbors.  The Court noted that there 
continued to be “free course at the Manhatoes to paye debts belonging to those in this 
jurisdiction” and agreed that “just debts” owed by New Haven residents in New 
Amsterdam could be paid so long as debts were paid to New Haven residents as well.  
Thus, both colonies attempted to secure payment for debts already incurred.127  By July 
1654, with peace concluded between the Dutch Republic and England, New Haven 
repealed its laws and orders prohibiting trade with the Dutch. 
 While some trade existed between New Haven and the Dutch during the war, 
trading relationships between Rhode Island and the Dutch caused tension in the English 
colony.  With news of England’s declaration of war against the Dutch Republic in July 
1652, by October of 1652 the intolerance toward the Dutch trading in Rhode Island had 
worsened. The General Assembly ordered that “no forinner, Dutch, French, or of any 
other nation, shall bee received as a free inhabitant in any of the Townes of our Collonie, 
or to have any trade with the Indians,” except through general consent granted.128 
Regardless of mounting tensions between the Dutch and English, Rhode Island courts 
                                                125	  Hoadly,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  or	  Jurisdiction	  of	  New	  Haven,	  from	  May	  1653	  to	  the	  Union,	  68-­‐75.	  126	  The	  open-­‐endedness	  of	   the	  prohibition	   is	   interesting.	   	   It	  suggested	  recognition	  of	   the	   latest	  geo-­‐political	   dispute	   between	   England	   and,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   Dutch	   Republic,	   but	   that	   trade	   would	   be	  reinstated	  between	  the	  North	  American	  colonies	  once	  such	  differences	  elsewhere	  were	  resolved.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  that	  was	  exactly	  what	  occurred.	  127	  Fernow,	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  the	  Colonial	  History	  of	  New	  York,	  14:179-­‐80;	  Hoadly,	  Records	  of	  the	  
Colony	  or	  Jurisdiction	  of	  New	  Haven,	  from	  May	  1653	  to	  the	  Union,	  25.	  128	  Ibid.,	  245-­‐6.	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maintained impartiality in a dispute originating in Warwick. A Dutch vessel had arrived 
in January of 1652 on a trading voyage. The crew, including merchant Jan Gerardy, 
resided with John Warner, one of the magistrates of Warwick.  Gerardy and Warner were 
related through marriage. They stored their trading goods at his house. A dispute arose 
after settling their accounts and the parties attempted to settle the dispute by arbitration.  
Gerardy appealed to the General Court and the Court held a special session. Warner 
defaulted in the matter and the jury assessed damages for Gerardy.  As a result of 
Warner’s conduct in this matter, the General Court both degraded Warner from office and 
disfranchised him. Later charges of “insufferable treachery against the town” saw 
Warner’s house and lands attached.129  The court’s actions suggest the importance of 
maintaining unprejudiced judgment in actions involving trading relationships with other 
colonies. 
Perhaps in response to the Battle of Dungeness in November 1652 and the 
disappointing news received about England’s efforts during the First Anglo-Dutch War, 
Rhode Island raised forts to defend itself against the Dutch.130  The Commissioners 
ordered in May 1653 “no provisions bee transported out of this Collonie for the supply of 
the Dutch, upon forfeiture of the double valew.”  Further, “no man within the limits of 
this Collonie presume to take vessells or goods from the Dutch” without the express 
permission of the General Court.  The citizens of Providence raised objections to the 
                                                129	  Arnold,	   History	   of	   the	   State	   of	   Rhode	   Island,	   241.	   Warner	   and	   his	   family	   left	   Rhode	   Island	   for	  England	   shortly	   after	   this	   incident.	   Jan	   Gerardy	   had	   become	   a	   resident	   of	  Warwick	   prior	   to	   1648,	  having	  previously	   lived	   in	  New	  Amsterdam	  with	  his	   family.	   	  An	   incident	   in	  1652	  involving	  Gerardy	  and	   others	   drew	   the	   wrath	   of	   Narragansett	   sachems	   and	   Roger	   Williams	   remarked	   that	   “the	  Dutchman’s	   goods	   and	  debts”	  were	   attached	  until	   he	   satisfied	   the	   Sachem’s	   charges.	  Nevertheless,	  Gerardy	  conducted	  substantial	  trade	  with	  both	  colonies.	  130	  The	  First	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  War	  was	  the	  first	  war	  to	  be	  fought	  entirely	  at	  sea,	  with	  no	  operations	  aimed	  at	  landing	  or	  supporting	  troops	  on	  shore.	  The	  war	  did	  not	  extend	  beyond	  European	  waters.	  
  
 76 
prohibition asserting they “knew not for what reasons” the trade was stopped.131  
 The colony appeared divided in 1653 with respect to how to treat any potential 
threat from their Dutch neighbors and to defend Englishmen living on Long Island.132  
The towns of Portsmouth and Newport granted commissions to certain persons to go 
against the Dutch to which the town of Providence and Warwick objected.133While news 
of the war had not yet reached Rhode Island, the General Assembly in May 1654 
examined Giles Glover about his trading activities with the Dutch in New Netherland.  
Glover admitted to traveling there twice.  On the second occasion, he went with John 
Garioud who also traded there.  The men “brought howes, gunnes and powder.”134 
Garioud’s parents lived in New Amsterdam and Glover said “he traded with some that 
weare not his Father and Mother.” Robert Westkote, also of Rhode Island, was in New 
Amsterdam to purchase beavers and liquor, but Glover admitted that he did not know 
whether Westkote purchased the items, but he did know he purchased howes on 
Garioud’s account. Glover concluded his testimony by indicating that Garioud also 
                                                131	  Bartlett,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  Rhode	  Island,	  261.	  
132 The General Court authorized cannon, smaller arms, and twenty volunteers to aid the English, as well as 
appointing a Court of Admiralty for the trial of prizes. Arnold, History of the State of Rhode Island, 246. 133	  On	  May	   26,	   1653,	   the	   towns	   of	   Portsmouth	   and	  Newport	   proposed	   “that	  we	   judge	   it	   to	   be	   our	  dutie	   to	   afford	   our	   countremen	   on	   Long	   Island,	   what	   helpe	   we	   can	   safely	   doe,	   by	   virtue	   of	   our	  comission	  from	  ye	  Right	  Honorable	  ye	  Councell	  of	  State,	  either	  for	  defendinge	  themselves	  against	  ye	  Dutch,	  ye	  enemies	  of	  ye	  Commonwealth,	  or	  for	  offendinge	  them	  as	  by	  us	  shall	  be	  thought	  necessarie.”	  Bartlett,	  Records	   of	   the	  Colony	   of	  Rhode	   Island,	  265-­‐67.	   	   In	   early	   June	   1653,	   the	   General	   Assembly	  [states]	   “notwithstandinge	   al	   our	   aforesayd	   endeavours	   to	   re-­‐unite	   the	   sayd	   two	   Townes	   of	  Portsmouth	  and	  Newport	  unto	  us,…the	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  sayd	  two	  Townes	  have,	  as	  we	  are	  informed,	  in	   the	  name	  or	  by	   the	  authoritie	  of	   the	  Collonie	  of	  Providence	  Plantations,	   granted	  and	  given	  unto	  John	  Underhill,	  Edward	  Hull	  and	  William	  Dyre,	  a	  commission	  or	  commissions	  tending	  to	  war,	  which	  is	  like,	  for	  aught	  we	  see,	  to	  set	  all	  New	  England	  on	  fire,	  for	  the	  event	  of	  war	  is	  various	  and	  uncertaine;	  and	  although	  the	  honoured	  councill	  of	  State's	  direction	  to	  us,	  videlicit,	  to	  offend	  the	  Dutch	  as	  we	  shall	  think	   necessary,	   yet	   we	   know	   not	   for	  what	   reason,	   or	   for	   what	   cause	   the	   sayd	   inhabitants	   of	   the	  Island	  have	  given	  forth	  the	  sayd	  commission.....”Ibid.,	  270.	  	  The	  Assembly	  subsequently	  ordered	  “that	  those	  inhabitants	  of	  this	  Collonie	  that	  doe	  owne	  the	  Commission	  which	  wee	  heare	  is	  granted…	  in	  the	  name	   of	   Providence	   Plantations,	   shall	   have	   henceforth	   no	   liberty	   to	   act	   in	   Government	   untill	   they	  have	  given	  satisfaction	  to	  the	  respective	  Townes	  of	  Privdence	  and	  Warwicke.”Ibid.,	  271.	  134	  A	  howe	  was	  a	  mattock	  or	  pickax.	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purchased some deer skins, some of which were from his mother.135   
 By September of 1654, news of the Treaty of Westminster136 had reached North 
America, and the Dutch could once again openly trade with Rhode Island’s merchants.  
But not, it seems, were they, along with the French, allowed to trade with the Indians 
living within Rhode Island’s jurisdiction.  That trade was reserved exclusively for Rhode 
Island merchants.137  Rhode Island endeavored to prohibit the Dutch-Indian trade because 
of the concern the Dutch supplied guns to the Indians.138  A further act in 1657 by the 
General Court of Commissioners, reconfirmed the lifting of trade restrictions with the 
Dutch noting, “that the Dutch may have lawfull commerce with the English in this 
Collony, correspondent to the peace in beinge betweene the two nations.”139  Despite the 
cessation of hostilities between the nations, the General Court in 1658 disavowed any 
unsanctioned privateering done by individuals against the Dutch in Narragansett Bay.  
The General Court warned of “the bad effects that may ensue if such uncommissionated 
and idle worthles persons should putt such thinges in practice in this Collony…” and any 
persons seizing Dutch goods and vessels pretending commissions from Rhode Island 
would be charged with a felony.140  The “bad effects” of which the General Court warned 
would be an interruption of trade with the Dutch, a trade vital to Rhode Island’s nascent 
                                                135	  Bartlett,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  Rhode	  Island,	  274.	  136	  Signed	   on	  May	   8,	   1654,	   the	   treaty’s	   terms	   required	   the	   Dutch	   Republic	   to	   recognize	   England’s	  Navigation	   Acts	   requiring	   imports	   from	   England	   to	   be	   carried	   English	   ships.	   	   Roger	   Williams,	  President	   of	   Providence	   Colony	  wrote	   to	   the	   General	   Court	   of	  Massachusetts	   in	   1654,	   voicing	   his	  displeasure	  at	  the	  waste	  and	  loss	  of	  life	  associated	  the	  war	  against	  the	  Dutch.	  	  See	  Bartlett,	  Records	  of	  
the	  Colony	  of	  Rhode	  Island,	  294-­‐295.	  137	  Bartlett,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  Rhode	  Island,	  279.	  138	  In	   a	   letter	   to	   the	   General	   Court	   of	   Massachusetts	   in	   1656,	   Providence	   Plantations	   sought	   to	  purchase	   barrels	   of	   powder	   and	   artillery	   from	   Massachusetts	   merchants	   on	   an	   annual	   basis	  “considering	   our	   hazardous	   frontier	   situation	   to	   these	   barbarians	   [Indians],	   who,	   from	   their	  abundant	   supply	   of	   arms	   from	   the	   Dutch	   …	   are	   full	   of	   artillery,	   which	   hath	   rendered	   them	  exceedingly	  insolent,	  provoking	  and	  threatening....”	  Barlett,	  Records	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  Rhode	  Island,	  344.	  
139 Ibid., 356.  140	  Ibid.,	  389-­‐90;	  Arnold,	  History	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Rhode	  Island,	  267.	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economy. 
 
Obstacles and Continuity: Trade Between New England and the  
Dutch, c. 1655-1664 
 Trade between the New England colonies and the Dutch resumed after the war. 
Trading networks were reestablished and new ones were formed.  The Second Anglo-
Dutch War had even less impact on trading relationships in America between the Dutch 
and the New England colonies than the events of 1650. 
 Throughout the region, merchants weighed which market would be the best for 
their goods.  For instance, in 1659, Richard van Rensselaer wrote to his brother, Jeremias, 
from Amsterdam.  He had sent some guns over to Rensselaerswyck for his brother to sell 
and was seeking information about whether Jeremias had sold the guns.  He wrote, “As to 
my guns, be pleased to sell them for what you can get for them and if you can find no 
purchaser, send them back at the first opportunity, as I understand from brother Jan 
Baptista that there is no demand there for such rare things, which I had not thought. If 
you had an opportunity to send them to [New] England by some acquaintance of yours, I 
believe that they would sell better there, as there are more people there.” For the Dutch in 
New Netherland and Amsterdam, Boston had become not only a commercial market for 
the sale of bulk commodities such as sugar and linen, but for the sale of “rare things” as 
well.141  
 Jeremias van Rensselaer traveled to Boston and reported on conditions there in 
1669.  He wrote his mother about the demand for commodities and the lack of supply. He 
                                                141Van	  Rensselaer,	  Correspondence	  of	  Jeremias	  van	  Rensselaer,	  148.	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remarked “As to letting you know any news, there is none, except, as I advised you in my 
last letter, that at present one can not get any return cargo for anything that is produced 
here in the colony. Last summer, as an experiment, I made a trip to Boston with three 
lasts of wheat, for which I got 17 stivers Holland money net per schepel; one can not get 
anything like that here.  We have chartered a sloop to make another voyage thither in the 
spring with some grain and to exchange that for some goods which can be sold here for 
beavers.”142 A shrewd merchant, Van Rensselaer, and others from New Netherland, 
would have taken advantage of the demand for basic commodities like wheat particularly 
if the cost of labor and transportation were so easily covered by the profit made from the 
sale.  
 There was a vibrant trade between New Netherland and Massachusetts.  Despite 
concerns about a just price and price controls, there certainly was ambivalence, at least 
among Boston’s merchants, concerning government regulation of trade with foreign 
nations. New Netherland’s merchants would have bridled under regulations they would 
have considered unfair and unworkable.  Boston’s merchants, instead, traded with the 
Dutch of New Netherland and the Dutch Republic. 
 And despite the difficulties that had arisen between Rhode Island and the Dutch 
during the war, trade with the Dutch resumed and New Amsterdam’s merchants included 
Rhode Island as part of their inter-colonial trading network that often began in Virginia 
with the purchasing of tobacco and concluded in New England or continued across the 
                                                142Van	  Rensselaer,	  Correspondence	  of	  Jeremias	  van	  Rensselaer,	  	  416	  (dated	  1669).	   	  Some	  explanation	  of	   the	   weights	   of	   measurement	   and	   monetary	   units	   as	   used	   by	   New	   Netherland’s	   merchants	   is	  warranted.	  A	  “last	  of	  wheat”	  was	  82.512	  bushels.	  A	  schepel	  was	  0.764	  bushel	  (wheat).	  A	  stuiver	  was	  1/20	  of	   a	   gulden.	   	   See	  A.	   J.	   F.	   van	  Laer,	   trans.	   and	  ed.,	  Van	  Rensselaer	  Bowier	  Manuscripts	   (Albany:	  University	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  1909),	  849,	  847.	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Atlantic to the Dutch Republic.143 Extant merchant correspondence for this period in 
North America is scarce. Nevertheless, the continuing anxiety about the Dutch is 
reflected in the correspondence of Peleg Sanford, a merchant in Newport.  His letterbook 
provides an interesting individual reflection of both the need for Dutch trade and the 
animosity against an enemy in times of war.144 It is through his activities handling the 
family’s export business in Rhode Island that we see the dual persona of a merchant 
struggling with government policy and the often times contrasting pressure for 
commercial gain. Associated with the prosperous Hutchinson family, Peleg arranged for 
the export of livestock and provisions to the West Indies, which his brothers exchanged 
for sugar and cotton.  In London, ships carrying the sugar and cotton were then sold for 
credit with London merchants. Although correspondence contained in his letter book 
occurs after the English takeover of New Netherland in 1666, it offers reflection of one 
English colonial merchant’s attitude about the Dutch in this period. 
 In June 1666, Sanford wrote to one of his brothers both with concern about 
perceived impending danger and with instructions in how to continue conducting 
business. “Brothr Henry Beare is not yeet arived which causes great Feares of his welfare 
if it please god that he arives in Safty: yo may Exspect to have him Returne unto yo wth 
horses: Jno Beare is discoradged in Respect of the dangerfulnes of the times and So fare 
as I Cann understand intends to lay up his vessell Brothr I would desiere in Respects of 
the dangr tht now is: that yo would Send me Sume thing in Every vessell that is Bound 
for this place: but not much in one vessell: we are in dayly Exspectation of the 
                                                143	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam	  from	  1653-­‐1674,	  Vol.	  4,	  198.	  144	  Sanford,	   Letterbook	   of	   Peleg	   Sanford.	   Peleg	   participated	   in	   Rhode	   Island	   politics	   sitting	   on	   the	  governor’s	  council,	  serving	  as	  governor,	  and	  [serving]	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Andros	  council.	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Enimy…”145  The enemy Sanford referred to was the Dutch. Yet again, mercantilist 
issues had become an important part of the political agenda in both the Dutch Republic 
and England. The outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1664, after years of 
increasing tensions, had important consequences for merchants like Sanford.146 The 
Dutch were both trading partners and rivals to English merchants in North American 
markets. While the naval confrontations that took place between the nations in the North 
Sea are well known, the war had an impact on North American trade. 
 By late 1666, Sanford was happy to take advantage of a “duch Sloope” trading in 
Newport to correspond with a business associate.147  Despite the war between nations, 
commercial necessity prevailed and the “enemy” provided useful opportunity to 
correspond with his trading network elsewhere in New England. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 How do we interpret the previously underestimated trading activities between the 
New England colonies and the Dutch?  The activities challenge traditional assumptions 
                                                145	  Sanford,	  Letterbook	  of	  Peleg	  Sanford,	  June	  27	  1666,	  p.	  10	  146	  Debate	   about	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   Second	   Anglo-­‐Dutch	   War	   continues	   amongst	   historians.	   	   One	  argument	  suggests	  that	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  the	  war	  was	  a	  deep-­‐seated	  rivalry	   in	  commerce	  between	  the	   Dutch	   Republic	   and	   England.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   C.R.	   Boxer,	   The	   Dutch	   Seaborne	   Empire,	   1600-­‐1800	  (London:	  Hutchinson,	  1972);	  C.R.	  Boxer,	  The	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  Wars	  of	  the	  17th	  Century,	  1652-­‐1674	  (Palo	  Alto:	  Pendragon	  House,	  1974);	  C.H.	  Wilson,	  Profit	  and	  Power:	  A	  Study	  of	  England	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Wars	  (London:	   Longmans,	   Green,	   1957);	   Jonathan	   I.	   Israel,	   Dutch	   Primacy	   in	   World	   Trade,	   1585-­‐1740	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	   1989).	   	  A	   second	  debate	   suggests	   that	   the	  political	  processes	  within	   the	  Restoration	   Court	   of	   Charles	   II	   should	   be	   examined	   as	   cause	   for	   the	   war.	   See,	   e.g.,	   J.R.	   Jones,	  The	  
Anglo-­‐Dutch	  Wars	   of	   the	   Seventeenth	   Century	   (London:	   Longman,	   1996).	   	   Finally,	   a	   third	   premise	  intimates	  that	  ideological	  and	  religious	  controversies	  between	  the	  nations	  were	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  war.	  	  See,	   e.g.,	   Steven	   C.A.	   Pincus,	   Protestantism	   and	   Patriotism:	   Ideologies	   and	   the	   Making	   of	   English	  
Foreign	  Policy,	  1650-­‐1668	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  147	  Sanford	   wrote:	   “but	   this/opertunity/happily	   presenting	   it	   Self:	   I	   have	   with	   Joye	   Imbracced	   it.”	  Sanford,	  	  Letterbook	  of	  Peleg	  Sanford,	  December	  7,	  1666,	  p.	  17.	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about the seventeenth century that each colony within England’s imperial bounds 
operated as a largely self-contained entity that interacted with other colonies only 
indirectly.  Rather, a regional economy tied the New England colonies to New 
Netherland and the Dutch Republic.  For the New England colonies, such ties 
significantly influenced their individual commercial development.  As well, the New 
England colonies developed trading networks outside of traditional English trading 
networks through their trade with merchants in the Dutch Republic. 
 Trading networks are only as good as how individual merchants are treated in 
foreign nations. New Netherland welcomed foreign merchants into both the trading 
community and the overall society.  Like Amsterdam, New Amsterdam welcomed 
diasporas of merchants.  Administrators knew that in order for the colony to thrive, it 
would require peopling it with traders who would bring revenue to the colony and 
continue to create a center of trade.  
 The New England colonies often reflected the suspicions early modern people 
tended to have of merchants, particularly foreign merchants.  The English colonies of 
New England had to undergo a transformation with respect to how they viewed trade and 
how they viewed foreigners.  For some colonies, commerce was an unpleasant vocation.  
The fact that it was practiced by foreigners added to the suspicion.  Nevertheless, when 
settling in New England, and the harsh realities of economic survival became apparent 
particularly with the lack of basic foodstuffs, societies slowly underwent transformations.  
That is what happened between the New England colonies and New Netherland and the 
merchants that traded between them.  They were agents of change, particularly in the 
New England colonies.  Despite the political conflicts overseas and its appearance in the 
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New World, in the end, trade won out and each of the colonies accepted its importance to 
their survival. 
 As well, the Dutch provided needed capital infrastructure the English sought in 
order to finance their trading endeavors throughout the region. Merchants in the Dutch 
Republic and in New Netherland were part of the world’s greatest trading nation.  As a 
consequence, the Dutch could offer New England’s merchants access to greater markets 
both regionally and in Europe via Amsterdam.  
 Although the First Anglo-Dutch War provided political and economic challenges 
to trading relationships between New England merchants and Dutch merchants, both in 
New Netherland and in the Dutch Republic, commerce continued.  Despite suspension or 
the threat of suspension of trade by New England colonies with foreign merchants, trade 
continued or resumed shortly after the war’s conclusion. To their credit, colonial leaders 
in New England never lost sight of the importance to their respective economies of the 
commercial arrangements with the Dutch.  So, despite disputes over geographical 
boundaries, retributive and inconsistent tariffs and duties, and controversial sales of guns 
to Indians by Dutch merchants, trade continued. 
 Finally, although the Dutch lost their political presence on the North American 
mainland after the English takeover of New Netherland in 1664, Dutch merchants 
remained a substantial trading partner for English colonial merchants throughout New 
England.  Dutch merchants provided commodities that New England consumers wanted 
and offered favorable trade for New England’s raw materials and other commodities.  
Merchants in New England and from the Dutch Republic or of Dutch ancestry in New 
York ignored political boundaries and conducted business as if they had no country.  
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Chapter 2 
 
“Men work there as in Holland; 
 one trades, upwards, southwards and northwards”148: 
Trade Networks between New Netherland and the Dutch Republic,  
1624 to 1664 
 
 
 
 Isaac Allerton was no stranger to New Netherland and its staple port of New 
Amsterdam.  He had traded there while living in New England since at least 1630.149  But 
what must he have felt when he once again needed to turn to the Dutch for sanctuary?  As 
noted in Chapter 1, Allerton had left England as early as 1609 and joined Pastor John 
Robinson and his congregation who sought refuge in Leiden. Like many English 
Separatists living in Leiden at the time, he joined the group on the Mayflower to leave 
behind the difficult life they faced in the Dutch Republic.   
 Despite Allerton’s contributions to the fledgling Plymouth colony, disputes arose 
between Allerton and Governor William Bradford about numerous commercial ventures 
Allerton had undertaken both individually and on behalf of the colony.  Bradford accused 
Allerton of “playing his own game and [running] a course not only to the great wrong and 
detriment of the Plantation who employed and trusted him, but abused them in 
England….”150 Bradford wrote with great passion about the wrongs committed by 
Allerton.  A man of reticence, Bradford’s life revolved around his church and the 
                                                148	  Nicolaes	  van	  Wassenaer,	  Historisch	  Verhael	  (1624-­‐1630)	  in	  John	  Franklin	  Jameson,	  ed.,	  Narratives	  
of	  New	  Netherland,	  1609-­‐1664	  (New	  York:	  Charles	  Scribner’s	  Sons,	  1909),	  84.	  	  149	  In	  a	  letter	  dated	  December	  8,	  1630,	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  leader	  Emmanuel	  Downing	  wrote:	  “if	  yt	  be	  trew	  that	  Mr.	  Allerton’s	  reports	  of	  Hudson’s	  river,	  there	  is	  noe	  place	  comparable	  to	  yt	  for	  a	  plantačon,	  and	   t’will	  quit	   cost	   for	  you	   to	   remove	   thither,	   though	  all	  be	   lost	   in	   the	  place	  where	  you	  are,	   for	  he	  sayth	   that	  Hudsons	  river	  goes	   into	  Canada	  and	  those	  2	  make	  New	  England	  an	   Iland…”	  See	  William	  Bradford,	   History	   of	   Plymouth	   Plantation,	   1620-­‐1647,	  W.C.	   Ford,	   editor	   (Boston:	   Houghton	   Miflin,	  1912),	  II:	  63-­‐4,	  edit.	  fn.	  150	  William	  Bradford,	  Of	  Plymouth	  Plantation,	  1620-­‐1647	   (1650),	  Samuel	  Eliot	  Morison,	  editor	   (New	  York:	  Alfred	  A.	  Knopf,	  1952),	  232.	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leadership of Plymouth Plantation.  As a devout Christian, Bradford viewed Allerton and 
his commercial activities with suspicion. When later writing about Allerton, Bradford 
quoted 1Timothy: 
 ‘They that will be rich fall into many temptations and snares,’ etc., ‘and pierce 
 themselves through with many sorrows,’ etc.; ‘for the love of money is the root of 
 all evil,’…God give him to see the evil in his failings, that he may find mercy by 
 repentance, for the wrongs he hath done to any and this poor Plantation in special.  
 They that do such tings do not only bring themselves into snares and sorrows, 
 but many with them, though in another kind, as lamentable experience shows, and 
 is too manifest in this business.151 
 
 Bradford and Allerton were on a personal and public collision course.  One man’s 
views were protective and insular; the other man’s views embraced risk and looked 
beyond boundaries. Bradford was not the only colonial leader who had adverse 
sensitivities to Allerton’s commercial practices. Edward Winslow complained bitterly 
about Allerton’s growing commercial networks outside Plymouth and linked them to his 
untrustworthiness, claiming that anyone who dealt with Allerton was destined to be 
deceived.  In 1637, after Allerton had settled in New Amsterdam, Winslow wrote to John 
Winthrop in Boston: “But were he as well knowned to yours as us, they would rather 
have kept him heer then any way have incouraged his going over: but what I write I 
would not have made publick; but the truth is he loveth neither you nor us.”  152    
 When the time came for Allerton to leave Plymouth Colony and his recently 
founded cod-fishing endeavors in Marblehead, Massachusetts, it seemed to come without 
                                                151	  Ibid,	  239-­‐40.	   	  See	  also	  Cynthia	   J.	  Van	  Zandt,	  Brothers	  among	  Nations:	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Intercultural	  
Alliances	  in	  Early	  America,	  1580-­‐1660	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  87-­‐101.	  	  Van	  Zandt	  pays	   close	   attention	   to	   the	   tensions	   between	   Bradford	   and	   Allerton	   concerning	   their	   respective	  attitudes	  toward	  colonization,	  trade,	  and	  inter-­‐cultural	  contact.	  	  	  152	  Jeremy	   Dupertuis	   Bangs,	   Pilgrim	   Edward	   Winslow:	   New	   England’s	   First	   International	   Diplomat	  (Boston:	  New	  England	  Historic	  Genealogical	  Society,	  2004),	  170.	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interruption to his cumulative trading activities.153 It is uncertain whether he was able to 
make plans ahead of time or whether he arrived in New Netherland ready to begin anew 
and subsequently concluded outstanding business arrangements in Plymouth Colony and 
Marblehead from the Dutch colony. Nevertheless, Allerton was like hundreds of Dutch 
and foreign merchants who saw New Netherland as a place of opportunity with 
commercial infrastructure in place to facilitate and encourage trade.154  
 The rise of New Netherland as an early American commercial center did not 
occur without several false steps. Yet, when various administrative misjudgments were 
rectified, New Netherland, and its staple port, New Amsterdam, established the 
foundation for subsequent commercial activities in early America.   
 The first part of this chapter examines the evolving historical context of Dutch 
trade in New Netherland.  The Dutch attempted various institutional models to stimulate 
and sustain trade to and within in New Netherland. Each had varying degrees of success.  
Subsequent to Hudson’s discovery of the region in his failure to find a passage to India, 
reports of abundant furs provided temptation to Dutch merchants. As early as 1611, 
Amsterdam merchants assembled plans to sail to the region and engage in trade. 
Merchants such as Arnout Vogels had early successes with profitable trading voyages. 
However, trade in the region by Dutch merchants became volatile in the competition for 
furs from Indians. Soon, groups of merchants formed companies in an effort to regulate 
                                                153	  On	   May	   6,	   1635,	   the	   Massachusetts	   Bay	   General	   Court	   noted	   that	   “Mr.	   Ollerton	   hath	   given	   to	  Moses	  Maveracke,	  his	  son-­‐in-­‐law,	  all	  his	  houses,	  buildings,	  &	  stages,	  that	  he	  hath	  at	  Marble	  head,	  to	  enjoy	  to	  him	  &	  his	  heirs	  forever.”	  See	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  
in	  New	  England,	  1628-­‐1686,	  ed.	  Nathaniel	  B.	  Shurtleff,	  (Boston:	  W.	  White,	  1853)	  1:147.	  154	  Allerton	   first	   appears	   in	   the	   Council	   Minutes	   of	   the	   Director	   General	   and	   the	   Council	   of	   New	  
Netherland	  on	  February	  17,	  1639	  in	  a	  dispute	  concerning	  a	  debt.	  	  See	  Arnold	  J.F.	  van	  Lear,	  trans.,	  New	  
York	  Historical	  Manuscripts:	  Dutch,	  Volume	  IV:	  Council	  Minutes,	  1638-­‐1649.	  Edited	  with	  added	  indexes	  by	  Kenneth	  Scott	  and	  Kenn	  Stryker-­‐Rodda	  (Baltimore:	  Genealogical	  Publishing	  Company,	  1974),	  39.	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themselves without interference by the States General.  They did seek, however, 
exclusive trading privileges within set boundaries.  Aside from furs, little else attracted 
the attention of Dutch merchants, as the English not yet established themselves 
economically in North America.  The establishment of trading posts allowed lesser 
merchants, not formally associated with Dutch trading companies, to undertake trading 
ventures to New Netherland. 
 The second portion of this chapter considers the formation of the Dutch West 
India Company modeled after the highly successful Dutch East India Company. 
Understanding the vast wealth available in New Netherland, the Company sought to 
secure its monopoly and only allowed private trade with the Company’s consent.  This 
was not a successful model for achieving profits for shareholders.  As well, private 
merchants from the Dutch Republic were hesitant to seek permission to trade in New 
Netherland.  From the private merchants’ perspective, the most lucrative aspect of trade 
to New Netherland, the fur trade, was secured by the West India Company.  
  The third section of this chapter surveys the patroonship model proposed by the 
Company in 1628 as a means of encouraging settlement in the colony and to protect the 
existing resources contained within the colony for the benefit of the Dutch Republic. As 
with other colonial and economic models, this model, too, had difficulties. There were 
few merchants interested in the proposed model of 1628 and the plan underwent 
modification in 1629.  The new plan allowed for private trade with New England and 
Virginia. The most prominent and successful merchant who subscribed to the new plan 
was Killian van Rensselaer.   
 Finally, the fourth division of this chapter discusses the free trade period of New 
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Netherland’s history from approximately 1640 onwards and the opposition to free trade.  
Ex-company employees were recruited as agents for Amsterdam merchant houses.  A 
renewed interest of trade developed from patria. Soon, New Amsterdam became a port 
that merchants from Amsterdam called upon when trading to the Caribbean or the 
Chesapeake. The renewed interest encouraged lesser merchants from the Dutch Republic 
to reassess their interest of trading to New Netherland and to take portions of cargo holds 
in which to ship merchandise in return for the lucrative furs of the New World.  Although 
the free trade policy originated with the States General, it soon met opposition from many 
within New Netherland, including the Governor General Peter Stuyvesant.   
 In essence, the Dutch Republic and the Dutch West India Company attempted to 
impose economic models for trade in New Netherland without a substantial 
administrative infrastructure to oversee the Republic’s interest in the collection of taxes.  
Once the Republic and directors of the Dutch West India Company agreed to jettison 
unsustainable colonial models and revert to free trade, the colony became the commercial 
entrepôt for early America. 
 
Beyond Hudson’s Discovery – Commercial Beginnings 
 Approximately twenty-five years before Allerton arrived in New Amsterdam to 
establish his residence, Henry Hudson approached the Dutch about a northern passage to 
the East and he received a welcoming reception for his proposal.    While the Dutch had 
successfully challenged the Portuguese domination of the trade routes through the Straits 
of Magellan and around the Cape of Good Hope, the routes were still fraught with peril.  
If a northern route to the East did indeed exist, so the directors of the Dutch East India 
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Company reasoned, they should be the ones to control it.  To this end, the States General 
in the Dutch Republic offered a prize of twenty-five thousand guilders to the explorer 
who discovered the way.   
    Money more than pride had driven the Dutch to seek the passage.  For fifty 
years a nasty and bloody war against the domination of the Spanish and the Catholic 
Church had burned up the resources of the seven northern provinces (Holland, Zeeland, 
Utrecht, Gelderland, Groningen, Friesland, and Overijssel), but now both sides were deep 
in deliberations that resulted in the Twelve Years’ Truce.  The coming peace would give 
the merchants of the Dutch East India Company the opportunity to make money; Henry 
Hudson’s plan to find a northern passage would give them a chance to make it faster.    
 Henry Hudson’s fabled voyage in 1609 on behalf of the Dutch East India 
Company to find an easterly passage to Asia resulted in the discovery of the river that 
bears his name.     It is likely that he first believed he had discovered the elusive passage 
to India.   Hudson happened upon the river by chance – ice blocked the designated route 
around Norway the directors of the Company had instructed Hudson to follow. Instead, 
Hudson sailed westward, something the directors had forbidden him to do, to find a 
passage through North America.   
    The record of his journey up the river sets Hudson apart from others who 
preceded him.  His trip gained fame from three chroniclers: Emanuel van Meteren of 
Amsterdam, who had been in England when Hudson arrived from America, published a 
brief account in 1610, in the last edition of his History of Nederlanders. An officer on the 
voyage, Robert Juet, published a day-by-day account of the exploration of the river 
probably no later than the spring of 1610.  Finally, Johannes de Laet included portions of 
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Hudson’s own journal in his New World, or Description of Dutch West-India, published 
in 1625.155     To the directors of the Dutch East India Company, and to other Amsterdam 
merchants forever watchful for new investment opportunities, Hudson’s failure to find a 
passage to the East suggested, nevertheless, the discovery of a new land, abundant in 
“good skin and furs…. to be got at a very low price.”156 
 Armed with the inevitable rumors surrounding Hudson’s voyage, various 
published accounts, and capital to invest, enterprising Dutch merchants sought to explore 
what opportunities existed in the New World, particularly if the supply of beaver there 
could supplement the diminishing sources for peltries in Europe.  While the directors of 
the Dutch East India Company reacted with measured action toward Hudson’s voyage, 
various Amsterdam merchants initiated steps for voyages to undertake trade as early as 
1611.  For example, Arnout Vogels chartered the St. Pieter in partnership with the 
Pelgrom brothers, Leonard and Francoys.  In the charter contract filed before an 
Amsterdam notary the ship’s destination was listed simply as Terra Nova.157 On board 
were victuals for a seventeen-month voyage, but it is only Vogel’s prominent 
participation in numerous later voyages to New Netherland that suggests the 1611 voyage 
of the St. Pieter was the first trading expedition to the area of Hudson’s discovery.   
 In 1612, Vogels sent the Fortuyn twice to New Netherland.   The 1612 expedition 
had been a financial success for him and his partners.  In a letter written by Francoys 
Pelgrom shortly after the Fortuyn’s return to Amsterdam, Vogel’s chief partner informed 
                                                155	  See	   Emanuel	   van	   Meteren,	   On	   Hudson’s	   Voyage	   (1610)	   in	   Jameson,	   ed.,	   Narratives	   of	   New	  
Netherland,	   1609-­‐1664,	   6-­‐9;	   Robert	   Juet,	   The	   Third	   Voyage	   of	   Master	   Henry	   Hudson	   (1610)	   in	  Jameson,	   ed.,	  Narratives	   of	   New	  Netherland,	   1609-­‐1664,	  16-­‐28;	   and,	   Johannes	   de	   Laet,	  New	  World	  (1625)	  in	  Jameson,	  ed.,	  Narratives	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  1609-­‐1664,	  36-­‐60.	  156	  Van	  Meteren,	  On	  Hudson’s	  Voyage,	  7	  157	  Stadsarchief	  Amsterdam	  (hereinafter	  cited	  as	  SAA),	  Notarial	  no.	  125/64v-­‐65v.	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his wife that their investment had paid off.  He wrote, “Further, dearest love, I cannot 
help telling you in this letter about the successful arrival of our ship under master Adriaen 
Block and our nephew Jan Kin for which God be praised.  Both are in good health and 
made a good voyage, yes, a better voyage even than last year.”158   
 Vogels’s ship had encountered another Dutch vessel on the river, the Jonge 
Tobias, captained by Thijs Volckertsz Mossel. 159 The competition between various 
merchant groups not only generated civil suits back in Amsterdam, but also alerted other 
merchants to the profitability of trade in New Netherland.  Amsterdam’s merchants were 
not foolish; they recognized that the volatile trade during 1613-14 threatened investments 
in trading goods, ships, and lives.160  Most importantly, violence between competing 
syndicates on the Hudson threatened future profits.   
                                                158	  SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   373	   (Letterbook	   of	   Francoys	   Pelgroms	   Geerartsen,	  merchant	   at	   Amsterdam).	  	  Pelgrom	  wrote	  his	  wife	  the	  next	  month	  “…Further,	  dearest	  love,	  I	  could	  only	  find	  an	  opportunity	  to	  send	  you	  this	  short	  letter,	  for	  which	  I	  can	  hardly	  find	  any	  time,	  because	  I	  am	  so	  hard	  at	  work	  sending	  Aderiaen	  Block	  out	  again	  to	  the	  same	  place	  from	  where	  he	  returned.	   	  We	  shall	  now	  send	  two	  ships	  thither	  and	  obtained	  a	  charter,	  so	  that	  no	  one	  but	  us	  is	  allowed	  to	  sail	  there.	  	  Will	  you	  please	  keep	  this	  a	   secret	   so	   that	  no	  one	  will	   know	  and	  hear	   about	   it?...”	   	   Ibid.	  Aside	   from	  Arnout	  Vogels,	   Pelgrom’s	  other	   partners	   included	   Leonard,	   Paulus,	   and	   Steffen	   Pelgrom,	   Hans	   Hunger,	   and	   Lambert	   van	  Tweenhuysen.	  This	  group	  of	  merchants	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Van	  Tweenhuysen	  Syndicate.”	  	  159	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	   197/614v-­‐615.	   	  Members	  of	   the	   syndicate	   financing	  Mossel’s	   voyage	   included	  Hans	   Claesz.,	   Barent	   Sweers,	   Arnout	   van	   Liebergen,	   Wessel	   Schenck,	   Jan	   Holscher,	   and	   Jacob	  Bontenos.	  This	  group	   is	  referred	  to	  as	   the	  “Hans	  Claesz.	  Company.”	   	  See,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  37/511-­‐512v;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   38/468v-­‐470;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   39/257,	   258,	   414,	   416;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	  456/394-­‐394v;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  431/152,	  153.	  The	  declarations	  of	  members	  of	  Block’s	  and	  Mossel’s	  crews	  told	  of	  the	  confrontation	  between	  competing	  trading	  vessels	  while	  on	  the	  river	  of	  New	  Virginia	  (i.e.,	   the	  Hudson	  River).	   	  Mossel	   and	   his	   supercargo	  were	   accused	   of	   trying	   “to	   spoil	   the	   trade”	   of	  Block.	  	  “They	  made	  Block	  suspicious	  partly	  because	  they	  gave	  or	  supplied	  twice	  as	  many	  goods	  of	  the	  same	   quality	   and	   quantity	   for	   a	   beaver	   as	   Block	   gave	   before	   they	   arrived	   there…”	   As	   well,	   Jan	  Rodrigues,	  “a	  mulatto	  born	  in	  St.	  Domingo,”	  who	  was	  a	  member	  of	  Mossel’s	  crew,	  stayed	  ashore	  with	  trading	  goods	  he	  had	  received	  as	  payment	  of	  wages.	  Mossel	  and	  his	  supercargo	  declared	  the	  Spaniard	  had	  run	  away	  from	  the	  ship	  without	  their	  permission.	  	  They	  also	  testified	  that	  Block’s	  crew	  ought	  to	  have	  killed	  him.	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  197/614v-­‐615.	  160	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   198/99-­‐101v	   (regarding	   the	   Onrust);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   611/45	  (regarding	  De	  Nachtegael);	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   137/130-­‐130v	   (regarding	   the	  Fortuyn);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	   198/269v	   (regarding	   De	   Nachtegael).	   For	   a	   general	   discussion	   about	   this	   period	   and	   early	  commercial	   activity	   in	   New	   Netherland,	   see	   Simon	   Hart,	   The	   Prehistory	   of	   the	   New	   Netherland	  
Company	  (Amsterdam:	  City	  of	  Amsterdam	  Press,	  1959),	  22-­‐33;	  Oliver	  A.	  Rink,	  Holland	  on	  the	  Hudson:	  
An	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  of	  Dutch	  New	  York	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  33-­‐44.	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 Fearing trading disputes would draw the attention of the States General and 
restrict private commercial activity, and because the competing syndicates failed to come 
to an agreement with each other, a group of merchants decided to form the New 
Netherland Company. On October 11, 1614, four syndicates of merchants successfully 
petitioned the States General for a charter of trading privileges.161  Wisely setting aside 
most of their differences to maximize profits, the group of predominately Amsterdam 
merchants was given the right to trade without restriction to North America between the 
40th and 45th parallels for a period of three years commencing January 1, 1615.162  Many 
of the founders of the company were leading Amsterdam merchants including Gerrit 
Jacobz Witsen, Jonas Witsen, Simon Morissen, Hans Hongers, Paulus Pelgrom, 
Lambrecht van Tweenhuyzen, Arnolt van Lybergen, Wessel Schenck, Hans Claessen, 
and Berent Sweertssen.  Additionally, some leading merchants from Hoorn, a prosperous 
trading port in North Holland, became founders, including Peter Clementsen Brouwer, 
John Clementsen Kies, and Cornelis Volckertsen.163  
    The company was moderately successful. It organized the fur trade through 
annual spring voyages, a total of four in all, and erected a few trading posts in the area.   
But its exclusive focus was on the fur trade with Native Americans and their trading 
requirements.  Aside from the fisheries area off the coast of Newfoundland, there were no 
other commodities, or trading partners, available to the Dutch in North America – the 
                                                161	  The	  syndicates	  comprising	  the	  New	  Netherland	  Company	  were:	  the	  Van	  Tweenhuysen	  Company,	  the	  Hans	  Claesz.	  Company,	  Witsen’s	  Company,	  and	  a	  company	  from	  Hoorn.	  162	  The	  40th	  parallel	  north	  corresponds	   to	   the	  present	  day	  city	  of	  Philadelphia	  and	   the	  45th	  parallel	  north	   corresponds	   to	   the	   present	   day	   border	   between	   the	   Canadian	   province	   of	   Quebec	   and	   U.S.	  states	  of	  New	  York	  and	  Vermont.	   	  The	   location	  was	  chosen	  to	  avoid	  confrontation	  with	  the	  English	  further	  south.	  163	  Simon	  van	  Brakel,	  De	  Hollandsche	  Handelscompagnieën	  der	  Zeventiende	  Eeuw	  (‘s-­‐Gravenhage:	  M.	  Nijhoff,	  1908),	  29-­‐31.	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English had yet to establish viable ventures that attracted the Dutch.  Over the next five 
years, this would change.   
    When the grant to the New Netherland Company expired in 1618, despite a 
request by company directors to extend the trading license, Dutch merchants continued to   
engage in the fur trade in the region.164  Discussions for the formation of a state-
sponsored Dutch West India Company were well advanced.    The directors of the New 
Netherland Company made only a half-hearted effort to continue their operations. 
Between 1618 and 1621, the company sponsored annual voyages, which included modest 
exploration of the coastline, but gave up any effort to exploit the region by establishing 
permanent trading posts.165   While trading voyages made profits, the lure of profits in the 
East through investment in the Dutch East India Company and the ever-dependable Baltic 
trade siphoned off substantial investment capital by merchants.166 This allowed other 
                                                164	  The	   Schilpad,	   whose	   voyage	   was	   organized	   by	   a	   group	   of	   merchants	   separate	   from	   the	   New	  Netherland	   Company,	   sailed	   to	   North	   America	   in	   1618.	   Merchants	   from	   this	   syndicate	   sought	  permission	  of	  the	  States	  General	  and	  Prince	  Maurice,	  before	  undertaking	  the	  voyage.	  The	  captain	  and	  crew	  of	  De	  Swarte	  Beer,	   a	  New	  Netherland	  Company	  vessel,	  were	  advised	  not	   to	   interfere	  with	   the	  trade	   conducted	   by	   the	   Schildpad.	   	   See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   154/176v,	   177,	   177v.	   	   Not	   all	   trading	  endeavors	  were	  successful.	  	  The	  voyage	  of	  De	  Witte	  Duyf	  in	  1620	  portrayed	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  inter-­‐cultural	   trade	   and	   lack	   of	   effective	   communication.	   Members	   of	   the	   crew	   testified	   as	   to	   the	  danger	  of	   trade	  with	  Native	  Americans	  with	   “bad	   intentions.”	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  200/625-­‐626v.	  See	  also,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  463/493-­‐493v.	  165	  Lambert	   van	   Tweenhuysen,	   Paulus	   and	   Steven	   Pelgrums,	   and	   Aert	   Vogels,	   equipped	  De	  Swarte	  
Beer	  to	  sail	  to	  New	  Netherland	  in	  1619.	  Of	  interest	  is	  the	  investment	  of	  a	  widow,	  Lourens	  Boudens,	  in	  the	  voyage.	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  159/127-­‐128.	   	  De	  Swarte	  Beer	  was	  attacked	  by	  Native	  Americans	  while	   off	   of	   Manhattan	   (“in	   de	   rivere	   van	   Virginia	   genaemt	   Rio	   de	   Montagne”)	   and	   few	   aboard	  survived.	  Some	  weeks	  later,	  a	  Dutch	  vessel	  arrived	  to	  trade	  in	  the	  area	  and,	  somewhat	  inhospitably,	  used	  De	   Swarte	   Beer	   for	   its	   own	   trading	   venture.	   For	   the	   ensuing	   litigation	   see	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	  645/36v-­‐37;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   645/21-­‐21v;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   691/29v-­‐30v.	   The	   captain’s	   widow,	  Marritgen	  Wouters,	   later	  sought	  compensation	  for	  her	  husband’s	  missing	  personal	  effects.	   In	  1620,	  the	  company	  sought	  naval	  protection	  from	  the	  Dutch	  government	  to	  bring	  settlers	  from	  Leiden	  and	  England	   to	   New	   Netherland	   with	   free	   transport	   and	   provide	   each	   family	   with	   cattle	   and	   other	  economic	  support.	  	  The	  Stad	  General	  denied	  the	  request.	  	  The	  English	  Pilgrims	  turned	  elsewhere	  for	  transport.	   	   See	   William	   Bradford,	   History	   of	   Plymouth	   Plantation,	   1620-­‐1647	   (Boston:	   Houghton	  Mifflin	  Company,	  1912),I:99.	  166	  See,	  e.g.,	  Mijla	  van	  Tielhof.	  The	  'Mother	  of	  all	  Trades':	  The	  Baltic	  Grain	  Trade	  in	  Amsterdam	  from	  the	  
Late	   Sixteenth	   to	   the	   Early	   Nineteenth	   Century	   (Leiden:	   Brill,	   2002);	   Oscar	   Gelderblom,	   Zuid-­‐
Nederlandse	   kooplieden	   en	   de	   opkomst	   van	   de	   Amsterdamse	   stapalmarkt,	   1578-­‐1630	   (Hilversum:	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merchants, not associated with the syndicates forming the company, to enter the trade as 
the once dominant company broke up into ad hoc partnerships and informal cartels.167    
 
The Dutch West India Company 
 The moderate success of the New Netherland Company did not fail to attract the 
attention of the States General.  The States General, in 1621, drew up a charter for a West 
India Company (“WIC”), granting it a monopoly of all the Dutch Atlantic trade with 
West Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. Modeled on the phenomenal 
success of the Dutch East India Company (“VOC”) established in 1602, the States 
General declared that the welfare and happiness of the country depended mainly upon 
foreign trade and navigation and, for a period of twenty-four years, such interests could 
be properly encouraged only by the strength and unified character of a general 
incorporated company.168 As a joint-stock venture, both government finance and private 
investment contributed to a capitalization of more than seven million guilders. Like its 
East Indian counterpart, the shareholders who met in five regional chambers – 
Amsterdam, Middleburg, Rotterdam, Enkhuizen, and Groningen, managed it.  A board of 
directors, the Heren Negentien (Heren XIX), governed the Company’s affairs, 
responsible only to the States General. Representation on the Council reflected both 
                                                                                                                                            Uitgeverij	   Verloren,	   2000);	   Jonathan	   I.	   Israel,	   Dutch	   Primacy	   in	   World	   Trade,	   1585-­‐1740	   (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1989).	  167	  For	  instance,	  the	  Van	  Tweenhuysen	  group	  of	  merchants	  in	  1620	  sought	  to	  prohibit	  any	  trade	  by	  other	  Amsterdam	  merchants	   in	  areas	  contiguous	   to	   the	  New	  Netherland	  Company’s	   former	  patent.	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   164/72v-­‐73v.	   Trading	   disputes	   were	   submitted	   to	   arbitration	   in	  Amsterdam.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  691/28.	  168	  For	   a	   copy	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	   West	   India	   Company,	   amplifications	   to	   the	   charter,	   and	  agreements	  between	   the	  directors	  and	  major	  participants	   in	   the	  Company	   through	  1623,	   see	  A.J.F.	  van	  Laer,	   trans.	  and	  ed.,	  Van	  Rensselaer	  Bowier	  Manuscripts	   (Albany:	  University	  of	   the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  1908),	  86-­‐135.	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regional capital investment in the Company and the predominance of merchants within 
geographical areas. So, for instance, eight council members came from the Chamber at 
Amsterdam, four from Zealand, two from the Maeze, two from North Holland, and two 
from Friesland and Groningen.  One delegate represented the States General.169 
 Private trade could not occur in any of the enumerated geographical regions – 
West Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, North America - including New Netherland, except in 
the Company’s name or by its consent.  To engage in trade without the Company’s 
permission subjected both a ship and cargo to forfeiture to the Company.170  When the 
Company finally closed share subscriptions and began operations in 1623, directors and 
shareholders anticipated healthy dividends.  For the first five years, the Company 
obtained substantial profits from its monopoly of the Dutch trade on the African coast 
and from the plunder its captains seized from Spanish treasure ships. As well, the 
takeover of existing property and commercial enterprises in the Atlantic region was 
significant for the Company, but the chief objective was expansion of the Dutch presence 
in the South Atlantic. Mismanagement soon placed it in a precarious financial condition, 
and by the 1640’s it was bankrupt.171  Over the course of its existence, the Company 
provided New Netherland with little more than token assistance. 
                                                169	  On	   the	   Dutch	   West	   India	   Company	   generally,	   see	   Henk	   den	   Heijer,	   “The	   Dutch	   West	   India	  Company,	  1621-­‐1791,”	  in	  Johannes	  Postma	  and	  Victor	  Enthoven,	  eds.,	  Riches	  from	  Atlantic	  Commerce:	  
Dutch	  Transatlantic	  Trade	  and	  Shipping,	  1585-­‐1817	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2003),	  77-­‐112;	  Henk	  den	  Heijer,	  De	  
Geschiedenis	  van	  de	  WIC	  (Zutphen,	   The	  Netherlands:	  Walburg	  Pers,	   2002);	   Thomas	   J.	   Condon,	  New	  
York	  Beginnings:	  The	  Commercial	  Origins	  of	  New	  Netherland	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1968).	  170	  See,	   for	   instance,	   petitions	   made	   to	   the	   States	   General	   by	   sundry	   merchants	   to	   trade	   to	   New	  Netherland	   or	   to	   “Virginia.”	   E.B.	   O’Callaghan,	   ed.,	  Documents	  Relative	   to	   the	   Colonial	  History	   of	   the	  
State	  of	  New	  York;	  Procured	  in	  Holland,	  England,	  and	  France	  by	  John	  Romeyn	  Brodhead	  (Albany:	  Weed,	  Parsons	  and	  Company,	  1856),	  24-­‐7.	  171	  Den	  Heijer,	  De	  Geschiedenis	  van	  de	  WIC,	  83	  (“In	  de	  jaren	  1624-­‐1625	  werd	  naar	  schatting	  100.000	  gulden	  aan	  kolonisatie	  uitgegeven,	  een	  bedrag	  dat	  niet	  door	  de	  opbrengsten	  van	  de	  bonthandel	  kon	  worden	  gedekt.”	  -­‐	  In	  the	  years	  1624-­‐1625,	  it	  was	  estimated	  that	  100,000	  guilders	  had	  been	  spent	  on	  colonization	  [in	  New	  Netherland],	  an	  amount	  that	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  fur	  trade	  could	  not	  cover.)	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 Private merchants in the Dutch Republic seemed hesitant to trade in New 
Netherland throughout the 1620’s.172 Whether the process of receiving consent from the 
Company seemed too burdensome, or the commercial and personal risks associated with 
trade to New Netherland appeared too great, or the opportunity for profits elsewhere 
enticed merchants to invest their capital there, merchants did not engage in trade to New 
Netherland in significant numbers.  Additionally, the Company regulated the most 
lucrative aspect of trade in New Netherland, the fur trade.  Merchants from patria who 
purchased furs from Native Americans, or from residents in New Netherland, had to sell 
the furs to the Company at stipulated prices.173 This, of course, minimized profits for 
merchants. It is unclear what enforcement mechanisms were used to compel compliance 
with Company regulations.  Reports of conspicuous smuggling reached Amsterdam.174 
 Rising costs associated with the New Netherland colony, a collapsing share price 
for Company stock, and misadventures by the Company elsewhere in the Atlantic opened 
                                                172	  From	   1620	   through	   1629,	   I	  was	   able	   to	   confirm	   in	   the	   Stadsarchief	   Amsterdam	   a	   total	   of	   four	  voyages	   from	   the	  Dutch	   Republic	   to	  New	  Netherland	   by	   private	  merchant	   ventures.	   For	   the	   same	  period,	  six	  private	  merchant	  ventures	  sailed	   from	  New	  Netherland	  to	  the	  Dutch	  Republic.	   	  Voyages	  undertaken	  by	  the	  WIC	  during	  the	  same	  period	  included	  nineteen	  ships	  from	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  to	  New	  Netherland	  and	  eighteen	  from	  New	  Netherland	  to	  the	  Dutch	  Republic.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  200/625-­‐626v	   (voyage	   of	   De	   Witte	   Duyf);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   1580/1114	   (voyage	   of	   De	  
Purmerlanderkerck);	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   291/15v	   (voyage	  of	  Den	  Samuel);	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   631/80,	  159	   (voyage	   of	  De	   Coninck	   David);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   742/13-­‐15	   (voyage	   of	  De	  Witte	   Paert);	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   256/182v	   (voyage	   of	  De	  Roode	  Duyf);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   226/63v-­‐64v	   (voyages	   of	  De	  
Griffoen,	  Het	  Zwarte	  Paard,	  and	  Het	  Schaap);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  652/11v	  (voyage	  of	  De	  Ruijter);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  469/567	  (voyage	  of	  ‘t	  Wapen	  van	  Amsterdam);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  767/172	  (voyage	  of	  De	  
Eendracht);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  443/16	  (voyage	  of	  De	  Naerden).	  173	  	  	  	  Isaac	  de	  Rasière,	  secretary	  to	  the	  colony’s	  council,	  found	  in	  1626	  that	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  make	  the	  colonists	   sell	   the	   pelts	   to	   him,	   especially	   as	   they	   had	   other	   options.	   	   For	   instance,	  Ondercommies	  Gerrit	  Fongersz.	  offered	  the	  colonists	  a	  higher	  price	  than	  De	  Rasière	  was	  prepared	  to	  pay	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Company.	   	  Fongersz.	  planned	   to	   ship	   the	  beavers	   to	   the	  Dutch	  Republic	   for	  his	  own	  account,	   a	  plan	   that	   De	   Rasière	   opposed.	   	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   employees	   of	   the	   WIC	   and	   colonists	   were	  permitted	  to	  take	  beaver	  pelts	  back	  to	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  is	  not	  completely	  clear.	  	  It	  is	  probable	  that,	  as	   with	   the	   Dutch	   East	   India	   Company,	   a	   limited	   amount	   of	   private	   trading	   was	   accepted.	   	   Many	  participants	   in	   the	   fur	   trade	   may	   not	   have	   sought	   the	   Company’s	   permission.	   	   	   F.C.	   Wieder,	   De	  
Stichting	  van	  New	  York	  in	  juli	  1625:	  Reconstructies	  en	  nieuwe	  gegevens	  ontleend	  aan	  de	  Van	  Rappard	  
documenten	  (Zutphen,	  The	  Netherlands:	  Walburg	  Pers,	  2009),	  114,	  130,	  167,	  171-­‐2.	  174	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   758/210	   (“een	  partij	   vellen	   voor	  de	   som	  van	  F.	   300.-­‐“.	   A	   quantity	   of	  beaver	  pelts	  worth	  300	  gulders	  was	  smuggled	  aboard	  ship	  in	  a	  sailor’s	  chest.)	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the Heren XIX to criticism about the Company’s colonial policy. Recognizing the 
problems associated with the administrative and commercial framework of the colony, 
the merchants from the Amsterdam Chamber proposed alternatives. 
 
The Patroons and Trade 
    The Company soon discovered the expenses associated with establishing and 
expanding a new colony were considerable. In order to increase their profit margin the 
Company sought to find means to share the risk of colonization. The first attempt at 
partnerships was the patroonship plan, first conceived in 1628 as a way to attract more 
settlers without increasing Company expenses.175 Under the plan, a patroon would be 
granted a large tract of land and given the rights to the land as well as legal rights to settle 
all non-capital cases, quite similar to a manorial lord. In return, the patroon would agree 
to bring over settlers and colonize the land without reimbursement by the Company for 
such expenses. No merchant accepted a patroonship under such conditions because the 
lucrative fur and fishing trades were left as a monopoly of the Company.   
    One of the most prominent Amsterdam merchants and a principal shareholder in 
the Dutch West India Company, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, had the plan modified.176 He 
argued, along with a number of associates, that the Company’s shortsighted policy of 
restrictive trade negatively impacted any hope for New Netherland’s success. They 
                                                175	  This	   plan	   was	   entitled	   “Freedoms	   and	   Exemptions	   for	   the	   Patroons	   and	   Masters	   or	   Private	  Persons	  who	  would	  plant	  a	  colony	  and	  cattle	  in	  New	  Netherland.”	  Algemeen	  Rijksarchief	  Aanwinsten:	  Kopie	  van	  de	  Vrijheden	  en	  Exemptieën	  voor	  maart	  10,	  1628,	  Jaarboek	  Register	  voor	  1895.	  	  176	  Van	  Rensselaer	  had	   traded	   to	  New	  Netherland	  as	   early	   as	  1625.	   See	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   652/11v	  (naming	   Van	   Rensselaer,	   Cors	   Bicker,	   Samuel	   Godijn,	   and	   Gommer	   Sprangers	   as	   charterers	   of	   the	  ship	  De	  Ruijter).	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complained that Company management had not allowed reasonable profits to private 
traders.  Their opponents argued that generous incentives for private trade had already 
been given. In the revised plan issued on June 7, 1629, the terms were much more 
favorable to Van Rensselaer’s faction: colonization requirements were less stringent, the 
allocation of land to the patroons was larger and there were broad jurisdictional rights 
over the colonists. Additionally, private traders were allowed to trade with New England 
and Virginia and, most importantly, they were allowed to engage in both the fur trade, 
subject to a company tax of one guilder per pelt, and in the fish trade.177    
    In 1630, with the more favorable terms in place, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, Samuel 
Godijn, Samuel Blommaert, Michael Pauw, and Albert Burgh all filed claims for 
patroonships in various sites around New Netherland. Van Rensselaer became patroon to 
the largest and most lucrative fur trading area in New Netherland, that is, the area along 
the Hudson River near Fort Orange (present day Albany), which he named the colony of 
Rensselaerswyck.  The other patroons experienced less success and relinquished their 
holdings by 1636.178 
 After taking on the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, Van Rensselaer also took 
part in several New Netherland trading ventures. Kiliaen remained in Amsterdam using 
local New Netherland merchants as his agents and conducting joint ventures with the 
                                                177 	  Van	   Laer,	   Van	   Rensselaer	   Bowier	   Manuscripts,	   136-­‐53.	   For	   a	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   the	  Patroonship	   Plan	   of	   1628	   and	   the	   Patroonship	   Plan	   of	   1629,	   see	   Oliver	   A.	   Rink,	   “Company	  Management	  or	  Private	  Trade:	  The	  Two	  Patroonship	  Plans	   for	  New	  Netherland,”	  New	  York	  History:	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  New	  York	  State	  Historical	  Association	  5	  (1978):	  5-­‐26.	  178	  Burgh,	   Blommaert,	   and	   Pauw	   either	   abandoned	   or	   sold	   back	   their	   holdings	   to	   the	   Company.	  	  Godijn	   entered	   into	   a	  partnership	  with	  David	  de	  Vries.	  Their	   tract	  was	  on	   the	  Delaware	  River	   and	  named	   the	   Zwaanendael	   Colony.	   	   Efforts	   to	   establish	   a	   settlement	   there	   met	   with	   tragedy	   when	  Indians	   attacked	   in	   1631,	   leaving	   no	   survivors	   among	   the	  Walloon	   refugees	   brought	   to	   settle	   the	  colony.	   Godijn	   and	   his	   partners	   accepted	   an	   offer	   by	   the	   Company	   to	   repurchase	   the	   patroonship.	  	  See	   Charles	   McKew	   Parr,	   The	   Voyages	   of	   David	   de	   Vries,	   Navigator	   and	   Adventurer	   (New	   York:	  Crowell,	  1969),	  109-­‐30.	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Verbrugge and de Wolff families.179  As well, the other current and former patroons took 
advantage of opportunities presented to them to establish trading networks to New 
Netherland.  While primarily focused on the fur trade, they also traded for other 
commodities.180 
 Nevertheless, the patroonship conformation did not create a free trade system. 
Limitations still existed on commodities, particularly the fur trade, and on private 
shipping.  By 1638, the States General recognized that the colony of New Netherland 
would be lost to the encroaching English unless the Company undertook drastic reform 
measures. The Amsterdam Chamber developed a set of “Articles and Conditions” to 
encourage population growth and a broader economic foundation. The States General 
rejected the reform measures arguing that the measures were too cautious. Revising the 
plan in 1639, the Amsterdam Chamber expanded colonists’ trade privileges to encompass 
a virtual free trade in all commodities.  The fur trade would be opened to all citizens of 
the Dutch Republic, not just residents of New Netherland.  Private shipping would be 
permitted to and from the colony, provided a Company supercargo was on board.181   The 
States General approved the revisions and the Company issued a revised set of Freedoms 
                                                179	  Although	   the	   directors	   of	   the	   Company	   had	   given	   permission	   for	   Company	   ships	   to	   be	   used	   to	  transport	   settlers	   and	   trade	   goods	   to	   the	   patroonships,	   the	   conflict	   of	   1629	   between	   competing	  factions	   of	   the	   Amsterdam	   Chamber	   had	   not	   been	   forgotten	   and	   few	   Company	   ships	   made	   the	  journey	   to	   New	   Netherland.	   	   As	   a	   consequence,	   Van	   Rensselaer	   became	   even	   more	   reliant	   on	  chartering	   ships	   or	   purchasing	   a	   controlling	   interest	   in	   a	   ship	   including:	   1636	   (Rensselaerswijck);	  1638	   (Wapen	   van	   Noorwegen);	   1639	   (Aker);	   1640	   (Wapen	   van	   Leeuwarden);	   1641	   (Aker);	   1641	  (Witte	  Valck);	  1641	  (Koning	  David);	  1642	  (Koning	  David);	  1643	  (Wapen	  van	  Rensselaerswijck).	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Van	  Laer,	  Van	  Rensselaer	  Bowier	  Manuscripts,	  355,	  405,	  580,	  602;	  Rink,	  Holland	  on	  the	  Hudson,	  198.	  180 	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   1534/173;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   2279III/74-­‐75;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	  1820/270.	  181	  A	  supercargo	  was	  a	   representative	  of	   the	  ship's	  owner(s)	  or	  merchants	  who	  had	  contracted	   for	  space	   aboard	   a	   ship.	   	   The	   supercargo	  was	   responsible	   for	   overseeing	   the	   cargo	   and	   its	   sale	   upon	  arrival	  at	  its	  destination.	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and Exemptions in 1640.182 
 Finally, after over fifteen years of commercial missteps, the opportunity existed to 
develop and expand trading networks and connect New Netherland as a radius to the 
greater Amsterdam commercial center. 
 
Free Trade – Commercial Networks with the Dutch Republic  
 Merchants from the Dutch Republic chose to trade with New Netherland neither 
because of any patriotic ties nor because of any particular fiscal inducements by the 
government or Company. They chose to trade there with the hope of making money.   
 Contemporary chronicles noted an entrepreneurial spirit among the colonists of 
New Netherland. In an account of his 1643 visit, Father Isaac Jogues observed, “Trade is 
free to all; this gives the Indians all things cheap, each of the Hollanders outbidding his 
neighbor, and being satisfied provided he can gain some little profit.”183  Given what 
actions the Heren XIX had undertaken in 1638 with the passage of the Articles and 
Conditions and in 1640 with the passage of the Freedoms and Exemptions, Jogue’s 
comments may have reflected a renewal of commercial interest.  
    Ex-Company employees were first to take advantage of the elimination of the 
Company’s monopoly. They began to act as agents for large Dutch merchant firms and 
also to trade on their own. Former employees such as Govert Loockermans and 
                                                182	  See	   O’Callaghan,	   ed.,	  Documents	   Relative	   to	   the	   Colonial	  History	   of	   the	   State	   of	  New	  York,	   1:105	  (Summons	  to	  the	  various	  chambers	  about	  ways	  to	  improve	  named	  colonies);	  1:106-­‐7	  (report	  on	  the	  condition	   of	   New	   Netherland);	   1:110-­‐4	   (proposed	   articles	   for	   the	   colonization	   and	   trade	   of	   New	  Netherland);	   1:115	   (States	   General	   rejecting	   proposed	   improvements);	   1:119-­‐23	   (proposed	  freedoms	  and	  exemptions	  for	  New	  Netherland	  –	  1640).	  183	  Father	  Isaac	   Jogues,	   “Novum	  Belgium”	   in	   Jameson,	  ed.,	  Narratives	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  1609-­‐1664,	  262.	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Augustine Heermans are prominent examples. Loockermans was a WIC employee from 
1633-1639 who became the local agent for the powerful Verbrugge family in 
Amsterdam.184 Heermans first came to New Netherland in 1633 as a Company surveyor 
in the Delaware region. In 1643, he moved to New Amsterdam, where he acted as an 
agent for the Dutch firm of Gabry and Company and also worked for himself in the fur 
and tobacco trade.185 Other WIC employees such as Oloff Stevenson van Cortlandt, who 
had come over in 1637 as a WIC soldier, rose within the Company. He was awarded the 
job of commissary, supervising the arrival and storage of provisions. In this position he 
made numerous business contacts and joined in various trading ventures with partners in 
New Netherland and the Dutch Republic.186 Another early independent merchant was 
Arnoldus van Hardenburg, from an Amsterdam merchant family, who came over to make 
his fortune.187 Some English colonists who also took advantage of the new trading 
                                                184	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1341/25v;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1346/20-­‐20v;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1113/22;	  SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   1359/83;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   1363/73v-­‐74.	   	   See	   also,	   Hugo	   Rau,	   “Govert	  Loockermans,	   een	   Turnhoutenaar	   in	   Amsterdam,	   Nieuw-­‐Amsterdam	   en	   New	   York	   (1617-­‐1671),”	  
Taxandria,	  NR	   62	   (1990):	   5-­‐12.	   	   The	   correspondence	   between	   Loockermans	   and	   the	   Verbrugge	  family	   illustrates	   the	   demand	   for	   information	   between	   merchants	   and	   their	   factors	   and	   the	  frustrating	  aspects	  of	   early	  modern	   transatlantic	   trade.	  Loockermans’s	   employer	   reprimanded	  him	  because	  he	  failed	  to	  include	  sufficient	  information	  about	  the	  trade	  he	  was	  engaged	  in	  on	  their	  behalf:	  “In	  your	  honor’s	  letter	  your	  honor	  writes	  us	  one-­‐and-­‐half	  page	  full	  of	  news,	  such	  as	  [the	  journey	  of]	  our	   little	   ship	   to	   the	   north	   [New	   England]	   and	   further	   about	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   land,	   which	   is	  unnecessary	  as	  we	  learn	  that	  sufficiently	  orally	   from	  the	  captain	  and	  the	  passengers,	  but	  the	  trade,	  that	  really	  concerns	  us…..Your	  honor	  will	  please	  realize	  that	   it	   is	  not	   like	  France	  or	  other	  places,	   to	  which	  mail	  carriers	  go	  every	  week,	  but	  it	  will	  take	  a	  whole	  year	  before	  we	  get	  further	  tidings,	  which	  time	  will	  hang	  very	  heavy	  on	  our	  hands.”	  New	  York	  Historical	  Society,	  Stuyvesant-­‐Rutherford	  Papers,	  3-­‐2	  (1648).	  185	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1946/16;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1946/22;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1619/2050;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1686B/2089;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  993/12;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1817/973;	  SAA,	  2278V/30-­‐31;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1819/245;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1819/385.	  186	  See,	   e.g.,	   A.J.F.	   van	   Laer,	   trans.	   and	   ed.,	   Correspondence	   of	   Jeremias	   van	   Rensselaer,	   1651-­‐1674	  (Albany:	  The	  University	  of	   the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  1932),	  48,	  50,	  154,	  166,	  253,	  276,	  292,	  293,	  303,	  370,	  383,	  397.	  	  Van	  Cortlandt’s	  daughter,	  Maria,	  married	  Jeremias	  van	  Rensselaer,	  son	  of	  the	  patroon	  Kiliaen	  van	  Rensselaer,	   joining	  each	  family	  through	  marriage	  and	  establishing	  commercial	  ties	  with	  each	  other.	  See	  also,	  Jacob	  Judd,	  ed.,	  The	  Van	  Cortlandt	  Family	  Papers	  (Tarrytown,	  NY:	  Sleepy	  Hollow	  Restorations,	  Inc.,	  1976),	  1-­‐5.	  187	  E.B.	  O’Callaghan,	  History	  of	  New	  Netherland;	  or,	  New	  York	  Under	  the	  Dutch	  (New	  York:	  D.	  Appleton	  &	  Company,	  1855),	  1:394-­‐5.	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privileges included Isaac Allerton, Thomas Willet of Plymouth (who often worked with 
Allerton), and Thomas Hall.    
 Dutch trading firms and individual merchants engaged in trade from patria to 
New Netherland with renewed interest.  Along with Kiliaen van Rensselaer, major firms 
that traded to New Netherland included Gilles and Seth Verbrugge, Dirck and Abel de 
Wolff, and Gillis van Hoornbeeck.188  
    Gilles Verbrugge and his son Seth participated in at least 27 voyages to New 
Netherland and at least 14 to Virginia, and additionally co-sponsored voyages in 
partnership with English merchants who had dual citizenship in Virginia and New 
Netherland.189   
    Dirck de Wolff was twice elected as a member of the board of directors for the 
Broker's Guild in Amsterdam and became supervisor of grain prices, setting the daily 
rates for wheat and rye as well as overseeing imports and exports. Dirck and his son Abel 
joined with Gerit Jansz Cuyper to trade in New Netherland. Cuyper had married Abel's 
sister Geertruyd and had previously worked in New Netherland for the Verbrugge family. 
Cuyper and his wife moved to New Amsterdam, shipping furs, lumber and tobacco to 
Abel, who sold the products in Amsterdam.190   
                                                188	  Oliver	  Rink	  argued	  that	  these	  four	  firms	  worked	  together	  to	  control	  most	  of	  the	  profits	  from	  the	  New	   Netherland	   trade.	   	   While	   he	   acknowledged	   that	   other	   Dutch	   merchants	   entered	   the	   market,	  particularly	   when	   there	   was	   no	   threat	   of	   war,	   he	   maintained	   that	   none	   kept	   up	   the	   sustained	  business	  of	  the	  other	  firms.	  	  While	  I	  do	  not	  disagree	  with	  Rink	  about	  the	  volume	  of	  trade	  engaged	  in	  by	  the	  four	  firms,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  because	  Rink	  did	  not	  look	  at	  Dutch	  trade	  throughout	  the	  North	  American	   region,	   he	  did	  not	  have	   a	   comprehensive	   conceptualization	  of	   the	   extent	   of	   activity	  by	   a	  broader	  segment	  of	  Dutch	  merchants.	  189 	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   1346/20-­‐21;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   1355/42-­‐43;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	  2196/470-­‐471;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2138/231.	  190	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   2189/624;	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   1300/46v;	   SAA,	  Notarial	   no.	   1443A/63;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1306/162v;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2614/167;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2459/79;	  SAA,	  Notarial	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    Up to 1651, Dutch merchants could trade with New England and Virginia as 
well as New Netherland. Once the British instituted the Navigation Acts of 1651, 
however, non-English ships were no longer allowed to transport goods to or from English 
ports. That forced the Verbrugge family to rely on English intermediaries for their 
Virginia trade, which they chose to cease in 1656. The Verbrugge family owned their 
boats and therefore suffered financial losses due to the Navigation Acts. In 1662, they 
sold off most of their New Netherland assets, including land, warehouse space, and ships. 
The de Wolff family had rented ship space rather than own their own ships and therefore 
were not as affected by the acts. Also, they had a more diversified operation with profits 
from the trading of Baltic grain, French wine, and African slaves. The family continued 
to operate in America until about the mid 1670's, when they abandoned the market 
entirely for the more profitable slave trade, although Dirck de Wolff's son-in-law, Gerit 
Cuyper, continued to trade in America until his death in 1679.   
    The fourth major Dutch merchant family predominant in the New Netherland 
trade was the firm of Gillis van Hoornbeeck. Van Hoornbeeck entered the market late, 
first trading in New Netherland in 1656. He had worked closely with the Verbrugge 
family and was their largest creditor. In fact, he served as the executor of the Verbrugge 
estate when Gilles and Seth both died in 1663. Van Hoornbeeck stepped in as the 
Verbrugges were leaving their New Netherland commercial ventures. During the ten-year 
period from 1656-1666 his firm was second only to the Van Rensselears’ in volume of 
                                                                                                                                            no.	  1364/60;	  SAA,	  1603Z/29v	  (A	  sampling	  of	  notarial	  documents	  exhibiting,	  for	  example,	  assurance	  on	   various	   trading	   voyages,	   payment	   terms	   for	   a	   loan,	   sailing	   directions	   for	   a	   ship’s	   captain	   and	  supercargo).	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trade.191 Van Hoornbeeck continued to trade in America during the English period, but 
found it prohibitively expensive. Rather than abandon the area, he continued trading as a 
client of various English merchants. When Gillis van Hoornbeeck died in 1688 his family 
liquidated their American holdings and concentrated on the slave trade supplying 
Africans to Dutch Suriname.192   
  Unlike New England, the individuals largely responsible for exploiting New 
Netherland's resources were merchants of the home country. Secure in their Amsterdam 
counting houses, the merchants grasped control of the colony's lifeline to Holland and 
held fast. Profits from their enterprises flowed into coffers in Amsterdam.  Not only 
larger, more established merchants engaged in trade with New Netherland.  Numerous 
smaller Dutch merchants took advantage of the opportunity to trade in the Americas and 
many found their starting point with trade to New Netherland.  
 In 1656, Talckjen, maid to Jeremias van Rensselaer’s mother, Anna van 
Rensselaer, sent Jeremias, from the Dutch Republic, six silver spoons valued at thirty 
guilders and a pair of silk stockings worth ten guilders.  Nicolaes van Rensselaer, 
Jeremias’s brother, had convinced Talckjen that her chances of making a profit in New 
Netherland were good, and she invested in this consignment not only her savings, but 
also some borrowed capital.  Six months later, Jeremias answered his mother’s queries 
                                                191	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  15576/1251;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1119/209;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1595/424;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2859/228;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2858/504;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1124/271v;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	   1125/93-­‐93v;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   no.	   2860/200.	   	   Various	   transactions	   regarding	   trade	   to	   New	  Netherland	   evidenced	   before	   the	   notary	   including	   a	   dispute	   regarding	   a	   voyage,	   an	   assurance,	   a	  contract	  for	  trade,	  a	  receipt	  of	  a	  bill	  payable	  and	  its	  terms,	  multiple	  directions	  to	  a	  captain	  regarding	  trade	  to	  New	  Netherland,	  and	  a	  declaration	  by	  a	  captain	  about	  damage	  to	  his	  ship	  during	  a	  hurricane	  on	  a	  voyage	  undertaken	  for	  Van	  Hoornbeeck.	  192	  See	  David	  Nassy,	  Geschiedenis	  der	  Kolonie	  van	  Suriname,	  1791	  (reprinted,	  Amsterdam:	  Emmering,	  1974),	  32-­‐40;	  Johannes	  Postma,	  “Suriname	  and	  Its	  Atlantic	  Connections,	  1667-­‐1795,”	  in	  Riches	  from	  
Atlantic	   Commerce:	   Dutch	   Transatlantic	   Trade	   and	   Shipping,	   1585-­‐1817,	   ed.	   Johannes	   Postma	   and	  Victor	  Enthoven	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2003),	  287-­‐322.	  
  
 105 
about the goods that he thought the silver spoons would yield a beaver each, and he had 
already received a bid of sixty guilders about which he was still negotiating.  In the 
meantime, the silk stockings had been sold for twenty guilders.  A couple of weeks later, 
he shipped to patria five and a half beavers for the spoons and two and a half beavers for 
the silk stockings.  He wrote his mother that the beavers were a partial advance, as the 
silver spoons had still not been sold.  In the meantime, the proceeds from the stockings 
turned out to be an insufficient return on Talckjen’s investment.  Anna van Rensselaer 
reported to him in 1658 that Talckjen made a loss of one guilder on them; and the 
advance for the spoons was too high.  Jeremias could not sell them for any more than five 
beavers, and ultimately decided to keep them himself at that price.193 
 While Talckjen was not a merchant, her experience is representative of the 
opportunities Dutch merchants foresaw in New Netherland.  Capital was available for 
borrowing, goods were available for purchase, and opportunities existed, however 
tenuous, to tap into existing trading networks to New Netherland. New Netherland’s 
markets represented both a hope and reality for lesser merchants in the Dutch Republic 
who, prior to the opening of trade in New Netherland to private traders, could neither 
afford to invest in the Dutch West India Company nor partner with merchant houses with 
extensive capitalization who neither required nor wanted additional partners.  As shipping 
increased to New Netherland, lesser merchants could purchase space in a cargo hold at 
reduced costs than previously and could disperse consignments of trading goods amongst 
different ships. Talckjen’s dream of riches was not to be achieved and instead she 
                                                193	  Van	   Laer,	   Correspondence	   of	   Jeremias	   van	   Rensselaer,	   1651-­‐1674,	   36,	   52,	   57,	   90,	   201,	   168.	  	  Jeremia’s	  brother,	  Jan	  Baptist,	  later	  wrote	  in	  1659,	  “The	  goods	  sent	  to	  you	  by	  brother	  Nicolaes	  belong	  to	  [our]	  servant	  girl.	  That	  rascal	  (dien	  bengel)	  has	  made	  the	  maid	  believe	  a	  good	  deal,	  so	  that	  she	  has	  borrowed	  some	  money	  for	  that	  purpose	  on	  which	  interest	  must	  be	  paid.	  	  This	  for	  your	  information.”	  Ibid.,	  201.	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experienced disappointment that her goods brought little profit.  Dutch law and culture 
allowed her to enter the market, but market forces of supply and demand still applied.  
 Take for instance, Jan Hendricksz Sijbingh who traveled to New Netherland from 
Amsterdam to trade in the late 1640’s and early 1650’s.  Sijbingh arrived in Beverwijck 
as a tailor, purchased a house in Fort Orange with Gerrit Jansz Cuyper, and sold the cloth, 
duffels, and blankets he had taken along with him from patria.  Returning to Amsterdam 
permanently, Sijbingh established a wholesaler’s business in cloth, De Gulden Fortuyn, 
which primarily served the New Netherland market.  He most likely obtained his duffels, 
popular in trade with Native Americans, from the textile centers of Kampen and Leiden.  
Along with trading directly to New Netherland, Sijbingh supplied the merchant houses of 
the Verbrugges and the De Wolffs with cloth goods.  As Sijbingh’s experience with the 
New Netherland trade developed and he accumulated his own capital, in 1660 he entered 
into business with Pieter Hartgers, Stoffel Jansz Abeel, and his brother, Jacob Sijbingh.  
Their agreement specified a limited term for the partnership’s existence – two years – 
after which the partnership would be dissolved and the profits distributed to each partner.  
Trade to New Netherland was successful for the partnership, as it was not extinguished 
until 1668.  Overseeing the partnership’s trading interests in New Netherland was Abeel, 
who traveled with the partnership’s goods and conducted trade on behalf of his 
partners.194  
 The Sijbingh partnership also provides a glimpse of further involvement by 
women in the trade with New Netherland.  Abeel’s wife, Neeltie, seemed to know much 
                                                194	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2459/121-­‐122;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1369/78;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  2787/776-­‐777.	   Abeel	   and	   his	   wife	   Neeltie	   immigrated	   to	   New	   Netherland	   in	   1660	   and,	   thus,	   could	   directly	  oversee	   trade	   for	   the	   partnership	   as	   well	   as	   correspond	   with	   partners	   in	   Amsterdam	   about	   the	  commodities	  that	  could	  receive	  a	  good	  price	  at	  any	  particular	  time.	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about textiles, as she was sometimes asked to appraise the value of clothes.  While 
Neeltie did not become a partner with her husband and his associates in this venture, she 
was, nevertheless, involved in the trade and most likely traded on her own account.  
 For merchants with less capital, or commitment to New Netherland, opportunism 
and commercial reality drove trade decisions. The Varlet family demonstrates the trans-
Atlantic nature of this period.  Caspar Varlet was born in Cologne in 1593 and later 
moved to Utrecht.  There, he married and began his textile business.  Along with textiles, 
he ventured into supplying cannon fuses to the Dutch government.  In 1625, Varlet 
moved his textile factory, along with his family and employees, to Amsterdam.   
 Caspar and his brother, Daniel, ventured into the Virginia tobacco trade.  In 1636, 
for instance, the brothers had provided 1200 guilders for a tenth part ownership stake in 
the vessel Rensselaerswyck bound for New Netherland and Virginia.195  In 1639, the 
brothers had invested in cargo to be sold in New Netherland aboard de Wapen van 
Leeuwarden.196  The opportunity to own a significant area of land and to produce 
commodities for sale within and outside of the colony of New Netherland must have been 
attractive to Caspar. He and his wife, Judith Tentenier, immigrated to New Netherland 
late in 1650 and eventually lived in Hartford, on the eastern most border of New 
Netherland.  And, while, Caspar and his wife remained in New Netherland until their 
deaths sometime in the early 1660’s, some of their children stayed in Amsterdam, 
engaged in trade, and provided a center from which the family’s Atlantic activities could 
be based.  Caspar’s son, Abraham, continued the trade his father and uncles had begun to 
                                                195	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  414/173;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  953/…;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  417/366;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1498/179-­‐180;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1499/179-­‐180.	  196	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1500/13-­‐17;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1500/26-­‐27;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1555/1059;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1500/35.	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Brazil. The Dutch in 1630 had decided to invade several sugar producing cities in Brazil, 
including Salvador and Natal. From 1630 to 1654, they took control of Recife and 
Olinda, making Recife the new capital of Dutch Brazil, the city of Mauritsstad.  The 
Varlets had traded to Brazil as early as 1635 and by 1638, with the implementation of 
free trade in Brazil (and the other regions claimed by the Dutch West India Company), 
trade flourished.197 The family continued to trade for sugar in Brazil until 1650.198  
 When trade in Brazil no longer proved profitable or safe for Dutch merchants, the 
Varlet family continued to trade to New Netherland, but also found additional avenues 
for trade with Curaçao and the Baltic region.   
 Free Trade – Colonial Opposition 
  While the States General and the Heren XIX developed policies and mandates for 
trade in New Netherland, the administration and merchants in New Netherland reacted 
accordingly.  As the colony developed, particularly after Peter Stuyvesant assumed the 
director-generalship in 1647, the colony’s administration became more vocal in 
opposition to certain policies and in creating policies relevant to the colony.  
 The West India Company’s opposition to price controls arose as a result of the 
conviction that a new colony owned by a bankrupt company could prosper only when the 
inhabitants were given the widest possible latitude in economic affairs.  The Company 
was not able to make a profit from New Netherland in the years immediately after the 
colony’s establishment, and the directors were convinced that this situation would 
continue until some way was found to make the colony more attractive to settlers.  As a 
                                                197	  See	  Wim	  Klooster,	   Illicit	  Riches:	  Dutch	  Trade	   in	   the	  Caribbean,	  1648-­‐1795	   (Leiden:	   KITLV	   Press,	  1998),	  18,	  22,	  24;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  412/248-­‐248vo.	  198	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  1947/513-­‐517.	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result of such considerations, in 1639 the fur trade with the Indians, which had been 
previously reserved to the Company, was thrown free and open to everybody.199  When 
traders who took advantage of this policy sought to evade the payment of taxes to the 
Company, the Director General and Council adopted an ordinance that provided for the 
inspection of books and stores of merchants suspected of smuggling.  But the Amsterdam 
chamber of the Company stated that the ordinance was “directly contrary to the course of 
Free Trade, which provisionally is granted by this Chamber to all Traders, for the reason 
that this Chamber is as yet unable to retain the trade to itself, but must content itself with 
the Duty, for the present, until more favorable circumstances.”200   
    The authorities in Amsterdam and in New Amsterdam were never able to work 
out a mutually satisfactory plan for the organization of the colonial economy.  Officials in 
patria were repeatedly compelled to remind their subordinates in America that 
interference with individual enterprise should always be kept at a minimum. If merchants 
viewed New Netherland as a restrictive trading environment, then trade would decline 
and tax revenues, payable to the Dutch government, would decrease. When Stuyvesant 
announced that he intended to restrain traders who went “several miles into the interior to 
meet the savages bringing down peltries and thus run up the price of the goods,” his 
superiors in the Netherlands replied that “it has been and still is the usual argument in our 
Department, that the trade should be open to everybody,” and that any interference by the 
Director General would result in “only a new form of restricted trade.”201 On another 
occasion, when the Director General and Council imposed an “internal duty of four 
                                                199	  O’Callaghan,	  New	  York	  Colonial	  Documents,	  14:	  251.	  200	  O’Callaghan,	  Laws	  and	  Ordinances	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  68.	  201	  O’Callaghan,	  New	  York	  Colonial	  Documents,	  14:	  84.	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stivers…in addition to the 8 per cent [export duty] on each merchantable beaver,” the 
Amsterdam chamber disallowed the law on the ground that “it is better to proceed in this 
matter with modesty, that commerce, just at present threatened by many dangers, may not 
be discouraged and people disgusted with it, which apparently would cause a 
depopulation of the country and deprive us of the means to bring emigrants over there.”202   
 The same issue arose again following Stuyvesant’s order in 1653 prohibiting 
traders from selling “their Merchandizes and Goods (Indian trade only excepted) any 
higher than one hundred per cent advance above the value of the Goods as entered in the 
Invoice.”203 This ordinance was no more acceptable to the directors than were other forms 
of price regulation.   
 This is an Ordinance, indeed, [they wrote Stuyvesant] as impracticable as 
 injurious in the highest degree to that State, being a sure means not only to banish 
 Trade and, at the same time to deprive the Company of a great population and 
 agriculture.  For who is there but knows that the expectation of gain is the greatest 
 spur to induce people to go thither, as experience hath already sufficiently 
 demonstrated.  On the contrary, the  dread of small and uncertain profit 
 discourages and deters people, as would, certainly, be the case whenever they 
 arrived there with their cargoes on these terms.  For, they would incur great 
 danger that their wares would be bought up on which the heaviest expenses fall, 
 among which are included those that pay sixty guilders and more per cent in 
 freight, duty,  convoy, &c., exclusive of insurance and the dangers of the seas.  
 What  profit  such merchants would derive, can easily be calculated.  We would 
 here adduce other and more cogent reasons, but as we are of opinion that Trade 
                                                202	  Ibid.,	  194.	  203	  O’Callaghan,	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  and	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   Calvinism	  had	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  from	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  may	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  New	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  Bailyn,	  The	  New	  England	  
Merchants	   in	   the	   Seventeenth	   Century;	   Mark	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   Heavenly	   Merchandize:	   How	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   Shaped	  
Commerce	  in	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  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  	  	  204	  Ibid.,	  149-­‐50.	  205	  O’Callaghan,	  New	  York	  Colonial	  Documents,	  14:	  208-­‐9.	  206	  “Scots”	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   “Scotch”	  did	  not	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   to	  merchants	   from	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   rather	   to	   itinerant	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  and	   traders,	  most	   probably	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   Veersteeg,	   trans.,	   and	  Martha	   Dickinson	  Shattuck,	   ed.,	  New	  Netherland	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   c.	  1650-­‐1660:	  From	  the	  Collected	  Papers	  of	  Hans	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  (Albany:	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  Center,	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  31,32,	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 cannot be subjected to the least constraint or limitation, but must be free and 
 unshackled, as is the practice among all Nations and peoples, so we have judged 
 such [a law] to be unnecessary.  And it is not to be doubted that the 
 exceedingly high prices will, with the increase of Trade, and importation of every 
 thing in abundance, also cease and disappear in time.204   
 
    The insistence of the Amsterdam chamber of the West India Company on free 
trade put them in the paradoxical position of opposing monopoly while they themselves 
enjoyed a monopoly.  But they saw nothing inconsistent in their attitude, for not only had 
they relinquished their monopoly of New Netherland’s trade, but they also maintained 
that economic freedom was essential to the development of a frontier economy.  But the 
Director General and Council in New Amsterdam believed that monopoly grants to 
individuals provided a feasible method for both obtaining revenue and guaranteeing the 
production of certain products. When Stuyvesant granted three monopolies (“one to 
establish an ashery, one to make tiles and bricks and the third to put up salt works”) to 
“some private parties,” the directors not only disallowed the ordinances in question, but 
they also ordered him not to grant any more monopolies in the future.  In explaining their 
opposition to such grants, they wrote: 
 we believe it [the granting of monopolies] to be very pernicious and 
 impracticable, especially in a new country, which begins only to develop,  and 
 must be peopled and made prosperous by general benefits and liberties to be 
 granted to everybody, who desires to settle there with this or that profession or 
 handicraft: that encourages people to remove thither, while on the contrary they 
 are deterred and consequently all trades and  business banished, if such 
 monopolies and privileges are given only to a few favored private individuals, the 
 advancement of whose interests must not be purchased at the expense of the 
 general welfare.  As the promotion of the latter depends mostly upon the growth 
 of a country, we have concluded to recommend to you to act in this matter always 
 on such theories, that increase of population, advancement of agriculture and 
 advantages to the common welfare may result from it; then the Company too may 
 at last reap some long expected benefits from this territory purchased so 
                                                204	  Ibid.,	  149-­‐50.	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 dearly.205   
 
    The Amsterdam and New Amsterdam authorities could not reach 
accommodation over economic policies. The protracted controversy over the right of the 
so-called “Scots” – or small traders from other regions – to carry on business in New 
Amsterdam and in other parts of the province provides another illustration of 
administrative conflict.206  The dispute was precipitated by a New Netherland ordinance 
of 1648, which was directed against the  
 Scottish merchants and small traders, who from time to time come over in  the 
 ships from the Fatherland, do not nor intend to do anything else, but to injure 
 trade with their underselling, by selling their goods quickly, and having sold out 
 returning in the ships, on which they came in the same year, without any benefit 
 to the country, to the injury of the inhabitants, having houses and lots and bearing 
 all burdens.207   
 
   In an attempt “to prevent such injury to the trade,” the Director General and Council 
 ordered, that henceforth all merchants, Scots and small traders, who come  over in 
 the ships from the Fatherland and intend to trade here, be it with Christians or 
 with heathens, in retail or wholesale, shall not be allowed to do any business in 
 the country, unless they remain here in New Netherland for three consecutive 
 years and besides build here, in the City of New Amsterdam, a decent burghers 
 dwelling house, each according to his means.208   
 
  This ordinance, like the medieval restrictions on the activities of “strangers,” was 
based on the assumption that it was the function of the local government to reserve to the 
members of the community all economic privileges.  As such it ran directly counter to the 
                                                205	  O’Callaghan,	  New	  York	  Colonial	  Documents,	  14:	  208-­‐9.	  206	  “Scots”	   or	   “Scotch”	  did	  not	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   to	  merchants	   from	  Scotland,	   but	   rather	   to	   itinerant	  merchants	  and	   traders,	  most	   probably	   of	   Dutch	   origin.	   See	   Dingman	   Veersteeg,	   trans.,	   and	  Martha	   Dickinson	  Shattuck,	   ed.,	  New	  Netherland	  Papers,	   c.	  1650-­‐1660:	  From	  the	  Collected	  Papers	  of	  Hans	  Bontemantel	  (Albany:	  New	  Netherland	  Research	  Center,	  2011),	  31,32,	  57.	  207	  Berthold	  Fernow,	  ed.,	  The	  Records	  of	  New	  Amsterdam	  from	  1653	  to	  1674	  (Baltimore:	  Genealogical	  Publishing	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  1976),	  1:10.	  208	  Ibid.	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company’s free-trade policies. Still, it is important to note the ordinance was not a 
limitation on “foreign” merchants from New England or the Chesapeake, for instance.  
They could continue to trade freely.  This was a protectionist scheme to maintain 
economic control on the fur trade, and substantial economic benefits, within New 
Netherland. It seemed to be a variation of mercantilism – ordinarily colonies existed to 
serve the mother country – whereby the mother country, or its traders, existed to serve the 
colony. 
    Although the directors objected to the ordinance regulating the “Scots,” they did 
not immediately veto it.209 In 1654, however, they wrote that a similar ordinance was 
“impracticable…principally in the infancy of a newly opened country, whose growth 
must be promoted rather by encouraging and unlimited privileges, than by prohibitions 
and restrictions.”  In the opinion of the directors, the conditions laid down by Stuyvesant 
were “repugnant” and would make traders settling in the province “servile and 
slavish.”210 As an alternative to the Director General’s plan, they proposed that anyone 
who maintained a public store in New Amsterdam be given the right to trade in the 
province. This suggestion was incorporated in an ordinance of 1657 that stated that 
traders who did not live in New Amsterdam had to keep “an open Store within the gates 
and walls of this City.” In addition, the Scots, like any inhabitant of New Amsterdam 
who wished to establish a business, were required to purchase the small burgherright, at a 
cost of twenty guilders.  The ordinance of 1657 was reissued by the Director General and 
Council in 1660 and by the burgomasters and Schepens in 1660 and 1661.  The hostility 
                                                209	  In	   January,	   1649,	   the	   directors	   wrote	   that	   they,	   like	   Stuyvesant,	   opposed	   “all	   these	   private	  extortioners,”	   but	   they	   also	   advised	   him	   to	   “temporize	   on	   all	   these	   points	   until	   more	   favorable	  circumstances.”	  O’Callaghan,	  Laws	  and	  Ordinances	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  92.	  210	  O’Callaghan,	  New	  York	  Colonial	  Documents,	  XIV,	  252.	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to the Scots, however, remained, and each successive enactment of the ordinance 
contained a preamble that accused nonresident traders of paying too little and making too 
much.211   
    The Jews, like the Scots, precipitated a controversy that clearly illustrated the 
basic differences in the economic views of the Amsterdam and New Amsterdam 
authorities. Twenty-three Jews from the Company’s former colony in Brazil joined Jacob 
Barsimson, who was the first Jew to settle in New Amsterdam, in 1654.212 Stuyvesant, 
who looked on the Jews and on those who arrived in subsequent years with undisguised 
antagonism, predicted to the Amsterdam Chamber of the West India Company they 
would be come a “charge” to the community, accused them of “their customary usury 
and deceitful trading with the Christians,” and noted he had “deemed it useful to require 
them in a friendly way to depart.”213   Knowledge of Stuyvesant’s letter reached the 
Jewish community in Amsterdam, who rejoined by appealing to the Company’s directors. 
Along with discussing the reasons for the relocation of Jews from Brazil to New 
Amsterdam, the letter noted how trade would increase if the Brazilian refugee Jews could 
remain in the under populated and financially struggling colony.214  
    The Amsterdam department, after accusing the Director General of being 
                                                211 	  O’Callaghan,	   Laws	   and	   Ordinances	   of	   New	   Netherland,	   299-­‐300;	   Fernow,	   Records	   of	   New	  
Amsterdam,	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  212	  See	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   “By	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  New	  Amsterdam,	  1654,”	  de	  Halve	  Maen	  77	  (2004):	   23;	   Noah	   Gelfand,	   “A	   People	   Within	   and	   Without:	   International	   Jewish	   Commerce	   and	  Community	   in	  the	  Seventeenth	  and	  Eighteen	  Centuries	  Dutch	  Atlantic	  World”	  (PhD	  diss.,	  New	  York	  University,	  2008),	  140-­‐70.	  213	  Extracts	   from	   “Letter	  of	  Petrus	  Stuyvesant	   to	   the	  Amsterdam	  Chamber	  of	   the	  Dutch	  West	   India	  Company,	  Manhattan,”	  September	  22,	  1654,	  in	  Morris	  U.	  Schappes,	  ed.,	  A	  Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  
Jews	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  1654-­‐1875	  (New	  York:	  The	  Citadel	  Press,	  1950),	  1-­‐2.	  214	  Ibid.,	  2-­‐4.	  For	  instance,	  Asser	  Levy,	  a	  resident	  in	  New	  Amsterdam	  and	  awarded	  the	  burgher	  right	  in	   1657,	   continued	   to	   travel	   to	   Amsterdam	   and	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   in	   Europe	   to	   trade	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  See	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  no.	  2443/761.	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“unreasonable and unfair,” decided that Jews not only settle in New Amsterdam, but that 
they also had the right “to sail to and trade in New Netherland…provided the poor among 
them shall not become a burden to the Company or the community.” The department’s 
officials were not necessarily more altruistic than Stuyvesant, but they did have a 
firsthand knowledge of the relatively liberal treatment accorded the Jews of Amsterdam, 
and they were in a position where they could not afford to ignore the fact that Jews had 
invested a “large amount of capital…in shares of this Company.”215   
     Stuyvesant, however, remained unconvinced, for he prevented Jews from 
buying real estate in New Amsterdam, forbade them “to trade to Fort Orange and the 
South [Delaware] River,” and argued that “to give liberty to the Jews will be very 
detrimental…because the Christians…will not be able at the same time to do business.”216  
Finally, after two years of evasion and outright insubordination, Stuyvesant in 1656 
accepted his superiors’ order that the Jews should be allowed “to ship and trade to and in 
New Netherland and to live and reside there and to enjoy the same liberty as other 
inhabitants.” 217   Throughout this controversy, burgomasters and Schepens, who 
complained of the difficulties of conducting a business in a community in which “Jews 
and Foreigners are as much encouraged as a Burgher or Citizen”, supported the Director 
General.218  In this instance, as in so many others, it was the local officials who wished to 
maintain a closed economy, while Company officials and policy makers in Amsterdam 
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demanded a competitive society that would be open to all comers.   
 The running dispute between the authorities in Amsterdam and their colleagues in 
New Amsterdam was the product of a basic disagreement over the nature of an economy 
at the outskirts of a more developed economy.  Stuyvesant, the members of his Council, 
and the burgomasters and Schepens were legislating for a “sustenance” economy.219  As a 
consequence, their major objective was to provide for the production and equitable 
distribution of necessities.  Living on the edge of the wilderness, in a community 
dependent on the outside world for many essential commodities, they were obsessed by 
the threat of scarcities.  Their problem was not how to produce more, but how to exist on 
what was already available.  Under the circumstances, they were inclined to view 
economic institutions as static, rather than changing, and to rely on a system of controls 
that had developed during the late Middle Ages and which was still very much a part of 
the Europe in which they had recently lived.   
    In contrast to New Amsterdam’s officials, Company officials in patria looked 
on the New World as the proverbial land of opportunity for individuals with the requisite 
amount of initiative.  To Stuyvesant’s arguments in favor of regulation, they replied with 
talk of individual freedom, and, for his static society endangered by shortages, they 
substituted the picture of an expanding economy in which the pursuit of the individual’s 
self-interest would redound to the benefit of all – and particularly to the benefit of the 
                                                219	  O’Callaghan,	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  Spanish	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  40	  florins;	  an	  anker	  of	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  at,	  44	  florins;	  a	  hogshead	  of	  French	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  at,	  110	  florins.	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Company.  The reasoning of the Company’s directors was relatively simple.  In their 
opinion, the colony had failed to prosper because it had not attracted new settlers – 
especially farmers who could produce necessities for themselves and the other 
inhabitants.  The unattractiveness of the colony to potential settlers, in turn, was the direct 
result of the regulations that curbed economic freedom.  The obvious solution was to 
reverse the process by removing the regulations.    
 
Conclusion 
 By the end of the 1630s, after nearly twenty years of Dutch claim to the region, 
New Netherland remained under-populated and dangerously dependent upon its trade 
lifeline with the Dutch Republic. The promise of Hudson’s discovery was in economic 
danger.  Although some profitable trade had been undertaken by individual merchants 
and chartered companies prior to the institution of the Dutch West India Company, the 
region in the earliest years after Hudson’s discovery failed to draw sufficient numbers of 
merchants or companies.   
 With the establishment of the Dutch West India Company in 1621, subscribers to 
the Company were optimistic that they too, like their fellow shareholders in the Dutch 
East India Company would soon enjoy substantial dividends from the bounty of natural 
resources and commodities to be generated from New Netherland and other regions under 
the Company’s auspices. Yet, the Company put too restrictive impositions on private 
trade, thus severely curtailing interest, much less activity, by Dutch merchants in the 
region.  As well, the Company retained the fur trade monopoly; the only profitable game 
in town as far as Dutch merchants were concerned. As a consequence, Dutch merchants 
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put their trading capital in ventures in Europe and Asia. 
 Finally, the Company fabricated one last plan in 1638. The grandiose plan to 
establish Dutch fiefdoms on American soil had not gone as planned, and only the 
struggling Rensselaerswyck remained as testimony to a decade’s efforts. To be sure, the 
patroons had wrenched important concessions from the Company during 1628 and 1629.  
Yet, encumbrances to investment remained. The Company required merchants to use 
Company ships, to engage Company supercargoes, and to pay the Company an 
assortment of fees. Gradually, but always grudgingly, the Company directors were forced 
by financial insolvency to abandon their trade monopoly altogether in exchange for a 
regulatory role in private trade within the geographical areas to which they laid claim.  
The surrender of monopoly privileges, however, was not a victory for the patroons. It 
came too late, long after they had lost their bid for supremacy in the colony’s trade.  
Private merchants with fewer ties to the colony would exploit free trade from 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Europe, and within the British North American colonies. 
 It was the private merchants, however, who established New Amsterdam as the 
trading center of early America subsequent to 1640.  In seventeenth century Amsterdam, 
trade was largely consigned to “personalized” rather than anonymous capitalism.220 The 
same would hold true for New Amsterdam and the larger colony of New Netherland. 
Free trade allowed the establishment of transatlantic trading relationships between 
merchants in the Dutch Republic and merchants in New Netherland.  Many of the 
networks that developed were sustained throughout the seventeenth century.  
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 By describing the process in this chapter by which the Dutch West India 
Company struggled to finally come to a free trade structure within New Netherland, the 
chapter provided the historical background for the subsequent economic growth of New 
Amsterdam and, ultimately, New York. By the 1640’s and onwards, Dutch merchants 
rapidly diversified their trade and expanded their regional connections to New Netherland 
and the English North American colonies.  Supported by access to abundant Amsterdam 
capital and markets, smaller Dutch merchants demonstrated an aggressive and flexible 
quality of entrepreneurship when they entered the North American trade. Such 
commercial experiences would facilitate their rapid adjustment to the advent of 
jurisdiction changes in early America well into the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Dutch Masters of Another Sort:  
The Chesapeake and its Tobacco 
1620 - 1664 
 
 
Tobacco – sweet tasting, putrid, abundant, addicting. That “moste abominable and 
noxious weede,” as King James I referred to it, was also a profitable weed.221  And if 
anyone could smell a profit, up the eastern seaboard or across the Atlantic, a Dutch 
merchant could.   
Of course, some Dutch merchants, such as Isaac Allerton, did need not to cross 
the Atlantic to engage in the tobacco trade.  They needed only to sail their fluyts 
southward from New Amsterdam along the coastal waters and travel up the various 
waterways flowing into the Chesapeake to isolated plantations.  There, they purchased 
tobacco.  In return, the Virginians received much needed English and European goods, as 
well as the opportunity to become a radial, however, minor, in the webs of commercial 
networks forming between Dutch merchants and English planters.   
Once again, Allerton exemplified the permeability of seventeenth-century 
America.  While still living in Plymouth, Allerton began trading in Virginia tobacco.  
Allerton, in fact, had extensive trade with the Chesapeake throughout his commercial life 
                                                221	  James	   I,	   in	  an	  anonymously	  published	  pamphlet,	  branded	  smoking	   “a	  custome	   loathsome	   to	   the	  eye,	  hatefull	  to	  the	  Nose,	  harmefull	  to	  the	  braine,	  daungerous	  to	  the	  Lungs,”	  and	  imposed	  a	  significant	  import	  duty	  on	  it.	  A	  Counter-­‐Blaste	  to	  Tobacco	  (London:	  R.B.,	  1604).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  James’s	  moral	  bias	  against	   tobacco	   smoking,	   tobacco	   cultivation	   and	   importation	   ran	   counter	   to	   prevailing	   economic	  thought	  that	  emphasized	  “desirable	  commodities”	  and	  diversification.	  As	  late	  as	  1680,	  early	  modern	  English	   policy	  makers	   viewed	   tobacco	   as	   a	   costly,	   nonessential	   luxury.	   	   See	   Richard	   Hakluyt	   (the	  younger),	   Discourse	   of	   Western	   Planting	   (1584).	   	   See	   also	   Peter	   C.	   Mancall,	   Envisioning	   America:	  
English	   Plans	   for	   the	   Colonization	   of	   North	   America	   (Boston:	   Bedford	   Books	   of	   St.	   Martin’s	   Press,	  1995),	  11-­‐5.	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and he, subsequently, established his eldest son in Virginia to act as his trade 
representative.222 Allerton joined the many Dutch merchants who were drawn to the 
Chesapeake tobacco trade. 
This chapter considers the development and importance of Dutch trading 
networks to the Chesapeake region during the period from 1620 to 1664.  The story of the 
quest for a profitable commodity from the Chesapeake is well known.  After years of 
struggle, tobacco emerged as the commodity that both grew well and satisfied a consumer 
demand (or perhaps served to create one) in Europe.  Less well known is that the Dutch 
were integral to Chesapeake merchants and the region’s tobacco trade.   
 The first part of this chapter examines the basis and development of Dutch trade 
to the Chesapeake. That the Dutch were interested in tobacco is undisputed.  But they did 
not set out to acquire tobacco from Chesapeake planters in a coordinated manner as part 
of a broader Dutch state policy.  The success in tobacco cultivation brought economic 
prosperity to the region’s planters.  Such prosperity brought Dutch merchants who came 
ladened with goods and promises of extended credit.  The English Civil War threatened 
the region’s increasing fortunes by diminishing the ships available for trade. 
Nevertheless, the Dutch continued to trade with Chesapeake planters and ensured the 
region’s economic survival.  English colonial officials in Virginia encouraged Dutch 
trade and made conditions favorable for trade. The passage of the Navigation Acts in 
1650 triggered concern among Virginia planters and Dutch merchants.  Despite economic 
and political hurdles, trade between Chesapeake planters and Dutch merchants persisted 
from 1620 through 1664. 
                                                222	  Walter	   A.	   Allerton,	   A	   History	   of	   the	   Allerton	   Family	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   1585-­‐1885,	   and	   A	  
Genealogy	  of	  the	  Descendants	  of	  Isaac	  Allerton	  (New	  York,	  1888),	  revised	  by	  Samuel	  Walters	  Allerton	  (Chicago,	  1900),	  23-­‐4.	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 The second portion of this chapter considers the rise of Rotterdam with the 
Chesapeake trade. The merchants in Rotterdam and Amsterdam developed trading 
networks to the Chesapeake that were mostly Dutch in ethnicity in Europe, but both 
Dutch and English in the Chesapeake.  Rotterdam merchants partnered with English 
merchants resident in Rotterdam and, together, they engaged in a brisk and competitive 
trade with both Dutch and English Chesapeake planters. The disruptions of the English 
Civil War allowed for the formation of trading partnerships between Dutch and English 
merchants and English plantation owners. Using Dutch bottoms and Dutch finance, new 
markets opened in Europe for Chesapeake tobacco that bypassed traditional London 
intermediaries. Virginia merchants traveled to Rotterdam to trade and the Dutch 
accommodated them with English-speaking notaries.  For Rotterdam merchants, Virginia 
became a destination for trade, not just a peripheral stop on a return voyage from the 
Caribbean. 
 The third section analyzes the trade between Amsterdam merchants and 
Chesapeake tobacco planters.  After establishing the earliest formation of such trade and 
its development through the 1620s, I provide evidence of how Dutch merchants 
integrated the Chesapeake tobacco trade with the New Netherland fur trade. 
 Finally, the fourth section of this chapter surveys immigration to the Chesapeake 
by the Dutch.  Dutch merchants who settled on the Eastern Shore enhanced or extended 
their commercial endeavors with resident tobacco planters and provided additional links 
for the Dutch tobacco trade as factors for merchants in New Netherland or the Dutch 
Republic.  Some Dutch immigration resulted from default on a debt by an English 
plantation owner to a Dutch merchant. As well, Dutch women residing in the Chesapeake 
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participated in the tobacco trade during the seventeenth century.  
 
The Rise of Chesapeake Tobacco and European Demand 
 The Chesapeake’s early economy was a notable series of missteps.  When the 
Virginia Company of London was chartered in 1606, its investors hoped for profits from 
glass manufacture, pitch and tar production, silkworm farming, the harvesting of timber, 
and a much anticipated trove of gold.  It soon became clear to settlers and investors that 
the region’s economic future was foundering. The settlers produced negligible trading 
commodities from the exploitation of available raw materials. Attempts at producing 
glass, pitch, tar, and potash yielded insignificant profits.  Such commodities could be 
produced in England, sold less expensively to consumers, and still yield satisfactory 
profits.  And, disappointingly, no gold had been extricated.223  
 When John Rolfe in 1612 ascertained that West Indian tobacco grew well in 
Virginia and would sell profitably in England, he could not have known then that the 
economic future of the Chesapeake had changed course. After the first shipments to 
England in 1617, the potential cash value of tobacco quickly captivated the colonists’ 
imaginations.  By 1622, as English tastes for Virginia tobacco intensified and the 
production of tobacco increased, tobacco became the currency for the Chesapeake that 
allowed its residents to participate in the nascent economy of the Atlantic World as 
economic agents. 
 Tobacco growing became widespread.  The lure of wealth to be made as a 
                                                223	  See	   Samuel	   M.	   Bemiss,	   ed.,	   The	   Three	   Charters	   of	   the	   Virginia	   Company	   of	   London,	   with	   Seven	  
Related	   Documents:	   1606-­‐1621	   (Williamsburg,	   Virginia:	   Jamestown	   350th	   Anniversary	   Historical	  Booklet	   4,	   1957);	   Wesley	   Frank	   Craven,	   The	   Dissolution	   of	   the	   Virginia	   Company:	   The	   Failure	   of	   a	  
Colonial	  Experiment	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1932).	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plantation owner even became the target of seventeenth-century satirists.  One wrote:  
 The Pagen weed was our hope 
 In Leafe, Pricke, Role, Ball, Pudding, Pipe, or Rope, 
 Brasseele, Varina, Meavis, Trinidado, 
 Saint Christophers, Virginia, or Barvado; 
 Bermudas, Providentia, Shallowcongo, 
 And the most part of all the rest (Mundungo). 
 That Patent, with a whiffe is spent and broke, 
 And all our hopes (in fumo) turn’d to smoake.224 
 
Despite the varieties of tobacco available for a satirist’s wit, only two types of tobacco 
were well-suited to early settlers in the Chesapeake: Oronoco and sweet-scented.  
Oronoco was grown all around the Bay and was stronger in flavor.  Sweet-scented was 
grown on the banks of the James, York, Rappahannock, and Potomac rivers and had a 
milder taste.  Sweet-scented tobacco was considered the best tobacco in the world and as 
a result it brought a better price than Oronoco.  Still, Oronoco, which was thought to be 
too strong for Englishmen, was in great demand throughout Europe, particularly the 
Dutch Republic.  Oronoco had a broader commercial market than sweet-scented, and 
proved more profitable to planters.225 
Certainly, the success of tobacco cultivation brought a singular level of economic 
prosperity to Chesapeake tobacco planters throughout much of the first half of the 
seventeenth century. Arguably, without tobacco, Chesapeake colonists would have 
engaged in subsistence farming and animal husbandry and had little, if any, opportunity 
for economic growth independent of England.  Nevertheless, successful tobacco 
cultivation also drew the attention of Dutch merchants who sought out trading 
opportunities. 
                                                224	  John	  Taylor	  (1641),	  printed	  in	  John	  Ashton,	  ed.,	  Humour,	  Wit,	  &	  Satire	  of	  the	  Seventeenth	  Century	  (London:	  Chatto	  and	  Windus,	  1883),	  307-­‐8.	  225	  Edmund	   S.	   Morgan,	  American	   Slavery,	   American	  Freedom:	  The	  Ordeal	   of	   Colonial	  Virginia	   (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  1975),	  90-­‐6.	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The Dutch offered Chesapeake tobacco planters many commercially alluring 
services.  The availability of Dutch bottoms in which to ship tobacco and the quantity of 
tobacco that could be economically shipped in a Dutch fluyt attracted English tobacco 
planters to Dutch merchants.  As well, the Dutch expressed interest in the strong-flavored 
Virginian tobacco.  Dutch tobacco processors and manufacturers understood that their up-
market for resale, German and Central European consumers, clamored for a stronger 
tobacco blend. Dutch merchants and shipping offered vital access to markets for 
Chesapeake planters when the English experienced political and commercial upheaval 
during the 1640s. Importantly, Dutch merchants extended credit and offered attractive 
goods and merchandise in trade for tobacco.  Further, the Dutch often paid higher prices 
for tobacco and provided shipping at a more reasonable rate than merchants of other 
nations, including the English.  All of this made sense to a Chesapeake tobacco planter 
who sought to maximize profitability. The Dutch expressed less concern about following 
the letter of the law – e.g., the Navigation Acts or pesky impost/export rules, than they 
had about bringing a sought after product to the European market.  In a geographical 
region that lacked a trading entrepôt and realistic administrative enforcement 
mechanisms, this worked out well for all concerned.  
During the English Civil War, the volume of commercial shipping between the 
Chesapeake and the Dutch Republic greatly increased.  Out of necessity, the region 
depended on Dutch trade for its economic survival. Recognizing the practical importance 
of a trade policy that did not inhibit trade or trading partners, and responding to a petition 
from Dutch merchants, Virginia’s Governor Sir William Berkeley introduced legislation 
in March 1642/43 to widen commercial access to Dutch merchants and further his free 
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trade policy.  The final act allowed “any merchant, factors, or other of the Dutch nation to 
import wares and merchandizes and to trade or traffique for the commoditys of the 
collony in any shipp or shipps of their owne or belonging to the Netherlands.” As well, 
the act rescinded the requirement of bonds to be procured in Virginia and held as security 
for the payment of customs duty in London.  Instead, Dutch merchants needed only to 
present letters of credit from a London merchant to the governor in order for their cargos 
to be cleared for sailing.226  For the first time, Virginia gave statutory recognition to the 
Dutch as trading partners and, arguably, loosened the administrative reins for legally 
procuring tobacco.   
English planters and local officials recognized the importance of Dutch shipping 
to their region’s economic profitability.  And, numerous commercial and maritime 
commentators throughout the seventeenth century remarked upon the cost-effective 
operation of Dutch merchant ships.  An efficient ship design, economical shipbuilding 
costs, and moderate voyage costs created a substantial demand for Dutch shipping 
services. 227  Lawrence Harper estimated that when Dutch shipping services were 
                                                226	  William	  Waller	   Hening,	   ed.,	  The	  Statutes	  at	  Large:	  Being	  a	  Collection	  of	  All	   the	  Laws	  of	  Virginia	  
from	  the	  First	  Session	  of	  the	  Legislature,	  in	  the	  Year	  1619,	  facsimile	  ed.	  (1809-­‐23);	  rpt.,	  Charlottesville,	  VA,	  1969),	  1:258.	  227	  The	   fluyt	  was	   first	   designed	   in	   the	   late	   sixteenth	   century.	   	  With	   a	   round	   stern	   and	   noted	   pear	  shape,	   it	  was	  particularly	  suited	  to	  commercial	  shipping	  by	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  crew	  required	  to	  sail	   a	   vessel,	   its	   shallow	   draft	   allowing	   for	   ease	   of	   access	   outside	   of	   deep	   harbors,	   its	   speed	   and	  stability,	   and	   that	   it	   could	   carry	   more	   payload.	   	   See	   Nicolaes	   Witsen,	   Aeloude	   en	   Hedendaegsche	  
Scheeps-­‐Bouw	  en	  Bestier	  (Amsterdam,	  1671),	  159-­‐60.	  	   Shipbuilding	   costs	   reflected	   the	   Dutch	   Republic’s	   lower	   costs	   for	   imports	   of	   building	  materials	  (timber,	  hemp,	  flax,	  etc.).	  	  And	  with	  respect	  to	  building,	  Witsen	  noted	  the	  lack	  of	  innovation	  by	  English	   shipbuilders.	   	  He	  wrote,	   “It	   is	   surprising	   that	   foreigners,	   though	   they	  may	  have	   studied	  economical	  building	  in	  the	  dockyards	  of	  this	  country,	  can	  never	  practice	  it	  in	  their	  own	  land…unless	  he	  should	   find	  a	  way	  to	   inculcate	   in	  his	  workmen	  the	  thrifty	  and	  neat	  disposition	  of	   the	  Hollander,	  which	  is	  impossible.”	  (“Te	  verwonderen	  is’t	  dat	  alle	  uytlanders,	  schoon	  zy	  op	  Timmer-­‐werven	  hier	  te	  lant	   de	   zuynigheyt	   bevlijtigen,	   in	   haer	   eygen	   lant	   gekomen,	   nimmer	   zulks	   na	   konnen	   volgen…’t	   en	  waer	   hy	   kans	   zag	   den	   aerd	   zijns	   volks,	  waer	  mede	   hy	   arbeyden	  moet,	   den	   zuyning	   en	   zindelijken	  hollantschen	  in	  borst	  gelijck	  te	  maken,	  ‘t	  geen	  niet	  doenlijck.”	  Ibid.	  	  See	  also	  Roger	  Coke,	  A	  Discourse	  
of	  Trade	  (London,	  1670),	  56.	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unhampered by armed conflicts with other nations, England carried only one third of her 
own trade.228 
Despite the importance of Dutch shipping to colonial American economies during 
the English Civil War, the 1650s saw renewed concerns in England about the reliance of 
the English colonial economy on foreign shipping.  Although the States General adopted 
a neutralist position, with respect to the English Civil War, both political sides in England 
were alienated from the Dutch Republic and attacked Dutch ships. Nevertheless, 
England’s Council of State regarded the Protestant Dutch Republic as a natural ally of the 
English Commonwealth.  A diplomatic team, headed by Oliver St. John, sent to The 
Hague in October 1650, had instructions to negotiate an alliance. The Dutch proposed a 
free trade agreement while the English suggested something akin to a political union that 
partitioned certain geographical regions. 229  Dutch republicans were in favor of an 
alliance, but supporters of the House of Orange distrusted this arrangement.  With the 
failure of his diplomatic mission, St. John returned to England and drafted the 
provocative Navigation Act of October 1651.230 
Parliament adopted the Navigation Act in 1651, reinforcing a longstanding 
                                                                                                                                            	   Smaller	  crews	  also	  meant	  lower	  operational	  costs	  for	  Dutch	  merchant	  ships.	   	   John	  Keymer,	  an	  English	  economic	  writer,	   observed	   in	  1620,	   “though	  an	  English	  Ship	  of	   tow	  hundred	   tun,	   and	  a	  Holland	  Ship,…of	  the	  same	  burthen	  be	  at	  Danske,	  or	  any	  other	  place	  beyond	  the	  Seas,	  or	  in	  England,	  they	  do	  serve	  the	  Merchant	  better	  cheap	  by	  one	  hundred	  pounds	  in	  his	  freight	  than	  we	  can,	  by	  reason	  he	  hath	  but	  nine	  or	  ten	  Marriners,	  and	  we	  near	  thirty;	  thus	  he	  saveth	  twenty	  mens	  meat	  and	  wages	  in	  a	   voyage.”	   John	  Keymer,	  Original	  Papers	  Regarding	  Trade	  in	  England	  and	  Abroad,	  drawn	  up	  by	  John	  
Keymer	  for	  Information	  of	  King	  James	  I,	  about	  1620.	  Edited	  by	  M.F.	   Lloyd	  Prichard	   (New	  York:	  A.M.	  Kelley,	   1967),	   38-­‐9.	   See	   also,	   Violet	   Barbour,	   “Dutch	   and	   English	   Merchant	   Shipping	   in	   the	  Seventeenth	  Century,”	  The	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  2:No.	  2	  (January	  1930),	  261-­‐90;	  C.R.	  Boxer,	  The	  
Dutch	  Seaborne	  Empire,	  1600-­‐1800	  (London,	  1965).	  228	  Lawrence	  A.	  Harper,	  The	  English	  Navigation	  Laws	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1939),	  350.	  	  229	  Jonathan	   Israel,	  The	  Dutch	  Republic:	   Its	   Rise,	   Greatness,	   and	   Fall,	   1477-­‐1806	   (Oxford:	   Clarendon	  Press,	  1995),	  714-­‐5.	  230	  Jonathan	  Israel,	  	  “England’s	  Mercantilist	  Response	  to	  Dutch	  World	  Trade	  Primacy,	  1647-­‐1674,”	  in	  
State	  and	  Trade:	  Government	  and	  the	  Economy	   in	  Britain	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  since	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  eds.	  S.	  Groenveld	  and	  M.	  Wintle,	  (Zutphen,	  1992),	  50-­‐61.	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principle of government policy that English trade should be carried in English vessels.231  
The events in England caused concern for both English tobacco planters in the 
Chesapeake and Dutch shippers servicing their tobacco trading networks.  When 
prominent Dutch trading families faced exclusion from American colonial trade by 
English authorities in 1650, the Dutch merchants petitioned the States General to 
intercede on a diplomatic level. They maintained they had traded with Virginia and the 
Caribbean Islands for over twenty years “by which commerce, the aforesaid places have 
from very humble beginnings . . . so improved from time to time, and been brought to 
such condition as to be at present a source of astonishment to the whole world.” The 
merchants expressed astonishment that “regardless of what they had contributed to their 
prosperity,” the merchants were to be excluded from further trade. And, wisely, they 
outlined the impact trade restrictions would have on the domestic economy of the Dutch 
Republic.  The petition stated,  
For, independent of the profit accruing from ship-building and what is 
 connected therewith, our cargoes, which are exported thither to the value yearly 
 of several millions, consist not of gold, silver, or any description of coin, but 
 exclusively of all sorts of domestic manufactures, brewed beer, linen cloth, 
 brandies, or other distilled liquors, duffels, coarse cloth, and other articles 
 suitable for food and raiment for the people inhabiting those places, in return for 
 which are imported all sorts of eastern commodities…affording extensive trade by 
 the exportation of said wares to countries far and near; contributing to the support 
 of several thousand people, independent of the profit of common stock.232 
 
Both Dutch and English merchants requested the Dutch government to apply diplomatic 
                                                231	  	  The	  Navigation	  Act	  of	  1651	  targeted	  the	  Dutch.	  	  The	  Dutch	  dominated	  European	  trade	  and	  much	  of	  England’s	   coastal	   shipping.	  Because	   trade	  between	  England	   and	   the	  Dutch	  was	   competitive,	   the	  English	  viewed	  exclusionary	  measures	  as	  the	  only	  solution.	  Had	  trade	  been	  complementary	  –	  the	  two	  countries	   exchanged	   commodities	   –	   the	   draconian	  measures	  would	   not	   have	   been	   necessary.	   See,	  e.g.,	   Charles	  Wilson,	  Profit	  and	  Power:	  A	  Study	  of	  England	  and	   the	  Dutch	  Wars	  (London,	   1957);	   J.E.	  Farnell,	  “The	  Navigation	  Act	  of	  1651,	  the	  First	  Dutch	  War	  and	  the	  London	  Merchant	  Community,”	  in	  
Economic	  History	  Review,	  2nd	  Series,	  16,	  no.	  3	  (1964):	  440.	  232	  O’Callaghan,	  Documents	  of	  New	  York,	  1:436-­‐7.	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pressure on England. They sought either rescission of the Act or, at the very least, more 
time to conclude colonial trading arrangements prior to the Act’s commencement.  The 
parties reached an accord in the Treaty of Westminster in 1654. In reality, the Act had 
little influence on Dutch trade in Europe or in North America. In fact, despite European 
political events and various discriminatory English economic policies, trade between the 
English Chesapeake colonies and New Netherland and the Dutch Republic persisted 
throughout the period from 1620 to 1664. The records of New Netherland, Virginia, 
Maryland, England, and the Dutch Republic attest to that point.  And the records reflect 
only a small portion of the trade that existed between the Dutch and the Chesapeake 
colonies. 
  
The New Netherland/Chesapeake Trade 
Dutch traders arriving from patria and colonial traders, both English and Dutch, 
from the Chesapeake converged on New Netherland’s port of New Amsterdam. While 
New Netherland’s political leaders and officials of the West India Company had hoped 
that New Netherland’s farmers could successfully grow tobacco to compete with the 
Chesapeake and supply the ever-increasing appetite of Europeans for tobacco, in reality, 
the colony’s farmers achieved only minimal success.233   
Instead, New Netherland provided a commercial infrastructure to Chesapeake 
merchants – one that offered markets for trade, credit for expansion, and a variety of 
                                                233	  While	  tobacco	  was	  grown	  in	  New	  Netherland,	  tobacco	  grown	  in	  the	  Chesapeake	  was	  of	  a	  higher	  quality	   and	   produced	   in	   significantly	   greater	   quantities.	   	   The	   West	   India	   Company	   and	   various	  patroons	  had	  plans	  to	  make	  tobacco	  a	  substantial	  export	  commodity	  from	  the	  colony.	  However,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  sufficient	  work	  force,	  climatic	  conditions,	  and	  the	  higher	  quality	  of	  Chesapeake	  tobacco	  soon	  pushed	  aside	  such	  designs.	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services well suited to an English merchant/planter.234  And the extended hands of 
commercial hospitality reached from the Chesapeake as well, at least as it related to trade 
with Dutch merchants resident in New Netherland.   
 
Trade between Rotterdam and Virginia   
When thinking about trading centers in the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, 
one is immediately inclined to think of Amsterdam. The city on the IJ, along with its 
merchants and financiers, dominated the Dutch Republic’s economic and political affairs. 
Nevertheless, Rotterdam’s economic growth in the seventeenth, and to a greater extent in 
the eighteenth century, came about because of the establishment of British trading houses 
in the city.  As a consequence of becoming “Little London,” Rotterdam became involved 
in trade with the Chesapeake.235  
 Herring in the sixteenth century and the wine trade of the seventeenth century 
underpinned Rotterdam’s economy. Rotterdam’s merchants focused their attention 
geographically on England, Scotland, and France.  Trade with England increased during 
                                                234	  The	  Directors	  of	  the	  West	  India	  Company	  kept	  abreast	  of	  relations	  between	  New	  Netherland	  and	  the	  Chesapeake.	   	   In	  1652,	   the	  directors	  wrote	   to	  Stuyvesant	  about	   the	  English	  colonies	   in	  America.	  	  “We	  have	  been	  pleased	  to	  learn,”	  they	  remarked,	  “that	  so	  far	  you	  have	  not	  had	  any	  troubles	  with	  the	  English	   there	   and	   hope	   you	  will	   not	   have	   any,	   but	   use	   all	   honest	   and	   fair	   means	   to	   continue	   the	  former	   harmony	   and	   keep	   up	   your	   commercial	   relations,	   especially	  with	   Virginia.	   	   That	  will	  most	  likely	  make	   the	  Manhattans	   flourish	   and	   increase	   in	   population;	   this	   increase	  will	   necessitate	   the	  fitting	  out	  of	  more	  ships….”	  	  Berthold	  Fernow,	  Documents	  Relating	  to	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Early	  Colonial	  
Settlements	  (Albany:	  Weed,	  Parsons,	  and	  Company,	  1883),	  14:194-­‐5	  
235 Rotterdam had been first termed “Little London” during the Reformation, when it hosted a sizeable 
English community.  In the late sixteenth century, when the Dutch Republic became an English 
protectorate, 6,000 English troops were quartered outside of Rotterdam. During the seventeenth century, 
Rotterdam’s improved harbor, economic inducements such as exemption from taxes and a bank of 
exchange, and regional trading system, attracted English and Scottish merchants.  See P.W. Klein, “‘Little 
London’: British Merchants in Rotterdam During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Enterprise 
and History: Essays in Honour of Charles Wilson, D.C. Coleman and Peter Mathias, eds., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984); M.R. Doormont and R. Vroom, ‘“Little London”, Engelse kooplieden 
te Rotterdam in de achttiende en het begin van de negentiende eeuw’, Rotterdams Jaarboekje, series 9, 3 
(1985), 197-218. 
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the seventeenth century. The Court of Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers, an English 
association of merchants which was authorized to trade English woolen draperies, as well 
as a number of other English merchants, settled in Rotterdam. Municipal authorities gave 
the English merchants special privileges.  A church was allotted to them to have their 
own services.  That colony of English merchants might have been an important advantage 
in 1651 when English laws banned all trade to England with non-English vessels.  
English citizens living in Rotterdam could partner with Dutch merchants to comply with 
the law.  Rotterdam’s trade was in all probability not as badly affected as other cities by 
this law because the English settlers were able to continue their business without the risk 
of seizure.236   
 The Dutch West India Company had several chambers in various cities and 
provinces of the Dutch Republic.  Each chamber had a particular geographical monopoly 
on trade.237 When the chamber of which Rotterdam was a part lost its monopoly on trade 
with Brazil, the trade moved to the Caribbean, where Curaçao became the most important 
harbor for slaves.  In the Rotterdam Municipal Archives, numerous notarial records 
reveal a trade in tobacco that developed between merchants in Rotterdam and merchants 
in various locations including Tobago, St. Kitts, Brazil, and other regions of the 
Caribbean and South America.  Nevertheless, the notarial records lack any mention of a 
journey from Rotterdam to Virginia for the specific purpose of trading in tobacco during 
                                                236	  On	   Rotterdam’s	   herring	   trade	   see	   R.	   Bijlsma,	   Rotterdams	  Welvaren,	   1550-­‐1650	   (‘s-­‐Gravenhage,	  Nijhoff,	  1918),	  5-­‐9,	  43-­‐58.	  	  On	  the	  growth	  of	  Rotterdam’s	  wine	  trade,	  see	  Henriette	  de	  Bruyn-­‐Kops,	  A	  
Spirited	  Exchange:	  The	  Wine	  and	  Brandy	  Trade	  between	  France	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  in	  its	  Atlantic	  
Framework,	  1600-­‐1650	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2007).	  	  For	  English	  merchants	  in	  Rotterdam,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Arie	  van	  der	  Schoor,	  Stad	  in	  Aanwas:	  Geschiedenis	  van	  Rotterdam	  tot	  1813	  (Assen:	  Waanders	  B.V.,	  1999);	  Z.W.	  Sneller,	  Rotterdams	  bedrijfsleven	   in	  het	  verleden	   (Amsterdam:	  H.J.	   Paris,	   1940);	   David	  Ormrod,	  The	  
Rise	  of	  Commercial	  Empires:	  England	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Mercantilism,	  1650-­‐1770	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  	  	  	  237	  Van	  Laer,	  Van	  Rensselaer	  Bowier	  Manuscripts	  (Albany:	  University	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  1908),	  86-­‐115.	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the 1620s and the greater part of the 1630s. This is understandable because the Rotterdam 
chamber had activities on numerous geographical fronts.  Also, journeys may have been 
undertaken to Virginia as part of a captain’s general instructions to voyage to the “West 
Indies.”  
By 1638, the Rotterdam archives first indicate that merchants in Rotterdam had 
developed a trade with Chesapeake tobacco growers.238 Two English tobacco merchants 
operating from Rotterdam, Francoys Gorling and William Atkinson, and their Dutch 
partner, Cornelis Franssen van Santvoort, appeared before a Rotterdam notary. They 
attested to import duties levied on barrels of tobacco they had previously received from 
Virginia. James Yates, also an English merchant trading in Rotterdam, had been the 
original recipient of the tobacco. The parties appeared before the notary and had a 
declaration drawn up, all in expectation of a dispute with an additional partner 
participating in the trade, Adriaen Willemsen Wortel.  Such commercial and legal actions 
of the English and Dutch merchants trading from Rotterdam to the Chesapeake suggest 
that by 1638, they had already long-established commercial relations with Virginia’s 
tobacco planters. 
By the 1640s, extensive commercial activity developed between Rotterdam and 
Virginia.  Along with Dutch merchants, English merchants resident in Rotterdam 
engaged in trade with Virginia. The ties between the city of Rotterdam and England seem 
                                                238	  While	  prudent	  to	  memorialize	  commercial	  agreements	  with	  notary	  publics,	  Dutch	  merchants	  and	  investors	  exercised	  caution	  when	  disclosing	  precise	  locations	  of	  trading	  voyages.	  	  For	  instance,	  there	  may	  well	  have	  been	  trade	  between	  Rotterdam	  merchants	  and	  Chesapeake	  tobacco	  growers	  prior	  to	  1638.	   	  The	  Gemeentearchief	  Rotterdam	  notes	  numerous	  voyages	  between	  Rotterdam	  and	  the	  West	  Indies	  during	   the	  1620s	  and	  1630s.	   	  While	   the	  Dutch	  often	   referred	   to	  North	  America	  as	   the	  West	  Indies,	   the	   parties	   might	   have	   intentionally	   worded	   documentation	   with	   a	   vague	   geographical	  reference	   to	   the	   region,	   or,	   intended	   to	   give	   the	   captain	   and/or	   supercargo	   broad	   discretionary	  powers	   to	   solicit	   trade.	   	   The	   Gemeentarchief	   Rotterdam	   has	   hundreds	   of	   commercial	   documents	  referencing	  tobacco	  prior	  to	  1638	  and	  some	  may	  relate	  to	  trade	  with	  Virginia.	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to have grown closer especially during the first half of the seventeenth century, when 
Rotterdam succeeded in connecting its regional trading system to the general upsurge of 
the Dutch economy.239  The bond was confirmed and invigorated in 1635 at the official 
establishment of the Court of Merchant Adventurers in Rotterdam.240  
Although the Civil War in England interfered with traditional European regional 
trade routes, investigation of Rotterdam and American colonial archives reveals that 
commercial opportunities arose for both Dutch and English merchants to examine new 
trade routes and to perhaps engage in new trading partnerships.241 One such opportunity 
arose in the Chesapeake. The Chesapeake tobacco trade allowed English merchants 
located in Rotterdam to utilize Dutch bottoms for carrying tobacco, employ Dutch 
finance to purchase trade goods and extend credit for the acquisition of tobacco, and 
develop English commercial networks with Chesapeake planters. For Dutch partners, the 
direct trade with Chesapeake planters provided a new market to fuel the Dutch tobacco 
industry.  Previously, trade had come through English intermediaries, which increased the 
cost for tobacco.  
Virginia merchants and planters of English origin arrived in Rotterdam to trade 
tobacco.  Joseph Sanders, an English merchant in Virginia, had recently come from the 
Chesapeake in 1639, but in the opinion of Jan Lambertsz and Joost van Overmeer, the 
                                                239	  Bijlsma,	  Rotterdams	  welvaren;	  Z.W.	  Sneller,	  Geschiedenis	  van	  de	  steenkolenhandel	  van	  Rotterdam	  (Groningen,	  1946),	  92-­‐108.	  240	  See	  C.	  te	  Lintum,	  De	  Merchant	  Adventurers	  in	  de	  Nederlanden	  (The	  Hague,	  1905),	  103-­‐207;	  Oscar	  Gelderblom,	  “The	  Decline	  of	  Fairs	  and	  Merchant	  Guilds	  in	  the	  Low	  Countries,	  1250-­‐1650,”	  in	  Jaarboek	  
voor	   Middeleeuwse	   Geschiedenis	   7	   (2004),	   225;	   David	   Ormrod,	   The	   Rise	   of	   Commercial	   Empires:	  
England	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   in	   the	   Age	   of	   Mercantilism,	   1650-­‐1770	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  93-­‐6.	  241	  P.W.	   Klein	   suggests	   that	   the	   English	   merchant	   community	   in	   Rotterdam	   suffered	   the	   same	  divisiveness	   that	   engulfed	   England	   and	   split	   into	   Royalists	   and	   Parliamentarians.	   	   See	   P.W.	   Klein,	  “‘Little	   London,”	   120.	   How	   this	   division	   within	   the	   Rotterdam	   English	   merchant	   community	  ultimately	  played	  out	  in	  commercial	  relationships	  with	  Dutch	  trading	  partners	  is	  presently	  unknown.	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tobacco Sanders brought with him was of poor quality and could not be taken on 
account.242 In 1642, Samuel Fernnidt (or Fermundt) of Virginia authorized English 
merchants in Rotterdam to deliver barrels of tobacco to another English merchant, 
Abraham Scheppert (Sheperd), who had paid for them.243  
The archives evidence the fluidity of residency that English tobacco merchants 
experienced in pursuit of their trade.  In 1643, Ysaack Lyte, an English merchant in 
Rotterdam, attested to the ownership of the tobacco on the ship Franciscus, a ship which 
had arrived in Delfshaven from Virginia.  Aside from an English captain, on board was 
Tomas Pers, co-owner of the tobacco and an English merchant living in Virginia.  The 
other co-owners of the tobacco lived partly in England and Virginia.  All of the tobacco 
was to be delivered to Lyte in Rotterdam.244 Other Virginia merchants, such as Thomas 
Pierce, Walter Chiles, and Richard Lee, all travelled with their cargos of tobacco to 
Rotterdam to do business with English and Dutch tobacco merchants.245  What such 
examples underscore were the commercial relationships that developed between early 
American, English, and Dutch merchants during the mid-seventeenth century and the 
willingness on each of the parties’ behalf to undertake and participate in such 
relationships.   
The Rotterdam Archives reflect a range of commercial activities between 
Rotterdam merchants and Chesapeake tobacco growers.  Realistically, Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam merchants focused on the West Indies trade. Trade with Virginia constituted 
                                                242	  Gemeentearchief	  Rotterdam,	  Not.	  Jacob	  Duyfhuysen,	  February	  22,	  1639,	  no.	  199	  (1/1).	  243	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Willem	  van	  Aller,	  April	  18,	  1642,	  no.	  473	  (84/134).	  244	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Jacob	  Duyfhuysen,	  July	  26,	  1643,	  no.	  204	  (288/435).	  245	  For	   Thomas	   Pierce,	   see	   Ibid.,	   Not.	   Adriaan	   Kieboom,	   August	   29,	   1643,	   no.	   152	   (647/957).	   For	  Walter	  Chiles,	  see	  DLFS	  Delfshaven,	  Not.	  Kornelis	  Kleyn,	  August	  20,	  1649,	  no.	  3838	  (201/696);	  and	  Gemeentearchief	   Rotterdam,	   Not.	   Adriaan	   Kieboom,	   August	   15,	   1650,	   no.	   154	   (466/750).	   	   For	  Richard	  Lee,	  see	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Balthasar	  Bazius,	  September	  24,	  1649,	  no.	  441	  (55/73).	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only a lesser subdivision of the West Indies trade. Nevertheless, numerous ship charter 
party agreements do specifically mention Virginia.246 For example, Cornelis Coninck, 
Adriaen Ambrosius, Isaac and Jacob du Castel, Francoys Vermande, Jacob Rentier, and 
Adriaen Albertsz, prominent Rotterdam merchants, entered into a charter agreement with 
Reyer Pietersen, skipper of the Fortuyn, in November 1644. They contracted for the ship 
to voyage to the West Indies and “surrounding countries.” Despite the fact that the 
agreement did not specifically mention Virginia, there were indications the ship did sail 
to Virginia for tobacco. First, many of the merchants listed in the agreement were 
important Virginia tobacco importers. Also, the parties agreed to a price and length for 
the journey that were uncharacteristic for a trading voyage simply to the West Indies. The 
parties agreed to pay the captain 99 guilders per month for at least seven months 
suggesting the ship would lay over for an extended period, characteristic of the tobacco 
trade.  Finally, the parties agreed that the ship would carry a disproportionate amount of 
armament on board, again intimating Virginia was one of the ship’s destinations.247  
In 1647, Robert Eaton engaged Cornelis van Hoyten, the skipper of the Snoeck of 
Rotterdam, to sail to Virginia. The agreement did not the specific trading goods to 
accompany Van Hoyten. But, it was apparent Eaton expected tobacco in return as he 
promised Van Hoyten a load for the return journey of at least 20 barrels of tobacco with a 
maximum of 70 to 80 barrels.  As well, the parties agreed that Jan Eaton, Robert Eaton’s 
son, would accompany Van Hoyten to learn the tobacco trade. 248  Thomas Lee, a 
Rotterdam merchant, also contracted for cargo space on the same voyage. His charter 
                                                246	  A	  charter	  party	  agreement	  was	  a	  contract	  between	  a	  ship	  owner	  and	  a	  merchant	  by	  which	  a	  ship	  was	  hired	  for	  the	  conveyance	  of	  goods	  on	  a	  specified	  voyage,	  or	  for	  a	  defined	  period.	  	  	  247	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Adriaan	  Kieboom,	  November	  18,	  1645,	  nos.	  323-­‐323v.	  248	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Johan	  Troost,	  August	  6,	  1647.	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agreement with Van Hoyten provided more details about the trade.  He joined the ship to 
trade for tobacco in the James, York, and Elizabeth Rivers.  He agreed to provide a return 
cargo of at least 40 barrels, but not to exceed 70 barrels. Lee had either previously 
undertaken voyages to Virginia or had had commercial correspondence for an order of 
goods, as he required that the goods he brought to Virginia had to be unloaded at the 
wharf of Mathew Philips, living on the Elizabeth River. Lee agreed to pay 32 guilders for 
each oxhead of tobacco for the return journey.  As well, Lee paid 500 pounds of good 
Virginia tobacco packed in cases for the transport of twelve male passengers.  The charter 
agreement does not list the nationality of the passengers accompanying Lee. Finally, the 
captain required Lee to pay caution money.249  Though the reasons for the required 
caution money were not stated, Lee may have previously defaulted on a contract or debt 
and the caution money was a means to ensure his performance and to rehabilitate his 
commercial reputation. 
The tobacco trade to Virginia during the 1640s was not without risk. Certainly, 
the traditional concerns of mariners about weather, sailing conditions, and durability of 
their vessels were prevalent. But the period also included privateers from the warring 
factions of the English Civil War - Roundheads and Cavaliers – as well as privateers 
from Dunkirk and Oostend.  All of them preyed on shipping from any nation traversing 
the English Channel and North Sea. For instance, in 1646, Captain Roosemont and 
                                                249	  Ibid.	   	  Mathew	  Philips	  became	   the	  administrator	  of	  Henry	  Sewell’s	  estate	   in	  1644.	   	   Sewell	  was	  a	  prominent	  tobacco	  planter	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Virginia	  House	  of	  Burgesses.	  Thomas	  Lee	  was	  “put	  in	  charge	   of	   his	   kinsman,	   Henry	   Sewell,	   the	   younger”	   by	   1649.	   	   Whether	   the	   younger	   Sewell	  accompanied	   Lee	   on	   this	   voyage	   is	   not	   disclosed.	   See	   Joshua	   Dorsey	   Warfield,	   Founders	   of	   Anne	  
Arundel	  and	  Howard	  Counties,	  Maryland:	  A	  Genealogical	   and	  Biographical	  Review	   from	  Wills,	  Deeds,	  
and	   Church	   Records	   (Kohn	   &	   Pollock,	   1905).	   	   “Caution	  money”	   was	   an	   amount	   of	   money	   paid	   by	  someone	  who	  has	  a	  contract	  with	  someone	  else	  to	  make	  certain	  that	  they	  do	  what	  the	  contract	  says	  they	  must	  do.	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  Lee	  was	  guaranteeing	  his	  performance.	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Corstiaen Solas of Dunkirk laid claim to the Dutch ship, the Planter, which sailed to 
Virginia. In 1647, Oostend privateers captured the Liefde captained by Pieter Symonsz 
Overzee and owned by Albrecht Cox and partners in Rotterdam. Jacob Gerritsen Blenck 
who sailed often to the Caribbean later recovered the ship. Also in 1647, Captain Thomas 
Gonsalex de Renolledo seized the St. Pieter, captained by Maerten Gerbrantsen. De 
Renolledo brought the Dutch ship to St. Sebastian in Spain.250  Symon Overzee, of 
Rotterdam, had contracted the ship to sail for “the Virginies.” Upon payment for the 
return of the vessel, the ship was returned to Rotterdam with extensive damage.  Later, on 
a journey to Virginia in 1653, the same ship had to return to Holland because of heavy 
seas and storms that separated her from the convoy in which she was sailing.251   
In addition, Dutch ships sailing around the Chesapeake could be subject to attack. 
In 1645, Captain Gabriel Cox attested to the voyage of the Spiegel, which had sailed to 
Virginia in the fall of 1643.  Cox confirmed the contents of the vessel – a full load of 
tobacco – and described how the ship was anchored in one of Maryland’s numerous bays 
when the captain and crew had been surprised and captured by the Reformation, 
captained by Richard Engel.252 Nevertheless, while privateering threatened Dutch ships 
trading in the area, Rotterdam’s tobacco trade with Virginia increased in volume owing to 
the continuing demand for Virginia tobacco in the Dutch Republic and in Europe. 
As in Amsterdam, the Rotterdam merchant community, particularly the 
contingent of English merchants residing in “Little London,” required notaries who could 
                                                250	  The	   term	   “Virginies”	  was	   a	   geographically	   inclusive	   term	   encompassing	   the	   Chesapeake	   region	  and	  occasionally	  the	  eastern	  seaboard.	  	  As	  time	  went	  on,	  it	  meant	  the	  English	  colony	  of	  Virginia.	  251	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Willem	  van	  Aller,	   June	  29,	  1646,	  no.	  352;	  Not.	  G.	  van	  der	  Hout,	   	  May	  26,	  1647;	  Not.	  A.	  Kieboom,	  March	  28,	  1648,	  no.	  36;	  Not.	  V.	  Mustelius,	  May	  16,	  1653.	  252	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Jan	  van	  Aller,	  Sept.	  23,	  1645,	  nos.	  95-­‐95v.	  	  The	  Spiegel’s	  owners	  sold	  the	  ship	  to	  a	  group	  of	  Dutch	  merchants	  “as	   is”	   in	  London	  during	  1646.	  Most	   likely,	   the	  English	  government	  considered	  her	  capture	  a	  mistake.	  	  Not.	  A.	  Kieboom,	  Jan	  8,	  1646,	  no.	  344.	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both speak and write in English.  Dutch authorities accommodated their English speaking 
resident merchants. For example, Pieter de Paus (alias Pope), an Englishman, served an 
apprenticeship with a Dutch notary.  Subsequently, he established himself in Rotterdam 
as a duly certified notary and serviced numerous English-speaking merchants. In 1650, 
when James de Hem and Thomas Rogerson, both English merchants of Rotterdam, 
contracted the ship Het Huys te Buren to take merchandise to Virginia and return with a 
cargo of tobacco, they appeared before De Paus to memorialize the terms of their charter 
party agreement. Notaries such as De Paus attended to the commercial pursuits of the 
many English-speaking merchants who arrived or lived in Rotterdam. Robert Eaton and 
his son, Jan, also appeared before De Paus. In 1650, the Eatons negotiated a charter party 
agreement with Captain Pieter Symonsz of the ship De Vergulde Eenhoorn. Symonsz 
agreed to transport merchandise and passengers to Virginia, unload the goods and 
passengers in the Pocohen [sp], and return with oxheads of tobacco.  Symonsz charged 28 
guilders for each oxhead of tobacco was 28 guilders. Soon after De Paus established his 
notary office, another English-speaking notary in Rotterdam, Jan Grimes, began offering 
his services at Rotterdam’s bourse.253 
The growth of Rotterdam’s trade in the seventeenth century was tied to the 
growth of the Chesapeake tobacco trade.  Dutch and English merchants joined together 
and created successful financial and commercial partnerships that bypassed traditional 
trading networks. 
 
 
                                                253	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Pieter	  de	  Paus,	  August	  19,	  1650;	  August	  24,	  1651;	   Ibid.,	  Not.	  Pieter	  de	  Paus,	   June	  20,	  1650;	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  Grimes,	  August	  12,	  1664;	  July	  14,	  1664.	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Trade from Amsterdam to Virginia 
Like the smoke arising from a clay pipe, tobacco whispered to Dutch merchants. 
Amsterdam merchants were attracted to the potential for profit that Chesapeake tobacco 
offered, just as their merchant brethren in Rotterdam.  Trade with the Chesapeake offered 
another location for commercial activity in the West Indies circuit.254  Then too, the 
region offered a commodity that Amsterdam merchants knew well – tobacco.  Along the 
lines of other European nations, the Dutch Republic exploited tobacco’s profitable 
properties and recognized that the plant was a source of income for the government 
through taxation, a source of income for the planters that grew it, and a source of income 
for the merchants and shippers that promoted and carried it.  As the popularity of tobacco 
rose in Europe, Amsterdam became a regional processing and distribution center.255 
A dispute over price generated the oldest extant notarial act in Amsterdam 
regarding Virginia’s tobacco trade. In May 1621, differences arose between Jan Jansen, 
an Amsterdam tobacco merchant, and Edward de Rousing, an English captain.  De 
Rousing had sailed into Middelburg with a substantial quantity of Virginia tobacco.  The 
captain had already sold 1000 pounds of the tobacco to Jansen. The dispute arose when 
De Rousing declined to deliver further quantities of tobacco to Jansen until De Rousing 
                                                254	  The	   second	   mate	   of	   the	   ship,	   De	   Blauwe	   Haan,	   declared	   in	   1644,	   that	   this	   ship	   made	   regular	  journeys	  from	  Brazil	  to	  St.	  Kitts,	  and	  New	  Netherland,	  and	  from	  there	  to	  Holland.	  	  Along	  the	  way,	  the	  captain	  took	  two	  slaves	  and	  two	  horses	  in	  Brazil	  apparently	  for	  his	  private	  trade.	  In	  St.	  Kitts,	  Spanish	  wine	  was	  taken	  on	  board	  for	  New	  Netherland	  where	  guns	  were	  traded	  for	  furs.	  	  In	  the	  Dutch	  colony,	  some	  Virginia	  tobacco	  was	  taken	  on	  board.	  The	  second	  mate	  testified	  that,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  the	  captain	  focused	  more	  on	  his	  private	  trade	  and	  neglected	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  West	  India	  Company	  for	  which	  he	  sailed.	  	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  Steyns,	  no.	  1861/462/463,	  October	  21,	  1644.	  255	  See	   Peter	   C.	  Mancall,	   “Tales	   Tobacco	   Told	   in	   Sixteenth-­‐Century	   Europe,”	  Environmental	  History,	  Vol.	  9,	  no.	  4	  (2004),	  648-­‐78;	  Joel	  Best,	  “Economic	  Interests	  and	  the	  Vindication	  of	  Deviance:	  Tobacco	  in	  Seventeenth	  Century	  Europe,”	  The	  Sociological	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  20,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  1979),	  171-­‐82.	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received a better price.256 While the notarial act does not record why De Rousing held 
back for a higher sale price, it was most likely reflective of current market conditions that 
De Rousing became aware of upon mooring at Middelburg’s port.  The simple economic 
theory of supply and demand probably came into play. 
A Dutch merchant and explorer more familiar to American historians was David 
Pietersz de Vries.  De Vries wrote of his journeys to North America.  Long before his 
voyages to North America in 1633, De Vries was acquainted with the Virginia tobacco 
trade.  The West India Company initiated action against De Vries for the non-payment of 
taxes on tobacco he had previously imported.  By 1636, de Vries began carrying tobacco 
to Amsterdam from the Chesapeake, including a shipment for the account of Jan Bicker, 
the former member of the Amsterdam Chamber of the West India Company and a partner 
of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, patroon of Rensselaerswyck.257 De Vries was again in Virginia 
by 1638 and purchased tobacco there, as well as furs from New Netherland, for Abraham 
van Peene, a director of the Middelburg Chamber of the West India Company.258 We 
learn of his activities through declarations made before a notary, not for non-delivery of 
the goods, but rather for non-payment of taxes to the West India Company. In the 
declarations, Company representatives sought payment of importation duties. As Virginia 
came under the territory were the Company claimed sole trading rights, according to the 
Company’s charter, importation of raw materials or goods from the territory by a 
merchant were subject to importation duties in the Dutch Republic. The geographical 
                                                256	  Stadsarchief	   Amsterdam,	   Not.	   Archives,	   Not.	   F.	   van	   Banchem,	   no.	   286,	   fs.	   237v-­‐238;	   241-­‐241v.	  	  May	  4,	  1621;	  May	  5,	  1621.	  	  From	  references	  in	  various	  individual	  notarial	  documents,	  it	  appears	  that	  Middelburg	   was,	   at	   the	   time,	   the	   import	   harbor	   for	   Chesapeake	   tobacco	   because	   delivery	   after	  personal	  inspection	  would	  take	  place	  in	  Middelburg.	  	  However,	  the	  complete	  loss	  of	  the	  Middelburg	  archives	  in	  World	  War	  II	  makes	  verification	  historically	  impossible.	  257	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Jan	  Warnaertsz,	  no.	  1278,	  March	  18,	  1636.	  258	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  C.	  Touw,	  no.	  1420,	  f.	  100v	  III,	  May	  8,	  1638.	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proximity of New Netherland to the Chesapeake and the demand in Europe for both furs 
and tobacco aligned both regions for collaborative trading voyages. Tobacco could be 
used as payment for furs in New Netherland or could fill a ship’s hold when an 
insufficient number of furs were available.  
One example of how the tobacco trade became partnered with the fur trade of 
New Netherland involved Dirck Corssen Stam.  Kiliaen van Rensselaer had appointed 
Stam as supercargo on a voyage of the Rensselaerswyck in 1636.  During the voyage, 
while in New Netherland and in Virginia, traded on his own account.  Prior to leaving 
Virginia, Stam stored 16,000 pounds of tobacco in Virginia. And, when the ship landed in 
London, he had another 16,000 pounds of tobacco transferred to a warehouse there under 
his own account. In 1637, still on the return voyage, he brought a sizable quantity of furs 
and tobacco to Holland. A dispute arose between Stam and Van Rensselaer. After his 
dismissal from Van Rensselaer’s service, he formed a partnership with the Verleth 
(Varlet) and Verbrugge brothers, Amsterdam merchants recognized for their active 
engagement in the Virginia tobacco trade. Stam’s brother, Arendt served as the newly 
formed partnership’s agent in Virginia.  While in Virginia, Dirck began to establish his 
own network of significant Virginia planters including John Galler, John Hill, Nathaniel 
Littleton, and Jan Coustaer.   
In 1638, after his return from New Netherland, Stam refused to hand over to Van 
Rensselaer several obligations contracted by New Netherland colonists in the fur trade 
unless Van Rensselaer paid Stam his wages, a portion of the return freight of his ship, and 
a part of the proceeds of the sale of the same ship.  Van Rensselaer’s refusal led to a legal 
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process before the courts of Holland lasting for many years.259 While the lawsuit was a 
reflection of a commercial relationship that had not succeeded, it provided a look into the 
temptation and power of Virginia tobacco for merchants and crewmembers on all levels. 
That temptation of profits from Virginia tobacco and New Netherland furs 
extended down to the lowest reaches of a vessel’s crew. A custom had developed aboard 
vessels sailing to North America that allowed crew members, regardless of rank, to bring 
merchandise with them for their own private trade. First originating in the Newfoundland 
trade, the practice prevailed in the New Netherland fur trade and the Virginia tobacco 
trade among Dutch ships.  The practice arose for a number of reasons: sailing to North 
American bore certain risks greater than plying the regional waters of Europe, the 
journeys were longer, the wages remained on the lower end, and it provided a certain 
incentive for the crew. For instance, in 1644, Daniel van den Enden of Egmont op den 
Hoeft testified that his captain aboard de Blaeuwen Haen, during the course of the voyage 
around the West Indies, including New Netherland, traded for slaves, horses, Spanish 
weights, pipes of Spanish wine, guns, knives, axes, and Virginia tobacco. 260  While a 
crew member’s rank determined how many trading goods he could bring aboard ship, his 
profits were determined by his own mercantile skills. 
Additional Dutch ships from Amsterdam traded in Chesapeake Bay and its rivers. 
Declarations and charter agreements in the Amsterdam archives note other ships, 
including Het Wapen van Leeuwarden and Vergulden Aecker. They, like so many ships, 
                                                259	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Jan	  Volkaertsz	  Oli,	  no.	  1497/100-­‐102,	  May	  11,	  1638;	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Fredrick	  van	  Banchem,	  no.	  317/25-­‐25v,	  January	  14,	  1638/9;	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  de	  Graeff,	  no.	  1621,	  	  December	  19,	  1639;	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Jan	   Volkaertsz	   Oli,	   no.	   1409/179/80,	   December	   28,	   1639;	   Ibid.,	   Not.	   Jan	   Volkaertsz	   Oli,	   no.	  1555/1113,	  July	  30,	  1640;	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  van	  de	  Ven,	  no.	  1055/200-­‐201,	   	  July	  10,	  1640.	   	  See	  also,	  Van	  
Rensselaer	  Bowier	  Manuscripts	  for	  Kiliaen	  van	  Rensselaer’s	  correspondence	  on	  the	  matter.	  	  260	  Stadsarchief	  Amsterdam,	  Not.	  J.	  Steyns,	  no.	  1861/462-­‐63,	  October	  21,	  1644.	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often anchored in the James River waiting for other ships to complete loading to return in 
convoy as protection against Ooostend and Dunkirk privateers.  In 1644, the supercargo 
of the De Swarte Raven testified about the regularity of Dutch ships in the Chesapeake.  
He declared  
that he has been with the said ship De Swarte Raven on her latest journey in New 
Netherland as well as in the Yorck River in Virginia, and arrived last April 2 in 
the Jamestown River down stream near a certain village called Kicketan where 
he, witness, was informed that higher up in the same Jamestown River were 
laying and loading three Dutch ships with another one who was said to be of 
Hamburg and whose skipper was Paulus Hoep.  De Swarte Raven joined the three 
Dutch ship in the River of Jamestown at Kicketan on April 23.  The three ships 
were de See Robbe, skipper Symen Dircksz and supercargo a certain Silvester; De 
Weyman’s Geneucht of Rotterdam, skipper Pieter Symonsz; the Medea, skipper 
Jan Claesz van Ly, and supercargo Abraham Yzebenraet, who with the said 
Silvester remained ashore in Virginia.261 
 
From the testimony given by George Armstrong, aboard De Swarte Raven as a free 
passenger returning to Holland, it appears many of the Dutch skippers spoke English and 
had familiarity with the topography of Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.262 
 Trading partners might have been able to overcome language barriers to 
undertake their commercial activities. Nevertheless, Amsterdam’s more established credit 
                                                261	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  H.	  Schaeff,	  no.	  1289/101v-­‐102v,	  July	  20,	  1644.	  	  262	  Ibid.	  	  Armstrong’s	  passage	  raises	  an	  interesting	  point	  about	  Dutch	  vessels.	   	  The	  vessels	  were	  not	  exclusive	   to	   the	   carrying	   of	   cargo.	   	   In	   fact,	   there	   was	   much	   demand	   for	   skilled	   workers	   in	   the	  Chesapeake	  region	  and	  Virginia	  planters,	   as	   they	  accumulated	  wealth,	   contracted	   to	  bring	  workers	  over.	  In	  1634,	  Martin	  Becker	  of	  Virginia	  entered	  into	  a	  contract	  with	  Dutch	  two	  carpenters	  who	  were	  hired	  to	  build	  a	  water	  mill	   in	  Virginia.	   	  Upon	  the	  conclusion	  of	  their	  two-­‐year	  contract	  with	  Becker,	  the	  carpenters	  were	  free	  to	  work	  for	  anyone	  else	  or	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Dutch	  Republic.	  Becker	  agreed	  to	  pay	  his	  men	  500	  guilders	  a	  year	  and	  25	  pounds	  of	   tobacco,	   room	  and	  board,	  with	  all	  payments	   to	  start	  from	  the	  moment	  they	  left	  Holland	  until	  they	  returned.	  	  Becker’s	  recourse	  to	  hire	  tradesmen	  in	  the	   Dutch	   Republic	   demonstrated	   the	   fierce	   competition	   for	   craftsmen	   in	   early	   Virginia.	   	   It	   also	  suggested	   the	   close	   commercial	   connection	  between	   the	  Dutch	  Republic	   and	  Virginia	  before	  1634.	  	  Becker	  had	  no	  difficulty	  finding	  in	  Amsterdam	  tradesmen	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  contract	  as	  bondsmen	  for	   the	  payment	  of	  wages	  and	   tobacco.	  See	   Ibid.,	  Not.	   Jan	  Warnaerts,	  no.	  701,	  August	  7,	  1634.	  This	  situation	  was	  confirmed	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  ship’s	  carpenter	  who	  in	  1638	  was	  occupied	  with	  the	  repair	   of	   his	   ship	   in	   Virginia.	   	   During	   the	   time	   he	   could	   not	   work	   on	   the	   ship,	   several	   colonists	  employed	  him	  and	  paid	  him	  36	  pounds	  of	  tobacco	  a	  day	  including	  room	  and	  board.	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  Pieter	  Carels,	  no.	  732/745-­‐745v,	  September	  13,	  1642.	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market offered more favorable credit terms and, thus, removed additional barriers of 
trade.  More Virginians sought credit in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam, most probably 
because there was more credit available in the Dutch capital, which during the 
seventeenth century had already become the heart of world trade.   
 Despite occasions when Dutch merchants sought to cheat the West India 
Company out of recognition duties on goods, including tobacco, upon entering the Dutch 
Republic, declarations before notaries made mention of English export duties paid in 
Virginia on tobacco transshipped to the Netherlands.  In 1644, Pieter Pietersz of 
Amsterdam brought his ship, de See Robbe, laden with 150 oxheads of tobacco.  Pietersz 
appeared before a notary to make a declaration. What is noteworthy about his declaration 
was the information about Virginia custom duty of half a stuyver for each pound of 
tobacco exported from the colony, in this instance “305 guilders and 12 shellings.”  
While the various contracts in the archives demonstrated that the governors of Virginia 
were anxious to give Dutch skippers and merchants their cooperation, as colonial 
officials representing the Crown, they could not ignore payment of export duties without 
suffering retribution from London.263  In essence, colonial officials treaded carefully by 
encouraging foreign trade, though prohibited, to stimulate economic activity, while at the 
same time, collecting duty on all commodities leaving the colony. 
 Because English merchants readily extended credit to Chesapeake planters, Dutch 
merchants needed to compete on the same commercial level and thus granted long-term 
credit to Virginia planters.  Occasionally, a Virginia planter would default on his payment 
                                                263	  See,	  e.g.,	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  Steyns,	  no.	  848,	  September	  13,	  1644.	  There	  is	  one	  instance	  where	  the	  parties	  agreed	   to	   transfer	   a	   non-­‐payment	   of	   English	   duty	   on	   tobacco	   to	   another	   party.	   	   So	   important	  was	  payment	  to	  Dutch	  merchants	  that	  even	  an	  obligation	  to	  pay	  could	  be	  transferred	  to	  preserve	  trading	  rights.	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obligations to his Dutch creditor. Possession of Virginia tobacco cargoes was quite often 
taken over by some Amsterdam merchants upon their arrival in Amsterdam.  For 
example, Justus Baack, in 1647, claimed part of a cargo of Virginia tobacco, 35 barrels, 
brought by the Pop and destined for Richard Glover of Rotterdam to satisfy Glover’s 
existing debts to Baack.  But the consequences for non-payment of debt could befall 
anybody, even an English merchant. One consequence included imprisonment.  Of 
course, imprisonment had to be seen as a last resort by the parties.  It meant that the 
merchant owed a debt had sought all other legal redress, including sale of the indebted 
merchant’s property, before finally availing himself of the recourse of prison. By 
imprisoning a debtor, it necessitated removing that person from employment and the 
ability to repay any debt. Edward Moor, of Virginia, suffered imprisonment in 
Amsterdam in 1647 for debts contracted during preceding years. In order to secure his 
freedom, he entered into a legal agreement with his Dutch creditors to ship all of his 
tobacco from his Virginia plantation in the ship de Hoop for the next two years until 
payment of his debts in full. 264 For his Dutch creditors, this was a harsh, but necessary 
measure, not only to collect the debts owed to them by Moor, but to emphasize the 
significance of commercial dealings. 
 By the mid-1640s, notable merchants, Abraham Grevenraet, Mathys Kessen, 
Justus Baack, and Charles Gabry, had become the principal importers of tobacco from 
Virginia in Amsterdam. Charles Gabry also provided important financial backing of the 
free traders of furs in New Netherland, often supplying them with shiploads of 
merchandise. Virginia planters sought out financing and commercial linkages with Dutch 
                                                264	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  van	  den	  Ven,	  no.	  1076/27v-­‐28,	  	  August	  14,	  1645;	  Not.	  J.van	  den	  Ven,	  no.	  1080/86-­‐86v,	  	  September	  7,	  1646;	  Not.	   J.	  van	  den	  Ven,	  no.	  1081/196-­‐196v,	   	  August	  8,	  1647;	  Not.	  F.	  Uytenbogaert,	  no.	  1882/165-­‐166,	  October	  4,	  1647.	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merchants.  In 1645, a notarial act memorialized the debts of John Gibbs, William 
Laurear, Richard Kemp, William Russen, John Gerby, Thomas Bourbage, and George 
Ardarsort, all Virginia planters. Together, they owed several thousand pounds of tobacco 
to Grevenraet of Amsterdam. The planters had contracted the debts during 1644 when 
they accepted Dutch and European merchandise on credit from the captain of the Medea 
who had traded the goods for the promise of Virginia tobacco.265 
 Along with Amsterdam merchant houses, free traders felt the lure of Virginia 
tobacco and contracted to engage ships and trading goods. The owners of the Princess 
Royal contracted with Knut Mathyssen, a free trader from Aalborg in Denmark.  The 
1649 charter agreement sent Mathyssen with a cargo of 1500 guilders worth of 
merchandise to Virginia to trade for tobacco.  The owners required Mathyssen to return 
with at least 30 oxheads of tobacco, but not more than 50 oxheads.  He was to pay 30 
guilders for each barrel of tobacco.266  A separate charter party for the same journey 
bound the owners of the ship and Borchert Scholten, a free trader of Amsterdam, who 
took merchandise valued at 1300 guilders.  For the return journey, he promised at least 20 
oxheads to a maximum of 50.  The cost for each oxhead of tobacco was also 30 
guilders.267  The owners of the Princess Royal took advantage of market conditions and 
the ability of Dutch and European free traders to pursue opportunities in Virginia. 
 The 1649 voyage of the Princess Royal must have successfully and safely 
concluded. In 1650, Jan PIetersen Ettes, a merchant of Medemblick, entered into a 
charter party agreement with the Princess Royal’s captain for a journey to Virginia. Ettes 
retained Jacobus Arbrhamsz Carponnel and Wybrandt Jansen Ruyter as supercargos for 
                                                265	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  van	  de	  Ven,	  no	  1076/27v-­‐28,	  	  August	  14,	  1645.	  	  	  266	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  H.	  Schaef,	  no.	  1343/76v-­‐77,	  August	  31,	  1649.	  267	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  H.	  Schaef,	  no.	  1343/81v-­‐82,	  September	  17,	  1649.	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the voyage. They took merchandise valued at approximately 1600 guilders to trade for 
tobacco. The agreement required that the minimum return freight was 40 oxheads, the 
maximum being allowed was 80 barrels.  Marcus Hooft van Aacken, a cabinetmaker in 
Amsterdam, also contracted for space in the cargo hold of the Princess Royal.  He loaded 
merchandise aboard equal to approximately 1200 guilders for trade of Virginia tobacco.  
In return, he agreed to ship back at least 20 oxheads of tobacco up to a maximum of 30 
oxheads.268  The shipments aboard the Princess Royal attest to the fact that lesser 
merchants began to seek opportunities for trade in Virginia tobacco and could afford the 
risk to take partial ship’s holds with the hope of profitable voyages. 
 Such free traders exemplify the opportunity that was available for non-specialist 
traders, and non-traders as well, to enter the tobacco market with the hope of amassing 
substantial profits on a single voyage.  Whether they achieved success, and what they 
subsequently did with the profits, is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the 
notarial records.  But the barriers to trade were minimal (raising sufficient capital for 
trading goods) and the potential for some sort of profit was high.  It is no wonder that the 
archives are full of free traders investing in the tobacco trade. 
None of the success of the Dutch in the tobacco trade in Virginia would have 
occurred without the active participation of elite members of Virginian society, both 
politically and economically. For instance, Argoll Yeardley became an important ally for 
Dutch merchants.  The eldest son of a former governor-general, Yeardley eased into 
politics at an early age, joining the council in 1639 while still in his twenties.  An active 
merchant-planter, he found much of his livelihood in commerce with the Dutch.  His 
                                                268	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  H.	  Schaef,	  no.	  345/74-­‐74v,	  August	  20,	  1650;	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  H.	  Schaef,	  no.	  1345/68v-­‐69,	  July	  28,	  1650.	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second wife, Ann Custis, tightened his bonds to the Netherlands even more.  She 
belonged to an Anglo-Dutch family from Rotterdam.  Blood ties and common business 
interests reinforced Yeardley’s loose alliance with like-minded merchant-planters, who 
linked the Eastern Shore and the lower James River basin to the Holland trade.  Besides 
Yeardley, the group included Nathaniel Littleton, Thomas Willoughby, Richard Kemp, 
Richard Lee, Edmund Scarburgh, Yeardley’s brother Francis, and Adam Thoroughgood, 
a Lower Norfolk County justice, whose daughter Sarah had married a Dutch trader, 
Simon Overzee.  Overzee later wed Willoughby’s daughter Elizabeth.  The network 
connected to Amsterdam via Governor Berkeley through Richard Glover.  Another of the 
Anglo-Dutch merchants with Virginia interests, Glover trucked mainly around 
Jamestown and along the York River. The Berkeley-Glover link drew into the mix 
councilors George Ludlow, Bridges Freemen, and Ralph Wormeley; burgesses Robert 
Holt and Stephen Gill; and numerous well-heeled independent merchant-planters.  
Yeardley was also instrumental in bringing his brother-in-law John Custis to the 
governor’s attention.  Custis had settled in Northampton County about the time of his 
sister’s marriage.  His fluency in the Dutch tongue proved the asset that attracted 
Berkeley, who used him as a translator on more than one occasion.  Their association 
sparked a lifelong intimacy between the two men and profited Custis handsomely.  He 
gained lands, preferments, and the heights of Virginia politics.  The question then 
becomes how, and to what degree, Virginian merchant/politicians attempt to sway public 
policy to accept foreign traders, particularly the Dutch.  For a substantial number of 
merchant/politicians, trading with the Dutch arose because of familial networks. But the 
familial networks quickly expanded to incorporate English merchant/politicians without 
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any previous ties to the Dutch Republic.  To them, trade with the Dutch provided profit. 
The political winds in London during the 1640s and 1650s made public support for Dutch 
trade problematic for pragmatic and susceptible colonial politicians. In the end, many 
Virginian merchant/politicians managed to sustain trade with the Dutch.  How “Dutch” a 
vessel appeared figuratively when it came to trade in Chesapeake waters and how 
“Dutch” it was in fact, were two different matters.    
 
The Dutch in Maryland 
On October 8, 1659, Augustine Herrman and an embassy sent from New 
Netherland dined in Simon Overzee’s home with Philip Calvert, Lord Baltimore’s 
younger brother.  Herrman and his fellow ambassador, Resolved Waldron, had been 
dispatched by Director-General Peter Stuyvesant to meet with Maryland’s Governor and 
the Council of Maryland to seek settlement of a boundary dispute for territory both 
colonies claimed along Delaware River.  Journeying overland, once in Maryland they 
sought out the hospitality of a fellow countryman who could provide introductions to the 
political elite of Maryland. Overzee, a successful tobacco merchant of Dutch ancestry, 
acted as a cultural liaison to the parties.  
Like Overzee, Augustine Herrman must have been impressed with the 
commercial and financial opportunities that Maryland could yield to him. Best known for 
his efforts as a diplomat and early cartographer of the Chesapeake, Augustine Herrman 
exemplified another Dutch merchant unfettered by political boundaries and he would 
soon acquire property in Maryland to engage in the tobacco trade. 
Although Dutch trade with Maryland began later than did that with Virginia, there 
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is reason to believe, in view of certain differences between the two colonies, that the 
Dutch trade with Maryland planters was more geographically concentrated.  Maryland 
was founded as a political and a geographical entity in 1634, twenty-seven years after the 
founding of Virginia.  Like the latter, it was established by Englishmen and had a 
plantation society devoted largely to the production of tobacco and so, presumably, had 
much the same economic pattern as Virginia.  In at least one important particular, 
however, Maryland differed from the latter colony.  Founded as a proprietary 
government, it was not dependent economically or politically on either a monopolistic 
company or the British government. 
In 1632 Charles I conferred to George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore, a charter that 
gave Maryland, from the beginning, a degree of freedom in its trading affairs that had not 
existed in Virginia.  The Crown gave Calvert as proprietor “the right to constitute ports of 
entry and departure…and to levy duties and tolls upon ships and merchandise exported 
and imported.” The Crown also made an “express covenant” with the proprietor that no 
“tax or custom be imposed…upon any merchandise to be laden or unladen within the 
province.” From the founding of Maryland in 1634 until the beheading of Charles I in 
1649, events in England conspired to preserve this right for the Maryland planters.  And, 
in view of what is known about the extent of Dutch trade in Virginia under less favorable 
circumstances, there can be no doubt that when the Dutch found so open a market in 
Maryland, they took full advantage of it. 
Tobacco production was underway almost immediately in Maryland and by 1639 
tobacco had become a vital medium of commercial exchange for Maryland.  
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Dutch Settlement in the Chesapeake 
The desire by Dutch merchants to trade for tobacco in the Chesapeake raised 
important logistical issues.  In frustration, after eight months in 1635 trying to fill his 
hold with tobacco, David Pietersz DeVries urged “those who wish to trade here must 
keep a house here, and continue all the year, that he may be prepared, when the tobacco 
comes from the field, to seize it, if he would obtain his debts.  It is thus the English do 
among themselves; so that there is no trade for us, unless there be an overplus of tobacco, 
or few English ships.”269 Although DeVries’s account of his voyages was not published 
until 1655, his sentiments about the tobacco trade for non-English merchants may have 
been common to other Dutch merchants. 
Not all of the Dutch who settled in New Netherland chose to remain.  For many, 
the lure of tobacco in the Chesapeake motivated many to leave the Dutch colony and 
reestablish themselves in Virginia.  Their aspirations focused more on the possibility of 
profit than loyalty to a colony. Nevertheless, the move to an English colony did not sever 
commercial or personal ties to the Dutch Republic or to New Netherland. 
Consider Dirck and Arendt Corssen (or Corszen) Stam.  The brothers came to 
New Netherland and served with the West India Company.  Dirck arrived sometime 
around 1628, remaining in New Netherland until at least 1633.270 Certainly, while 
residing in New Netherland, Dirck witnessed the trade in Virginia tobacco. As a 
                                                269	  Part	   of	   De	   Vries’s	   frustration	  was	   due	   to	   circumstances	   beyond	   his	   control.	   	   Little	   tobacco	   had	  been	  cured	  prior	  to	  his	  arrival	  and	  disease	  had	  ravaged	  the	  English	  settlers.	  David	  Peterson	  De	  Vries,	  
Voyages	   from	   Holland	   to	   America,	   A.D.	   1632	   to	   1644,	   ed.	   and	   trans.	   Hency	   C.	   Murphy	   (New	   York,	  1853),	  112.	  	  He	  reiterated	  his	  point	  in	  May	  1636	  and	  wrote	  “The	  English	  Virginias	  are	  an	  unfit	  place	  for	  our	  nation	  to	  trade,	  unless	  they	  continue	  the	  trade	  through	  all	  the	  year.”	  Ibid.,	  113-­‐4.	  270	  Dirck	   served	   as	   a	   Commissary	   of	   Stores	   in	   1628,	   as	   a	  Vice	  Commissary	   of	  Wares	   or	   Cargoes	   in	  1633,	   and	   as	   a	   councilor	   of	  New	  Netherland.	   See	  E.B.	  O’Callaghan,	  The	  Register	  of	  New	  Netherland,	  
1626	   to	   1674	   (Albany:	   J.	   Munsell,	   1865),	   30;	   Stadsarchief	   Amsterdam,	   Notarial	   Archives,	   inv.	   Nr.	  1285,	  fol.	  114,	  notary	  Hendrick	  Schaeff	  (13	  July	  1641).	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consequence of his appointment in 1636 as supercargo aboard Kiliaen van Rensselaer’s 
ship Rensselaerswyck, he might have seen for the first time the richness of all that the 
Chesapeake offered.  The Rensselaerswyck began its journey in Amsterdam laden with 
settlers and provisions.   After discharging settlers and supplies at both New Amsterdam 
and Fort Orange, the ship sailed back down the Noord River (the Hudson River) and 
continued along the coastline until it reached Virginia’s Eastern Shore and engaged in 
trade.271   
Arendt Corssen Stam is first noted in New Netherland’s records in 1633.  On 
behalf of the West India Company, he purchased land from Native American peoples to 
establish a trading post to restrain the perceived encroachments of the Swedes from the 
South. The Swedes sought to monopolize the fur trade in the region with the Native 
Americans. Arendt became Commissary of Fort Nassau on the South River (now 
Delaware River) in 1633.272  
When the Privy Council in 1634 ended almost ten years of uncertainty regarding 
land patents, the brothers took advantage of land that became available for settlement and 
tobacco production. In 1638, the Stams obtained two land patents in Virginia.  The first 
was for 860 acres in Elizabeth City County on the James River, and bounded on the west 
by Newport News Creek.  The second parcel was on James Island, measuring “10 po. in 
breadth & 8 po. in length.” In 1640, Arendt took advantage of the headright system and 
                                                271	  A.J.F.	  van	  Laer,	  Van	  Rensselaer	  Bowier	  Manuscripts	   (Albany:	  University	  of	   the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  1908),	  349,	  381.	   	  Kiliaen	  van	  Rensselaer	  subsequently	  accused	  Dirck	  and	  the	  skipper	  of	   the	  vessel,	  Jan	  Tiepkesz	  Schellinger,	  of	  defrauding	  him.	  Ibid.,	  392-­‐4,	  409-­‐11,	  415,	  418,	  445-­‐6,	  512.	  	  272	  See:	   E.	   B.	   O'Callaghan,	  History	   of	   New	  Netherland,	   or	   New	   York	   under	   the	   Dutch	   (New	   York:	   D.	  Appleton	   &	   Co.,	   1855),	   1:124,	   n.142,	   156,	   156n,	   359;	   2:	   81,	   81n;	   “Notes	   and	   Queries”,	   The	  
Pennsylvania	  Magazine	  of	  History	  and	  Biography,	  15,	  No.	  2	  (1891):	  252-­‐3	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received 250 acres of land for importing three other persons.273  Additionally, Arendt also 
sought land on Virginia’s Eastern Shore and subsequently leased land from Nathaniel 
Littleton, a member of the Virginia Council and fellow tobacco planter. Over the ensuing 
years, Arendt engaged in various legal and commercial activities in Virginia, many of 
which involved his trade in tobacco.274  
But what is important about Arendt and Dirck Corssen Stam is how Arendt’s 
immigration to Virginia and Dirck’s residence in the Dutch Republic linked together 
Virginia, New Netherland, London, and the Dutch Republic through property ownership, 
advantageous marriage, and a commercial network that took advantage of available 
credit, personal prestige, and political stability.  Arendt’s property ownership in Virginia 
was key to establishing a permanent settlement and integrating himself into the English 
plantation community.  Becoming part of the community then permitted Arendt to 
                                                273	  On	  land	  patents,	  see	  Wesley	  Frank	  Craven,	  The	  Southern	  Colonies	  in	  the	  Seventeenth	  Century,	  1607-­‐
1689	  (1949;	  reprint	  ed.,	  Baton	  Rouge,	  Louisiana:	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  1970),	  175-­‐6.	  	  For	  information	   on	   the	   brothers’	   land	   patents	   see	   Nell	   Marion	   Nugent,	   ed.,	   Cavaliers	   and	   Pioneers:	  
Abstracts	  of	  Virginia	  Land	  Patents	  and	  Grants,	  1623-­‐1666	  (Baltimore:	  Genealogical	  Publishing	  Co.,	  Inc.,	  1974),	  104,	  98.	  	  For	  a	  discussion	  about	  imperial	  units	  of	  measurement	  see	  Sarah	  S.	  Hughes,	  Surveyors	  
and	   Statesmen:	   Land	   Measuring	   in	   Colonial	   Virginia	   (Richmond:	   Virginia	   Surveyors	   Foundation,	  1979),	  189	  (a	  “po.”	  was	  a	  pole,	  rod,	  or	  perch	  and	  equaled	  5	  ½	  yards	  or	  16	  ½	  feet).	  	  The	  grant	  of	  land	  to	  “Arond	  Curson	  Stam”	  and	  his	  wife	  was	  for	  transporting	  “Dericke	  Curson	  Stame,	   Johes	  [?]	  Curson	  and	   Garrett	   Curson.”	   See	   Susie	   M.	   Ames,	   ed.,	   County	   Court	   Records	   of	   Accomack-­‐Northampton,	  
Virginia,	  1640-­‐1645	  (Charlottesville:	  The	  University	  Press	  of	  Virginia,	  1973),	  58.	  For	  a	  description	  of	  Virginia’s	   headright	   system	   see	   Edmund	   S.	   Morgan,	   “Headrights	   and	   Head	   Counts,”	   The	   Virginia	  
Magazine	  of	  History	  and	  Biography,	  Vol.	  80,	  No.	  3,	  Part	  One	  (Jul.	  1972),	  361-­‐71.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	   Arendt	   Stam	   became	   a	   naturalized	   English	   subject	   and	   there	   is	   nothing	   to	   suggest	   in	   the	  commission	  granted	   to	  Governor	  William	  Berkeley	   in	  1641	   that	   any	  one	  who	   transported	  persons	  under	  the	  headright	  system	  needed	  to	  be,	  or	  become,	  a	  naturalized	  English	  subject.	  See,	  e.g.,	  W.	  Noel	  Sainsbury,	  ed.,	  Calendar	  of	   the	  State	  Papers,	  Colonial	  Series,	  1574-­‐1660,	  (London:	  Longman,	  1860),	  10:321.	  274 	  On	   Littleton’s	   lease	   of	   land	   to	   Arendt	   see	   Ames,	   ed.,	   County	   Court	   Records	   of	   Accomack-­‐
Northampton,	  Virginia,	  1640-­‐1645,	  148-­‐9.	  	  Littleton	  may	  have	  had	  some	  affinity	  for	  the	  Dutch	  having	  served	  in	  the	  Earl	  of	  Southampton’s	  Company	  that	  landed	  on	  the	  Dutch	  coast	  in	  1625	  to	  liberate	  the	  Protestant	   Low	   Countries	   from	   the	   Spanish.	   “The	   Randolph	   Manuscript:	   Virginia	   Seventeenth	  Century	   Records,”	   The	   Virginia	  Magazine	   of	  History	   and	  Biography,	   Vol.	   18,	   No.	   1	   (Jan.	   1910),	   20;	  Peter	  Hamish	  Wilson,	  The	  Thirty	  Years	  War:	  Europe’s	  Tragedy	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  369.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Ames,	  ed.,	  County	  Court	  Records	  of	  Accomack-­‐Northampton,	  Virginia,	  1640-­‐1645,	  98,	  142-­‐3,	  149-­‐50.	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introduce and integrate his own commercial network into the greater community.  For 
instance, in 1639, Dirck boasted having 16,000 pounds of tobacco in London and another 
16,000 pounds in Virginia. And, in 1640, Arendt, in conjunction with his brother Dirck, 
shipped 60,000 pounds of Virginia tobacco to the Dutch Republic aboard De Vergulde 
Aecke. An additional 20,000 pounds remained in Virginia awaiting subsequent 
shipment.275 The brothers were then handling significant quantities of tobacco. And in 
return for shipments of tobacco, Dirck imported into the colony blankets, boots, horses, 
fancy Leyden tiles, bricks, grindstones for water and windmills and many other articles 
for trade. Nevertheless, the brothers could not have shipped such quantities of tobacco 
without being part of a commercial network. For the Stam brothers, one such network 
involved the Verbrugge Company.   
The Verbrugge Company of Amsterdam, founded by Gillis and Seth Verbrugge, 
traded extensively with merchants in New Netherland.  And, they did not limit their 
activities to the Dutch colony.  The company also relied on family networks to gain entry 
into other North American markets, in particular Virginia.276  Arendt Stam provided a 
                                                275	  For	   the	   1639	   shipment,	   see	   Stadsarchief	   Amsterdam,	  Notarial	   Archives,	   Notary	   J.	   de	   Graeff,	   no.	  1621,	   December	   19,	   1639.	   The	   details	   of	   the	   1640	   shipment	   were	   memorialized	   for	   insurance	  purposes.	   	   Dirck	   Stam’s	   ship	   was	   attacked	   by	   privateers	   from	   Dunkirk	   in	   1640	   and	   he	   appeared	  before	  an	  Amsterdam	  notary	  in	  1641	  to	  attest	  to	  the	  events	  surrounding	  the	  loss	  of	  his	  ship	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  cargo	  he	  carried	  aboard.	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  Archives,	  Notary	  J.	  Warnaerts,	  696/93,	  July	  8,	  1641.	  The	  volume	  of	  their	  trade	  that	  year	  greatly	  exceeded	  that	  of	  any	  single	  London	  importer	  of	  Virginia	  tobacco.	  	  See	  John	  R.	  Pagan,	  “Growth	  of	  the	  Tobacco	  Trade	  between	  London	  and	  Virginia,	  1614-­‐40,”	  
Guildhall	   Studies	   in	   London	  History,	  Vol.	   3,	   No.	   4	   (April	   1979):	   262	   n.	   92.	   Pagan	   notes	   the	   top	   ten	  percent	  of	  Virginia	  tobacco	  importers	  in	  England.	  The	  highest	  individual	  importer	  of	  Virginia	  tobacco	  for	  that	  year	  was	  John	  Bradley	  with	  47,557	  pounds.	  276	  Oliver	  Rink	  noted	  that	  the	  father-­‐son	  partnership	  of	  the	  Verbrugges	  resulted	  in	  approximately	  14	  voyages	   to	   English	   Virginia,	   based	   on	   his	   examination	   of	   notarial	   records	   in	   the	   Stadsarchief	  Amsterdam.	  	  Oliver	  A.	  Rink,	  Holland	  on	  the	  Hudson:	  An	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  of	  Dutch	  New	  York	  (Ithaca:	   Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1986),	   177.	   However,	   Rink	   did	   not	   connect	   the	   Verbrugges’s	  voyages	   to	   the	   kinship	   relationship	   with	   Arendt	   Stam,	   who	   resided	   in	   Virginia.	   Arendt	   and	   Dirck	  Corssen	   Stam	  were	   Gillis	   Verbrugge’s	   nephews	   and	   Seth	   Verbrugge’s	   first	   cousins.	   	   The	   father	   of	  Arendt	  and	  Dirck,	  Cors	  Stam,	  was	  the	  brother	  of	  Gillis’s	  wife,	  Jannetje.	  	  Govert	  Loockermans	  was	  also	  related	  by	  marriage	  to	  the	  Stams	  and	  Verbrugges.	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direct entré for the Verbrugge Company to trade in Virginia for tobacco acting as a factor 
and trading partner for the company beginning at least by 1639.277  Arendt could provide 
shipping with noted Amsterdam merchants to his fellow tobacco growers in Virginia 
without waiting the chance of whatever ship happened by.278 
There are other examples of Dutch merchants who emigrated from New 
Netherland (or from the Delaware region) to the Chesapeake to undertake tobacco 
production or to conduct trade with English and Dutch tobacco planters.  These included: 
Nicolas Boot, William Westerhouse, and the Varlets.   Each merchant bound his or her 
commercial and familial networks to the Chesapeake economy.   
Like their countrymen, Dutch women could also perceive a profit in tobacco.  
Anna Varlet was a dynamic and talented individual.  Her father and uncle, Caspar and 
Pieter Varlet of Amsterdam, were involved with the Dutch West India Company and in 
the silk business, having been engaged in the Virginia tobacco trade from Amsterdam 
since the 1630’s.279  Anna and her husband, George Hack, immigrated to the Eastern 
Shore of Virginia in 1651.280  There, Anna engaged in the tobacco trade.  Anna and 
                                                277	  A	  dispute	  between	  arising	  in	  1639	  Casper	  and	  Daniel	  Verleth	  had	  Arendt	  Corsten	  Stam	  arrested	  in	  Amsterdam	  alleging	  he	  was	   attempting	   to	   remove	  himself	   from	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	  magistrates	  during	  a	  pending	  matter.	  	  The	  notary,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	   find	  Arendt,	  called	  at	  the	  residences	  of	  Dirck	  and	   Gillis	   Verbrugge	   and	   served	   notice	   on	   them.	   See	   Stadsarchief	   Amsterdam,	   Notarial	   Archives,	  Notary	  Jan	  Volkaertsz	  Oli,	  No.	  1409/179-­‐80,	  December	  28,	  1639.	  278	  David	  Pieterson	  De	  Vries	  wrote	  of	  his	  second	  voyage	  to	  America	  that	  in	  October	  1635	  he	  “began	  to	  sail	   up	   and	   down	   the	   river	   [the	   James	   River].”	   De	   Vries,	   Voyages	   from	   Holland	   to	   America,	   112.	  	  Speculative	   trading	   voyages	  with	   the	  hope	  of	   filling	   a	   ship’s	   hold	  with	   tobacco	   in	   a	   timely	  manner	  seemed	   to	   be	   the	   norm	   for	   the	   Virginia	   trade.	   See	   Philip	   Alexander	   Bruce,	   Economic	   History	   of	  
Virginia	  in	  the	  Seventeenth	  Century	  (New	  York:	  Peter	  Smith,	  1935),	  Vol.	  II,	  363-­‐4.	  279	  Caspar	  Varlet	  and	  his	  brother,	  Daniel,	  provided	  1200	  carolus	  guilders	  to	  Dirck	  Corssen	  Stam,	  for	  a	  tenth	   part	   of	   the	   vessel	   Rensselaerswyck	   bound	   for	   New	   Netherland	   and	   Virginia.	   	   Some	   of	   these	  funds	  were	   for	  cargo	  and	  equipment.	  SAA,	  Notarial	  Archives,	  414/173,	  dd	  26-­‐8-­‐1636.	   In	  December	  1639,	   both	   Caspar	   and	   Daniel	   were	   plaintiffs	   in	   a	   legal	   dispute	   over	   their	   share	   in	   a	   cargo	   of	  merchandise	  sent	  to	  Virginia	  aboard	  the	  Wapen	  van	  Leeuwarden	  that	  was	  traded	  for	  tobacco.	  	  280	  It	   is	   uncertain	  whether	   Anna	   emigrated	   from	   the	  Dutch	   Republic	   to	   New	  Netherland	  with	   her	  parents,	  Caspar	  Varlet	  and	  Judith	  Tentenier,	  and	  her	  siblings,	  aboard	  the	  Fortuyn	  in	  1650,	  or	  whether	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George owned a nine hundred acre plantation at Hack’s Point on Pungoteague Creek, two 
nearby islands totaling another hundred acres, and a four hundred acre plantation along 
Matchotank Creek.  Each of the Virginia plantations had frontage on Chesapeake Bay.  
Here they were neighbors with some of the largest planters of the region, and in the 
company of other Dutch settlers, such as Willem Westerhouse and Hendrick Waggaman, 
both also former Amsterdam residents. Additionally, George Hack received a grant in 
1658 of a four hundred acre track further up the bay, in Cecil County, Maryland.  This 
plantation, called Anna Catharina Neck, was on the south side of the Bohemia River, 
across from Augustine Herman’s on the other side.281 
As a colonial merchant trading between Holland, the West Indies, New 
Amsterdam, and Virginia, Anna Hack dealt in tobacco, furs, grain, manufactured goods 
such as furniture and cloth, and African slaves.  In the family business dealings, both 
before and after the death of George, Anna herself purchased or had ships built for her, 
equipped and maintained them, and represented most of her own legal interests in court 
proceedings.282 Like the Stam brothers, operating her own ship based out of two locations 
on Chesapeake Bay reduced shipping costs, gave her the ability to collect from numerous 
                                                                                                                                            she	   came	   sometime	   earlier	   with	   her	   husband.	   Caspar	   and	   Judith	   and	   their	   children	   settled	   at	   the	  Dutch	  trading	  post	  along	  the	  Connecticut	  River.	  281	  For	   the	   Virginia	   lands,	   see	   Library	   of	   Virginia	   Archives,	   Virginia.	   	   Colonial	   Land	  Office.	   Patents,	  1623-­‐1774,	   Land	   Office	   Patents,	   No.	   3,	   1652-­‐1655,	   p.	   127	   (Reel	   2).	   	   For	   the	   Maryland	   lands,	   see	  Maryland	   State	   Archives,	   Cecil	   County	   Circuit	   Court	   Land	   Survey,	   Subdivision	   Plats,	   MSA	   Section	  1586:	   Patent	  Record	  Q,	   p.	   456.	   The	  Hacks	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   headright	   system	   in	   operation	   in	  Virginia.	   	   Their	   headrights	   included:	   George	   Nicholas	   Hack,	   Sepherin	   Hack,	   An(n)	   Kathrine	   Hack,	  Domingo,	  a	  Negro,	  George,	  a	  Negro,	  Kathrine,	  a	  Negro,	  Ann,	  a	  Negro,	  Hendrick	  Volkerts,	  Rnick	  Gerrits,	  Bermon	  Nephrinninge,	  Giltielmus	  Varlee	  (Varlett?),	  Augustine	  Hermonds,	  Barnard	  Rams,	  Augustine	  Riters,	   Adrian	   Rams,	   Claus	   Gisbert,	   Brigitta	   Williams,	   and	   Cornelis	   Hendrickson.	   	   Northampton	  County	  Court	  Order	  Book,	  1654-­‐61,	  fol.	  4,	  32-­‐4,	  April	  5,	  1659..	  282	  For	   instance,	   in	   August	   1652,	   “Mrs.	   Anna	   Varlet	   the	   wife	   of	   George	   Hacke	   dwelling	   in	   Var.”	  purchased	  the	  pinnace	  “Fortune”	  from	  the	  Dutch	  skipper,	  Juriaen	  Blanck,	  probably	  taking	  delivery	  in	  Virginia.	   	   In	   New	   Amsterdam,	   her	   father	   and	   her	   brother,	   Nicholas,	   stood	   security	   for	   her;	   her	  brother,	  William,	  delivered	  the	  payment	  there	  to	  Blanck.	  Purchase	  on	  9	  August	  1652.	  Jeurien	  Blanck	  filed	   a	   notarial	   act	   in	   New	   Amsterdam	   by	   Dirck	   Schelluyne,	   recorded	   in	   Northampton	   County,	  Virginia	  on	  13	  October	  1652.	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tobacco growers all around the region as soon as the latest crops were ready, and, in turn, 
market her imported merchandise directly to Virginia and Maryland buyers.  Her family’s 
connections in Amsterdam and their longstanding association with transatlantic 
merchant-shipper families such as the Bestevaers of Graft, Holland, undoubtedly gave 
her a competitive edge in the Dutch Republic as well. She was most likely was educated 
as Dutch women were of the day, able to read, write, and understand accounts.283 
But two other factors would have contributed to her success as a merchant in the 
Chesapeake.  The first was naturalization as an English subject.  Anna and her husband 
became English subjects almost immediately upon moving to Virginia.  In Northampton 
court on March 25, 1651, George Hacke signed an oath of allegiance to the 
commonwealth of England, then under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell.  Their 
allegiance to England allowed the Hack-Varlet family to legally trade within the 
tightened rules imposed by the English Navigation Act of 1651, restricting trade with 
England to English ships with English crews. 284  And because the family owned 
plantations in both Virginia and Maryland, the couple sought naturalization in 
                                                283	  Kim	  Todt	   and	  Martha	  Dickinson	   Shattuck,	   “Capable	  Entrepreneurs:	   The	  Women	  Merchants	   and	  Traders	  of	  New	  Netherland,”	   in	  Women	  in	  Port	  Cities:	  Gendering	  Communities,	  Economies,	  and	  Social	  
Networks	  in	  Atlantic	  Port	  Cities,	  1500-­‐1800,	  eds.,	  Douglass	  Catterall	  and	  Jodi	  Campbell	  (Leiden:	  Brill,	  2012)	  (forthcoming).	  284	  Northampton	   (later	  Accomack)	  County,	  Virginia,	  March	  25,	  1651.	  With	   the	  advent	  of	   the	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  war	  in	  1652,	  business	  interests	  and	  landholdings	  of	  Dutch	  residents	  in	  English	  colonies	  were	  in	  jeopardy.	  	  Several	  Dutch	  ships	  had	  been	  captured	  in	  Virginia	  waters	  during	  the	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  War	  of	   1652-­‐54,	   yet	   Virginians	   and	   Marylanders	   depended	   on	   Dutch	   trade.	   	   So,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	  George	   Hack’s	   family	   lived	   in	   Amsterdam	   from	   the	   time	   he	   was	   a	   small	   boy,	   on	  March	   28,	   1653,	  George	  Hack	  declared	  in	  court	  that	  he	  was	  “a	  high	  German	  both	  by	  presents	  and	  birth	  born	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Cologyn,”	   –	   thus	  declaring	   to	   the	  world	   that	  he	  was	  not	  Dutch.	   	  The	   court	   then	   “ordered	  by	   the	  effect	  these	  lines	  be	  record	  that	  all	  persons	  whom	  it	  may	  concern	  take	  notice	  thereof.”	  In	  the	  March	  1657/58	   session	   of	   the	  Virginia	  House	   of	   Burgesses,	   George	  Hack	  was	  made	   a	   denizen	   of	   Virginia	  Colony,	  which	  gave	  him	  the	  full	  power	  to	  purchase,	  own,	  and	  sell	   lands,	  and	  to	  trade	  “to	  all	   intents	  and	  purposes	  as	  if	  he	  had	  been	  an	  Englishman	  borne.”	  Laws	  of	  Virginia,	  March	  1657/8	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Maryland.285  As a naturalized citizen, Anna could operate vessels in the Chesapeake, 
take on tobacco from English and Dutch tobacco planters, and transport the tobacco to 
England to satisfy the letter of the law. 
And, arguably, the other factor for Anna’s success as a merchant in the 
Chesapeake was her commercial and familial association with Augustine Herrman.  
Herrman had married Anna’s sister, Jannetje, in New Amsterdam.  
But if Anna became a naturalized English subject, how did she conduct business 
in Virginia in her own name during a time when women’s commercial activities were 
constrained by marriage? Anna had less difficulty conducting trade with merchants of 
Dutch origin, who may well have been the bulk of her trading partners.  In such case, 
their cultural acceptance of women would not have been a barrier to trade.  As well, Anna 
availed herself of New Netherland’s courts when required, a place where she need not 
worry that her gender would prohibit her from representing herself in court.286 
Occasionally, a Dutch merchant was compelled to immigrate to Virginia to 
                                                285	  In	  a	  session	  of	   the	  Maryland	  Assembly	  on	  September	  17th,	  1663,	   it	  was	  ordered	  that	  “an	  Acte	  of	  Naturalizacon	  be	  prepared	  for	  Augustine	  Herman,	  and	  his	  Children	  and	  his	  brother	  in	  Lawe	  George	  Hack	  and	  his	  wife	  and	  Children.”	  But	  George	  died	  before	  the	  Maryland	  naturalizations	  were	  enacted,	  and	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1666,	  naturalizations	  of	  “Anna	  Hak	  George	  &	  Peter	  her	  Sonnes”	  along	  with	  the	  Augustine	  Herman	  family,	  were	  finalized.	  MSA	  1:	  462	  “Proceedings	  and	  Acts	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  January	  1637/8	  –	  September	  1664”;	  MSA	  2:	  144,	  “Assembly	  Proceedings,	  April/May	  1666.”	  286	  For	   instance,	   in	  1652,	  Anna	  made	  several	  appearances	   in	  New	  Netherland’s	  court.	  She	  was	  sued	  by	   the	  alleged	  assignees	  of	  Augustine	  Herrman	   for	   a	  quantity	  of	   tobacco,	  brought	  by	  Anna	   to	  New	  Amsterdam,	  which	  the	  assignees	  claimed	  was	  sent	  in	  payment	  for	  a	  debt	  Herrman	  owed	  them.	  	  Anna	  replied	   that	   Herrman’s	   debt	   to	   the	   assignees	   had	   been	   paid	   and	   the	   tobacco	   she	   carried	  was	   her	  private	  property	  sent	  to	  her	  by	  her	  husband.	  Charles	  T.	  Gehring,	  trans.	  and	  ed.,	  New	  York	  Historical	  
Manuscripts,	  Volume	   V,	   Council	   Minutes,	   1652-­‐1654	   (Baltimore:	   Genealogical	   Publishing	   Co.,	   Inc.,	  1983),	  50.	  	  Anna	  was	  also	  a	  defendant	  in	  a	  matter	  by	  additional	  assignees	  of	  Augustine	  Herrman.	  	  The	  plaintiffs	   sought	  payment	   “for	  boards,	   a	  horse	  and	  a	  negro,	   sent	   to	  Virginia	  by	  Heerman	  before	  he	  absconded.”	  	  Anna	  denied	  the	  debts,	  except	  for	  the	  slave,	  and	  asked	  to	  be	  free	  from	  attachment.	  	  The	  court	  ordered	  Anna’s	  tobacco	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  the	  public	  store	  for	  security.	  	  Ibid.,	  45-­‐6.	  	  Additionally,	  Anna	   had	   purchased	   slaves	   from	   Capt.	   Geurt	   Tyssen	   that	   Tyssen	   later	   sold	   to	   others.	   	   Anna	   sued	  Tyssen	   for	   the	   return	   of	   her	   slaves	   or	   their	   purchase	   price.	   The	   director	   and	   council	   referred	   the	  matter	  to	  arbitration.	  	  Ibid.,	  37,	  41,	  53-­‐4.	  	  At	  no	  point	  in	  any	  of	  the	  legal	  activities	  she	  undertook	  for	  herself	   or	   in	   representing	   Herrman	   did	   any	   one	   question	   her	   authority	   as	   a	   woman	   to	   appear	   in	  court.	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protect his investment or an investment of which he was a part. In 1649, Symon Overzee, 
of Rotterdam, received a power of attorney from Jan Jacobsen Palm, Francois Vermande, 
Jan de Colonia, Ysbrandt Vethuysen and Jacob Gerritsen Blenck, all merchants of 
Rotterdam.  The power of attorney required Overzee to travel to Virginia and sell the 
merchants’ tobacco plantation in Kicketan.287 By November of 1652, Overzee’s son had 
been put in charge of the Virginia plantation.  The exact reason for this was unknown.  It 
might have been for a lack of purchasers for the plantation. Alternatively, the merchants 
might have received offers that were insufficient to cover the contracted debt owed on the 
plantation288 As the English Navigation Acts were in effect, the Rotterdam merchants 
may have seen ownership of a Virginia plantation as a means to evade English trade 
restrictions on Virginia tobacco.  This course of action was hinted at by a sailor’s 
declaration in 1652.  He stated that in 1650 he was in Virginia aboard a Dutch ship Witte 
Paard, captained by Dirck Wittepaard.  Colonel Francis Erlyn and Simon Overzee, Jr., 
both residents of Virginia, purchased the ship soon after its arrival in Virginia. They 
                                                287	  Gemeentearchief	   Rotterdam,	   Not.	   V.	   Mustelius,	   Sept.	   18,	   1649.	   Overzee	   had	   participated	   in	   the	  Virginia	  tobacco	  trade	  for	  some	  time.	  	  In	  1647,	  Ysbrant	  van	  Houten	  of	  Rotterdam	  contracted	  Captain	  Pieter	   Revertsen	   van	   der	   Swiep	   to	   take	   malt,	   beans	   and	   “other	   grains	   belonging	   to	   the	   brewers’	  business”	   to	   New	   Netherland.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   contract	   ended	   in	   the	   Dutch	   colony	   and	   that	   the	  supercargo	  was	  Symon	  Overzee	  indicated	  that	  it	  was	  a	  journey,	  in	  actuality,	  for	  Virginia.	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  V.	  Mustelius,	  August	  26,	  1647	  and	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  J.	  Delphius,	  nos.	  139-­‐139v,	  June	  11,	  1647.	  When	  Overzee	  senior	  may	  have	  left	  the	  Chesapeake	  is	  unknown.	  A	  Simon	  Overzee	  is	  mentioned	  in	  a	  contract	  of	  1650	  when	  Pieter	  Claessen	  residing	  in	  Warenscreek	  Bay	  in	  Virginia	  acknowledged	  to	  have	  received	  from	  this	   Rotterdam	  merchant	   the	   sum	   of	   100	   guilders	   on	   bottomry	   on	   all	   such	   goods	   the	   former	   had	  loaded	  in	  the	  ship	  De	  Stroo	  Yoncker	  of	  200	  tons.	   	  The	  return	  cargo	  was	  to	  be	  25	  oxheads	  of	  tobacco	  and	  one	  passenger.	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  V.	  Mustelius,	  September	  3,	  1650.	  The	  charter	  party	  of	  the	  Stroo	  Yonker	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Ibid.,	  Not.	  V.	  Mustelius,	  dd,	  September	  3	  and	  August	  19,	  1650.	  288	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  some	  confusion	  among	  historians	  about	  Simon	  Overzee.	   	  Historians	  such	  as	  Pagen	   assumed	   “Cornelis	   Symoasz	  Overzee”	   and	   “Simon	  Overzee”	  were	   the	   same	   individual.	   Later	  historians,	   such	   as	   Hatfield,	   repeated	   this	   mistake.	   	   However,	   Cornelis	   Symoasz	   Overzee	   was	   the	  individual	   granted	   a	   power	   of	   attorney	   by	   a	   group	   of	   Rotterdam	  merchants	   to	  manage	   a	   tobacco	  plantation	  at	  Kicketan.	  	  He	  subsequently	  left	  his	  son	  in	  Virginia,	  Simon,	  approximately	  23	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time,	  in	  his	  stead.	  	  Simon,	  the	  son,	  actively	  traded	  between	  Virginia	  and	  Rotterdam	  and	  along	  the	  Eastern	   seaboard.	   	   As	   well,	   he	   married	   into	   elite	   Virginian	   families.	   His	   first	   wife	   was	   Sarah	  Thoroughgood	  and	  his	  second	  wife	  was	  Elizabeth	  Willoughby	  (who	  would	  later	  take	  Isaac	  Allerton,	  Jr.,	  as	  her	  third	  husband).	  	  Simon	  died	  in	  1660	  in	  Virginia.	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rechristened her The Merchant of Virginia and sailed for New England in the spring of 
1651.289 Of course, the voyage from Virginia to New England, under English territorial 
claims was from one English territory to another, and thus fell within the constraints of 
the English Navigation Acts. We would not have been informed about this journey and 
transfer of the ship, however, had she not subsequently been shipwrecked on the New 
England coast, resulting in an insurance claim on the Dutch insurance market. 
Dutch settlement in the Chesapeake during the seventeenth century was for 
opportunistic reasons.  It was a chance to secure tobacco directly from planters, whether 
Dutch or English, and to ship the tobacco directly to patria or to England.  Often, a Dutch 
planter or merchant living in the Chesapeake would ship tobacco on his own fluyt.  But, 
as often, the tobacco would be secured in a warehouse awaiting ships contracted as part 
of a commercial network of planters, merchants, shippers, and buyers – all related or well 
known to each other.  Immigration to the Chesapeake by Dutch merchants, either from 
another early American colony or from the Dutch Republic, did not seem to meet with 
publicized hostility from English residents. While correspondence and legislation 
reflected geo-political concerns about Dutch trading activities in the Chesapeake, 
particularly during period of European conflict, once settled there, Dutch immigrants did 
not seem to encounter opposition. In fact, the overwhelming presence of the Dutch in the 
region had significant importance for English residents of the Chesapeake and their own 
personal financial well being.  Dutch immigrants filled commercial voids in the 
Chesapeake.   
 
                                                289	  Gemeentearchief	  Rotterdam,	  Not.	  B.	  de	  Gruyter,	  	  November	  16,	  1652.	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Conclusion 
What this chapter has surveyed was the development and the persistence of the 
tobacco trade that existed between Chesapeake plantation owners and Dutch merchants 
throughout the period of 1620 through 1664.  The rise of tobacco as the engine that 
fueled the Chesapeake economy soon brought Dutch merchants to the Eastern Shore. 
With them, Dutch merchants brought Dutch and European goods for trade as well as 
needed credit to finance purchases associated with tobacco production. 
By the time of the English Civil War, Dutch merchants had established 
themselves as integral to the Chesapeake tobacco trade.  It was fortunate for the 
plantation owners.  Arguably, without Dutch bottoms for shipping, access to European 
markets, and Dutch credit, the Chesapeake economy would have suffered tremendously 
during a period when the armed conflicts and political machinations between 
Parliamentarians and Royalists preoccupied English shipping.  Such was the dependency 
on and loyalism to Dutch merchants and shipping, that when the Navigation Acts were 
passed in 1650 both Virginia planters and Dutch merchants expressed concern about the 
economic logic of such policy and various interest groups sought diplomatic intervention. 
Dutch trade to the Chesapeake was not just undertaken from one Dutch staple port 
such as New Amsterdam or Rotterdam.  Rather, large trading houses, partnerships, and 
individuals throughout the Dutch trading communities of the Atlantic World engaged in 
the Chesapeake tobacco trade.  Additionally, English tobacco planters and merchants 
sought out Dutch merchants and by doing so created inter-colonial commercial networks. 
 Dutch colonial merchants, resident in New Netherland, found additional partners 
for trade among English tobacco planters in the Chesapeake.  The inter-colonial trade 
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between New Netherland and the Chesapeake brought welcomed and frequent trade 
between the colonies not dependent on trans-Atlantic voyages. Like merchants from New 
England, Dutch authorities accommodated Chesapeake planters.  As well, many Dutch 
chose to re-settle in the Chesapeake from New Netherland.  Whether as merchants or as 
planters, cultural accommodation provided them access to Chesapeake society and 
additional commercial ties.   
 The relinquishment by the Dutch of New Netherland to England in 1664 did not 
curtail Dutch involvement in the tobacco trade.  Rather, because trading networks 
between the Chesapeake and Amsterdam and Rotterdam had existed for decades, 
commercial relationships were well defined.  Trading partners accommodated the 
changed circumstances.   
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Chapter 4   
 
Yankee and Janneke290:  
The Continuing Trade between 
New England and Dutch Merchants, 
1664-1750 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In March 1671, John Willoughby, captain of The Hopewell, made his final 
preparations for his return voyage to Boston from Amsterdam.  As Amsterdam was the 
leading commercial center in Europe, the fifty-ton vessel was loaded with European 
goods.  He made sure that his insurance premium reflected the value of his costly cargo 
should he suffer a loss along the way.  
 Willoughby accepted the terms of the Amsterdam insurance market.  He received 
2200 guilders from George Gotfright of Rotterdam as bodemerij, or bottomry.  When a 
ship’s owner or captain took out a bottomry loan the loan was only repaid if the vessel or 
merchandise arrived safely at the destination port. Yet, this method of transferring risk 
was not purely an insurance contract.  Willoughby agreed to pay a premium for the 
bottomry (known as opgelt).  In this instance, Willoughby paid a twenty per cent buyer’s 
premium on the loan’s value, or roughly 440 guilders. Additionally, the bottomry loan 
was repayable to Gotfright within ten months in either Amsterdam or Rotterdam after the 
successful completion of the voyage.   
                                                290	  British	   etymologist,	  Michael	   Quinion,	   asserts	   that	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   term	  Yankee,	   “most	   likely	  …	  came	   from	  a	  nickname,	   Janke,	   a	  diminutive	   form	  of	   Jan,	   the	  Dutch	  equivalent	   to	   John.”	   Janke	   is	  not	  only	  a	  nickname,	  but	  also	  a	  surname.	   In	  New	  Netherland,	   Janke,	   alongside	   Jan,	   Janneke,	   Jankin,	   and	  several	  other	  variants,	  was	  a	  common	  surname.	  After	  the	  British	  ousted	  the	  Dutch	  administration	  in	  1664,	  Dutch	   families	  began	   to	   spell	   their	  names	  with	  Y-­‐	   instead	  of	   J-­‐	   in	  English-­‐speaking	   contexts.	  Even	  today,	  families	  spelling	  their	  name	  Yanke	  are	  found	  in	  the	  Hudson	  Valley	  alongside	  others	  using	  the	  more	  traditional	  spelling	   Janke.	  This	  was	  used	  as	  a	  nickname	  for	  a	  Dutch-­‐speaking	  American	  in	  colonial	   times.	   	   See	  Michael	   Quinion,	  Ballyhoo,	   Buckaroo,	   and	   Spuds:	   Ingenious	   Tales	   of	  Words	   and	  
Their	  Origins	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2004),	  270.	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 Typical of this particular circum-Atlantic trading network, Willoughby had begun 
his voyage in Boston, sailed along the eastern seaboard of the American colonies to the 
Chesapeake.  Once there, he traded with the local planters living along the waterways 
feeding into the Chesapeake. He loaded his ship with tobacco and sailed across the 
Atlantic to Amsterdam. As he passed Texel, interested parties in Amsterdam would have 
heard the news of the arrival of another tobacco ship before he moored. Willoughby 
would have unloaded his ship with Dutch tobacco merchants waiting at the pier. 
 As it was March, Willoughby would have been anxious to set sail again.  Boston’s 
harbor would be free of ice and the Atlantic crossing would be easier on both his crew 
and his ship. The journey across the Atlantic would have brought him into Boston’s 
harbor sometime in April or May.  Then after unloading his cargo and making any 
necessary repairs to his ship, he would set sail again for the Chesapeake arriving in the 
autumn as the slaves harvested the tobacco crop.  He and his crew would stay through 
winter to finish all of their trading. In the spring, the cycle would begin again, and 
Willoughby would journey back to Amsterdam with a load of tobacco.291 
 For Willoughby, and his trading partners, his actions were customary.  Despite 
two recent wars between England and the Dutch Republic, and one looming on the 
horizon, Willoughby was free to trade in Amsterdam, enter into contracts, and confirm 
his trading relationships.  His trade was welcomed.  So, too, were the European goods he 
brought to Boston. And, when he called on tobacco planters in the Chesapeake, they 
knew he travelled directly to the Dutch Republic to sell their tobacco.  And, yet, nearly 
all of Willoughby’s actions disregarded the Navigation Acts and the economic policy of 
                                                291	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3206/251	  (1671).	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mercantilism.  I would assert, that despite widely publicized regulations, intermittent 
enforcement, and the best intentions, English merchants and their Dutch trading partners, 
until well into the eighteenth century, derided England’s Navigation Acts and economic 
policies. 
 This chapter surveys the continued trade between the Dutch Republic and New 
England merchants during the period of 1664 through 1750.  It was a period beset with 
wars in Europe and aggression that reached North American shores. Throughout it all, 
merchants in the New England colonies sustained and renewed trading networks with 
their Dutch colleagues.   
 The first part of this chapter evaluates the conflict over trade that existed between 
England and the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century.  The Navigation Acts looked 
good on paper and English policymakers intended the laws to eliminate or significantly 
curtail Dutch trade competition with the English. But the laws failed to resonate with 
American colonists who did not abandon their transatlantic trading behavior. For any 
merchant, trade was about profit. And consumerism, even at this nascent stage of 
development, was about supplying goods the consumer wanted at a price the consumer 
was willing to pay.  Enforcement of the Navigation Acts during most of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries was sketchy at best and New England and Dutch merchants 
continued to trade with each other.  
 The next portion of this chapter assesses New England’s reaction to the 
Navigation Acts.  Colonial officials urged that the Acts not have application to America 
stressing how the Acts would discourage trade. Of course, part of their concern related to 
their trading relationship with the Dutch. The importance of the trading relationship with 
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the Dutch for New England merchants should not be underestimated. Commerce with 
merchants in the Dutch Republic offered New Englanders minimal barriers of entry, 
acculturated commercial institutions, and less restrictive taxation policies.  New 
England’s ships carried regional goods to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. New England 
merchants used Dutch bottoms for shipping.  The notarial records reveal how New 
Englanders understood and applied Dutch legal and commercial procedures to their 
advantage, as well as how these same colonists ignored the Navigation Acts. 
 The third section considers the response by the English government to the 
continued foreign trade undertaken by New England merchants after the passage of the 
Navigation Acts.  English colonial officials, such as Edward Randolph, take notice of the 
persistent commercial activity of foreign ships, including Dutch bottoms, in Boston’s 
harbor ladened with non-English goods in contravention of the Navigation Acts.  As 
representatives of the English government, and mostly unsympathetic with colonial 
rational about the Navigation Acts, administrators from England urged more stringent 
enforcement.  While some enforcement of the restricting legislation did occur, it was 
never enough to deter New England’s trade with the Dutch. 
 The next division of this chapter discusses the involvement of the Hope family 
with New England merchants.  The Hopes had established merchant houses in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam and would later develop into one of the largest banking 
houses in Europe.  By 1730, the family began to institute commercial links with New 
England merchants.  These links were strengthened with the arrival of a son, Henry, who 
lived in Boston and established bonds with the elite level of New England merchants and, 
in turn, expanded their networks of trade through his family’s merchant house.  It was a 
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unique relationship that should not have existed in New England because of the 
Navigation Acts, but did so because the Dutch commercial house saw an opportunity for 
trade in New England. 
 As the eighteenth century continued, so, too, did Dutch trade with New England.  
The next portion of this chapter explores individual Dutch merchants and the trade with 
New England colonies. Various New England ports developed specialties of trade which 
Dutch merchants recognized and encouraged.  Dutch smuggling increased during this 
period, particularly for commodities such as tea, which Dutch merchants could supply 
directly to New England and for less expense than their English counterparts. New 
England merchants were willing participants in the smuggling activities.  While it has 
been argued that New England merchants symbolically protested English policies as part 
of the lead up to the American Revolution, it is here in the 1730s and 1740s that 
American consumers protested by knowingly purchasing contraband tea in contravention 
to the despised Navigation Acts. 
 Finally, the last part of this chapter assesses Dutch military aggression in North 
America during the Third-Anglo Dutch War.  A privateering commission issued by the 
Dutch to a Dutch sea captain turned into taking physical possession of Acadia in New 
France. New England colonial officials expressed no concern about the Dutch physical 
presence to their north and, indeed, sent ships to trade with the Dutch. However, when 
the Dutch privateers started attacking New England trading ships, events took a markedly 
different turn. The incident, nevertheless, suggests a familiarity and comfort by New 
England officials with the Dutch over the French, particularly if it founded increased 
trading opportunities.  While the Dutch presence in Acadia was eliminated, and the 
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English government had had no time to respond to events, it does imply a certain 
mentalité by New Englanders of what the Dutch could offer to New England. 
 
  
The Conflict over Trade 
 In 1670, England and the Dutch Republic were between wars.  Between 1665 and 
1667, the two nations had fought each other at sea and in Europe during the conflict 
known as the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The physical hostilities concluded in 1667 with 
the signing of the Treaty of Breda.  
 That conflict, much like the First Anglo-Dutch War, centered on mercantile 
competition. The English sought to take over Dutch trade routes and colonies while 
excluding the Dutch from England’s colonial possessions. Merchants had engaged in 
shipping from English colonies in America and Surinam for a decade, in contradiction of 
the Navigation Acts, thus cheating the nation of critical tax revenues, or so argued 
English administrators.292  But the Acts had fundamental flaws from their inception. 
 From 1664 through 1750, the concept of the Navigation Acts looked good on 
paper. English administrators intended that the legislation would eliminate Dutch and 
other competitors in the carrying trade to and from the American colonies. One historian 
has contended that, 
 removing the Dutch and incorporating the English colonies’ trade fully within the 
 empire would not be as simple as conquering Dutch colonies (of  which there 
 were few) and passing restrictive laws.  Instead, it would require changing the 
 commercial habits and culture of colonists.  That is, officials could not extend 
                                                292	  The	  Navigation	   Acts	   enacted	   by	   Parliament	   in	   1651,	   1660	   and	   1663,	  were	   pieces	   of	   legislation	  intended	   to	   work	   in	   conjunction	   with	   English	   economic	   policies	   emphasizing	   mercantilism.	  Generally,	  the	  acts	  reserved	  for	  England	  the	  right	  to	  trade	  with	  its	  colonies	  and	  prohibited	  the	  import	  of	  goods	  of	  non-­‐European	  origin	  unless	  transported	  in	  ships	  flying	  the	  English	  flag.	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 their fiscal-military state across the Atlantic until locals eschewed their cross-
 national, flexible origins and chose to conform to new imperial standards.  The 
 years between 1624 and 1713 were distinguished, therefore, both by new 
 expressions of state power and by the greater realization that mercantilism rested 
 on individual behavior.  It would be the willingness of colonists to abandon an 
 earlier cross-national Atlantic community and accept membership in the British 
 Empire, presumably on the same terms as those in the metropole, which would 
 ultimately make a mercantilist empire possible.293 
  
 But the reality was that individuals did not have such willingness and sought 
opportunity and profit outside of England’s legal strictures. The enumerated goods, 
considered valued American products, always had ready markets outside of England or 
its colonies. Taking the time to ship goods through England and pay English import 
duties was both costly and time consuming to many profit-conscious merchants.294 
Occasionally, merchants were caught and brought to trial.295 But they were willing to take 
such a risk because enforcement mechanisms in the form of human capital were scarce.  
Additionally, profit drove merchant’s individual behavior to evade existing enforcement. 
 Commercial border crossing continued because buyers and sellers paid little 
notice to nationality.296  On an individual, quotidian level, merchants sought opportunity 
                                                293 	  Christian	   J.	   Koot,	   Empire	   at	   the	   Periphery:	   British	   Colonists,	   Anglo-­‐Dutch	   Trade,	   and	   the	  
Development	  of	  the	  British	  Atlantic,	  1621-­‐1713	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  5.	  	  Koot	  examines	   New	   York,	   Barbados,	   and	   the	   English	   Leeward	   Islands.	   	   His	   geographical	   selectivity	   is	  problematic,	   particularly	   when	   looking	   at	   the	   West	   Indies.	   	   Most	   voyages	   in	   this	   period	   visited	  multiple	   ports	   in	   the	  West	   Indies	   and	   frequently	   traded	   along	   the	  North	  American	   coast.	   	   As	  well,	  Koot	  asserts	   that	  colonists	  shifted	  away	  from	  Dutch	  trade.	  My	  archival	  research	   in	  Amsterdam	  and	  Rotterdam	  contradicts	  his	  assertions.	  294	  The	   list	   of	   enumerated	   goods	   initially	   included	   wool,	   sugar,	   tobacco,	   indigo,	   ginger,	   and	   dyes.	  	  Later,	  rice,	  naval	  stores,	  copper,	  and	  furs	  were	  added	  to	  the	  list.	  295	  As	   late	   as	   1682,	   merchants	   who	   had	   been	   accused	   of	   violating	   the	   acts	   successfully	   evaded	  prosecution	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  ‘those	  Acts	  are	  not	  the	  Laws	  of	  this	  Colony,	  because	  not	  sufficiently	  published	  as	   required	   in	  Law	  Book.’	   See	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  
Bay	  in	  New	  England,	  ed.	  Nathaniel	  B.	  Shurtleff,	  6	  vols.	  (1854;	  Boston,	  1968),	  4:	  73	  and	  5:155,	  211.	  	  In	  1663,	  the	  General	  Court	  had	  made	  arrangements	  for	  collecting	  bonds	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Act	  of	  1660,	  but	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  laws	  and	  liberties	  to	  include	  them.	  296	  John	  Locke	  advocated	  an	  early	  description	  of	   supply	  and	  demand	  and	   their	   relationship.	   In	   this	  description	   demand	   is	   rent:	   “The	   price	   of	   any	   commodity	   rises	   or	   falls	   by	   the	   proportion	   of	   the	  number	  of	  buyer	  and	  sellers”	  and	  “that	  which	  regulates	  the	  price...	  [of	  goods]	  is	  nothing	  else	  but	  their	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and profit and nationality was a barrier easily overcome. Concerned, the English 
government attempted to provoke compliance by lowering duties. The government’s 
efforts occasionally worked and stemmed non-compliant trading patterns. Nevertheless, 
trade in the Atlantic world still depended on trust.  To become a participant in an 
established merchant network, a merchant needed to have an excellent reputation, to 
subscribe to uniform principles including honesty, and to have access to a formal legal 
system (contracts, courts, law). Colonial merchants participated in a more multi-faceted 
and multi-layered institutional reality than the Navigation Acts, other reform measures, 
and English economic policy took into account. Dutch trading partners offered American 
colonists a commercial realm with minimal barriers of entry, acculturated commercial 
institutions, and less restrictive taxation policies. They purchased raw materials and 
agricultural products at higher prices than their English counterparts without any 
additional legal or administrative impediments. 
 In England, pamphlets vilified Dutch traders.297 Details about the commercial 
behavior of Dutch merchants might not all have been accurate, but promoters calculated 
that the tracts would excite much anger at the Dutch among the English. For that reason, 
whenever the exigencies of a diplomatic situation between the Dutch and English 
                                                                                                                                            quantity	  in	  proportion	  to	  their	  rent.”	  	  See	  John	  Locke,	  Some	  Considerations	  on	  the	  Consequences	  of	  the	  
Lowering	  of	  Interest	  and	  the	  Raising	  of	  the	  Value	  of	  Money	  (1691).	  297	  The	  English	  and	  Dutch	  had	  experienced	  a	  long	  history	  of	  pamphlet	  wars.	  	  One	  of	  the	  best	  known	  involved	   the	   Amboyna	   Massacre.	   In	   1623,	   agents	   of	   the	   Dutch	   East	   India	   Company	   tortured	   and	  executed	  ten	  employees	  of	  the	  British	  East	  India	  Company	  on	  Ambon	  Island	  (today	  known	  as	  Maluku,	  Indonesia).	  	  The	  English	  employees	  had	  been	  accused	  of	  treason,	  suspected	  of	  encouraging	  the	  local	  sultan	  to	  switch	  allegiance	  from	  the	  Dutch	  to	  the	  Spanish.	  The	  incident	  was	  attributed	  to	  the	  intense	  rivalry	   between	   the	   two	   national	   companies	   over	   the	   spice	   trade.	   	   See	   Noel	   W.	   Sainsbury,	   ed.,	  
Calendar	   of	   State	   Papers	   Colonial	   Series,	   East	   Indies,	   China	   and	   Japan	   -­‐	   1622-­‐1624	   (London:	   Public	  Record	  Office,	  1878),	  4:4991.	  	  Included	  among	  the	  many	  pamphlets	  published	  are	  one	  by	  the	  Dutch	  in	  1624,	  A	  True	  Declaration	  of	  the	  News	  That	  Came	  out	  of	  the	  East	  Indies,	  with	  the	  Pinace	  Called	  the	  
Hare,	  Which	  Arrived	  in	  Texel	  in	  June,	  1624	  (London,	  1624):	  the	  English	  retorted	  with	  A	  True	  Relation	  
of	   the	   Unjust,	   Cruell	   and	   Barbarous	   Proceedings	   Against	   the	   English	   at	   Amboyna	   (London:	   John	  Skinner,	  1624).	  See	  Karen	  Chancey,	  “The	  Amboyna	  Massacre	  in	  English	  Politics,	  1624-­‐1632,”	  Albion:	  
A	  Quarterly	  Journal	  Concerned	  with	  British	  Studies	  30	  (1998):	  583-­‐98.	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necessitated a rekindling of public resentment against the Dutch, pamphlets became 
useful propaganda tools. English officials utilized pamphlets prior to the onset of the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War.  A pamphlet entitled “The Character of Holland,” originally 
published in 1653, was reprinted repeatedly during the early 1660’s.  It encouraged 
Englishmen to view Holland as “This indigested vomit of the Sea/Fell to the Dutch by 
just Propriety.”298 
 Seeking to wrest commercial supremacy away from the Dutch, the English went 
on a series of geo-political conquests. From 1663, with the capture of Dutch trading posts 
and colonies in West Africa by Robert Holmes, in the service of the Royal African 
Company, to the 1664 takeover of New Netherland in North America, the English sought 
to suppress Dutch trade in regions of commercial importance to the English.  By 1665, 
the nations were again at war.  The war was costly to the English. And disaster struck 
domestically as plague and fire devastated London.  
 Despite, or perhaps because of, England’s defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch War, 
contemporaneous political instability, and commercial upheaval in London resulting from 
the Great Fire, Dutch merchants found a welcome reception in New England. Certainly, 
the economic importance of the North American colonies lacked consensus in England. 
England needed to regroup politically and economically.  The existing commercial void 
was not lost on Dutch merchants.299 
                                                298	  Andrew	  Marvell,	  The	  Complete	  Works	  in	  Verse	  and	  Prose	  of	  Andrew	  Marvell,	  ed.	  Rev.	  Alexander	  B.	  Grosart	   (London:	   Robson	   and	   Sons,	   1872),	   242-­‐53;	   Blair	   Worden,	   Literature	   and	   Politics	   in	  
Cromwellian	  England:	  John	  Milton,	  Andrew	  Marvell,	  Marchamont	  Nedham	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	  299	  See,	   e.g.,	   Steven	   C.A.	   Pincus,	   Protestantism	   and	   Patriotism:	   Ideologies	   and	   the	  Making	   of	   English	  
Foreign	   Policy,	   1650-­‐1668	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   1996)	   in	   which	   Pincus	  substantiates	   the	   ideological	   origins	   for	   England’s	   foreign	   policy.	   For	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	   lack	   of	  interest,	  including	  economically,	  in	  England’s	  North	  American	  colonies,	  see	  Steve	  Pincus,	  “Rethinking	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 English mercantilist policies encouraged its colonies to concentrate on the 
production of crops that were profitable for England in world trade. Nevertheless, 
focusing on one distinct staple rendered the individual colonies susceptible to the 
vagaries of demand for particular staples. Before long, the economy of many individual 
colonies became almost entirely dependent upon the production of a single product. For 
instance, Virginia and Maryland were dependent on tobacco; South Carolina on rice; and 
North Carolina on naval stores. 300  
 New England colonists learned early on that the region’s wealth would not be 
based on farming.  That forced colonists living in the region to look for export 
commodities attractive to markets in England, Europe, and the West Indies. New England 
turned to a diverse array of activities that evolved over time in response to emerging 
opportunities and challenges including: ship building, shipping, fishing, producing 
livestock for export, harvesting forests, and whaling.301 The result was a more complex 
and more productive economy than colonies with one or two dominant products such as 
sugar or tobacco. Single staple colonies tended to remain dependent on their dominant 
product, failing to develop the web of activities that contributed to growth in New 
England.302 
 Dutch merchants were there, of course, to provide England’s colonies with 
valuable trade goods from England and Europe and to provide shipping for agricultural 
                                                                                                                                            Mercantilism:	  Political	  Economy,	  the	  British	  Empire,	  and	  the	  Atlantic	  World	  in	  the	  Seventeenth	  and	  Eighteenth	  Centuries,”	  William	  and	  Mary	  Quarterly	  69	  (January	  2012):	  28-­‐32.	  	  	  300	  John	  J.	  McCusker	  and	  Russell	  R.	  Menard,	  The	  Economy	  of	  British	  America,	  1607-­‐1789	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	   of	   North	   Carolina	   Press,	   1991),	   29-­‐32	   (discussion	   on	   the	   staple	   approach	   to	   colonial	  economic	   development);	   91-­‐111	   (New	   England);	   189-­‐208	   (the	   Middle	   Colonies);	   117-­‐143	   (the	  Chesapeake).	  	  	  301	  Ibid.	  302	  Margaret	  Newell,	  “The	  Birth	  of	  New	  England	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  Economy,”	  in	  Engines	  of	  Enterprise:	  An	  
Economic	  History	  of	  New	  England,	  ed.	  Peter	  Temin	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  17-­‐32.	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products and natural resources found in America. Colonial merchants and governments 
understood the importance of Dutch commercial networks and shipping to their overall 
economies. And, unlike during the period of England’s Civil War when colonists were 
just finding their economic footing, English colonists in this subsequent period 1664 
through 1750, felt the direct effects of mercantilism.303    
 
New England and Dutch Trade 
 New Englanders were pleased with neither mercantilism nor the Navigation Acts.  
In 1678, the Massachusetts General Court urged England’s Attorney General: 
 That for the Acts in for trade and passed in Parljament for incouraging trade 
 and navigation, wee humbly conceive, according to the usual sayings of the 
 learned in the lawe, that the lawes of England are bounded within the fower 
 seas and doe not reach America.304 
 
 The Court further advised the Attorney General that the Acts were “a 
discouragement to trade, and a great damage to his Majesty’s plantation.”305 
 Throughout most of this period, when merchants and colonial officials in 
Massachusetts wrote in terms of mercantilism, it had a distinctively inward perspective.  
It was focused on the welfare of Massachusetts Bay, rather than that of the British 
Empire.  As it turned to trade, New England began to take advantage of the burgeoning 
Atlantic economy.  New England merchants joined Dutch trading networks in one of 
                                                303	  Mercantilism	  was	  the	  prevailing	  economic	  theory	  in	  England.	  Its	  focus	  upon	  the	  national	  welfare	  may	   have	   been	   a	   thinly	   veiled	   rationalization	   of	   the	  merchant	   class	   seeking	  wider	  markets	   for	   its	  goods.	  The	  policy	  privileged	  exports	   from	  England	  and	  established	  protectionist	  provisions	  against	  competition	   from	   imported	  goods.	   	  England	  endeavored	   to	  provide	   its	   citizens	  with	  a	  monopoly	  of	  the	  resources	  and	   trade	  outlets	  of	   its	  colonies.	   	  Trade	  between	  New	  England	  and	  Dutch	  merchants	  was	  never	  going	  to	  be	  viewed	  favorably	  by	  English	  economic	  policy	  makers.	  See,	  e.g.,	  E.A.J.	  Johnson,	  “Some	  Evidence	  of	  Mercantilism	   in	   the	  Massachusetts-­‐Bay,”	  New	  England	  Quarterly,	  1	  (1928):	  371-­‐95;	  Wesley	  Frank	  Craven,	  The	  Colonies	  in	  Transition,	  1660-­‐1713	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  Collins,	  1968).	  304	  Nathaniel	  B.	  Shurtleff,	  ed.,	  Records	  of	  the	  Governor	  and	  Company	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Bay	  in	  New	  
England	  (Boston:	  William	  White,	  1854),	  5:200.	  305	  Ibid.	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several manners. When Dutch ships came into New England’s ports, merchants arranged 
for shipping aboard the vessels. Additionally, New England ships carried regional 
commodities to Amsterdam and Rotterdam.  Bernard Bailyn has asserted about New 
England’s economy, “Despite acts of navigation, large increases in population, and 
changes in both the quantity and types of supply and demand, the character of the 
economic system as it emerged” between 1640 and 1660 “remained essentially the same 
until just before the American Revolution.”306  He further maintained that 
 Commercial contacts in seventeenth-century New England were relationships 
 between individuals whose personal lives played important  roles in their 
 economic activities.  The creation of new ties was less an impersonal economic 
 transaction than the actual coming together of men  interested in similar types of 
 enterprises.  Innovations in New England commerce, therefore, depended to a 
 large extent on the movements of men.  And since commercial relation with the 
 English-speaking world had been outlined by the first generation of merchants, 
 new types of contacts tended  to link New England to England’s main rival in the 
 colonial word, France.  The  men who introduced New England to this alien 
 world included not only immigrants with different backgrounds from those of the 
 first settlers, but French freebooters, merchants, and commercial agents as well.307  
 
 I would concur with Bailyn’s perception, but for reasons significantly different 
from his.   There is no doubt that New England had critical economic ties to England 
from the founding of individual colonies.  New England also had economic ties with 
other nations including the Dutch Republic and France.308  New England merchants had 
commercial relationships with Dutch merchants, both on the continent and in New 
Netherland, beginning in the 1620’s.   “The character of the economic system as it 
                                                306	  Bernard	   Bailyn,	   The	   New	   England	   Merchants	   in	   the	   Seventeenth	   Century	   (Cambridge,	   Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1955),	  45.	  307	  Ibid.,	  144.	  	  308	  Recent	   scholarly	  work	   in	   the	   field	  of	  French	  Atlantic	  History	  has	  emphasized	   the	   importance	  of	  illegal	  contraband	  trade	  between	  New	  England	  and	  the	  French	  colonies.	  See,	  e.g.,	  James	  S.	  Pritchard,	  
In	  Search	  of	  Empire:	  The	  French	  in	  the	  Americas,	  1670-­‐1730	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004).	   	   Pritchard	   has	   argued	   that	   contraband	   was	   much	   more	   important	   than	   legal	   commerce.	  Additionally,	  New	  England	  merchants	  actively	  traded	  to	  the	  French	  West	  Indies.	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emerged” between 1640 and 1660 did remain the same – New Englanders established 
valued trading networks with individual Dutch merchants and trading houses both before 
and during that period; and trading relationships with the Dutch continued throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.   
 Bailyn also asserted, “The creation of new ties was less an impersonal economic 
transaction than the actual coming together of men interested in similar types of 
enterprises.”  New commercial ties between New Englanders and the Dutch existed on 
both a personal and an impersonal level.  Both Dutch traders from New York and New 
England traders plying the coastal trade had personal economic transactions and 
established continued networks of exchange. Nevertheless, Dutch ships from the 
continent were also welcome in New England’s ports.  Some might have come directly 
from the Dutch Republic with specific cargos known to trade well in the English 
colonies.  Others might have called at ports in the West Indies, the Chesapeake, and at 
New York, before mooring in New London, Rhode Island ports, or Boston. In such 
instances, ship’s captains acted as commercial intermediaries or supercargos in 
transporting goods, most often, to the Dutch Republic and selling them on behalf of a 
particular merchant.  
 As Bailyn suggested, New England merchants traded with France.309 However, 
the most significant trading nation of the period was the Dutch Republic and archival 
sources reveal that merchants from the Dutch Republic and New England maintained 
strong commercial ties with each other. Like France, the Dutch Republic and England 
had experienced an extended rivalry.  Although the Dutch Republic was no longer a 
                                                309	  Bailyn	  does	  not	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  French	  Catholic	  or	  Huguenot	  merchants.	   	  Given	   the	  religious	  make-­‐up	  of	  New	  England’s	  merchant	  class,	  this	  trade	  was	  most	  likely	  with	  French	  Huguenot	  merchants.	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political threat on the North American continent after 1675,310 the two nations maintained 
a bitter global rivalry over contested commercial expansion.311  Mercantilism was still the 
predominant economic theory of the day and dominated English political policy.312  
 New England merchants consistently ignored the terms of the Navigation Acts 
and not only encouraged Dutch ships to anchor in port, but prepared their own goods for 
shipment on Dutch vessels or arranged for the transportation of goods on New England 
ships directly to the Dutch Republic.  The Dutch offered New Englanders a variety of 
wares, expanded business markets throughout Europe, reliable credit, and they 
traditionally paid higher prices than the English for the merchant’s goods.   
 The trade that occurred between New England merchants and their Dutch 
colleagues from 1664 through 1750 had a certainly familiarity to it.  Merchant networks 
formed with a distinctive Atlantic focus. The same networks expanded or contracted as 
necessary.  Often, trading voyages would include the West Indies, but that was not a 
prerequisite. New England merchants and ship captains appeared before English-
speaking notaries in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.313 Notaries recorded their declarations, 
contracts, and instructions and made them available for subsequent legal action, if any.  
                                                310	  The	  Treaty	   of	  Westminster	   signed	   in	  1674	   ended	   the	  Third	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  War.	   In	   return	   for	   the	  Dutch	   retaining	   Suriname,	   they	   agreed	   that	   New	  Netherland,	   retaken	   by	  Dutch	   naval	   commander,	  Cornelis	   Evertsen	   the	   Youngest,	   in	   1673,	   would	   again	   be	   an	   English	   possession.	   The	   loss	   of	   New	  Netherland	   again	  meant	   that	   the	  Dutch	   no	   longer	   had	   a	   physical	   political	   presence	   on	   continental	  North	  America.	   See	  Frances	  G.	  Davenport,	   European	  Treaties	  Bearing	  on	   the	  History	  of	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Its	  Dependences	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Carnegie	  Institution	  of	  Washington,	  1917-­‐37),	  229-­‐40	  311	  See	   Donald	   G.	   Shomette	   and	   Robert	   D.	   Haslach,	  Raid	  on	  America:	  The	  Dutch	  Naval	  Campaign	  of	  
1672-­‐1674	  (Westminster,	  Maryland:	  Heritage	  Books,	  1988).	  312	  See,	  e.g.,	  Nuala	  Zahedieh,	  “Making	  Mercantilism	  Work:	  London	  Merchants	  and	  Atlantic	  Trade	  in	  te	  Seventeenth	  Century,”	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Historical	  Society,	  9	  (1999),	  143-­‐60;	  David	  Ormrod,	  
The	  Rise	   of	   Commercial	  Empires:	  England	  and	   the	  Netherlands	   in	   the	  Age	  of	  Mercantilism,	   1650-­‐100	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  241-­‐66.	  313	  Many,	   but	   not	   all,	   notarial	   acts	   were	   recorded	   in	   English.	   	   Some	  were	   not	   recorded	   in	   English	  because	  the	  particular	  New	  England	  merchant	  involved	  may	  have	  been	  able	  to	  read	  Dutch.	  	  However,	  some	  savvy	  New	  England	  merchants	  may	  have	  chosen	   to	  keep	  written	  declarations	  or	  contracts	   in	  Dutch	  to	  avert	  knowledge	  by	  competing	  parties	  or	  the	  English	  government.	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Such procedures were accepted by New England merchants and formed part of the 
ordinary course of commercial transactions with Dutch merchants. 
 In what sort of business did New England merchants and their Dutch counterparts 
engage?  Often, notaries recorded insurance agreements, bodemerij contracts, or 
bottomry bonds on ships.  The masters of ships declared where ships were traveling and 
the parties insuring the ships and/or its contents were noted along with the terms of the 
agreements.314 Or, notaries recorded the complaints of ordinary sailors particularly with 
respect to pay disputes or conditions aboard ship.315 
 The notarial records offer glimpses of individuals going about their trade with the 
benefit of historical knowledge about what fate awaits them.  In 1675, Jacob Leisler was 
an ordinary merchant, building what would become a substantial colonial fortune.  By 
1688, the English Revolution had divided the people of New York into two well-defined 
factions. In general, the small shopkeepers, small farmers, sailors, poor traders and 
artisans allied against the patroons, rich fur-traders, merchants, lawyers, and crown 
officers. The former were led by Leisler, the latter by Peter Schuyler, Nicholas Bayard, 
Stephen Van Cortlandt, William Nicolls and other representatives of the aristocratic 
Hudson Valley families.  But that lay in the future and Leisler’s trading activities 
included appearances before Amsterdam notaries and memorialized trading relationships 
                                                314	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3206/251	  (1671),	  in	  which	  the	  master	  of	  the	  Hopewell	  sailing	  to	  New	  England	   from	   Amsterdam	   received	   financial	   underwriting	   for	   the	   voyage	   and	   for	   bodemerij	   from	  George	  Gotfright	  of	  Rotterdam.	  315	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3222/319	  (1675),	  in	  which	  New	  England	  sailors	  declared	  the	  custom	  of	  their	   region	   that	   all	   hired	   sailors	   received	   one	   third	   of	   their	   monthly	   payment	   in	   cash	   and	   the	  remaining	  two	  thirds	  in	  goods.	  	  The	  ship	  had	  come	  from	  New	  England,	  picked	  up	  tobacco	  in	  Virginia,	  and	  voyaged	   to	  Amsterdam.	   	   It	  was	   set	   to	   return	   to	  New	  England.	   	  However,	   it	   seemed	   the	   sailors	  aboard	  wanted	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  selling	  their	  portion	  of	  wages	  in	  the	  Amsterdam	  market;	  see	  also	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2560/828-­‐829	  (1675)	  where	  New	  England	  sailors	  demanded	  to	  be	  dismissed	  from	  service	  because	  the	  captain	  had	  changed	  the	  ports	  to	  which	  the	  ship	  would	  be	  traveling	  and	  the	  ship	  would	  not	  be	  returning	  to	  Boston.	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with New England merchants. In one instance, Leisler contracted to ship 25 to 30 tons of 
merchandise to Boston with Captain Nicolas Skimer aboard The Dove out of Boston. 
They agreed on a freight price of three pounds sterling per ton and that extra lay days 
spent in Amsterdam loading the merchandise would incur a 30-shilling per day charge.316 
Leisler used Amsterdam as a commercial center not only to purchase merchandise for 
another market other than his own, but also to find an appropriate vessel to ship the 
merchandise. 
 Occasionally, pirates would attack a ship bound to or coming from New England.  
The captain, ordinary sailors, and any merchants traveling with the ship would appear 
before a notary to provide statements about events.  The statements were particularly 
important if the ship owner and merchants sending cargo aboard had taken insurance out 
on the voyage.317  
 New England ship owners often availed themselves of ready buyers in 
Amsterdam and sold their ships, or parts therein, to merchants. Notaries recorded the 
terms of the agreement between the parties. John Osborne, a captain out of New England, 
sold a three quarter interest in his ship The Hopewel in Amsterdam in 1676.  Elisser 
Makernes and his principals were the purchasers of the majority interest in the ship for 
600 guilders.318  As well, New England merchants felt free to purchase vessels in 
Amsterdam when the opportunity arose. In 1677 Jan Willemsen Ongeluck and the other 
co-owners of the ship de Witte Duijf sold their interests in the fluit to Pieter Dartjaque and 
Samuel Shrimpton, merchants from Boston.  Dartjaque and Shrimpton renamed the ship 
                                                316	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3222/387	  (1675),	  involving	  the	  ship	  The	  Dove.	  317	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4304/227	  (1676)	  in	  which	  the	  captain	  and	  sailors	  aboard	  The	  Elisabeth	  bound	  for	  Boston	  from	  Amsterdam	  encountered	  a	  pirate	  ship.	  318	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4777	  (1676).	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Samuel en de Jan and took a 15/16 interest in the vessel.  Jan de Bast [John Bast], a 
citizen of Limerick, Ireland undertook the ship’s command for a 1/16 ownership 
interest.319 
 
Response by the English Government 
 Representatives of the English government did take notice of New England’s 
merchants’ behavior.  Take Edward Randolph, for example. An English colonial 
administrator, Randolph was best known for provoking significant changes in the 
structure of the England's North American colonies during the late seventeenth century. 
His reports to the Lords of Trade convinced King Charles II to revoke the charter of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1684. As secretary of the unpopular Dominion of New 
England, Randolph argued for tighter crown control over proprietary and charter colonies 
that previously lacked such oversight.320 Given the difficult task of enforcing England's 
Navigation Acts, he faced local popular and political resistance. His actions contributed 
                                                319	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3041/46	  (1677).	   	  For	  minutes	  record	  the	  parties’	  preparation	  of	  the	  ship	  for	  a	  voyage.	   	   See	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   4777/434	   (1677)	   (bodermerij	   for	   the	   ship	   as	  well	   as	   sailing	  plans);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2159/229	   (1677)	   (John	  Bast,	   the	  ship’s	   captain,	   acknowledged	  receipt	  of	  monies	  form	   Dartjaque	   and	   Shrimpton	   for	   repair	   costs	   to	   the	   vessel	   and	   foodstuffs	   for	   the	   voyage);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2159/237	  (1677)(acknowledgement	  by	  Thomas	  Whiting	  of	  Amsterdam	  to	  provide	  a	  bill	  to	  Dartjaque	  when	  Dartjaque	  arrived	  in	  Drontem	  [Drontheim],	  Norway);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2159/242	  (1677)(acknowledgement	   by	   Peter	   Dartjque	   that	   the	   ship	   lay	   at	   Texel	   ready	   for	   its	   voyage	   to	   the	  West	   Indies	   with	   the	   last	   port	   being	   Hispaniola);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   2159/244	   (1677)(promise	  between	  Peter	  Dartjaque	   and	   John	  Bast	   that	   in	   the	   event	   of	   the	  death	  of	   either	  on	   the	   voyage,	   the	  other	  will	  complete	  the	  voyage.	  Possible	  administrators	  of	  estates	  also	  appointed).	  320 	  The	   English	   government	   established	   the	   Dominion	   of	   New	   England	   (1686–89)	   as	   an	  administrative	  union	  of	  its	  New	  England	  colonies.	  The	  dominion	  was	  ultimately	  a	  failure	  because	  the	  area	   it	   encompassed,	   composed	   of	   present-­‐day	   Maine,	   New	   Hampshire,	   Vermont,	   Massachusetts,	  Rhode	  Island,	  Connecticut,	  New	  York,	  and	  New	  Jersey,	  was	  too	  large	  for	  a	  single	  governor	  to	  manage.	  Its	  governor,	   Sir	  Edmund	  Andros,	  was	  highly	  unpopular,	   and	  had	  engaged	   in	  actions	   that	  offended	  significant	   segments	   of	   the	   New	   England	   population.	   After	   news	   of	   the	   Glorious	   Revolution	   in	  England	   reached	   Boston	   in	   1689,	   the	   local	   citizenry	   arrested	   Andros	   and	   his	   officers.	   Leisler's	  Rebellion	  in	  New	  York	  City	  deposed	  the	  dominion's	  lieutenant	  governor,	  Francis	  Nicholson.	  See,	  e.g.,	  David	  S.	  Lovejoy,	  The	  Glorious	  Revolution	  in	  America	  (Middleton:	  Wesleyan	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  179-­‐219.	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to the development of England's colonial administrative infrastructure, but he remained 
unpopular in the Dominion. During the 1689 Boston revolt, which deposed Andros and 
overthrew the Dominion, he was jailed. In writing to the Privy Council in 1690, 
Randolph intimated that the “chief ends of their Imprisoning me were to Restore to 
themselves a free Trade for their Vessels to all parts of Europe…To make Boston a Store 
and Magazine to supply their Matys Plantations with all sorts of European 
Commodities.”321   
 Randolph observed what was happening in the colonial harbors.  In 1689, he 
provided an “An Accot of Severall Ships & Vessells Trading Irregularly” in New 
England.  Randolph’s narrative described harbors teeming with activity, with ships 
arriving from and departing for various locations in the Atlantic world. He witnessed 
numerous Dutch ships, or colonial American ships recently returned from Holland, all 
having ignored the ports of England and all in contravention of the Navigation Acts.  For 
instance, Randolph wrote about numerous vessels coming from Holland including: “The 
Bark Elizabeth of Boston Caleb Lamb Mar directly from Holland to New Haven in 
Connecticut Colony he unlivered part there and the remainder at Boston” (September 25); 
“A Ship of 150 Tuns directly from Holland unlivered her Loading at New London in 
Connecticut Colony loaded Lumber, Thirty horses and took in some of her Hollands 
Goods and saild to Barbados” (October 10); “The Brigantine Mary of Boston Thomas 
Carter Mar from Holland directly with Holland Commodities, John Borland a Scotchman 
Merchant” (November 28); “The Ketch Jonathan of Salem Stephen Robins Mar arrived at 
                                                321	  Edward	  Randolph,	  Letters	  and	  Official	  Papers	  from	  the	  New	  England,	  Middle,	  and	  Southern	  Colonies	  
in	  America,	  with	  other	  documents	  relating	  chiefly	  to	  the	  vacating	  of	  the	  royal	  charter	  of	  the	  colony	  of	  
Massachusetts	  Bay,	  1676-­‐1703	   (Boston:	   John	  Wilson	  &	  Sons,	  1899).	  See	  also	  Michael	  Garibaldi	  Hall,	  
Edward	  Randolph	  and	  the	  American	  Colonies	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1960).	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Salem with Goods directly from Holland” (December 13); “Christopher Clarke Mate to 
Capt Bant lately gon to Holland to sail from Amsterdam in a Hol­land Vessell to Boston 
“ (December 13). 322  He urged the Privy Council to send over an officer duly qualified to 
uphold the Acts of Trade and dependent on no one other than the Lords of the Treasury. 
 Perhaps Randolph lived long enough to see prosecutions undertaken against inter-
imperial trade in contravention to the Navigation Acts.  In 1703, John Borland, a 
prominent Scots merchant based in Boston, was tried by the English High Court of 
Admiralty on a charge of exporting goods from Boston via Curaçao to Amsterdam in 
contravention of the Navigation Acts. 323  Randolph had earlier drawn attention to 
Borland’s arrival in Boston from Holland.  The Amsterdam archives provide numerous 
examples of Borland’s trading activities with the Dutch.  For instance, in September 
1688, Borland appeared before a notary acknowledging his indebtedness to assorted 
Dutch merchants for providing goods on credit – iron pots and kettles from Wolfert 
Beeltsnijder, 55 rolls of Holland canvas from Gerrit Blaeu, undisclosed goods from Pieter 
Reijn, and fancy articles from Messrs. Boucheret and John Soijer.  Each of the merchants 
assumed the risk of sale and gave him credit terms of twelve months in which repay the 
specified sum.  Delay beyond the one-year term required Borland to pay interest on the 
principal sum of six percent.324  Nor was there mention in the notarial records of 
                                                322	  See	  Randolph,	  Letters	  and	  Official	  Papers	  from	  the	  New	  England,	  Middle,	  and	  Southern	  Colonies	  in	  
America,	  231.	  	  	  	  323	  See	  C.G.	  Headlam,	  ed.,	  Calendar	  of	  State	  Papers,	  America	  and	  the	  West	  Indies,	  1698-­‐1733	  (London:	  HMSO,	   1905),	   1:501.	   	   Borland	  moved	   to	   Boston	   in	   1682	   from	   Glasgow.	   Borland	   had	   an	   extensive	  trading	  network	   among	   Scots,	   both	   in	   Europe	   and	  America,	   including	  Robert	   Livingston	   in	  Albany	  (who	   had	   lived	   in	   Rotterdam)	   and	   Andrew	   Russell	   in	   Rotterdam.	   	   On	   Scots	   trading	   networks	  generally	  see	  David	  Dobson,	  Scottish	  Emigration	  to	  Colonial	  America,	  1607-­‐1785	  (Athens:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  press,	  1994),	  41,	  46.	  For	  Scots	  trading	  networks	  in	  Massachusetts	  see	  Marsha	  L.	  Hamilton,	  
Social	   and	   Economic	   Networks	   in	   Early	   Massachusetts	   (University	   Park:	   The	   Pennsylvania	   State	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  90.	  324	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  5255	  (1688).	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Borland’s goods passing through a port in England in compliance with the Navigation 
Acts.325   
 Borland’s trading ventures frequently included Hero Moij of Amsterdam, who 
had commercial networks throughout the Atlantic world. 326   Although Moij more 
commonly traded to New York, the Chesapeake, or Surinam in the West Indies, he did 
occasionally have business interests in New England.327 Moij entrusted Borland in 1696 
and 1699 with powers of attorney “for all his business there to observe,” which suggests 
something more substantial than the occasional foray in to New England.328 
 Borland was one of the few colonial merchants trading with the Dutch that was 
prosecuted pursuant to regulations enacted under the Navigation Acts. Still, Borland’s 
prosecution did not curtail trading activity between New England and Dutch merchants.   
 
The Hope Family and New England 
 As New England’s economy matured, additional Dutch merchants took notice of 
the continuing opportunities for profit.  As early as 1730, merchants who would found, 
arguably, the most famous Dutch bank over the next two centuries, Hope & Co., began to 
                                                325	  Borland	  wrote	  to	  Andrew	  Russell	  in	  Rotterdam	  about	  their	  cargoes	  being	  scrutinized	  by	  customs	  agents	   in	   Amsterdam	   for	   “not	   touching	   in	   England.”	   	   See	   John	   Borland	   to	   Andrew	   Russell,	   11/21	  August	   1686,	   RH	   15/106/583/1,	   National	   Archives	   of	   Scotland;	   John	   Borland	   to	   Andrew	   Russell,	  July-­‐August	  1688,	  RH	  15/106/643/2-­‐6,	  National	  Archives	  of	  Scotland.	  326	  See	  Andrew	  Russell	  Papers,	  GD	  1/885,	  RH	  15/106,	  RH	  801,	  National	  Archives	  of	  Scotland.	   	  The	  Moij	   (or	   Mooij)	   family	   were	   prominent	   merchants	   in	   seventeenth	   and	   early	   eighteenth	   century	  Amsterdam.	  	  	  327	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   5851	   (1694);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   5852/177	   (1694)	   in	  which	  Moij	   had	  cargo	  aboard	  a	  ship	  filled	  with	  Virginia	  tobacco	  and	  goods	  from	  Boston	  that	  suffered	  more	  than	  3000	  gulders	  worth	  of	  damage	  from	  a	  storm	  near	  Boston.	  328	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5856/265	  (1696);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5871/376	  (1699).	   	  Upon	  Moij’s	  death,	  his	   widow,	   Catherine	   de	   Vlieger,	   continued	   the	   family’s	   commercial	   networks	   with	   New	   England.	  	  Henry	  Mackintosh,	  of	  Bristol,	  Rhode	  Island,	  appointed	  her	  his	  Amsterdam	  agent.	  	  Mackintosh	  owned	  a	   plantation	   named	   “Fairfield”	   in	   Suriname	   and	  Catherine	   collected	   annual	   rents	   from	  his	   tenants.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  7969II/21	  (1715);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.7975II/24	  (1717).	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establish commercial links with New England merchants.329  
 Originally from Scotland, the Hope family settled in Rotterdam at the end of the 
seventeenth century.330 Archibald Hope and his sons established merchant houses in 
Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Boston. 331  They offered services in shipping, storage, 
insurance, and credit in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In 1720, the family merchant house 
barely survived the financial crisis that shook European finance on a commercial and 
personal level.332 Many merchants and bankers in the Dutch Republic experienced 
bankruptcy. For the Hope family, the economic crisis had the greatest impact on 
Archibald’s son, Henry, who subsequently left Rotterdam in 1730 for America and 
established a radial for the family’s trading network in Boston. 
                                                329	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8659/166	  (1730).	  330	  See	   P.W.	   Klein,	   “’Little	   London’:	   British	   Merchants	   in	   Rotterdam	   During	   the	   Seventeenth	   and	  Eighteenth	   Centuries,“	   in	   D.C.	   Coleman	   and	   Peter	   Mathias,	   ed.,	   Enterprise	   and	   History:	   Essays	   in	  
Honour	  of	  Charles	  Wilson	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  116-­‐34.	  331	  Henry	  Hope,	  Archibald’s	  father,	  lived	  in	  Rotterdam	  by	  the	  1660’s,	  having	  emigrated	  from	  Scotland,	  most	  likely	  expressing	  resistance	  to	  perceived	  Stuart	  tyranny.	  Henry	  and	  his	  wife	  Anna	  had	  Archibald	  christened	  in	  the	  Scottish	  church	  in	  Rotterdam	  in	  1664.	  	  On	  the	  migration	  of	  Scots	  to	  Rotterdam	  see	  Douglas	  Catterall,	  Community	  without	  Borders:	  Scots	  Migrants	  and	  the	  Changing	  Face	  of	  Power	  in	  the	  
Dutch	   Republic,	   c.	   1600-­‐1700	   (Leiden:	   Brill,	   2002)	   and	   Douglas	   Catterall,	   “Fortress	   Rotterdam:	  Rotterdam’s	   Scots	   Community	   and	   the	   Covenanter	   Cause,	   1638-­‐1688	   in	   David	   Worthington,	   ed.,	  
British	   and	   Irish	   Emigrants	   and	   Exiles	   in	   Europe,	   1603-­‐1688	   (Leiden:	   Brill,	   2010),	   87-­‐106.	   In	   the	  1680’s,	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   a	   decline	   in	   business,	   Henry	   removed	   his	   family	   and	   business	   from	  Rotterdam	   to	   London.	   	   Although	   Henry	   died	   in	   England,	   Archibald	   returned	   to	   Rotterdam	   as	   a	  merchant.	   There,	   Archibald	   married	   the	   daughter	   of	   a	   wealthy	   Amsterdam	   button-­‐maker,	   Anna	  Claus,	  who,	   like	   Archibald,	  was	   a	   Quaker.	   	   The	   family’s	   Quaker	   beliefs	   connected	   them	  with	   other	  Quaker	  merchants	  throughout	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	  Archibald	  and	  Anna’s	  sons	  who	  engaged	  in	  trade	  included	  Archibald	  Jr.	  (1698–1734),	  Isaac,	  Zachary,	  Henry,	  Thomas	  (1704–1779),	  and	  Adrian	  (1709–1781).	  	  All	  of	  their	  children	  were	  born	  in	  Rotterdam.	  332	  Three	  financial	  bubbles	  -­‐	  French,	  British,	  and	  Dutch	  -­‐	  began	  at	  different	  times,	  but	  all	  burst	  around	  September	   1720.	   The	   South	   Sea	   Bubble,	   named	   after	   the	   British	   South	   Sea	   Company,	   lasted	   from	  January	  to	  September	  1720.	  The	  Mississippi	  Bubble,	  named	  after	  the	  Mississippi	  Company	  in	  France,	  had	  begun	  earlier,	  in	  1719.	  The	  Dutch	  bubble	  started	  in	  March	  1720	  and	  derived	  from	  the	  other	  two	  bubbles.	   	   Dutch	   investors	   invested	   later,	   in	   the	   spring	   and	   summer	   of	   1720.	   They	  mostly	   ignored	  Mississippi	  shares,	  but	  eagerly	  went	  after	  South	  Sea	  shares	  when	  they	  hit	  the	  market.	  	  Investors	  and	  promoters	  referred	  to	  the	  trade	  as	  "Wind-­‐Handel"	  and	  "Wind-­‐Negotie,"	  (both	  meaning	  Wind-­‐Trade),	  because	  the	  trader	  often	  did	  not	  own	  the	  shares.	  Dutch	  companies	  formed	  in	  the	  Bubble	  tended	  to	  be	  associated	   with	   specific	   cities.	   See	   F.P.	   Groeneveld,	   De	   economische	   crisis	   van	   het	   jaar	   1720	  (Groningen:	   Noordhoff	   1940);	   C.H.	   Slechte,	   “De	   Maatschappij	   van	   Assurantie,	   Disonteering	   en	  Beleening	  der	  stad	  Rotterdam	  van	  1720,	  bekeken	  naar	  haar	  produktiefactoren	  over	  de	  periode	  1720-­‐1874,”	  Rotterdams	  Jaarboekje	  7th	  series,	  8	  (1970):	  252-­‐310	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 Of the remaining sons, Archibald, Jr., and Thomas would establish offices for the 
family in Amsterdam, later joined by brother Adrian in 1734.333 Isaac and Zachary 
inherited the Rotterdam business, specializing in trafficking German migrants from the 
Rhineland to Pennsylvania.334  The house of Thomas & Adrian Hope was renowned for 
its consistent policy of covering risks and for the high degree of continuity in its 
commodity trading in the face of changing political circumstances. Despite the risks, the 
Hopes engaged in commodity trading on a widespread scale.  They had originally 
concentrated on trade with England, but by the 1730’s, their activities embraced the size 
and dynamics of the Atlantic trade and extended to incorporate the whole of Europe, 
North America, and the West Indies.  
 Henry Hope became the family’s commercial link in America.  The family 
followed a recognized commercial practice that established branches in different trade or 
financial capitals or geographic regions with family members.  While neither blood ties 
nor a common religion guaranteed commercial proficiency, it did facilitate bonds of trust 
among merchants.335  Thus, Henry’s brothers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam could rely 
upon Henry to serve the family’s commercial interests in Boston.336 
                                                333	  The	   title	   of	   the	   Amsterdam	  merchant	   house	  was	   changed	   to	   Thomas	   &	   Adrian	   Hope.	   See	   SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  8613/1726	  (1734).	  334From	   the	   1720’s	   through	   the	   1760’s,	   the	   Hope	   brothers	   organized	   passage	   for	   Quakers	   out	   of	  Rotterdam	   to	   Pennsylvania.	   The	   City	   of	   Rotterdam	   and	   the	   local	   Baptist	   church	   paid	   for	   the	  transports	  since	  the	  Quakers	  had	  no	  money	  and	  the	  city	  needed	  to	  do	  something	  about	  the	  refugees.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Brants	  Archives,	  1638.	  	  See	  also	  Marianne	  Wokeck,	  Trade	  in	  Strangers:	  The	  Beginnings	  
of	  Mass	  Migration	  to	  North	  America	  (University	  Park:	  Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  69-­‐73.	  335	  Arguably,	  as	  the	  family’s	  success	  grew,	  other	  Dutch	  merchant	  houses	  looked	  at	  their	  commercial	  practices	  and	  established	  branches	  in	  North	  America.	  	  	  336	  In	   time,	   Henry’s	   son,	   Henry	   (1735-­‐1811),	   left	   America	   for	   schooling	   in	   London.	   In	   1754,	   he	  became	   apprenticed	   to	   the	   well-­‐known	   banking	   firm,	   Gurnell,	   Hoare,	   &	   Harman.	   Henry	   Hope	   the	  younger	   is	   usually	   referred	   to	   as	   Scottish,	   though	   he	  was	   born	   in	   America	   and	   immigrated	   to	   the	  Dutch	  Republic	  to	  join	  the	  family	  business	  in	  1762.	  Upon	  his	  joining,	  the	  name	  of	  the	  merchant	  house	  was	   formally	   changed	   to	   Hope	   &	   Co.	   	   Henry	   was	   the	   driving	   force	   behind	   the	   company	   in	   the	  eighteenth	   century.	  While	   continuing	   as	   merchants,	   under	   Henry’s	   leadership,	   the	   firm	   started	   to	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 Henry served the family well, establishing a commercial relationship with Charles 
Apthorp.  Apthorp came to New England from England prior to 1726 and became one of 
the most distinguished merchants of Boston.337  At his death, he was eulogized as the 
“greatest and most noble merchant on the continent.”  Apthorp conducted his business on 
Merchants Row in Boston, known as a location for many of the city’s best-connected 
importers. 338   He traded in a variety of goods, including English and European 
commodities, munitions, ships, and slaves.339 His political connections within the British 
government and reputation for business acumen facilitated his appointment as paymaster 
and commissary of His Majesty’s land and naval forces quartered in Boston. He delivered 
the gold and silver coins the military needed to pay its men and, out of each shipment of 
the army’s money, Apthorp received a 2.5 percent commission. Given the conflicts 
between the British and French for much of the mid-1700s, Apthorp had steady work.340  
 His Majesty’s servant availed himself of the facilities offered by Archibald and 
Thomas Hope in Amsterdam on numerous occasions.   For instance, in December 1733, 
an October bill of exchange was presented on Archibald and Thomas Hope in 
Amsterdam.  The terms of the bill provided for payment to Charles Apthorp thirty days 
                                                                                                                                            focus	   on	   the	   financing	   of	   commercial	   transactions,	   particularly	   the	   issue	   of	   loans	   to	   princes	   and	  governments	   in	   Sweden,	   Poland,	   Russia,	   Portugal,	   Spain,	   France,	   and	   America.	   See,	   e.g.,	   J.C.	   Riley,	  
International	   Government	   Finance	   and	   the	   Amsterdam	   Capital	   Market,	   1740-­‐1815	   (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1980).	  337	  Apthorp	   was	   born	   in	   1698	   in	   England	   and	   educated	   at	   Eton.	   	   He	   married	   Grisselda	   "Grizzel"	  Eastwick	  in	  1726	  in	  Boston.	  See	  James	  Henry	  Stark,	  The	  Loyalists	  of	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  Other	  Side	  
of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  (Salem:	  Salem	  Press,	  1910),	  351.	  338	  See	  Boston	  Gazette,	  November	  7,	  1726.	  339	  Advertisements	   in	   various	   Boston	   papers	   provide	   a	   sample	   of	   Apthorp’s	   trade.	   For	   general	  commodities	  see	  New	  England	  Weekly	  Journal,	  January	  10,	  1732;	  Boston	  Gazette,	  December	  13,	  1736;	  
New	  England	  Weekly	   Journal,	  May	  5,	   1741;	  Boston	  Weekly	  News-­‐Letter,	  December	  30,	   1742;	  Boston	  
Evening	  Post,	  February	  28,	   1743.	   	   For	  munitions	   see	  Boston	  Post	  Boy,	  October	  16,	   1758.	   	   For	   ships	  offered	   for	   sale	   see	  Boston	  Gazette,	  November	  28,	  1726;	  New	  England	  Weekly	  Journal,	  February	  14,	  1732.	  	  For	  slave	  sales	  see	  Boston	  Gazette,	  September	  13,	  1731;	  Boston	  Gazette,	  July	  25,	  1737.	  340	  See	  James	  Henry	  Stark,	  The	  Loyalists	  of	  Massachusetts	  and	  the	  Other	  Side	  of	  the	  Revolution	  (Boston:	  W.B.	  Clarke,	  1907),	  351-­‐2.	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after the arrival of the ship Don Carlos in Cadiz, Spain, or Lisbon, Portugal. Henry Hope 
drew up the bill for payment in Apthorp’s favor for the value of the cargo and ship’s 
equipment at sale.  John Bouwman, a merchant in Amsterdam, presented the bill of 
exchange for £2400 to the Hopes.  The Hopes refused the bill of exchange because they 
were awaiting further advice from the drawer – their brother, Henry Hope.  They sought 
confirmation that the ship had actually arrived in Cadiz or Lisbon. Prudently, they 
recorded their refusal, along with information presented to them on the bill of exchange, 
with a notary.341   
 Any merchant house's ultimate security was in the goods themselves, and most 
houses required the goods to be shipped and sold through their own networks. In this 
instance, the goods appeared to have been transported through Henry Hope’s network to 
Spain and Portugal. The Hopes in Amsterdam were being asked to cover the bill without 
the security of the specific goods in their warehouse.  If, in fact, the ship had been lost at 
sea through storm or if it had been taken by piracy, and word of such event had not yet 
been received in Amsterdam or through their information networks, payment on the bill 
would have left the Hopes without recourse.  
 There was every likelihood that Charles Apthorp, having arranged shipment of 
cargo through Henry Hope to Cadiz or Lisbon, and instructed the sale of the cargo, 
wished to purchase goods in Amsterdam.  The bill was drawn on the Hopes’ merchant 
banking house in Amsterdam, in expectation that they would honor the bill when it was 
presented. Since the drawer, Henry Hope, issued the bill, he was invoking the credit of 
the merchant house on which the bill was drawn. Many trading companies, like the 
                                                341	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8708/2533	  (1733);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8708/2534	  (1733).	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Hopes, were familial-based. If the drawer of a bill was part of the same family that the 
bill was drawn on, the drawee was more likely to believe that the credit was good.  
 Without further information, and subject to the vagaries of information transfer in 
the eighteenth century, Archibald and Thomas Hope issued powers of attorney on 
December 24, 1733, to merchants in Portugal and Spain: Gaburrij en Galiij, merchants in 
Cadiz, Sterling and Poutz, merchants in Lisbon, and Pedro Beekvelt, merchant in 
Bilbao.342  Using their established trading networks, the Hopes sought information about 
the ship carrying Apthorp’s cargo and into which port it had arrived. The powers of 
attorney authorized the merchant to “arrest” goods and effects belong to Henry Hope of 
Boston.  The actions of the Hopes in December suggest that they felt compelled to honor 
the bill presented to them on behalf of Apthorp by John Bouwman, but they wanted to 
ensure they had some sort of security for the payment they would be releasing. 
 Again, this time in February 1734, John Bouwman presented a bill of exchange 
on Archibald and Thomas Hope on behalf of Charles Apthorp for £600.  The Hopes 
denied the request, citing a lack of proof of the ship’s arrival in Cadiz or Lisbon.  
Bouwman filed a protest before the notary about the non-payment of the bills 
presented.343  In mid-month, Bouwman requested payment from the Hopes on a bill 
drawn on Apthorp for £2194.	   	   Again,	   the	   Hopes	   denied	   the	   bill,	   noting	   they	   still	  awaited	  advice	  from	  the	  drawer.344	  	  In	  March	  1734,	  the	  parties	  were	  again	  before	  a	  notary.	  	  Bouwman	  presented	  correspondence	  from	  the	  ship’s	  captain,	  James	  Sterling	  
                                                342	  See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8708/2565	   (Cadiz	   merchants);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8708/2566	   (Lisbon	  merchants);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8708/2569	  (Bilbao	  merchant).	  343	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   8710/239.	  On	   the	   same	  day,	  Bouwman	   requested	   the	   acceptance	  of	   a	   second	  draft,	  this	  one	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  £665,	  regarding	  fitting	  out	  the	  ship.	   	  The	  Hopes	  denied	  this	  request	  again	  citing	  the	  lack	  of	  proof	  of	  the	  ship’s	  arrival	  in	  port.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8710/247.	  344	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8710/272.	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that	  the	  ship,	  Don	  Carlos,	  had	  safely	  arrived	  in	  Cadiz	  on	  February	  8.	  	  The	  Hopes	  again	  refused	   payment	   on	   the	   bill,	   stating	   they	   were	   awaiting	   word	   from	   the	   Spanish	  consulate	  about	  the	  ship’s	  arrival	  in	  Cadiz.345	  	  	  	   The	   archives	   reveal	   no	   further	   documentation	   about	   this	   particular	  transaction.	   	   Nor	   is	   there	   surviving	   correspondence	   about	   the	  matter. The lack of 
subsequent record about the transaction might suggest that the Hopes ultimately paid the 
bill. Yet, the difficulties associated with acceptance of this bill also underscore the 
importance of reputation and trust in trading networks. From 1733 through 1734, four 
separate bills were presented to the Hopes and in each instance they refused payment on 
the bills. While they expressed continued concern about the arrival of the ship in either 
Cadiz or Lisbon, they might have sought information about John Bouwman.346  
 Henry Hope also introduced Thomas Hancock to the sprawling network 
established by the Hope family.347  In 1741, Hancock included Amsterdam as a port of 
call for his commercial activities, preparing his ships for trade among Boston, the 
Caribbean, and Amsterdam. In Amsterdam, Hancock established commercial ties with 
Thomas and Adrian Hope. Usually, Hancock sent one or more vessels south from Boston 
in the fall, loaded with fish, almost certainly servicing the slave-based economies of the 
West Indies. Hancock’s captains were ordered to consult his factor, Martin du Broy 
Godet, on the island of St. Eustatius for the best West Indian markets. Typically, the 
                                                345	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8711/568.	  346	  The	  War	   of	   the	   Polish	   Succession	   had	   just	   begun	   in	   1733	   and,	   given	   both	   Spain	   and	   Portugal’s	  involvement	   in	   the	  conflict,	   the	  Hopes	  might	  have	  prudently	  awaited	   the	  most	  current	   information	  about	  the	  ship’s	  safe	  arrival.	  347	  A	   central	   figure	   of	   colonial	   Boston’s	   wealthy	   merchant	   class,	   Thomas	   Hancock	   successfully	  engaged	   in	   paper	   manufacturing;	   exported	   various	   commodities	   including	   codfish,	   whale	   oil,	  logwood,	  and	  potash;	  supplied	  rum,	  molasses,	  and	  other	  supplies	  to	  the	  Newfoundland	  fishing	  fleet;	  and	  controlled	  a	  group	  of	   fishing	  vessels.	  One	  activity	  that	  contributed	  to	  his	  ample	  wealth	  was	  his	  participation	  in	  smuggling.	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captains could receive bills of exchange, payable in London or Amsterdam, or valuable 
commodities on the European markets such as logwood, indigo, or molasses.  
Additionally, Hancock directed that any unused capacity in a ship’s cargo hold be filled 
with freight, such as sugar, attractive to the European market. In Amsterdam, the Hope 
brothers facilitated the handling of Hancock’s cargoes. They, in return, provided 
European wares attractive to the New England market. When the ships arrived off Cape 
Cod or Cape Ann, the captains sent word to trusted men ashore, and the contraband 
goods were smuggled away discreetly into Hancock’s warehouses.348 
 The firm of Thomas and Adrian Hope maintained a commercial relationship with 
Hancock for over two decades.  Throughout, the Hopes filled Hancock’s orders for 
various commodities, including tea and paper. Their ventures were not always successful, 
particularly when the Spanish seized a vessel carrying goods for Hancock from the Hopes 
en route to Boston in 1748.  The Hopes’ correspondence with Hancock was typical for 
the period; they relayed information about specific voyages, reported on current 
European political or military news, and conveyed information about commodity prices 
in Amsterdam.349 
 
 
                                                348	  W.T.	  Baxter,	  The	  House	  of	  Hancock:	  Business	  in	  Boston,	  1724-­‐1775	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1945),	  82-­‐91;	  Marten	  G.	  Buist,	  At	  Spes	  Non	  Fracta:	  Hope	  &	  Co,	  1770-­‐1815	  (The	  Hague,	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1974),	  11,	  543;	  Leonie	  van	  Nierop,	  in	  Amstelodamum	  26	  (1939):160,	  and	  Amstelodamum	  27	  (1940):47	  
349 See, e.g., Massachusetts Historical Society, microfilm edition of the Hancock Family Papers, 1728-
1885, Reel 2: letter dated June 18, 1748, from Thomas and Adrian Hope to Thomas Hancock regarding 
shipment of tea and paper on board the Young Jacob; letter dated October 1748, from Thomas and Adrian 
Hope to Thomas Hancock about the seizure of the sloop Young Jacob; letter dated August 28, 1765, from 
Thomas and Adrian Hope to Thomas Hancock, William Tyler, and Captain Joseph Frost about news of the 
fall of Flanders, with copies of letters relating to commodity prices, the capture of their vessel, Three 
Friends, and the arrival of Captain Forsyth in Amsterdam. 
  
 190 
Dutch Trade with New England – The Eighteenth Century 
 While some Dutch merchants often focused on one colony and its merchants with 
whom to develop trading networks, other Dutch merchants acquired multiple geographic 
radials in their trading networks with the American colonies. Daniel Crommelin, an 
Amsterdam merchant who had diverse trading relationships with merchants in New York 
from early in the eighteenth century, was part of an extended group of Dutch merchants 
who traded with Rhode Island.350  Although the Dutch continually traded with Rhode 
Island merchants from the colony’s founding in 1636, trade activity increased during the 
War of Jenkins’ Ear, which lasted from 1739 to 1748.351 With British ships occupied 
against Spain, Dutch shipping filled the increase in demand for goods from England and 
Europe.  
 Merchants such as Jeremiah Clark sent ships from Rhode Island to Amsterdam 
loaded with goods.  In 1739, one of Clark’s vessels, The Two Josephs, met with 
unfortunate weather in the Atlantic.  In the event of loss or damage, insurers required 
evidence. The vessel’s owners would require the captain and crew to give declarations 
before a notary. Such declarations afford a glimpse into trading activities. From this 
particular voyage, the ship’s captain, Solomon van Heynen, and two sailors, Joseph Bull 
                                                350	  Crommelin	  was	  born	   in	  1707	   in	  New	  York.	  His	   father,	  Charles	  Crommelin,	   the	  descendant	  of	  an	  old	  Dutch	  family	  that	  had	  taken	  refuge	  in	  France	  during	  the	  Spanish	  domination,	  emigrated	  to	  New	  York	  around	  1696.	  After	  his	   father’s	   failed	  copper	  mining	  endeavors	   in	  Connecticut,	  Daniel	   left	   the	  "New	  World"	  and	  immigrated	  to	  Europe	  in	  1724	  to	  live	  among	  relatives	  in	  Amsterdam.	  	  One	  source	  mentions	  that	  the	  father,	  Charles,	  had	  started	  the	  Holland	  Trading	  Company	  in	  New	  York	  in	  1720.	  It	  could	   be,	   therefore,	   that	   Daniel	   was	   sent	   overseas	   as	   soon	   as	   possible	   to	   establish	   himself	   as	   the	  firm's	  primary	  European	  contact.	   	   See	  Virginia	  D.	  Harrington,	  The	  New	  York	  Merchant	  on	  the	  Eve	  of	  
the	  Revolution	  (Gloucester,	  Mass.:	  Peter	  Smith,	  1964),	  199.	   	  Daniel	  became	  a	  successful	  merchant	  in	  Amsterdam	   as	   founder	   of	   the	  merchant	   house,	   Daniel	   Crommelin	   &	   Sons,	  which	   continued	   on	   for	  several	   generations.	   His	   firm	   made	   large	   loans	   to	   the	   United	   States	   shortly	   after	   the	   American	  Revolution.	  	  Some	  records	  of	  Crommelin’s	  trade	  with	  Rhode	  Island	  can	  be	  found	  in	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8892/304(1750);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8893/569	  (1750).	  351	  See,	  e.g.,	  Patricia	  T.	  Young	  and	  Jack	  S.	  Levy,	  “Domestic	  Politics	  and	  the	  Escalation	  of	  Commercial	  Rivalry:	  Explaining	  the	  War	  of	  Jenkins’	  Ear,	  1739-­‐48,”	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Relations,	  17	  (2010):	  209-­‐32.	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and John Joho, provided an account of the vessel’s journey and goods aboard.  The ship 
had been loaded in Amsterdam and was bound for either Rhode Island or New London. 
Storms forced the ship to seek shelter on Voorne-Putten Island in the western 
Netherlands, in the province of South Holland. The ship encountered poor weather while 
crossing the Atlantic and the captain decided to divert to St. Eustatius in December. The 
ship continued its voyage to New England once securing repairs.  Seemingly 
encountering every storm in the Atlantic that season, the ship ran aground near Block 
Island. Local residents rescued the crew and salvaged some of the cargo and ship’s 
rigging.  Because Clark’s vessel had been insured in Amsterdam, Van Heynen attested to 
the value received for both the cargo and the ship’s salvage.352  
 The unfortunate series of incidents associated with this voyage was not typical. 
Nevertheless, the voyage illustrates the ease with which transatlantic merchant 
cooperation took place.  Clark secured a cargo in Amsterdam for himself and the co-
owners of the vessel and had the cargo insured in the Amsterdam insurance market.  
Despite more rigorous enforcement of the Navigation Acts, and Clark’s residency in the 
colonies, he faced no obstacles in obtaining insurance coverage, or in securing a captain 
and crew for the voyage. As well, the attestation about the damage sustained to the cargo 
and the salvage of the vessel was considered routine.  Nationality was never a factor.  
 Later in 1740, Van Heyman again appeared before a notary to declare the value of 
a shipload of merchandise he was transporting to Rhode Island aboard The Phenix.  In 
addition, Van Heyman’s wife, Maria Jackson, and his brother Pieter Fredrik van Heynen, 
a merchant in Amsterdam, provided declarations as to the value of the goods for 
                                                352	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8952/659.	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insurance purposes.353  The brothers’ relationship must have taken a disagreeable turn.  In 
March 1742, Pieter gave a power of attorney to another Rhode Island merchant, Henry 
Collins, to collect goods and money owed to Pieter by Solomon, who resided in 
Bristol.354 
 Despite captains like Solomon van Heinen, many voyages between Rhode Island 
and Amsterdam seemed to occur without incident.  Parties appeared before notaries in 
Amsterdam for a variety of purposes: to register agreements for the hiring of ships to 
trade in Rhode Island; to record orders given to ship’s captains and/or supercargos about 
where to trade, how long to remain in port, and what commodities to return with; and, to 
issue powers of attorney to collect outstanding debts from Rhode Island merchants.355  
Many other trading voyages from Amsterdam included Rhode Island as part of a larger 
trans-Atlantic/Caribbean undertaking engaging in multiple exchanges over a broad 
geographical context before returning to Amsterdam.356 
 Dutch merchants seized opportunities for trade in North America. When George 
II authorized privateering against Spain in a 1739 proclamation, Americans responded 
                                                353	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10218/542.	  354	  SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10222/122.	   See	   also	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10233/709	   (1745)	   when	   Pieter	   gave	  another	   power	   of	   attorney	   to	   Collins	   to	   collect	   from	   Solomon	   and	   his	  wife,	   as	  well	   as	   a	   power	   of	  attorney	  to	  William	  Belan	  in	  Boston	  to	  undertake	  the	  same.	  Solomon’s	  troubles	  continued.	   	  He	  was	  co-­‐owner	   of	  The	  New	  Revenge,	  a	   vessel	   that	   in	   1742	   became	   stranded	   and	   perished	   on	   the	   Vlie,	   a	  seaway	   between	   the	  Dutch	   islands	   of	   Vlieland	   and	  Terschelling.	   	   It	   is	   one	   of	   the	   entrances	   for	   the	  Zuiderzee	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  port	  of	  Amsterdam.	  	  The	  vessel	  was	  coming	  from	  Newport,	  Rhode	  Island,	  with	   a	   cargo	   hold	   of	   goods,	   including	   furs.	   	   For	   the	   power	   of	   attorney	   given	   by	   an	   Amsterdam	  merchant	   to	  a	   third	  party	   to	   recover,	   if	  possible,	   five	  barrels	  of	   furs	   from	  the	  distressed	  vessel	   see	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  11279/79.	  	  It	  is	  unusual	  to	  see	  furs	  as	  part	  of	  a	  cargo	  coming	  from	  Rhode	  Island	  at	  this	   point	   in	   the	   eighteenth	   century.	   	   Archival	   sources	   do	   not	   reveal	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   furs,	   which	  might	  have	  come	  from	  northern	  New	  York	  or	  Canada.	  	  Solomon	  had	  the	  captain	  of	  the	  ship	  provide	  a	  declaration	  as	  to	  the	  events	  surrounding	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  ship.	   	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10224/454.	   	   In	  addition,	  he	  gave	  powers	  of	  attorney	  to	  individuals	  to	  conduct	  salvage	  operations.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10223/456.	  355 	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10248/440;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10251/112;	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	  10251/148;SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10415/910.	  356	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5834/…	  (1727);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8771/1731	  (1738);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8775/7	  (1739);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  11253/96	  (1739).	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enthusiastically to the prospects. Soon, Boston ships carried logwood back to New 
England, where it was re-exported to England to counter the trade imbalance with the 
mother country.357 With equal enthusiasm, Dutch merchants contracted with their Boston 
commercial networks to secure quantities of logwood.  Like the English, Dutch textile 
manufacturers used the dye during the production of cloth and piece goods.  Dutch ships, 
before long, gathered in Boston’s harbor to secure logwood shipments. 
 During the War of Jenkins’ Ear, Boston’s warehouses became depositories for 
logwood captured on privateering voyages.358  American privateers, including those from 
Boston, operated principally in the Caribbean during the war.359  The attraction of 
Spanish merchantmen carrying the lucrative agricultural staples of the West Indies made 
the area a magnet for the Americans.  The first half of the war was particularly 
detrimental to Spanish shipping and, as a result, lucrative in compiling logwood. In 
addition to seeking financial gains, Americans wanted to retaliate for Spanish destruction 
of British shipping.  
                                                357	  See	   Michael	   J.	   Jarvis,	   In	   the	   Eye	   of	   All	   Trade:	   Bermuda,	   Bermudians,	   and	   the	   Maritime	   Atlantic	  
World,	   1680-­‐1783	   (Chapel	   Hill:	   University	   of	   North	   Carolina	   Press,	   2010),	   223.	   	   Notably,	   logwood	  could	  be	  carried	  to	  European	  ports	  as	  the	  Privy	  Council	  “had	  ruled	  in	  1701	  that	  these	  direct	  exports	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  Navigation	  Acts.”	  Ibid.	  	  	  358	  Logwood	  is	  a	  generic	  term	  referring	  to	  any	  number	  of	  varieties	  of	  hardwoods	  that	  were	  used	  for	  dye	  making.	   The	   logwood	   that	   grows	   in	  what	   is	   now	   the	  modern	  Mexican	   state	   of	   Campeche,	   is	   a	  variety	  native	  to	  that	  region	  exclusively,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  Campeachy	  wood.	  The	  tinting	  properties	  of	  logwood,	  or	  as	  the	  Dutch	  referred	  to	  it	  campechehout,	  was	  known	  from	  the	  first	  millennium	  by	  the	  Aztecs.	   	  After	  the	  invasion	  of	  Central	  America	  by	  Spain,	  Europe	  started	  to	  use	  this	  dyewood	  in	  huge	  quantities,	  replacing	  the	  domestic	  vegetable	  dyes	  –	  dyer’s	  woad	  and	  indigo	  –both	  of	  which	  produced	  blue	  dye.	  One	  reason	  given	  for	  the	  War	  of	  Jenkins’	  Ear	  was	  the	  recession	  that	  was	  allegedly	  provoked	  in	  the	  English	  conventional	  dye	  market	  because	  of	  the	  use	  of	  logwood.	  	  Since	  the	  English	  takeover	  of	  Jamaica,	   however,	   English	   men	   and	   ships	   regularly	   had	   been	   cutting	   logwood	   near	   modern-­‐day	  Champotón,	   an	   area	   they	   claimed	   was	   uninhabited	   by	   any	   Spanish	   and	   distant	   from	   Hispanic	  settlement.	  	  The	  Spaniards	  protested	  this	  activity,	  because	  they	  considered	  logwood	  as	  “produce”	  of	  the	   Spanish	   colonies,	   thereby	   granting	   them	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   that	   resource,	   an	   understanding	  shared	  by	  European	  nations	   influenced	  by	  mercantilist	  policy	  and	  thought.	  See	  David	  J.	  Weber,	  The	  
Spanish	  Frontier	  in	  North	  America	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  177.	  359	  On	   privateering	   generally	   during	   the	   war,	   see	   Carl	   E.	   Swanson,	   “American	   Privateering	   and	  Imperial	  Warfare,	  1739-­‐1748,”	  William	  and	  Mary	  Quarterly,	  42	  (Jul.,	  1985),	  357-­‐82.	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 Despite the usage of American vessels by Dutch merchants for shipping logwood, 
claims still arose. The wood was a valued commodity and saltwater damage diminished 
its value and usage. Insurance claims were often brought for reputed damage.  For 
instance, The Charming Molly arrived in Amsterdam with cargo that weighed less than 
when it had left Boston.  Amid accusations of theft, in August 1741, at the request of 
Captain James Morris, the mate, boatswain, and a sailor on The Charming Molly, 
provided testimony about the state of a shipment of logwood that left Boston aboard ship 
in April.  The crew attested to the seaworthiness of the vessel and declared that during the 
voyage the ship maintained good momentum. Instead, they suggested that if the cargo 
sustained damage, the parties contracting for the wood should examine the ship’s design.  
In an ensuing declaration, the crew further elaborated about the voyage, suggesting the 
wood was wet and filled with ice when it was loaded into the hold.360  This, they urged, 
accounted for the wood’s increased weight. When the wood dried during the voyage, the 
weight of the load decreased.  The crew adamantly proclaimed that the diminution in the 
load’s weight was not due to theft by the crew.361  Not only were the crew’s explanations 
important for the insurance claim, but they also addressed the issue of reliability of 
American shippers for Dutch merchants.   
 The goods that entered the New England colonies through the Dutch trade fit 
comfortably into the flow of North Atlantic commerce. For example Adrian and Thomas 
                                                360	  The	  Dutch	  phrasing	  is	  “met	  ijs	  bezet.”	  	  The	  ship	  was	  loaded	  during	  April	  and	  the	  wood	  might	  have	  been	   stored	   outside	   during	   the	   winter	  months.	   	   This	   would	   account	   for	   the	   declarations	   that	   the	  wood	  was	  filled	  with	  ice.	  	  Campeche	  wood	  was	  grown	  in	  great	  quantities	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Campeche,	  in	  the	  southern	  bight	  of	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico.	  There,	  the	  English	  cut	  it,	  and	  sent	  it	  to	  Jamaica.	   	  It	  is	  there	  that	   Boston	   merchants	   would	   trade	   for	   the	   wood.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   Henry	   Barham,	   Hortus	   Americanus:	  
Containing	  an	  Accountof	  the	  Trees,	  Shrubs,	  and	  other	  Vegetable	  Productions	  of	  South	  America	  and	  the	  
West	   India	   Islands	   and	   Particularly	   of	   the	   Island	   of	   Jamaica	   (Kingston,	   Jamaica:	   Alexander	   Aikman,	  1794),	  91–2.	  361	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  no.	  10220/400;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10220/410;	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10220/412.	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Hope in Amsterdam and Herman van Yzendoorn in Rotterdam did a large business in tea, 
which undercut England’s East India Company.  In Boston, from 1700 through 1824, a 
building known as the "triangular warehouse" dominated Merchant’s Row. In the 
nineteenth century, Nathaniel Dearborn speculated it was built "probably by Dutch tea 
merchants, as they had been in the habit of supplying the inhabitants with teas, at a less 
price since 1660, than could be afforded by the London East India Company, as most of 
the Teas from Holland were smuggled into this market." The warehouse was "taken down 
in 1824, to make room for the City Market improvements."362  
 While of humble beginnings and, ultimately, to attain the highest pinnacles of 
finance during the eighteenth century, Hope & Co. maintained trading networks 
throughout colonial America.  While it was commonplace for merchant houses to send 
family members as representatives to the various commercial centers in Europe, it was 
unusual for a representative to be sent to America.  Normally, factors or agents would be 
appointed.  Here, Henry Hope’s presence in Boston allowed Hope & Co. to form trade 
linkages with some of colonial Massachusetts most prominent and wealthiest merchants, 
siphoning off their trade from England. 
 
Trade Wars 
 While Dutch activities in and with New England during the period of 1664 
through 1750 were mostly centered on trade, one event in the 1670’s threatened to 
undermine established commercial relationships. The early 1670’s saw Dutch military 
and naval aggression in North America on a scale not previously seen. Commercial 
                                                362	  Nathaniel	  Dearborn,	  Dearborn's	  Reminiscences	  of	  Boston:	  and	  Guide	  through	  the	  City	  and	  Environs.	  (Boston:	  1851),118-­‐19.	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ambitions drove hostile activity up and down the eastern seaboard. The region had been 
animated with unrest during the latest military conflicts between the Dutch and English 
and news soon reached Curaçao that the Dutch had regained physical and political 
control of New York.363   
 In the summer of 1674, the governor of Curaçao, Jan Doncker, directed Jurriaen 
Aernoutsz to New York.  Aernoutsz commanded the frigate, Vliegende Paert, based in 
the West Indies.  Doncker ordered Aernoutsz to conduct hostilities against France and 
England in the North Atlantic, specifically to “to take, plunder, spoil and possess any of 
the ships, persons or estates.”  When Aernoutsz arrived in New York, he learned that the 
Dutch and English had resolved their extant hostilities and had become parties to the 
Treaty of Westminster. 
 The resolution of hostilities between England and the Dutch Republic meant that 
Aernoutsz’s privateering commission, as issued by Governor Doncker, only had validity 
against the French.  Thus, the treaty had denied Aernoutsz the opportunity for 
commercial plunder against the English.  As background, Aernoutsz also would have had 
knowledge of the recent military aggression undertaken by the Dutch in North America. 
The Dutch fleet had invaded Chesapeake Bay, captured or destroyed nearly 200 English 
and French vessels, virtually wiped out the English Newfoundland fisheries, and restored 
New York, New Jersey, and Delaware to the Dutch.  Against this context, what 
Aernoutsz subsequently became involved with was driven by commercial opportunity 
                                                363	  The	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  War	  began	   in	  1672	  after	  French	  king	  Louis	  XIV	   invaded	  Holland,	  and	  England,	  committed	  to	  a	  secret	  alliance	  with	  France,	  found	  itself	  in	  another	  naval	  war	  with	  the	  Dutch	  Republic.	  	  The	  Dutch	  were	  victorious	  in	  the	  major	  naval	  engagements,	  but,	  when	  the	  treaty	  of	  peace	  was	  signed	  in	  1674,	  the	  Dutch	  acknowledged	  that	  New	  York	  was	  an	  English	  possession,	  while	  England	  ended	  its	  treaty	   of	   alliance	   with	   France.	   	   See	   Gijs	   Rommelse,	   The	   Second	   Anglo-­‐Dutch	   War	   (1665-­‐1667):	  Rainson	  D’état,	  Mercantilism,	  and	  Maritime	  Strife	  (Hilversum,	  The	  Netherlands:	  Uitgeverij	  Verloren,	  2006),	  198.	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and the recent Dutch military offensive against the English colonies. 
 Upon mooring in New York, Aernoutsz met a sea captain, John Rhoades, from 
Boston.  Rhoades spoke of the lucrative fur trade along the coasts of Maine and Acadia, 
territory contested by England and France.  Before Aernoutsz could finalize his plans to 
attack French fishing grounds further north, he became enticed by Rhoades’s descriptions 
of the French forts and their weakened defenses.  Rhoades suggested that if Aernoutsz 
took the forts by surprise it would be an easy conquest for Aernoutsz and the Dutch. Such 
a raid fit perfectly with Aernoutsz’s diminished commission. As this was a privateering 
voyage, Aernoutsz sought the approval of his officers and crew. With their endorsement 
in hand, Aernoutsz recruited Rhoades, who took the oath of allegiance to the Prince of 
Orange.  Aernoutsz appointed Rhoades the chief pilot of the Vliegende Paert. 
      Aernoutsz seized the area quickly, conquering the fort at Pentagouet on the Penobscot 
River in two hours. Aernoutsz destroyed Pentagouet and pillaged all the French posts 
along the west shore of the Bay of Fundy, capturing both the governor of Acadia and his 
lieutenant. Aernoutsz spent a month in the region, taking formal possession of the region, 
which he called “New Holland.” He then sailed to Boston where he disposed of his 
plunder, even selling the cannon from Fort Pentagouet to the Massachusetts government. 
Some time in October 1674 he sailed for Curaçao, but left his prisoners and a number of 
his ship’s company in Boston, including John Rhoades. 
 Aernoutsz ordered John Rhoades and his other men left in Boston to return to the 
newly conquered region and maintain possession of the coastal towns along the shores of 
Maine and New Brunswick, the area’s two forts, and the former French military 
headquarters. Aernoutsz knew that maintaining continuous possession was necessary to 
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provide strength to the conquest he made on behalf of the Dutch Republic. The monotony 
of maintaining possession of the territory, however, offered few rewards to the men who 
sought greater financial reward than sentry duty. They soon began to seize New England 
vessels arriving along the coast to engage in the fur trade with the Indians.  
 It had been one thing for the Dutch privateer to oust the French from the area and 
quite another to seize New England vessels.  Despite previous tacit acquiescence to the 
Dutch privateer’s actions, the governor of Massachusetts, Governor John Leverett, could 
not allow the confiscation of New England vessels. He sent armed vessels from the 
colony against Rhoades. Defeated in a naval fight in the Bay of Fundy, Rhoades and his 
companions were taken prisoner to Boston and tried as pirates. The court convicted all 
but two of them for either piracy or theft and condemned Rhoades to death. The court 
postponed his execution because of King Philip’s war. He was released in October 1675 
on the condition that he left Massachusetts forever. 
      In September 1676 the Dutch West India Company made a belated effort to capitalize 
on Aernoutsz’s conquest by granting Rhoades a commission to reside and trade in Acadia 
and by appointing Cornelis van Steenwijck, a prominent Dutch merchant in New York, 
as governor of Acadia. Rhoades attempted to exercise his commission, but a lieutenant of 
Governor Andros’s arrested him on the St. George River for trespassing on the Duke of 
York’s territory. He was returned to New York, but released after a brief imprisonment. 
In the Treaty of Nimwegen (1678), ending the war between France and Holland, the 
Dutch conquest of Acadia was not even mentioned.364 
                                                364	  I	   came	   upon	   this	   incident	   through	   a	   notarial	   minute	   in	   the	   Amsterdam	   archives.	   	   In	   it,	   John	  Rhoades	  gave	  a	  statement	  about	  his	  participation	   in	   the	  events.	   	  He	  expressed	  dismay	  at	   the	  rouse	  the	   English	   perpetrated	   upon	   those	   occupying	   the	   fort.	   He	   noted	   that	   the	   British	   in	   Boston	   were	  jealous	   of	   them	  and	   four	   ships	  under	   the	   command	  of	   Samuel	  Mosely	  were	   sent	   to	   the	   forts.	   	   The	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 The Dutch takeover of Acadia raises more questions than answers. Why did 
Aernoutsz feel this was an important military move when his commission spoke of 
destroying estates, not seizing them on behalf of the Republic? Was this a military action 
against just the French, or did he envision further eventual encroachment southward 
against the English?  Certainly, the Dutch had a penchant for commercial opportunity.  
Again, Aernoutsz was permitted to take ships or other property and he did so.  But did he 
suppose that merchants in patria would welcome the commercial opportunities in the fur 
trade available there after the earlier loss of New Netherland?  Was the purchase of the 
plunder taken from the French opportunistic on the part of Boston merchants and the 
Massachusetts government or were they hoping to create some sort of trading relationship 
should the Dutch actually sustain rights to the area?  Did they envision some sort of 
cooperation with the Dutch?  Why did the Massachusetts government not pursue any 
earlier action against the Dutch residing in Maine/Acadia until Rhoades and his men 
seized New England vessels?  Why did the Dutch West India Company delay their 
reaction to the situation?  Why appoint a prominent merchant such as Steenwijck in the 
role as governor?   
 Despite the unanswered questions about the Maine/Acadia attack, the incident 
does suggest that notwithstanding military action and political agreements in Europe, and 
economic policies in England that legislated against trade with merchants from foreign 
                                                                                                                                            Dutch	  within	  the	  forts	  believed	  they	  came	  as	   friends.	   	  However,	   they	  acted	  as	  enemies	  taking	  all	  of	  the	   beavers,	   otters,	   artillery	   and	   other	   looted	   goods	   and	   bringing	   them	   to	   Boston	   for	   sale	   there.	  	  Rhoades	  also	  noted	  that	  Aernoutsz	  provided	  Governor	  Leverett	  with	  a	  copy	  of	  his	  commission	  and	  the	  governor	  deemed	  it	  appropriate.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3225/269-­‐270v	  (1676).	  	   See	  also	  James	  Finney	  Baxter,	  ed.,	  Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Maine	   (Portland:	  The	  Thurston	   Print,	   1897),	   Vols.	   4-­‐8;	   Charles	   W.	   Tuttle,	   Captain	   Francis	   Champernowne,	   the	   Dutch	  
Conquest	   of	   Acadia	   and	   Other	   Historical	   Papers,	   edited	   by	   A.	   H.	   Hoyt	   (Boston:	   J.	   Wilson	   and	   Son,	  1889);	  G.F.	  Dow	  and	  J.H.	  Edmonds,	  The	  Pirates	  of	  the	  New	  England	  Coast,	  1630-­‐1730	  (Salem,	  MA:	  The	  Marine	  Research	  Society,	  1923).	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nations, New England merchants continued to trade with Dutch merchants as we have 
seen.  They maintained existing trading networks, in addition to establishing new 
commercial contacts. 
 
Conclusion 
 The relationship between Dutch and New England merchants transformed over 
time.  During the period of 1664 through 1750, New England shipping became more 
reliable.  New England merchants extended their voyages beyond the eastern seaboard 
and West Indies and ventured into the Atlantic.  The notarial minutes reflect New 
England merchants and ships’ captains contracting with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam.  
They accepted and agreed to trade under the terms of Dutch law.   
 This sense of ordinariness of Dutch trade in early America has been lost to 
history.  Dutch merchants trading in New England or New England merchants trading in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam were accepted commercial activities throughout this period. 
The notarial minutes provide a fuller understanding of how substantial the trade was and 
how ineffectual economic policies, such as the Navigation Acts, were to ordinary people. 
 New England merchants previously had seen the devastating effects of England’s 
economic policies and political events on local and personal economies during the mid-
seventeenth century.  Trading with the Dutch provided profitable outlays for regional 
commodities and markets in which to purchase goods.  Additionally, Dutch merchants 
paid well for New England commodities, provided needed credit on favorable terms, and 
had low barriers of entry to trade, that is, taxation duties were not prohibitive or punitive 
in nature.  In many respects, Amsterdam and Rotterdam provided the training ground in 
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which New England’s merchants could engage in trade on a global level. 
 Certainly, there was direct trade between New England and the Dutch Republic.  
As well, New England merchants developed a circum-Atlantic route that linked New 
England with the Chesapeake and Amsterdam.  This filled transport vacuums left when 
Dutch shipping was curtailed because of European and domestic political events.   
 The commercial relationships that developed between New England and Dutch 
merchants provided the foundation for later activities. Merchant houses such as Hope and 
Company would continue to trade with colonial merchants and invest in the new nation 
well into the nineteenth century.365  It was no accident that John Adams sought loans on 
behalf of the American government from the Dutch during the American Revolution.  
While the Dutch had provided financing for other nations’ military efforts or domestic 
needs, the footing to provide such loans for America had been established over a century 
previously with colonial merchants that cautiously, then ardently, ventured into 
international trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                365	  The	   growth	   of	   Hope	   &	   Co.	   seemingly	   paralleled	   and	   participated	   in	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   English	  colonies	  in	  North	  America	  and,	  then,	  the	  new	  nation.	  	  The	  merchant	  house	  went	  from	  a	  small,	  family-­‐run	  partnership	  to	  one	  of	  the	  premiere	  banks	  in	  Europe.	   	  It	  provided	  several	  loans	  to	  the	  American	  government,	  the	  most	  notable	  was	  assistance	  with	  the	  Louisiana	  Purchase	  in	  1803.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Buist,	  At	  
Spes	  Non	  Fracta,	  188-­‐90.	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Chapter 5 
 
Found in Translation: 
Dutch Trade with the Colony of New York, 
1664-1750 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 In October 1664, Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote a letter to his brother, Jan Baptist 
van Rensselaer, in Amsterdam. The brothers often exchanged correspondence concerning 
the business management of Rensselaerswyck. This particular letter was different.  In it, 
Jeremias casually noted that he was sending his letter by one of the English frigates 
departing for London.  The English frigates of which he wrote were the same ships that 
had recently captured New Netherland for the English. 
 Jeremias also remarked, 
 How it will go with our colony, I do not yet know, but I have been summoned 
 by Governor Richard Nicolls to come down to show him our patents and what 
 right we have to the colony.  You know how few documents thereof with seals we 
 have here, so that I shall have to appeal to his Royal Majesty of England, of which 
 I shall advise you more at length, please God, in my next letter.366 
 
The colony about which Jeremias wrote was the patroonship granted to the Van 
Rensselaer family by the Dutch West India Company in 1628.367 Jeremias expressed 
                                                366	  See	  A.J.F.	  van	  Laer,	  trans.	  and	  ed.,	  Correspondence	  of	  Jeremias	  van	  Rensselaer,	  1651-­‐1674	  (Albany:	  The	  University	   of	   the	   State	   of	  New	  York,	   1932),	   361.	   	   Sometime	  after	   this	   letter,	   Jeremias	   told	   Jan	  Baptist	  “that	  I	  showed	  to	  the	  English	  governor	  our	  patent,	  to	  wit,	  our	  leen	  Brief	  [letters	  patent],	  from	  the	   lords	  States	  General,	  which	  he	  accepted,	  but	  he	   told	  us	   that	  we	  must	  have	  a	  new	  one	   from	  the	  Duke	   of	   York.	   	   I	   agreed	   with	   him	   that	   you	   would	   try	   to	   procure	   that	   within	   the	   year,	   so	   that	   I	  recommend	  this	  matter	  to	  you,	  otherwise	  they	  may	  easily	  run	  away	  with	  the	  bacon	  (sullen	  licht	  met	  het	   hachgie	   doorgaen).	   [I	   shall]	   try	   to	   agree	   about	   the	   limits	   and	   the	   annual	   [quitrent].”	   	   Disputes	  about	  Rensselaerswyck	  would	   continue	   for	   years	   after	   the	  English	   takeover,	   including	   legitimizing	  ownership	  under	  English	  rule	  and	  succession	  issues	  within	  the	  Van	  Rensselaer	  family.	  367	  See	   Oliver	   A.	   Rink,	   Holland	   on	   the	   Hudson:	   An	   Economic	   and	   Social	   History	   of	   Dutch	   New	   York	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  94-­‐116;	  Janny	  Venema,	  Kiliaen	  van	  Rensselaer	  (1586-­‐1643):	  
Designing	  a	  New	  World	  (Hilversum,	  The	  Netherlands:	  Uitgeverij	  Verloren,	  2010),	  216-­‐24.	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concern, but his correspondence never reflected a sense of despair or forthcoming loss.  
He ended his letter with the date and the location of “New York,” rather than “New 
Netherland.” 
 If Jeremias had concerns about the transition of trade between the former New 
Netherland and patria, he need not have worried.  Rather, it was the English government 
that worried for the next century about the Dutch and their proclivity for sustaining their 
trading networks between Europe and New York.   
 By 1670, Jeremias was corresponding with the English governor, Francis 
Lovelace, about matters concerning the colony.  Lovelace had made inquiry “Concerning 
the three hundred schepel of wheate you agreed with my Predecessor Col. Nicolls the last 
yeare to pay, I thought good to put you in mind of it, To the End it may bee in a 
readinesse...” Lovelace also sought information about “what number of Horse may bee 
risen about you, if they amount to a competent number, sufficient to compose a Troope, I 
shall give you the Command of it, if you’l accept thereof.”368  Indeed, the reliance of the 
English governor on his subjects of Dutch ancestry would be significant.  Rather than 
ostracizing those of Dutch ancestry, it created a pattern of acceptance and 
accommodation that ultimately undermined English trade policies in their newly acquired 
colony. 
 The trade between New York and Amsterdam was capacious during the period 
1664 to 1750.  On one hand, that was understandable.  Extensive and profitable trading 
networks had developed between the Dutch merchants of New Netherland and 
Amsterdam.  New Amsterdam became one of several ports a Dutch ship would call at 
                                                368	  Ibid.	   	   It	   is	   instructive	   that	   Lovelace	   had	   already	   adapted	   to	   Dutch	   terminology.	   	   A	   schepel	  was	  0.764	   of	   a	   bushel	   of	   wheat.	   	   See	   A.J.F.	   van	   Laer,	   Van	   Rensselaer	   Bowier	   Manuscripts	   (Albany:	  University	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  1908),	  849.	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when it made its circuitous route through the Atlantic world.  Severing such networks 
would be difficult, particularly as many were based on family or religious ties. On the 
other hand, the English takeover in 1664 and subsequent political and economic 
appropriation of Dutch institutions should have had a stronger presence by the start of the 
eighteenth century and a greater impact on Dutch trade.  Dutch notarial archives reflect 
something much different.  The archives reflected the continuation of previous trading 
networks and the establishment of new networks with both English residents and 
merchants of Dutch ancestry.  There was little regard for following the precepts of the 
Navigation Acts.  Rarely did the archives acknowledge payment of tariffs or imposts in a 
New York or Great Britain.   
 The first part of this chapter studies women and trade in the colony of New York.  
The legal status and cultural acceptance of Dutch women trading in New Netherland was 
beyond dispute.  Yet, what was the status of women of Dutch ancestry residing and 
trading in New York after 1664?  In 1664, a significant number of women residing in 
New York had been born in the Dutch Republic or had been raised by mothers who had 
been born there.  But what accounts for the later generations of women residing in New 
York who were further removed from a direct nexus with the legal norms and cultural 
mores of the Dutch Republic? What we discover is that good trade transcended gender 
boundaries and English men readily traded with women of Dutch ancestry. This upends 
historiographic notions of gender division. The evidence, however, demonstrates how 
women merchants continued to trade in New York well into the eighteenth century.  As 
well, women from the Dutch Republic actively traded in New York whether in person or 
through agents.  There was no evidence questioning or disputing trade by a Dutch woman 
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with an English colonist in New York. 
 The second portion of this chapter examines Jacob Leisler as representative of a 
merchant in New York of Dutch ancestry who did not publicly object to the English 
takeover of New Netherland. Leisler readily accepted English citizenship and used his 
new citizenship to his advantage.  In particular, he exercised his rights as an Englishman 
to conceal his actual trading activities to the Dutch Republic and other locations in 
Europe. 
 At the beginning of the eighteenth century, England had had political control of 
New York for nearly forty years.  Yet, as the third section of this chapter demonstrates, 
merchants from the Dutch Republic were still actively trading in New York including 
merchants from many of the large Amsterdam merchant houses.  Circumvention of the 
English Navigation Acts was commonplace.   
 Finally, over the eighty-year period of this chapter, something else happened as 
well.  There was a transition on the part of merchants.  A certain sense of professionalism 
came into their actions.  Certainly, earlier commercial developments from the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries such as improvements in accounting, the introduction of credit 
instruments, and the standardized language of common documents contributed to the 
competence and proficiency of merchants.  But during this period, merchants created 
written records documenting events and relationships with other merchants.  While 
personal relationships were at the center of many business transactions, merchants 
increasingly formalized such relationships and relied on the use of notaries to do so.  
Daniel Crommelin, who had been born in New York but immigrated to the Dutch 
Republic, represented this type of new, professional merchant. During the course of his 
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commercial activity, he established important trading networks for New York merchants 
in Amsterdam, effectively used the Dutch legal system in anticipation of litigation, and 
instituted the importance of New York City as an active and significant trading port for 
European trade.  Crommelin’s importance to colonial America resonated for over one 
hundred years as his trading house grew in stature while maintaining its linkages to 
American merchants. 
 
Don’t Tell the English Ladies – Dutch Women and Trade to New York 
 Examining New York in this period allows for consideration of trade by women. 
Because the Dutch, when settling New Netherland, brought both their culture and legal 
system, women residing in the colony continued to trade as if in patria.  By the time of 
the political transition to New York in 1664, trade by women was as much ingrained in 
the colony, as it was back in the Dutch Republic.   
 The legal status of women to trade as merchants was well settled under Dutch 
law.  However, the legal status of women in New York had been reduced as a 
consequence of the English takeover of New Netherland in 1664.369 Was there an issue 
with women from the Dutch Republic trading in New York?  The notarial records do not 
disclose any hesitation or refusal to trade with a Dutch woman who was a merchant.  
Arguably, good trade was not gender specific.  Nevertheless, there might have been 
instances when a Dutch woman needed to recede into the background and let a kinsman 
interact with the tentative “foreign” merchant. 
                                                369	  See	  Linda	  Briggs	  Biemer,	  Women	  and	  Property	  in	  Colonial	  New	  York:	  The	  Transition	  from	  Dutch	  to	  
English	  Law,	  1643-­‐1727	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  UMI	  Research	  Press,	  1983),	  1-­‐9.	  	  Biemer	  correctly	  describes	  how	  the	  laws	  changed	  from	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law	  to	  common	  law	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  women	  and	  their	  legal	  activities.	  However,	   she	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   cultural	   aspects	   of	   both	  men	   and	  women’s	  behavior	  as	  it	  related	  to	  trade.	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 Historians have identified the wide-ranging role of Dutch merchants in 
transatlantic trade. Nevertheless, most have disregarded women’s participation in trade, 
at any level.370 Early modern Dutch women, whether trading to New York or at home in 
patria, did not need, implicitly or explicitly, to challenge traditional gender expectations. 
Thus, women moved freely about in transacting their business.  
 The number of women in the Dutch Republic trading as merchants is difficult to 
estimate as not everyone required the use of notaries or engaged in trade in a manner that 
otherwise effected a written record. Dutch laws provided the opportunity for women to 
take part in trade and Dutch cultural attitudes encouraged parents to bring their daughters 
up to participate in the nation’s commercial and trading society. 371   Under such 
circumstances, it was not surprising that a vigorous participation by women in 
commercial enterprises existed, one that included trade to New York.  
 Dutch women received the education and training to comprehensively participate 
in trade. Daughters received instruction at home in the family’s business. Daughters 
could also receive a formal education by attending school to learn reading, writing, and 
ciphering.372 Josiah Child, an English economist and merchant, asserted that one of the 
basis for the increased wealth of the Northern Netherlands was “the education of their 
Children, as well Daughters as Sons” who grew up to have “an ability for Commerce of 
                                                370	  See,	  for	  example,	  C.R.	  Boxer,	  The	  Dutch	  Seaborne	  Empire,	  1600-­‐1800	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Knopf,	  1965);	  Oliver	  Rink,	  Holland	  on	  the	  Hudson:	  An	  Economic	  and	  Social	  History	  of	  Dutch	  New	  York	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	   University	   Press,	   1986);	   Simon	   Schama,	  The	  Embarrassment	  of	  Riches:	  An	   Interpretation	  of	  
Dutch	  Culture	  in	  the	  Golden	  Age	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1988);	  Jonathan	  I.	  Israel,	  
Dutch	  Primacy	  in	  World	  Trade,	  1585-­‐1740	  (Oxford:	  The	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1989).	  371	  See,	   e.g.,	   Danielle	   van	   den	   Heuvel,	  Women	  &	   Entrepreneurship:	   Female	   Traders	   in	   the	   Northern	  
Netherlands,	  c.	  1580-­‐1815	  (Amsterdam:	  Aksant,	  2007),	  46-­‐56.	  372	  Oscar	   Gelderblom,	   Zuid-­‐Nederlandse	   kooplieden	   en	   de	   opkomst	   van	   de	  Amsterdamse	   stapelmarkt	  
(1578-­‐1630)	  (Hilversum:	  Verloren,	  2002),	  192,	  200-­‐202.	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all kinds.”373  
 Despite social acceptance of women as merchants and sufficient education and 
training for them to engage in trade, neither factor alone would account for the success 
and extent to which Dutch women participated in commerce. The Dutch legal system 
allowed single and widowed women the same rights as men – except for political rights.  
In other words, at the legal age of twenty they could administer their own property, carry 
out legal transactions, enter into contracts, and appear before a court on their own.374  
 Marriage would seem at first to offer little in the way of rights. Most common was 
the marriage of community goods, whereby the goods held by both parties were joined, 
including properties.375 Still, the law considered a husband as his wife’s guardian.  A wife 
could not institute an action or defend herself in court on her own or trade without her 
                                                373	  Josiah	  Child,	  A	  new	  discourse	  of	   trade:	  wherein	   is	  recommended	  several	  weighty	  points	  relating	  to	  
companies	   of	   merchants,	   etc.	   (London,	   1693),	   4.	   	   Earlier,	   Roger	   Coke	   noted	   “The	   Dutch	   generally	  breed	   their	  youth	  of	  both	  Sexes	   in	   the	  Studies	  of	  Geometry	  and	  numbers,	  especially	  more	   than	   the	  English	  do.”	  	  Such	  subjects	  being	  one	  of	  the	  foundational	  tools,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  for	  success	  in	  trade.	  See	  Roger	   Coke,	  A	  Discourse	  of	  Trade	  (London:	   Printed	   for	  H.	   Brome	   and	  R.	  Horne,	   1670).	   See	   also	  De	  Vries	  and	  Van	  der	  Woude,	  The	  First	  Modern	  Economy:	  Success,	  Failure,	  and	  Perseverance	  of	  the	  Dutch	  
Economy,	  1500-­‐1815,	  596-­‐603.	  374	  For	   instance,	   Sherrin	   Marshall	   suggests	   that	   gentry	   widows	   were	   slow	   to	   remarry,	   preferring	  instead	  to	  enjoy	  their	  autonomy.	  	  She	  asserts	  that	  “The	  protection	  of	  their	  rights	  by	  law	  and	  custom	  gave	  them	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   independence…In	  short,	   they	  were	   individuals	  and	  not	  ciphers,	  and	  their	  behavior	   exemplifies	   a	   society	  where	  women	   had	   considerable	   autonomy.”	   	   Sherrin	  Marshall,	  The	  
Dutch	   Gentry,	   1500-­‐1650:	   Family,	   Faith	   and	   Fortune	   (Westport,	   CT:	   Greenwood	   Press,	   1987),	   164.	  	  Martha	   Dickinson	   Shattuck	   maintains	   that,	   “Since	   women	   could	   inherit	   as	   well	   as	   dispose	   of	   her	  goods	   by	   will,	   many	   women	   came	   to	   their	   marriages	   with	   real	   and	   personal	   belongings.	  	  Furthermore,	  single	  women	  enjoyed	  considerable	  freedom	  under	  the	  law,	  which	  allowed	  them	  to	  run	  their	  own	  businesses	  or	  be	   involved	   in	   commerce	  and	   trade,	   investments	   that	   they	  brought	   to	   the	  marriage.	  	  Therefore,	  if	  they	  chose,	  women	  so	  endowed	  could	  keep	  any	  or	  all	  of	  their	  holdings	  out	  of	  the	   common	  estate	  by	   an	   antenuptial	   contract.”	  Martha	  Dickinson	  Shattuck,	   “A	  Civil	   Society:	   Court	  and	   Community	   in	   Beverwijck,	   New	  Netherland,	   1652-­‐1664”	   (PhD	   diss.,	   Boston	  University,	   1993),	  157.	  	  The	  reference	  to	  the	  “legal	  age	  of	  twenty”	  for	  women	  is	  the	  age	  at	  which	  a	  woman	  could	  marry	  without	  parental	  permission.	  	  Such	  age	  of	  majority	  opened	  a	  world	  of	  legal	  and	  economic	  opportunity	  for	  women.	   	   In	  order	   to	  understand	   the	   laws	  of	   the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  Hugo	  Grotius’s	  work	  provides	  foundational	  material	   on	   all	   aspects	   of	   Roman-­‐Dutch	   Law.	   	   See	  Hugo	  Grotius,	  The	   Jurisprudence	  of	  
Holland,	  trans.	  R.W.	  Lee	  (Oxford:	  The	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1926),	  I:v:15.	  375	  Grotius,	  The	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Holland,	  I:v:21;	  I:xi:1-­‐19.	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husband’s authorization.376 As there is no reference in the works of Dutch jurist, Hugo 
Grotius, regarding a written procedure to follow to acknowledge this authorization, it 
might well have been acceptable for a husband to provide verbal authority. 
 Dutch law recognized the prerequisites of a successful commercial society and the 
utility of integrating women into commercial activities.  Thus, a wife as the domestic 
marital manager supervised not only the household expenses, which included making 
contracts related to the expenses that would bind both her and her husband, but also the 
buying and selling of material germane to her husband’s business.377 What was important 
in marriage involving the community of goods was the fact that women could, and did, 
appear in court for themselves and their husbands; write promissory notes; enact bonds 
and contracts; give and receive powers of attorney; buy, sell, and lease property; and 
trade, as long as they had their husband’s consent.   
 Dutch society did not discourage trade as an occupation or as a part-time activity 
for women.  As with so many of early modern women’s activities, documentation about 
women in trade can prove problematic.  The women of the Dutch Republic participated 
through the whole stratum of trade practiced by merchants, both in relation to the nature 
of goods traded and the geographical boundaries of trade.378 While Dutch women actively 
traded for goods and commodities from the English colonies in North America, they were 
most active in New York. Our window into their world is opened through the notarial 
records. 
 Some women in the Dutch Republic had extensive commercial activity over a 
significant period. Their active participation in trade represented a lifelong career in 
                                                376	  Ibid.,	  Chapter	  I:	  v,	  17-­‐23.	  377	  Ibid.	  378	  See,	  e.g.,	  Van	  den	  Heuvel,	  Women	  &	  Entrepreneurship,	  223-­‐65.	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commerce, similar to any man’s participation.  For instance, Alida Reinders successfully 
traded to New York and other transatlantic ports. She co-owned a ship and had 
established commercial networks. She began trading to New York as early as 1693 and 
gave a power of attorney to Rombout Philips in New York to collect from her debtors 
there.379 In 1700, she received a power of attorney from her brother, Barent Reinders, a 
merchant in New York, to represent his commercial interests in the Dutch Republic, 
including his interests with respect to ships, trading goods, and monetary demands.380  As 
a man raised within the Dutch culture, a culture that respected women’s roles in business, 
Reinders respected his sister’s proficiency as a merchant. Her brother continued to think 
in a “Dutch” manner. As late as 1711, Alida still traded as a merchant and still acted for 
her brother under his power of attorney.381  
 Women traders, reminiscent of their male counterparts, often relied on kinship 
networks. The networks included both family and friends who provided reliable and 
trustworthy trading partners locally, regionally, and internationally. Such associations had 
marked importance for women during their reproductive years. They also were 
particularly useful for a woman who had just begun her trading operations.  In either 
situation, they provided a trusted network of individuals upon whom a woman could rely. 
This network of social relations, often referred to as “social capital,” was also important 
for men.382   
                                                379	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4905/308	  (1693).	  380	  SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   5876/26	   (1700);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   5876/35	   (1700).	   	   Alida	   had	   transatlantic	  trading	  networks	  herself.	  	  	  	  381	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5921	  (1711).	  	  382	  Social	   capital	   refers	   to	   connections	   within	   and	   between	   social	   networks.	   	   Pierre	   Bourdieu	  introduced	  this	  concept	  in	  the	  1980s	  in	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  “Őkonomisches	  Kapital,	  kulturelles	  Kapital,	  soziales	   Kapital”	   in	   Reinhard	   Krecke,	   ed.,	   Soziale	   Ungleichheiten	   (Gottingen:	   O.	   Schwartz,	   1983).	  	  Robert	   Putnam’s	   work	   brought	   the	   concept	   of	   “social	   capital”	   to	   American	   academic	   circles.	   	   See	  Robert	   D.	   Putnam,	  Making	  Democracy	  Work:	   Civic	  Traditions	   in	  Modern	   Italy	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	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 All early modern merchants required a variety of factors to achieve success – 
commercial kinship ties, marriages that broadened commercial networks, and an 
association of business colleagues. Women frequently participated in informal merchant 
networks consisting of immediate family or friends. Nevertheless, an increasingly 
impersonal trading world developed during the early modern period. Often, a woman 
residing in the Dutch Republic might not know everyone in her distribution chain in 
Europe or New York.     
 Kinship networks were particularly important for women when they gave another 
merchant a power of attorney.  The reasons for granting a power of attorney were 
numerous.  A woman might have been incapable of traveling a great distance because of 
pregnancy or childcare obligations. Or her household or other business responsibilities 
prohibited her from doing so.  In any event, granting a power of attorney was an effective 
means of having some other trusted person represent or act on one’s behalf in business, or 
some other legal matter.   
 The notarial records most often recorded powers of attorney being given by 
women merchants who were seeking to recover a debt from another merchant or 
customer who lived in New York.  Occasionally, the document referred to the 
relationship between the female merchant in the Dutch Republic and the person receiving 
                                                                                                                                            University	  Press,	   1994).	   	   The	   concept	   has	   been	   applied	   to	   research	   about	  women	  and	   commercial	  activity	  suggesting	   that	  networks	  were	  positive	  vehicles	   for	   them.	   	  See	  Daniel	  Rabuzzi,	   “Women	  as	  Merchants	   in	   Eighteenth-­‐Century	   Northern	   Germany:	   The	   Case	   of	   Stralsund,	   1750-­‐1830,”	   Central	  
European	  History	  28	   (1995):	  435-­‐56;	  Francisca	  de	  Haan,	   “Homo	  economicus	  of	  pater	   familias?	  Een	  pleidooi	   voor	   meer	   cultuur	   in	   de	   bedrijfsgeschiendenis,”	   NEHA-­‐Bulletin	   14	   (2000):	   276-­‐83.	  	  Nevertheless,	   some	   historians	   have	   argued	   that	   social	   capital	   did	   not	   always	   benefit	  women.	   	   See	  Kathryn	  L.	   Reyerson,	   “Women	   in	  Business	   in	  Medieval	  Montpellier”	   in	  B.	  A.	  Hanawalt,	   ed.,	  Women	  
and	  Work	   in	  Preindustrial	  Europe	  (Bloomington:	   Indiana	  University	   Press,	   1986):	   117-­‐44;	   Sheilagh	  Ogilvie,	  “How	  Does	  Social	  Capital	  Affect	  Women?	  Guilds	  and	  Communities	  in	  Early	  Modern	  Germany,”	  
The	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  109,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  325-­‐59.	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the power.  In most instances, however, the relationship was not given.383 Sometimes, the 
notarial records noted a husband’s agreement with the authorization, although that was 
not required.384 
 From time to time, a woman would grant power of attorney to another woman in 
the Dutch Republic while she traveled to New York to conduct business.  In 1680, 
Magdaleentje Wolsen granted a power of attorney to Anneke Webbers. Magdaleentje 
requested that Anneke observe the goods she would be sending over from New York at 
Magdaleentje’s business.  She asked Anneke to sell such goods as they arrived, to pay the 
freight charged for shipment, and not to accept any goods damaged in transit.385  
 Similarly, Helen Tellers granted powers of attorney to Abel de Wolff and to 
Cornelis Jacobs Moy to oversee her business in the Dutch Republic when she traveled to 
New York.386  She requested from Moy additional undertakings: that he would collect 
300 guilders owing on a bodemerijbrief and that he would sell a piece of land for her.387 
 Often, the notarial records provide an indication of protracted negotiations over 
bills of exchange.  In 1680, Elsie van Hardenbroeck, a merchant in Amsterdam, 
conducted extended negotiations over an exchange protest with Tobias Hoornbeeck, an 
Amsterdam merchant, acting under power of attorney for his uncle, Jilles van 
Hoornbeeck, a merchant in New York.  After six months, the parties finally resolved their 
issues and came to an agreement about a settlement.388   
 Merchants required financial capital to establish operations. How did women gain 
                                                383	  See,	  e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4508/472	  (1679);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4508/514	  (1679);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3938/425	  (1679);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2515/833	  (1682).	  384	  See,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3020/275	  (1680).	  385	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3799/757	  (1680).	  386	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2515/825	  (1682).	  387	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2515/821	  (1682).	  388	  See,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2315/607-­‐609	  (1680);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2315/606-­‐609	  (1680).	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access to capital for trade and did they face impediments in doing so?  A woman who 
inherited money, or goods that she could easily sell, had one means by which she could 
enter trading activities. Perhaps a woman traded goods for others as an agent and 
brokered a commission for herself. Kinship networks might have provided start-up 
capital to begin trading. Unfortunately, it is seldom clear, or stated, how a woman 
obtained her original capital to buy goods. Arguably, the lower the investment costs to 
partake in trade, the more women participated in a certain type of trade.   
 Yet, in other instances, gender was irrelevant.  For example, when Alida Reinders 
became co-owner of a ship, her purchase and subsequent use of the ship was legal under 
Dutch law.  Nevertheless, the Navigation Acts prohibited her, on the basis of her 
citizenship, from engaging in trade with the English colonies or her “English” brother.389 
Like her male counterparts, she chose to undermine the law and trade contrary to its 
provisions. 
 Trade was a primary component of the commercial society of the Dutch Republic 
and, likewise, with New Netherland.  Women were an accepted part of that society, 
supported, as we have seen, by the legal system that allowed them to participate in trade.  
Society’s acceptance of their position in trades large and small, and the underpinning of 
the Dutch legal system, were transferred to and embedded in the colony of New 
Netherland.  Given these rights, women received no special treatment, but were treated 
the same as men in court and in notarial proceedings.  This included the extensive trade 
of women living in New York and trade from women in the Dutch Republic.  Such 
women, even at a modest level, had commercial acumen and so-called commercial 
                                                389	  The	  drafters	  of	  the	  Navigation	  Acts	  most	  likely	  never	  considered	  prohibitions	  about	  gender.	   	  For	  them,	  the	  concern	  was	  about	  nationality	  and	  one	  nation	  in	  particular.	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complexities presented few problems for Dutch women, such capable entrepreneurs, in 
this age. 
 
Jacob Leisler as a Merchant 
 On May 16, 1691, a large crowd stood in Manhattan’s drizzling rain to witness 
the beheading of Jacob Leisler and his son-in-law, Jacob Milborne. As the ax fell, the 
“shrieks of the people,” fainting women, and tumultuous jostling for “pieces of his 
garments” and strands of Leisler's hair, as “for a martyr,” gripped the crowd with 
hysteria.390    
 Before the events that took his life in 1691, Jacob Leisler was a prosperous New 
York merchant who had an extensive trade network with Dutch merchants. He is 
representative not only of the type of trade conducted, but also the manner in which the 
trade was conducted. 
 Leisler joined the Dutch West India Company in 1659 and in 1660 he was sent to 
New Netherland.  Shortly after arriving in New Amsterdam, Leisler entered into the fur 
and tobacco trades.  As commercial opportunities presented themselves, he later added 
salt, grain products, fish, whale oil, and horses to his export trade and spices, human 
cargoes (indentured and slave), finished clothe, and trade goods to his import business.391  
                                                390	  See	   Robert	   C.	   Ritchie,	   The	  Duke’s	   Province:	   A	   Study	   of	  New	  York	   Politics	   and	   Society,	   1664-­‐1691	  (Chapel	   Hill:	   The	   University	   of	   North	   Carolina	   Press,	   1977),	   198-­‐231.	   The	   Amsterdam	   archives	  contain	   numerous	   notarial	   minutes	   from	   individuals	   making	   declarations	   in	   support	   of	   Leisler’s	  actions.	   	   The	   declarations	   were	   made	   for	   presentation	   before	   a	   court	   of	   inquest	   in	   the	   Dutch	  Republic,	  which	  subsequently	  applied	  pressure	  on	  the	  English	  government	  concerning	  Leisler’s	  and	  Milborne’s	   execution.	   	   See	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   4752/79	   (1691);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   4752/394	   (1691);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4752/84	  (1691);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4753/135	  (1691);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4753/203	  (1691).	  391	  See	   Claudia	   Schnurmann,	   “Merchants,	   Ministers	   and	   the	   Van	   Rensselaer-­‐Leisler	   Controversy	   of	  1676	   as	   a	   Dress	   Rehearsal	   for	   1689,”	   in	   Jacob	   Leisler’s	   Atlantic	   World	   in	   the	   Later	   Seventeenth	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 Leisler’s trading activities provided wealth and social position making him a 
prominent member of the New York community.  In August 1664, he was among the 
residents of New Netherland urging Governor-General Petrus Stuyvesant to surrender the 
colony to the invading English, and a month later he was one of the first to swear 
allegiance to the new regime.392  Becoming an English citizen only broadened the 
commercial opportunities available to him by incorporating multiple national claims 
(German, Dutch, and English), privileges (Dutch and English), and options in his 
widening Atlantic network. 
 As early as 1674, Leisler had increased his transatlantic trading connections and 
began chartering ships and cargo space for voyages between New York and Amsterdam.  
In 1674, for instance, Leisler worked in cooperation with other New York merchants to 
buy shares of freight on the ship St. Michiel, for a voyage from New York to Amsterdam.  
Leisler shipped 14 otters, 4 wolf skins, 9 foxes, 84 hams, and 13 deerskins to Amsterdam 
merchant Cornelis Moij.393  In addition to Leisler, other New York merchants, including 
the Van Rensselaers and Gabriel Minvielle, undertook the illicit trade with merchants in 
Amsterdam. In 1675, he had 160 hogsheads of Virginia tobacco that he wished to sell to 
two Amsterdam merchants.  Of course, the direct shipments from New York to 
                                                                                                                                            
Century:	  Essays	  on	  Religion,	  Militia,	  Trade,	  and	  Networks,	  ed.,	   Hermann	  Wellenreuther	   (Piscataway,	  NJ:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  2009),	  69-­‐88.	  392	  The	   articles	   of	   capitulation	   were	   the	   terms	   by	   which	   the	   colony	   was	   surrendered	   and	   that	  established	   the	   rights	   of	  Dutch	   settlers	   under	  English	   rule.	   Among	   the	  24	   articles	  were	  provisions	  that	   guaranteed	   certain	   permanent	   rights,	   including	   liberty	   of	   conscience	   in	   divine	   worship	   and	  church	  discipline,	   the	  possession	  of	  property	  rights,	  and	   the	  right	  of	   the	  Dutch	   to	   follow	   their	  own	  customs	   with	   regard	   to	   inheritance.	   	   See	   E.B.	   O’Callaghan	   and	   Berthold	   Fernow,	   eds.,	   Documents	  
Relative	  to	  the	  Colonial	  History	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  (Albany:	  Weed,	  Parsons,	  and	  Company,	  1856),	  2:248-­‐50.	  393	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2629	  (1676).	   	  Moij	  would	  be	  the	  merchant	  with	  whom	  Leisler	  interacted	  most	  frequently.	   	   See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   3808/557-­‐8	   (1682);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   3266/62	   (1683);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3270/113	  (1684);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5515/97	  (1687).	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Amsterdam were in contravention of the Navigation Acts.394 
 Leisler’s successes in chartering ships allowed him to expand his business options 
by purchasing his own vessel.  He purchased the Neptune and the Susannah of New 
Yorke.  Both vessels were for the transatlantic trade, particularly trade with the Dutch 
Republic. 395   A shrewd merchant, Leisler tried to find ambiguities in the various 
provisions regulating trade by English merchants.  His captains were instructed to call 
dutifully at English ports, but then continue to Dutch ports with contraband such as 
tobacco and to return directly to the American colonies without stopping at English ports 
as required by law. 
 Leisler’s career as a merchant is often overlooked.  Nevertheless, he is 
representative of the type of transatlantic trade that continued between the Dutch 
Republic and New York subsequent to 1670.  Newly naturalized English merchants from 
the former New Netherland took advantage of the particular opportunity trade under the 
Navigation Acts presented to them.  That is, they maintained the well-established trading 
networks with Amsterdam merchants while utilizing their English citizenship to 
effectively conceal their trading activities from local officials and evade taxation 
obligations such as duty.  Playing both sides was for Dutch merchants part of the ordinary 
course of business. 
                                                394	  See,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3897/72	  (1675).	  The	  sale	  of	  tobacco	  was	  to	  Amsterdam	  merchants	  Cornelis	  Moy	  and	  Jan	  Hendrick	  Sibingh.	  395	  Leisler	  had	  less	  success	  with	  ship	  ownership	  than	  he	  had	  by	  simply	  purchasing	  space	  on	  vessels.	  	  The	   ship,	   Susannah	  of	  New	  Yorke,	   sailed	   in	   1677	   from	  Maryland	   to	   Dover,	   England.	   North	   African	  corsairs	   captured	   the	   vessel	   as	   it	   sailed	   either	   to	   or	   from	  Amsterdam.	   	   Leisler	   and	   his	   crew	  were	  imprisoned	  and	  taken	  to	  Algeria	  from	  where	  they	  were	  eventually	  ransomed.	  See	  David	  W.	  Voorhees,	  “Captured:	   The	   Turkish	   Slavery	   of	   the	   Susannah,”	   in	   Seaport	   Magazine,	   3	   (1997):	   6-­‐11.	   In	   the	  meantime,	  his	  wife,	  Elsie,	  was	  responsible	  for	  his	  business.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3631B/347	  (1678)	  (denying	   a	   bill	   of	   exchange).	   See	   also	   Claudia	   Schnurmann,	   Atlantische	   Welten:	   Engländer	   und	  
Niederländer	  im	  amerikanisch-­‐atlantischen	  Raum	  1648-­‐1713	  (Köln:	  Böhlau	  Verlag	  GmbH	  &	  Cie,	  1998).	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The Eighteenth Century Begins: 1700-1750 
 Nearly forty years of English political rule in New York did not diminish the 
persistence of trade between Dutch merchants and their New York colleagues. Several 
Amsterdam merchant houses, including John de Neufville & Zoon, John Hodshon, 
Daniel Crommelin & Zoon, Levinus Clarkson, and Thomas and Adrian Hope continued 
to build their trading networks and engaged additional agents and factors in New York, 
particularly for financial transactions such as discounting bills of exchange and making 
money transfers. Agents also sought out trade to fill the ships sailing to New York from 
the Dutch Republic with European goods. Even after nearly one hundred years of English 
political rule in New York, Lewis Morris, Judge-Commissary of the New York Vice-
Court of Admiralty would complain bitterly in 1750: “The [Dutch] are known to be the 
cheapest carriers in the world.”396 
 At the end of the seventeenth century, after an influx of English merchants, the 
New York Colonial Assembly passed legislation that taxed exports and imports, and 
forbad foreign vessels at New York City.  The legislation could be viewed as an offshoot 
of the Navigation Acts in an attempt to curb Dutch trade specifically. The Assembly also 
more vigorously regulated New York’s commerce with New England and Philadelphia in 
an attempt to curtail the notorious illicit activities of Amsterdam merchants from previous 
                                                396	  	   Despite	   being	   of	   Dutch	   ancestry,	   Morris	   was	   known	   for	   his	   animosity	   against	   the	   Dutch.	   	   He	  acquired	  knowledge	  about	  Dutch	  trading	  patterns	  and	  the	  duplicity	  contained	  within	  ships’	  papers.	  	  He	  condemned	  nearly	  every	  Dutch	  ship	  brought	  to	  his	  court	  as	  a	  prize.	  	  Morris	  criticized	  the	  Dutch	  as	  being	   “public	   factors	   for	   the	   enemy.”	   	   See	   Michael	   Watson,	   “Lewis	   Morris	   Jr.:	   British	   American	  Officeholder,”	   in	   The	   Human	   Tradition	   in	   Colonial	   America,	   ed.	   Ian	   K.	   Steele,	   Nancy	   L.	   Rhoden	  (Wilmington:	  Scholarly	  Resources,	  1999),	  181-­‐96.	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decades.397   
 The legislation passed, despite the fact that several assemblymen were of Dutch 
ancestry and actively engaged in trade and, most probably, many other assemblymen of 
non-Dutch ancestry were reliant on trade that included Amsterdam and Dutch merchants. 
Before 1690, trade to Amsterdam was dynamic and New York merchants had extensive 
shares in vessels to Amsterdam. After that, trade began to diminish, but not because of a 
lack of interest or persistence. 
 Rather, Dutch merchants had faced their own difficulties with wars waging 
throughout Europe at the turn of the century.  Trading networks were disrupted and 
shipping lanes blocked by belligerent nations.  Nevertheless, trade continued although in 
a more muted manner.  And by the second decade of the century, trading patterns 
returned to pre-war levels. 
 One reason trading patterns from the Dutch Republic to the English colonies 
resumed was that the barriers to entry were low for merchants. Barriers to entry were 
anything that made it difficult for a new entrant to break into a market. Capital costs were 
often a key barrier to entry where the investment that needed to be made in fixed assets 
(such as ships) by a start-up was high relative to the sales and profits such assets would 
generate. Yet, a middling merchant from the Dutch Republic could secure space on a ship 
sailing to New York with ease.  There was no need for a substantial capital investment of 
purchasing a ship.  Certainly, shipping costs were higher during periods of war.  
However, when such periods concluded or even waned, the market for middling 
merchants opened because shipping costs did not have the added premium of war 
                                                397	  The	   Colonial	   Laws	   of	   New	   York	   from	   the	   Year	   1664	   to	   the	   Revolution	   (Albany:	   J.B.	   Lyon,	   1894),	  1:518-­‐526.	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associated risk.  At that point, middling merchants found trade with New York again 
enticing and suggestive of profits. 
 Often, networks could be a substantial barrier to entry.  Typically, any merchants 
first at a geographical location had certain advantages over merchants who arrived later.  
As time progressed, such barriers to entry became stronger.  That was not the case with 
trade to New York.  Although there were established trading networks, the networks 
seemed to encourage and accept new trading partners. 
 What should have been a significant barrier to entry with trade to New York or 
any English colony in North America was mostly ignored.  The English government’s 
attempt to create a legal barrier to entry through the Navigation Acts was easily evaded.  
Once middling merchants perceived the evasion taking place, they, too, could participate 
in trade from the Dutch Republic. 
 Merchants such as Barent Reinders of New York, son-in-law of Jacob Leisler, 
saw opportunity. In 1700, Reinders bought the Nieuw Jork Pinck in Rotterdam. He 
engaged as captain Nicolaas Gerritse, a New Yorker experienced in the Amsterdam-New 
York route.  In Amsterdam, Reinders explained his method of circumventing English 
laws.  His method permitted the ship, New York Pink, to set sail for the West Indies and 
other places at his direction.  He also declared that he owned the ship’s freight and that 
the captain and crew understood he owned the ship and its freight. All commercial 
transactions were done in his name so as to enjoy English liberties and the liberties 
extended to the English plantations.  In reality, his sister, Alida Reinders, widow of Jan 
van Grift, and herself a merchant in Amsterdam, owned one-half of the ship; his brother, 
Jan Reinders, an Amsterdam merchant, owned one quarter of the ship; and, Michiel 
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Haulsey owned one quarter of the ship.398 
 This particular notarial record is one of the most transparent records that recorded 
how merchants in the Dutch Republic and the English colonies avoided the provisions of 
the English Navigation Acts.  Confident that English officials did not have access to 
notarial minutes, parties made declarations that evidenced commercial obligations and 
were, nevertheless, illegal.  It was as if two commercial realities existed: one for 
appearances before English officials and the other actual.399 
 The New York Pink arrived in New York without incident in September 1700. It 
brought Dutch commodities from Amsterdam to New York for the account of Jacob van 
Cortlandt. The ship continued sailing between New York and Amsterdam through 1704. 
Reinders, often in partnership with Van Cortlandt, supplied American commodities to 
Amsterdam merchants.400  Reinders persisted in trade with partners in Amsterdam at least 
through 1715.401 
 More than one family of Dutch ancestry in New York sent sons to Amsterdam 
and to London to secure commercial opportunities and to act as agents in their respective 
cities. By 1718, the three Clarkson brothers, David, Levinus, and Matthew were 
                                                398	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   5876/32.	   	   Alida	   paid	   2912	   guilders	   for	   her	   one-­‐half	   share;	   Jan	  Reinders	   paid	  1456	  for	  his	  quarter	  share;	  and	  Michiel	  Haulseij	  paid	  937	  for	  his	  quarter	  share.	  	  399	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5878/132	  (1700).	  This	  particular	  record	  noted	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  vessel,	  de	  
Hoopewell,	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  England.	  	  The	  ship	  was	  sailing	  from	  New	  York	  to	  Amsterdam.	  	  A	  number	  of	  prominent	   Amsterdam	   merchants	   executed	   a	   power	   of	   attorney	   in	   favor	   of	   Adolphus	   Philipse,	   a	  English	  citizen	  of	  Dutch	  ancestry,	  living	  in	  New	  York,	  to	  journey	  to	  England	  to	  retain	  their	  interests	  in	  any	   goods	   salvaged	   from	   the	   ship.	   	   The	   intention	  was	   for	   Philipse,	   as	   an	   English	   citizen,	   to	   direct	  attention	   away	   from	   the	   Dutch	   ownership	   of	   the	   goods	   and	   claim	   ownership	   himself.	   	   The	  Amsterdam	   merchants	   involved	   included:	   Hero	   Moij,	   Livinius	   van	   Schaik,	   Anthonij	   Kops,	   Willem	  Bancken,	   Pieter	   van	   Dijck,	   Jeronimo	   Coesaart,	   Johannes	   Lepper,	   Steven	   Melony,	   Bernardus	  Holthuijsen,	  and	  Reinier	  and	  Jan	  Dijkhuijsen.	  400	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5884	  (1702).	  401	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5934	  (1715).	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established merchants in London, Amsterdam, and New York respectively.402  David 
would return from London after six years, but Levinus remained in Amsterdam and 
provided a valuable nexus in the family’s trading network until at least 1745. 
 In turn, Levinus became the focal point for trade that extended familial trade 
beyond New York to Suriname, Curaçao, Hamburg, and Rotterdam.  He collected freight 
charges on behalf of ship’s captains and handled damage claims.403  He arranged for the 
captain and sailors to make declarations about a vessel laden with Campeche wood and 
taken by Spanish privateers in Honduras. The ship originated from New York and 
Levinus had an interest in the cargo.404  He provided payment for colonial merchants 
pursuant to bills of exchange presented to him and extended credit.405  
 And, in an uncommon situation, Levinus contracted to make transport 
arrangements for Ashkenazi Jews, both in the Dutch Republic and in Germany, for 
relocation to New York.  Several hundred people were put in his care and transported.  
Government officials required Levinus to post a bond as there was concern about the 
“damage” the people could do and that one or more would remain and take up begging.406  
Levinus’s trading networks in New York included Jews and he might have undertaken 
such arrangements to solidify his commercial relationships. 
                                                402	  David	   was	   born	   in	   1694,	   Levinus	   in	   1696,	   and	   Matthew	   in	   1699.	   Their	   father	   was	   English,	  Matthew	  Clarkson,	  and	  their	  mother	  was	  of	  Dutch	  ancestry,	  Catharina	  van	  Schaick.	   	  Catharina	  died	  while	  her	  sons	  were	  still	  small	  boys.	  	  Her	  sister,	  Margrieta	  van	  Schaick	  undertook	  their	  care.	  	  Perhaps	  this	   is	  where	   they	  received	   their	  commercial	   training	  as	   it	  was	  reputed	   that	  Margrieta	   “engaged	   in	  mercantile	   adventures	   and	   conducted	   a	   profitable	   trade	   with	   foreign	   countries.	   She	   became	   very	  wealthy	  and	  was	  the	  owner	  of	  considerable	  real	  estate	  in	  the	  city.”	  See	  The	  Clarksons	  of	  New	  York:	  A	  
Sketch	  (New	  York:	  Bradstreet	  Press,	  1875),	  1:144.	  403	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8619/1340	  (1726).	  404	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8700/1107	  (1733).	  405	  See,	  e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8723/252	  (1735);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8723/261	  (1735);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8745/2172	  (1736);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8748/2574	  (1736);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10374/1594	  (1745).	  406	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8935/2229	  (1736);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  7671/346	  (1736);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10305/339	  (1737);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10310/402	  (1738).	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 Levinus was a middling merchant in Amsterdam.  So, too, was Abraham ter 
Borch.  He represented Andrew Fresneau, a prominent New York merchant, in the Dutch 
Republic.407  Over a seven year period, Ter Borch accepted and denied bills of exchange 
on behalf of Fresneau,408 exposed information relating to the loss of a ship,409 and 
contracted with bergwerkers (literally, mountain workers or miners) on behalf of 
Fresneau in New York.410   
 Ter Borch arranged only one trading voyage on behalf of Fresneau. Nicolas 
Timmote, captain of The Henry and Margret, took a load of European goods to New 
York with instructions to unload the same, load the ship with trading goods for Virginia, 
trade such goods for hogsheads of tobacco, and return to Amsterdam.411  Additionally, 
Ter Borch arrested a ship on Fresneau’s behalf.412  Fresneau asserted that Rosewel and 
                                                407	  The	  Fresneau	   family	  came	   to	  New	  York	   from	  Paris	  via	  London	   in	  1709.	  They	  rapidly	   joined	   the	  colonial	  trading	  networks	  established	  by	  merchants	  of	  Dutch	  ancestry	  including	  the	  Livingstons	  and	  Beekmans.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  The	  Colonial	  Laws	  of	  New	  York	  from	  the	  Year	  1664	  to	  the	  Revolution	  (Albany:	  J.B.	  Lyon,	  1894),	  1:913-­‐4.	  	  	  408	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6451/278	  (1725);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8611/842	  (1725).	  409	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8612/1181	  (1725).	  410	  See,	  e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6440/559	  (1720);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6442/210	  (1721);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6443/454	  (1721);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6443/455	  (1721);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6443/475	  (1721).	   	   In	  each	  of	  these	  contracts,	  Ter	  Borch	  engaged	  workers	  from	  Germany	  for	  Andrew	  Fresneau	  for	  specific	  terms	  of	  service.	  	  The	  project	  was	  one	  in	  which	  Fresneau	  partnered	  with	  Charles	  Crommelin	  (father	  of	   Daniel	   Crommelin,	   see	   below)	   for	   a	   copper	  mining	   venture	   in	   Simsbury,	   Connecticut	   (north	   of	  Hartford).	  Ter	  Borch	  contracted	  with	  an	  Opperste	  Bergwerker	  (Supreme	  Mountain	  Worker);	  a	  copper	  smelter;	   a	   carpenter;	   ordinary	   laborers;	  mountain	  workers	   (miners);	   and	   a	   superintendent	   of	   the	  miners.	   	   For	   further	   details	   on	   the	   Simsbury	   mine,	   see	   Effie	   Mae	   Prickett,	   	   Connecticut	   Archives,	  
Industry,	  1708-­‐1789	  (Hartford:	  1921).	  	  As	  well,	  Benelle	  en	  Compagnie,	  also	  merchants	  in	  Amsterdam,	  and	  agents	  for	  Charles	  Crommelin,	  contracted	  with	  German	  miners	  to	  travel	  to	  New	  York	  for	  a	  term	  of	  years	  to	  work	  at	  the	  copper	  mine.	  	  See,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8565	  (1718).	  411	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6110A	  (1718).	  412	  “Arresting”	  a	  vessel	  was	  a	  legal	  procedure	  well	  established	  in	  English	  maritime	  law.	  	  As	  the	  name	  implies,	  the	  vessel	  in	  question	  was	  legally	  prevented	  from	  moving	  or	  trading	  pending	  the	  resolution	  of	  a	  court	  action	   in	  which	  more	  often	  than	  not	  the	  vessel	   to	  be	  arrested	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  claim.	  The	  arrest	  was	  undertaken	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  claim	  rather	  than	  an	  arrest	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  	  In	  simple	  terms,	  a	  party	  who	  wished	  to	  take	  action	  against	  another	  on	  a	  claim	  wanted	  to	  know	  that,	  should	   they	  be	   successful	   in	   court,	   there	  was	  be	   something	   that	   could	  be	   sold	   to	   recover	  what	   the	  judgment	  had	  determined.	  	  A	  court	  could	  determine	  which	  party	  was	  at	  fault,	  but	  did	  not	  intervene	  to	  recover	  damages	  on	  the	  successful	  litigant’s	  behalf.	  On	  the	  assumption	  there	  was	  a	  right	  to	  arrest,	  the	  vessel	  became	  the	  security	  and	  the	  ultimate	  sanction	  was	  that	  a	  court	  would	  order	  the	  vessel	  sold	  to	  satisfy	  the	  claim.	  The	  ship	  could	  be	  released	  quickly	  and	  was	  able	  to	  make	  money	  for	  the	  owner.	  In	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Monteneij, merchants in Madeira, owed him 1000 guilders and instructed Ter Borch to 
act on his behalf when a ship linked with Rosewel and Monteneij was next in 
Amsterdam’s port.413   
 The relationship with Fresneau seemed to be the only trading relationship Ter 
Borch had with merchants in colonial America.  There is no indication of why Ter Borch 
decided against trading to North America again, but he and his sons did establish trading 
networks with, among others, Irish merchants.414 
 Levinus Clarkson and Abraham ter Borch, not unlike many Amsterdam 
merchants, had trading activity with New York merchants over several years, which may 
be traced through the notarial records. Still, there are glimpses of other Amsterdam 
merchants and their trade with New York only because of damage occurring to cargos 
through storms or alleged theft.  It is through the loss of a vessel or cargo, or both, that 
the extent and type of trade from Amsterdam and New York in this period becomes 
apparent.   
 For instance, the Anna, sailing from New York to Amsterdam in 1701, 
encountered several storms on its voyage.  Members of the crew provided declarations 
about the state of the cargo in New York and the concerns they had about potentially 
losing the vessel due to the storms.  On board was a shipment of Brazilian wood 
(Braziliehout) and furs.415  While the furs were obtained through trading networks with 
Indians in New York or Canada, the Brazilian wood most likely came through Caribbean 
                                                                                                                                            some	   instances,	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   arrest	   brought	   forth	   the	   required	   undertakings.	   	   See	   F.L.	  Wiswall,	  Jr.,	  The	  Development	  of	  Admiralty	  Jurisdiction	  and	  Practice	  Since	  1800:	  An	  English	  Study	  with	  
American	  Comparisons	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1970).	  413	  See,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  6110A	  (1718).	  414 	  See	   Thomas	   M.	   Truxes,	   “Dutch-­‐Irish	   Cooperation	   in	   the	   Mid-­‐Eighteenth	   Century	   Wartime	  Atlantic,”	  in	  Early	  American	  Studies:	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  Journal	  10	  (2012):	  319.	  415	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3350/594	  (1701).	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networks. 
 Similarly, the cargo of The Dragon sustained storm damage and members of her 
crew affirmed that the damage was not as a result of theft.  This ship carried from New 
York to Amsterdam a variety of goods including sugar, cotton, wool, cocoa, furs, and 
Campeche wood.416 Comparable damage occurred to The Sarah and her crew attested to 
the storms encountered from New York to Amsterdam. The spoiled cargo aboard 
included rice, Campeche wood, red wood, tobacco, and other goods from New York.417 
Aside from the furs, none of the goods aboard the Anna, The Dragon, or The Sarah 
would have been grown or produced in New York. Yet, the shipments suggest the 
continuing importance of New York as an entrepôt and transshipment point for trading 
networks between New York and Amsterdam.   
 Spanish and English privateers wreaked havoc for merchants regardless of their 
prominence.  The difference was that wealthier merchants nearly always insured their 
vessels, could distribute their goods among several ships departing for the same location, 
and could absorb limited financial losses.  Small to middling merchants who participated 
in transatlantic trade did not always insure their cargos due to cost considerations, could 
not necessarily distribute smaller cargos among several vessels, and could rarely sustain 
financial losses. But seizures by privateers also provided inventories of goods aboard 
ships, most often used for insurance purposes, which originated in New York. For 
instance, the crew aboard the Little Strength explained at the request of the ship’s owners 
that a Spanish privateer, The Esperance, seized the entire cargo west of the Scilly Isles on 
a voyage from New York to Amsterdam.  The ship was ladened with Campeche wood, 
                                                416	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5939	  (1716).	  417	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10361/1291	  (1744).	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hides, wax and any number of other goods.418  
 And Willem van Brienen, a merchant in Amsterdam, was forced to give a power 
of attorney to merchants in London when English privateers took his vessel, The Arnold 
and John Gally, in 1746 off the coast of New York.  Van Brienen requested the London 
merchants to appeal to the King of England or whomever it may be appropriate the 
decision made by the judges in New York.  He asked that the vessel’s confiscation be 
withdrawn and both the vessel and cargo be returned to him.  The vessel carried a cargo 
hold full of European goods for the New York market that provides an opportunity to see 
what was thought to trade well.419 
 Despite incidents of privateering, lapsed payments, or damaged vessels, Dutch 
merchants in Amsterdam continued to trade with New York merchants.  Trading 
networks were too entangled and the promise of new opportunities was too great for 
Dutch merchants to consider abandoning the region. 
  
Daniel Crommelin – The Emergence of a Modern Merchant 
 Of French Huguenot origins, Daniel Crommelin was born in a British New York 
and immigrated to the Dutch Republic in 1724.420  Evidence suggests that he was sent 
over to Amsterdam to receive commercial training and to represent his father’s trading 
interests there.  The Atlantic world was for Crommelin the backdrop by which he 
                                                418	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  9403/12158	  (1744).	  419	  See,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   10236/420	   (1746);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   12789/205	   (1746).	   	   Lewis	  Morris,	  noted	  previously,	  served	  as	  one	  of	  the	   judges	  upholding	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  vessel	  and	  approving	  its	  sale.	  420	  The	  oldest	   sources	   about	   the	   family	   go	  back	   to	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   twelfth	   century	  when	   they	  were	  located	  near	  Lisseweg	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Bruge.	  	  Later,	  they	  were	  part	  of	  the	  patricians	  of	  Ghent	  and	  Kortijk.	  	  As	  early	  as	  the	  fifteenth	  century,	  the	  family	  operated	  as	  a	  linen	  manufacturer	  in	  Kortrijk.	  	  French	  intolerance	  of	  Huguenots	  forced	  the	  Crommelin	  family,	  along	  with	  many	  others,	  to	  emigrate	  from	  France.	  	  The	  Crommelins	  immigrated	  to	  the	  Dutch	  Republic	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century.	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established his thriving and formidable banking and commercial house.421  And while 
Crommelin traded throughout the British colonies in North America, he had a particularly 
significant commercial network in New York. 
 From 1724 through 1750, Crommelin laid the foundations for his trading network.  
As early as 1739, Crommelin had pieced together transatlantic trading linkages.  In a 
notarial record, he noted that he was an agent for Joan [Jan] van Sevenhoven of New 
York.422  He gave a power of attorney to Johannes Specht Nicolaasz, a merchant in 
Rotterdam, to act on Van Sevenhoven’s behalf.423  The record indicates that Crommelin 
maintained commercial contact with merchants in New York. The records suggests that 
Crommelin’s business had not yet become large enough to have a family member or 
other trusted merchant in his employment residing in Rotterdam.  As a consequence, he 
was forced to appoint another merchant to act on his behalf. 
 Crommelin represented New York merchant Gulian Verplanck in Amsterdam by 
1740.  Not only did Crommelin and Verplanck have close familial ties (Verplanck had 
married Crommelin’s sister), but also their families were of French Huguenot ancestry 
and immigrated to New Netherland several generations earlier.  As Verplank’s 
commercial representative, Crommelin undertook on Verplanck’s behalf to ascertain the 
proceeds from the sale of flour, butter, and milk biscuits to Edward Tothill in Suriname.  
Crommelin enlisted the aid of Isaac de la Croix for an account from Tothill of the goods 
                                                421	  The	  Stadsarchief	  Amsterdam	  has	  extensive	  materials	  on	   the	   family	  and	   the	   family’s	   commercial	  archives	  from	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  through	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  The	  archive	  is	  known	  under	  the	  title	  “Daniel	  Crommelin	  and	  Soonen.”	  422 	  The	   Van	   Sevenhovens	   were	   early	   residents	   in	   New	   Netherland.	   	   See	   Newbold	   LeRoy,	   III,	  “Appendix:	  The	  Van	  Sevenhoven	  Family	  of	  La	  Rochelle,	  Rotterdam,	  and	  New	  York”,	  in	  The	  New	  York	  
Genealogical	  and	  Biographical	  Record,	  131	  (April	  2000),	  93-­‐5.	  423	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  11248/103	  (1739).	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that had arrived aboard the Joanna.424  Either through direct business dealings or through 
familial connections, Crommelin was able to secure a representative in Suriname, thus 
providing linkages for his trading network. 
 The brothers-in-law relied on each other for commercial and personal matters.425  
In 1740, Crommelin provided a power of attorney to Verplanck to sell his plantation 
Watereiland [Water Island], including the buildings, slaves, and tools, on Pointe 
Pasquereau in Guadeloupe.  Crommelin had inherited the plantation from Pierre le 
Surrurier and his father, Charles Crommelin.426  This suggests that Verplanck had a 
stronger commercial network in the French Caribbean than Crommelin.   
 And while Crommelin had numerous commercial transactions with New York 
merchants, he occasionally was forced to seek legal recourse against some.  In 1742, 
Crommelin gave a power of attorney to John Peter Blaquire, a noted London merchant 
and attorney, to arrest a ship named Albany, captained by James Clark.  Three New 
York merchants, Henry Cuyler, James Alexander, and Robert Livingston, and a London 
merchant, Samuel Storke, owned the ship.  All four men were prominent merchants in 
                                                424	  Tothill	  was	  a	  Boston	  lawyer	  who	  had	  invested	  in	  a	  plantation	  in	  Suriname.	  	  De	  la	  Croix	  was	  also	  of	  Huguenot	  ancestry.	  	  De	  la	  Croix	  later	  built	  a	  coffee	  plantation	  in	  1745	  on	  the	  Commewijnerivier	  in	  the	  district	  Commewijne	  in	  Suriname.	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8950/20	  (1740).	  425	  Crommelin	   appointed	   Verplanck	   as	   representative	   for	   his	   underage	   brother,	   Charles,	   in	   an	  inheritance	   matter.	   	   Crommelin’s	   grandmother,	   Mary	   Sinclair,	   widow	   of	   Robert	   Sinclair,	   had	  bequeathed	   a	   life	   estate	   in	   several	   houses,	   land,	   and	   other	   property	   to	   her	   daughter,	   Crommelin’s	  mother,	   Hanna.	   	   The	   co-­‐executors	   of	   the	   estate	   asked	   to	   be	   relieved	   of	   the	   administration	   of	   the	  property	   and	   to	   allow	  Hanna	   the	   administration	   as	   long	   as	   she	   did	   not	   remarry.	   	   Crommelin	   had	  already	   received	   the	   bulk	   of	   his	   inheritance	   from	   his	   father,	   but	   sought	   to	   protect	   his	   brother’s	  interests.	  	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8952/792	  (1740).	  	  Crommelin	  had	  his	  own	  difficulties	  administering	  his	   father’s	   estate.	   	  He	  gave	  powers	  of	   attorney	   to	   various	  merchants	   to	   collect	   on	  debts	  owed	  his	  father’s	  estate.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8954/334	  (1741)	  (account	  owed	  from	  St.	  Domingue);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8954/614	  (1741)(account	  owed	  from	  St	  Thomas	  in	  the	  Danish	  West	  Indies).	  426	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8950/263	  (1740).	  	  Crommelin’s	  father,	  Charles,	  had	  transported	  from	  Africa	  the	  slaves	  that	  worked	  the	  plantation.	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their respective cities.  Cuyler was of Dutch ancestry and a leading fur trader.427  James 
Alexander, a native of Scotland, immigrated to New York in his youth.  Most well known 
for his work as an attorney, he was also a businessman.428  Livingston, also a Scot by 
birth, was the New York agent for his brother, Philip, the second lord of Livingston 
manor and one of the largest wholesalers of Indian trade goods in Albany.429  Storke had 
founded one of the largest London mercantile houses engaged in transatlantic commerce 
in the eighteenth century.430  Crommelin alleged that the merchants owed him 1182 
guilders plus interest and he ordered Blaquire to search the ship once it was under 
arrest.431   
 Crommelin’s actions were tactically risky.  On the one hand, while he was 
becoming a leading merchant in Amsterdam, he risked the ire not only of the provincial 
merchants – Cuyler, Alexander, and Livingston – but of a well-respected London 
merchant as well. Each of the merchants had substantial trading networks that could have 
effectively impaired any future trade by Crommelin in New York. While the notarial 
                                                427	  See	  Cuyler	  Reynolds,	  Genealogical	  and	  Family	  History	  of	  Southern	  New	  York	  and	  the	  Hudson	  River	  
Valley	  (New	  York:	  Lewis	  Historical	  Publishing	  Company,	  1914),	  1188.	  428	  See	  Edmund	  B.	  O’Callaghan	  and	  Berthold	  Fernow,	  eds.,	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  the	  Colonial	  History	  
of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  (Albany:	  Weed,	  Parsons	  and	  Company,	  1853-­‐1887),	  Volumes	  4-­‐6.	  	  Alexander	  founded	   the	  New-­‐York	  Weekly	   Journal	   and	  was	   one	   of	   John	   Peter	   Zenger’s	   defense	   attorneys.	   	   His	  wife,	   Mary	   Spratt	   Provoost,	   was	   really	   the	   merchant	   in	   the	   family.	   	   She	   ran	   a	   New	   York	   based	  importing	  company	  that	  was	  considered	  one	  of	  the	  major	  mercantile	   firms	  of	  the	  Colonial	  era.	   	  See	  Joan	  N.	  Burstyn,	  Past	  and	  Promise:	  Lives	  of	  New	  Jersey	  Women	  (Syracuse:	  Syracuse	  University	  Press,	  1997).	   	   Her	   father	   was	   a	   merchant	   who	   had	   been	   born	   in	   Scotland	   and	   her	   mother	   was	   the	  descendant	  of	  prominent	  Dutch	  merchants	  (the	  DePeyster	  family).	  429	  See	   Cynthia	   A.	   Kierner,	  Traders	   and	  Gentlefolk:	  The	  Livingstons	   of	  New	  York,	   1675-­‐1790	   (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1992);	  Michael	  Kammen,	  Colonial	  New	  York:	  A	  History	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  430	  See	  William	   I.	  Roberts,	   III,	   “Samuel	   Storke:	  An	  Eighteenth-­‐Century	  London	  Merchant	  Trading	   to	  the	  American	  Colonies”	  in	  The	  Business	  History	  Review	  39	  (1965):	  147-­‐70.	  431	  Cuyler,	  Livingston,	  and	  Storke	  owned	  the	  vessel	  form	  1728.	  	  Ibid.,	  151.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  trade	  between	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  in	  1741,	  the	  partners	  sent	  the	  vessel	  to	  Honduras	  for	  logwood	  with	  instructions	  to	  sell	  the	  logwood	  in	  Amsterdam.	  	  There,	  Storke	  tried	  unsuccessfully	  to	  sell	  his	  share.	  In	  a	  dispute	  with	  his	  partners,	  Storke	  lost	  his	  ¼	  share	  in	  the	  Albany	  to	  pay	  his	  share	  of	  the	  crew’s	  wages.	  Ibid.,	  168.	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records do not note what sort of discussion the parties had prior to Crommelin’s actions, 
it should be assumed that he did not act hastily.  On the other hand, if Crommelin had not 
acted against the other merchants with regard to this particular debt, his reputation would 
have suffered. 
 Throughout the 1740’s, numerous ships sailed directly from New York to 
Crommelin’s Amsterdam warehouses carrying goods in contravention of the Navigation 
Acts.  The notarial records were effectively closed to British authorities and, 
consequently, illicit trading activities come to light through various insurance claims, 
charter agreements, and general disputes. 
 Often, notaries were employed in anticipation of, or to thwart, litigation. 
Crommelin used them regularly for such purposes.  In 1745-1746, Crommelin, over a 
four-month period, appeared before a notary about the voyage of a ship named Jane. The 
ship was sailing from New York to Amsterdam.  Crommelin received notice that the ship 
had come into difficulty at Terschelling and some of the cargo needed to be unloaded 
there.432 In October, Crommelin gave power of attorney to a local resident to make 
arrangements to convey his cargo with the ship or another vessel.433  
 The following month, Crommelin requested that crewmembers appear before a 
notary to give a description of events on the voyage.  The mate, carpenter, and sailors 
described how the ship was laden with sugar, hides, and other cargo from New York.  
Near Kampen, the ship encountered heavy storms.434  The crew managed to reach 
Terschelling, but once there, they described how local residents who had been hired to 
                                                432	  Terschelling	  is	  an	  island	  in	  the	  northern	  Netherlands,	  one	  of	  the	  West	  Frisian	  Islands.	  433	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10375/1896	  (1745).	  434	  Kampen	   is	   a	   town	   on	   the	   island	   Sylt,	   in	   the	   district	   of	   Nordfriesland,	   in	   Schleswig-­‐Holstein,	  Germany.	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load the cargo caused damage to the cargo.435   
 Shrewdly, Crommelin had utilized a notary to establish a record of his actions, 
first by requesting transshipment of the cargo from Terschelling and then by having 
crewmembers give a recent account of events. Later, in January 1746, the captain of the 
Jane, John Bill, appeared before a notary.  Bill stated, on behalf of the ship’s owners in 
New York, that he was required to start a protest against Crommelin if the ship had not 
unloaded its cargo within 23 days. Bill noted that the unloading delay was neither his 
fault nor Crommelin’s as the ship had suffered damage.  Inspectors for the insurance 
board delayed matters, and there was heavy frost suspending loading of the cargo.436  
Thus, Bill, most probably at Crommelin’s urging, provided a description of events that 
absolved both himself and Crommelin.  It was a skillful use by Crommelin of notarial 
records to excuse himself from liability and preserve a commercial relationship with the 
New York ship owners. 
 In the late 1740’s, privateers took a number of Crommelin’s ships.  The War of 
the Austrian Succession threatened traditional shipping lanes between New York and 
Amsterdam.437  New York was Crommelin’s primary North American port for trade.  In 
November 1746, The John, a ship in which Crommelin had an interest, was sailing from 
New York to Amsterdam.  Christiaan van der Kroon, an Amsterdam resident aboard the 
ship, recounted that a French frigate under the command of the Duke d’Anville took the 
ship.  Van der Kroon, the captain, and some of the passengers were transferred to the 
                                                435	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10376/2146	  (1745).	  436	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10378/30	  (1746).	  437	  The	  War	  of	  the	  Austrian	  Succession	  (1740–48),	  including	  King	  George's	  War	  in	  North	  America,	  the	  War	  of	  Jenkins'	  Ear,	  and	  two	  of	  the	  three	  Silesian	  wars,	  involved	  most	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  Europe	  over	  the	  question	  of	  Maria	  Theresa's	  succession	  to	  the	  realms	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Habsburg.	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  the	  traditional	  enemies	  of	  France,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Sardinia	  and	  Saxony	  supported	  Austria.	  France	  and	  Prussia	  were	  allied	  with	  the	  Electorate	  of	  Bavaria	  and	  later	  Spain.	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frigate while The John was taken to Rochelle.438 
 In May 1747, Crommelin appeared before a notary regarding the ship Aurora.  
The vessel was sailing from New York to Amsterdam and had been previously insured 
earlier in the year.439  Crommelin received word that a French vessel had taken the 
Aurora as a prize.  In the notarial record, Crommelin listed all of the Amsterdam-based 
insurers and the New York merchants who would be affected by the news.440  Two 
months later, Crommelin affirmed the French had taken another ship, on which goods 
were consigned to him.  He also confirmed that two insurance polices totaling 8650 
guilders were in effect for the consigned items.  Crommelin also included information in 
his declaration that the English had retaken the vessel but the vessel had perished off the 
Scottish coast.441 
 Yet, again, in 1748, Crommelin reported the loss of goods aboard a ship taken by 
the French.  The Susanna was sailing from New York to Amsterdam when two French 
ships seized it off the eastern coast of Scotland, one commanded by Jean Baptiste de 
Cock and the other by Jean Pierre.  The captain of The Susanna offered £500 to £1,500 as 
ransom money (ransoengeld), but the privateers refused the offer.  The ship and its cargo 
were taken to Bergen, Norway.  Crommelin’s account of the goods aboard ship included 
the ship’s equipment, white French sugar, indigo, wood, tar, and rice. He also declared 
that he had no other insurance on the ship or goods aboard than that stated.442 
                                                438	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10396/1572	  (1747).	  439	  See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10390/98	   (1747).	   Abeleven	   &	   Comp.,	   merchants	   in	   Amsterdam,	   assured	  Crommelin	   they	  would	  subscribe	   for	   insurance	  coverage	  of	  1500	  guilders	   for	  goods	  carried	  by	   the	  vessel.	  	  Abeleven	  had	  not	  done	  so	  and	  Crommelin	  put	  them	  on	  notice	  that	  Abeleven	  would	  be	  liable	  for	  the	  damage.	  	  	  	  440	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10393/709	  (1747).	  441	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10398/1840	  (1747).	  442	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10404/1155	  (1748);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10404/1156	  (1748).	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 Despite the disruption of war to Crommelin’s trade, he continued to engage ships 
to transport goods to the Dutch Republic.  He did so because trade with New York was 
financially profitable and he had developed trade networks with family and non-family 
members. Had he curtailed his activities during the war, he might not have been able to 
regain the trade. Crommelin was also diligent in securing insurance on each cargo.  
Although he paid a higher premium during the war to account for the elevated risks of 
transport, it seemed that engaging in trade without insurance was untenable for 
Crommelin.   
 Crommelin made astute use of notaries.  When he anticipated difficulty, he 
engaged a notary’s services to create a written record of events and, in particular, his 
actions or reactions to such occurrence.  He also put other parties before a notary to 
chronicle their eyewitness account of an event.  Crommelin had such accounts prepared 
soon after an individual returned to Amsterdam as if he was preserving the freshness of 
their testimony.  He created a paper trail for insurers and adversaries that would have 
been difficult to dispute.   
 While Crommelin’s employment of a notary occurred mostly in anticipation of 
the loss of cargo or a ship, he also used notaries in the ordinary course of business, 
including charter agreements,443 denial of a bill of exchange,444 and powers of attorney.445  
                                                443	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8893/600	   (1750)	   (charter	   of	   ship	  The	  Samuel	  and	   Judith	   to	   St.	   John	  (Danish)	   and	   then	   to	   New	   York,	   returning	   to	   Amsterdam);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8893/653	   (1750)	  (charter	  of	  ship	  The	  Dragon	  to	  St.	  John	  and	  New	  York,	  returning	  to	  Amsterdam).	  	  444	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10395/1343	   (1747);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10395/1344	   (1747);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10416/1136	  (1749).	  445	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   12667/68	   (1749)	   (power	   of	   attorney	   given	   by	   ship’s	   captain	   to	  Crommelin	  to	  defend	  all	  matters	  concerning	  the	  ship	  that	  had	  arrived	  from	  New	  York);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10414/653	  (1749)	  (power	  of	  attorney	  given	  to	  Crommelin	  by	  Margareta	  van	  Bulderen	  to	  settle	  the	   inheritance	   for	   her	   children	   of	   her	   deceased	  husband’s	   estate	   in	  New	  York);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10416/971	  (1749)	  (power	  of	  attorney	  given	  to	  Crommelin	  by	  the	  ship’s	  captain	  to	  collect	  monies	  for	  delivered	  goods).	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Crommelin can be characterized as a merchant who exploited the available commercial 
resources offered to him, developed extensive trade networks not solely dependent on 
kinship or religious requisites, diversified his trading networks and activities 
geographically, and shrewdly continued to trade during times of war.  
   
Conclusion  
 The examples documented in this chapter prove a general trend: English laws did 
not destroy Dutch participation in transatlantic trade. Merchants in the Dutch Republic 
and in New York, such as Jacob Leisler, used available resources and creative 
subterfuges to establish lucrative niches and trading networks with each other after 1664 
and well into the eighteenth century. 
 Additionally, women of Dutch ancestry resident in New York continued to trade 
as merchants well into the eighteenth century.  Dutch cultural acceptance of women 
involved in commercial enterprises trumped any attempt to impose English norms for 
women’s participation outside of the domestic sphere on these women.  Women 
succeeded in trade because they were commercially astute, educated, and offered good 
trade that disregarded gender divisions. 
 Despite nearly forty years of physical possession of the colony of New York, 
English colonial administrators could do little to upend disregard for the Navigation Acts 
by their colonial subjects.  Nor did political boundaries mean much to the Dutch 
merchants who arrived from Europe to ply New York’s waters for trade.  Smuggling was 
just another means of engaging in trade, albeit with some additional risk involved.   
 Daniel Crommelin’s activities as a merchant reflected the continuously evolving 
role of Dutch merchants trading to the British colonies in North America during the mid-
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eighteenth century.  Many such merchants transitioned from only providing trade goods 
in exchange for a particular commodity to merchants who became bankers and provided 
the financing to acquire trade goods.  And, there were Dutch merchants, such as Daniel 
Crommelin and Sons and Hope & Company, who developed into substantial banking 
houses. They furnished financial support for the war efforts of the soon-to-be newly 
independent nation, as well as providing subsequent funds for large-scale public works 
projects and land purchases such as Erie Canal, the Holland Land Purchase, and the 
Louisiana Purchase to enable America to grow economically.  While historians have 
characterized Dutch merchants as commercially astute and tenacious, it is here, at the 
mid-point of the eighteenth century, that we recognize the modern businessperson and the 
ability to use all available resources – knowledge, institutional, economic – to engage in 
profitable trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 235 
Chapter 6 
 
“They had English Faces but Dutch Harts”446:  
Tobacco, Rice, and Dutch Merchants in the 
Chesapeake and South Carolina, 
1664-1750 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 In June 1742, Robert Pringle, a Scottish-born merchant who immigrated to 
Charleston, South Carolina in his youth, wrote his brother in London. In a typical 
exchanges between the two men, Robert would apprise his brother about the arrival of 
ships in Charleston’s harbor, the prices of various commodities, the progress of the rice 
crop for the year, requests for merchandise, and sundry items about his family.  
 In this particular letter, he requested his brother to obtain insurance in the London 
market on a sloop; he told of the receipt of a consignment of New England rum by a Mr. 
Thomas Hutchinson of Boston (who Robert had heard bore “a good Character there”); 
and he reported the arrival in Charleston’s port of a Spanish privateer who had allegedly 
cut Captain Jenkins’s ear some years ago, which subsequently caused disruption to trade.  
And there, in its midst, the letter contained a criticism. Quite simply, Robert wrote, 
“Those Dutch have gott too much into this trade.”447  That trade was the only one that 
mattered to a South Carolina merchant who wished to rise to prominence in this period – 
the rice trade.  Robert’s comment suggests animosity toward the Dutch.  For what reason, 
                                                446	  The	  remark	  was	  made	  about	  the	  merchants	  in	  Virginia	  and	  their	  proclivity	  toward	  and	  protection	  of	   foreign	  traders	   in	   this	  period.	  Frank	  Walczyk,	  ed.,	  Northampton	  County,	  VA	  Orders,	  Deeds	  &	  Wills,	  	  
1651-­‐1654	  (Coram,	  NY:	  Peter’s	  Row,	  1998)	  4:	  163.	  447	  Much	   of	   Robert	   Pringle’s	   early	   life	   is	   unknown.	   	   His	   brother,	   Andrew,	   was	   a	   sea	   captain	   who	  became	   a	  merchant	   and	   established	   his	   own	   trading	   house	   in	   London.	   	   The	   two	   brothers	   assisted	  each	   other,	   but	   did	   not	   operate	   as	   a	   formal	   partnership.	   	   Walter	   B.	   Edgar,	   ed.,	  The	   Letterbook	   of	  
Robert	  Pringle	  (Columbia:	  The	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1972),	  I:	  381-­‐2.	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is unknown.  He might have experienced a difficult trade with a Dutch merchant.  He 
might have felt that the Dutch carrying trade interceded into the English trade, to the 
detriment of his and his brother’s profits.  In any event, Robert noted his dissatisfaction 
about Dutch involvement in the rice trade. 
 The historiography concerning trade in the Chesapeake and Lower South during 
the period of 1664 to 1750 almost exclusively speaks about the vital partnerships of local 
colonial planters with English and Scots merchants.  If another nation is mentioned, it is a 
passing reference, almost as if a ship had blown off course and arrived along the James 
River or the harbors of Charleston or Savannah by happenstance. Nevertheless, the 
archival records and merchant correspondence belie the historiography and demonstrate 
the continuing and robust presence of Dutch merchants, shipping, and financing in the 
region.   
 The Dutch competed with the English for trade throughout the Atlantic, and 
particularly in colonial North America.  As has been contended throughout this work, the 
Dutch effectively disregarded political boundaries and often ignored administrative and 
fiscal exigencies.  Instead, they established trading networks with English planters and 
merchants by offering lower transaction costs, timely shipping of staples, and access to 
extensive European and Caribbean markets.  Their English partners were willing 
participants.  There was little English officials could do either within the colonies or 
elsewhere to enforce Navigation Acts regulations.  But, later during the mid-eighteenth 
century, as the British government allocated more resources to enforcement, particularly 
in the collection of duties, traders from other nations could not overtly disregard policies 
and regulations effecting trade in the British colonies. 
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 The first part of this chapter picks up the story of tobacco previously discussed in 
Chapter 3.  European demand for tobacco began to wane in this period, particularly as the 
quality of Chesapeake tobacco diminished.  Nevertheless, Dutch merchants continued to 
trade for tobacco in the Chesapeake and new commercial networks replaced old.  For the 
Dutch, tobacco was the most important commodity shipped to the Dutch Republic from 
North America.  As the tobacco trade evolved in the Chesapeake, so, too, did processing 
centers transform in Holland.  From Middelburg, to Rotterdam, and then to Amsterdam, 
each city held the distinction of being the center of tobacco processing in the Dutch 
Republic.  And each processing center added some sort of innovation to the tobacco 
trade. 
 Dutch merchants and English planters still engaged in subterfuge to hide Dutch 
national identities from English authorities. Though, because tobacco was such an 
important colonial export to England, colonial officials paid closer regard to Dutch 
activities in the region.  Attention by officials eased off during the 1690’s and early 
1700’s when the Dutch Republic was at war with France and Dutch shipping was 
otherwise employed in the war efforts.  Although Amsterdam remained dominant in the 
tobacco market, trade never returns to previous activity levels. 
 The second section of this chapter examines the development of the rice trade in 
South Carolina and the entry of Dutch merchants.  The colony of South Carolina initially 
struggled to find a commodity suitable for production and export.  When it finally landed 
upon rice, Dutch merchants expressed immediate interest because rice was such a valued 
staple in Europe.  English policymakers soon listed rice as an enumerated commodity that 
could only be shipped to England.  After years of protest, and much to the relief of Dutch 
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merchants, in 1730 South Carolina planters succeeded in convincing Parliament to allow 
the shipment of rice directly to Europe. 
 Despite the fact that rice was listed as an enumerated commodity, Dutch ships 
mostly ignored such petty bureaucracy and initiated trade directly with South Carolina 
planters. Soon trading networks flourished.  As early as 1711, Dutch merchants were 
investing in South Carolina rice plantations.  Through the 1720’s and 1730’s, Dutch 
shipping of South Carolina rice increased dramatically.  Even the largest merchant houses 
in Amsterdam became involved in the trade.  Although Dutch merchants made half-
hearted attempts to comply with the Navigation Acts, the lure of meeting market 
demands often persuaded them to sail directly to the Dutch Republic. 
  
 
Sailing for Tobacco Road – Continued Profits 
 
 Tobacco fueled the economy of the Chesapeake region during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  The single staple of the Chesapeake was the source of constant 
concern for planters, colonial officials, and merchants.    
 Despite the substantial growth in tobacco production in the Chesapeake, problems 
in price stability and quality existed.448  In 1660, when English and Dutch markets 
became glutted with tobacco, prices fell so low Chesapeake planters faced an economic 
crisis. Facing a loss of income without a means to offset losses, planters mixed other 
organic material with tobacco to increase the quantity of tobacco shipped overseas.  The 
immediate effect was to resolve short-term cash flow issues based on the increased 
quantity of tobacco shipped. Still, overproduction and a deterioration of the tobacco’s 
                                                448	  Terry	   L.	   Anderson	   and	   Robert	   Paul	   Thomas,	   “Economic	   Growth	   in	   the	   Seventeenth-­‐Century	  Chesapeake,”	  in	  Explorations	  in	  Economic	  History	  15	  (1978),	  368-­‐87.	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quality had serious consequences.449   
 European demand for Chesapeake tobacco declined, but did not completely 
diminish, as the staple’s quality was compromised.  Colonial authorities stepped in and 
took corrective measures.  During the last half of the seventeenth century through the 
early part of the eighteenth century, authorities implemented three solutions.  First, they 
reduced the amount of tobacco produced annually.  Second, they standardized the size of 
a tobacco hogshead and prohibited shipments of bulk tobacco.  Finally, they prevented 
the exportation of tobacco mixed with any other substances.  Yet because there was no 
practical way to enforce the regulations, the measures were initially ineffective.  Not until 
1730, when the Virginia Inspection Acts were passed, did one colonial government have 
a means by which to fully enforce tobacco trade laws.450 
 The Inspection Acts transformed tobacco regulation becoming a permanent 
feature of the tobacco trade until the American Revolution.  The Inspection Acts 
established public warehouses with official inspectors and required planters to transport 
every hogshead of tobacco in the colony to a warehouse for inspection.  Colonial 
inspectors were empowered to break open any hogshead, remove and burn any trash, and 
issue tobacco notes to the owner specifying the weight and kind of tobacco.451 
 Despite the difficulties with the quality of Chesapeake tobacco, Dutch merchants 
                                                449	  Arthur	  Pierce	  Middleton,	  Tobacco	  Coast:	  A	  Maritime	  History	  of	  Chesapeake	  Bay	  in	  the	  Colonial	  Era	  (Newport	  News,	  VA:	  Mariners’	  Museum,	  1953),	  112-­‐16;	  Jacob	  M.	  Price,	  “Glasgow,	  the	  Tobacco	  Trade,	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Customs,	  1707-­‐1730,”	  in	  Scottish	  Historical	  Review	  63	  (1984):	  1-­‐16.	  450	  Philip	  Alexander	  Bruce,	  Economic	  History	  of	  Virginia	  in	  the	  Seventeenth	  Century:	  An	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  
Material	  Condition	  of	  the	  People	  (New	  York:	  Peter	  Smith,	  1935);	  John	  C.	  Rainbolt,	  From	  Prescription	  to	  
Persuasion:	  Manipulation	  of	   Seventeenth-­‐Century	  Virginia	  Economy	   (Port	  Washington,	   NY:	   Kennikat	  Press,	   1974).	   Virginian	   planters	   raised	   concerns	   and	   produced	   pamphlets	   in	   support	   of	   their	  positions	  outlining	  many	  of	  the	  same	  suggestions	  ultimately	  adopted.	  	  See	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Planters	  of	  
Tobacco	  in	  Virginia,	  as	  represented	  by	  themselves,	  signed	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  Speaker	  of	  
the	  House	  of	  Burgesses	  (1732).	  451	  Middleton,	  Tobacco	  Coast,	  112-­‐21.	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continued to trade with established networks and to forge new networks.452  From the 
latter half of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, tobacco was the 
most important North American commodity shipped to the Dutch Republic.  From its 
earliest cultivation, Virginia tobacco arrived in considerable quantities in the Dutch 
Republic to be processed into spun tobacco and snuff tobacco.453  Over time, different 
processing and production centers arose within the country to handle tobacco. Each was 
associated with a port and reflected the relative importance of the port as a commercial 
center in the Dutch Republic. During the first decades of the seventeenth century, 
Middelburg was the hub for Virginia tobacco.  Around 1650, Amsterdam took over this 
position becoming known as the tobacco capital of the world. Later, in the eighteenth 
century, the manufacturing of tobacco products shifted once again, this time to 
Rotterdam.  During the period, between thirty and fifty percent of all Chesapeake tobacco 
was shipped to the Dutch Republic, this despite being an enumerated commodity.  While 
some tobacco did go through England, a significant amount did not and was shipped 
directly from the Chesapeake to Europe.  
                                                452	  Contrary	   to	  what	   has	   been	   suggested	   by	   numerous	   historians,	   exclusion	   of	   the	  Dutch	   occurred	  only	   theoretically	   and	   in	   the	  minds	  of	  Whitehall.	   	   Practically,	   the	  Dutch	   continued	   to	   ship	   tobacco,	  finance	  planters,	  and,	   in	  some	   instances,	  manage	  plantations.	  For	  an	  example	  of	   the	  historiography	  that	   contends	   the	   Dutch	  were	   excluded	   from	   the	   region,	   see,	   e.g.,	   John	   J.	  McCusker	   and	   Russell	   R.	  Menard,	  The	  Economy	  of	  British	  America,	  1607-­‐1789	  (Chapel	  Hill:	   The	  University	   of	  North	   Carolina	  Press,	  1985),	  123;	  Russell	  R.	  Menard,	  “The	  Tobacco	  Industry	  in	  the	  Chesapeake	  Colonies,	  1617-­‐1730:	  An	   Interpretation,”	   in	   Research	   in	   Economic	   History	   5	   (1980):	   128-­‐42;	   Victor	   Enthoven	   and	   Wim	  Klooster,	   “The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	   the	  Virginia-­‐Dutch	  Connection	   in	   the	  Seventeenth	  Century,”	   in	  Early	  
Modern	   Virginia:	   Reconsidering	   the	   Old	   Dominion,	   eds.,	   Douglas	   Bradburn	   and	   John	   C.	   Coombs	  (Charlottesville:	  University	  of	  Virginia	  Press,	  2011):	  90-­‐127.	  453	  For	  a	  quantitative	  look	  at	  Virginia	  tobacco	  arriving	  in	  the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  see	  Nicolaas	  Posthumus,	  
Nederlandsche	  Prijsgeschiedenis	  (Leiden,	  1943-­‐64),	  1:202-­‐8;	  H.K.	  Roessingh,	  Inlandse	  Tabak:	  Expansie	  
en	  Contractie	  van	  een	  Handelgewas	  in	  de	  17e	  en	  18e	  Eeuw	  in	  Nederland	  (Zutphen:	  De	  Walburg	  Pers,	  1976),	  516-­‐55.	  Producing	  spun	  or	  roll	  cut	  tobacco	  for	  pipe	  smoking	  began	  by	  putting	  cut	  tobacco	  in	  a	  tube	  and	  putting	   it	  under	  direct	  pressure.	  When	  the	  rod	  of	  pressed	  tobacco	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  tube,	   it	   was	   then	   wrapped	   with	   other	   tobaccos.	   The	   end	   product	   was	   sliced	   into	   disks,	   usually	  referred	   to	   as	   coins,	   for	   easy	   handling	   by	   the	   consumer.	   The	   coins	   normally	   had	   a	   core	   that	   was	  visually	  different	   than	   the	  outer	   layers.	   	   Snuff	   is	   a	   generic	   term	   for	   fine-­‐ground	   smokeless	   tobacco	  products.	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 Throughout the latter part of the seventeenth century, Dutch merchants availed 
themselves of established trading networks with trusted commercial partners in the Dutch 
Republic, London, New York, and Virginia. Merchants of Dutch ancestry throughout the 
former New Netherland and elsewhere in the British colonies continued to trade with 
each other and with their networks in England and Europe.454  As late as 1698, the noted 
merchant and economic theorist, Sir Josiah Child, published objections to the transport of 
Virginia tobacco to Amsterdam merchants via New York City: “The Dutch, under 
pretence of trading to and from New-York, carry great quantities of Virginia Tobacco 
directly for Holland.”455  For instance, Anthony Brockholls, deputy governor of New 
York, owned the Susan, a vessel that in 1687 sailed from New York to Virginia and then 
to Rotterdam laden with tobacco. As well as the Susan, Brockholls held an interest in at 
least one other vessel, The Happy Return, seized for trading in violation of the Navigation 
Acts.456 
 In addition, ships sailing from the Dutch Republic often acquired an English 
identity, through their captain, en route to Virginia.  By the time the vessels arrived in the 
Chesapeake, the Dutch ships had become English, or at least appeared to be English.  The 
Amsterdam archives reveal the continuing magnitude of Dutch trade for Virginia tobacco 
                                                454	  Douglas	   Catterall,	   “Interlopers	   in	   an	   Intercultural	   Zone?	   Early	   Scots	   Ventures	   in	   the	   Atlantic	  World,	  1630-­‐1660	  in	  Bridging	  the	  Early	  Modern	  Atlantic	  World:	  People,	  Products	  and	  Practices	  on	  the	  
Move,	  ed.,	  Caroline	  A.	  Williams	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate	  Publishing,	  2009),	  75-­‐96.	  455	  Sir	  Josiah	  Child,	  A	  New	  Discourse	  of	  Trade,”	  (London:	  T.	  Sowle,	  1693).	  456	  Brockholls	  did	   little	   to	   collect	  duties	  or	   enforce	   trade	   laws	  during	  his	   term	  as	   interim	  governor	  before	  the	  arrival	  of	  Colonel	  Thomas	  Dongan.	  	  Nor	  did	  he	  offer	  much	  assistance	  as	  deputy	  governor,	  given	  his	   links	  with	  Dutch	  trading	  interests.	   	  See	  John	  Romeyn	  Brodhead,	  Documents	  Relative	  to	  the	  
Colonial	   History	   of	   the	   State	   of	   New	   York	   Procured	   in	  Holland,	   England	   and	   France	   (Albany:	  Weed,	  Parsons	  and	  Company,	  1853)	  3:287-­‐321;	  Robert	  C.	  Ritchie,	  The	  Duke’s	  Province:	  A	  Study	  of	  New	  York	  
Politics	  and	  Society,	  1664-­‐1691	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1977),	  155-­‐57.	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during the 1670s.457 
 In 1673, the Dutch recaptured New York and held it for over a year before losing 
it again to the English.458 The Dutch also raided Chesapeake Bay, burned numerous 
English ships containing tobacco lying in the Bay, and seized many others as prizes of 
war.459  Despite the temporary hostilities between the Dutch and English in the British 
colonies and general aggression between the two states in Europe, the English rarely 
enforced the Navigation Acts at the time and throughout the 1680s, trade continued 
between Amsterdam and the Chesapeake.460   
 Daniel Petit, English consul in Amsterdam, corresponding with James II’s 
secretary of state, the Earl of Middleton, complained frequently about the Dutch and their 
underlying disregard for the English. In particular, Petit noted that Dutch merchants 
failed to pay duties required under the Navigation Acts.  In August 1688, Petit detained 
the Vriendschap, under Captain Niclas Madder, which arrived in Amsterdam.  Petit wrote 
Middleton: “I [Petit} have this morning arrested the ship Freindship, Nicolas Madder, 
master, lately arrive here from Virginia, without having payed…duties in England.” The 
ship was 
                                                457	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3496/12	  (1670);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3496	  II/46	  (1670);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2233/34-­‐36	  (1670);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  2902/1061	  (1670);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3204/119	  (1670);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  1983/386	   (1670);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3496	   II/101	   (1670);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3772/326	  (1671);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3774/241-­‐43	  (1672).	  458	  For	  detailed	  discussion	  of	   the	   retaking	  of	  New	  York	   and	   its	   context	  within	   a	   broader	  European	  naval	  expedition,	  see	  Donald	  G.	  Shomette	  and	  Robert	  D.	  Haslach,	  Raid	  on	  America:	  The	  Dutch	  Naval	  
Campaign	  of	  1672-­‐1674	  (Westminster,	  MD:	  Heritage	  Books,	  1988).	  459	  For	  the	  burning	  of	  the	  tobacco	  fleet	  in	  1673,	  see	  Warren	  M.	  Billings,	  ed.,	  The	  Old	  Dominion	  in	  the	  
Seventeenth	  Century:	  A	  Documentary	  History	  of	  Virginia,	  1606-­‐1689	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1975),	  319-­‐23.	  	  The	  Dutch	  also	  exhibited	  similar	  aggression	  to	  the	  tobacco	  fleet	  lying	  in	   the	   Chesapeake	   in	   1667.	   	   See	   “Attacks	   by	   the	  Dutch	   on	   the	  Virginia	   Fleet	   in	  Hampton	  Roads	   in	  1667,”	  Virginia	  Magazine	  of	  History	  and	  Biography	  4	  (January	  1897),	  229-­‐45.	  460	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   2259/86-­‐7	   (1680);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   3249/72	   (1680);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3254/248	  (1681);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3257/121	  (1682);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  4960/208	  (1682);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   5129/312	   (1683);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   4814/	   (1683);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   3271/8	   (1684);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5242A/	  (1685);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  3293/234	  (1688).	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 abt 90 tunns, and was, as Madder told me, entered by him in Virginia upon 
 his owne name and called the Society, he sayd also that one [John] Michael, 
 who came in the ship from Virginia, is her true owner, and that he was but  mate 
 when he made entry of her there. One John Bornall [John Borland] a 
 Scotsman living att Boston in New England is also come in her, as supercargo 
 or merchant of the tobacco.461 
 
 Petit would have been supportive of the efforts of Francis Howard, governor of 
Virginia, who established a type of state-sponsored coast guard to patrol the Chesapeake 
to dissuade Dutch shipping. One of the commanders, Thomas Allen, noted in 1684 
 The Virginians are very angry that I stay here because I won’t let them cheat 
 the King, they say I spoile their trade, and the best words I can get from them 
 is old rogue and old dog, and when they see the ketch they say here comes 
 the divells’ ketch, and this is the best language I can get from them behind my 
 back…[T]hey have hired some small vessels to come when I am gone to one 
 end of the country to fetch their Tobacco and carry it to New York or 
 Newfoundland and from thence bring French brandy and the Tobacco they 
 ship away for Holland, and soe cheat the King of his due.462   
 
Despite Allen’s efforts, trade continued between Dutch merchants and Virginian 
plantation owners. 
 During the early 1690’s, Dutch merchants continued their commercial activities 
with Virginia.  George Baron, an Amsterdam merchant, and James Frend, captain of Het 
Land van Beloften, recounted before a notary the price of Virginia tobacco over the years.  
They noted fourteen voyages to the Chesapeake in partnership together.  They declared 
they had never purchased 100 pounds of tobacco for more than 8, 9, or 10 shillings and 
never for 12 shillings.  They also explained that they had never sold tobacco for more 
than 10 shillings per 100 pounds.463 The notarial document did not disclose the purpose 
for which depositions were made, but the information gained about continued trade and 
                                                461	  See	   MS	   A	   41816,	   Petit	   to	   Middleton,	   Amsterdam,	   August	   1688,	   British	   Library,	   London.	   	   John	  Borland	  had	  significant	  ties	  with	  New	  York	  merchants,	  including,	  Philip	  Livingston.	  462	  See	  Allen	  to	  Howard,	  June	  1684,	  CO	  1/63,	  ff.	  278-­‐81,	  The	  National	  Archives,	  Kew.	  463	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5842/	  (1691).	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amount received for the commodity in Amsterdam is noteworthy. 
 William Darvall, a merchant in New York, was particularly active during this 
period and is an example of a colonial merchant with commercial ties in Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam.  Operating as Darvall and Company, William both shipped cargos and owned 
vessels that transported Virginia tobacco directly to Europe.464 
 Trade and commercial relationships between the Chesapeake and the Dutch 
Republic was severely disrupted by war with France during the late 1690’s.465  In 1698, a 
French privateer captured Joseph Lord, skipper of De Swaen, on his journey from 
Virginia.  He provided a power of attorney to an Amsterdam merchant who represented 
the vessel’s owners and the merchants with interests in the cargo of tobacco.466 Notarial 
declarations were non-existent during the war era and, thus, there are no further notarial 
references to trade between the Dutch Republic and the Chesapeake region until 1714. 
 A once porous and diverse Atlantic trade between merchants of various nations 
was subsequently relegated to state protection and control by the British government.467  
Yet, some time before 1718, the Dutch resumed direct trade with the Chesapeake.468 
Certainly, trade did not return to the previous levels experienced in the seventeenth 
century. Europeans continued to demand tobacco and previous trading networks and 
                                                464	  SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   5843/	   (1692);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   5844/	   (1692);	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   5850/135	  (1694).	  465	  The	  Chesapeake	  economy	   faced	  severe	  disruption	   from	  the	  1690s	   to	   the	  1710s.	   	  King	  William’s	  War,	   as	   it	  was	  known	   in	   the	   colonies,	  was	  part	  of	   the	  War	  of	   the	  League	  of	  Augsburg	   (Nine	  Years’	  War)	  (1688-­‐97),	  in	  which	  Louis	  XIV’s	  France	  fought	  against	  the	  Duchy	  of	  Savoy,	  the	  Dutch	  Republic,	  England,	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire,	  Spain,	  and	  Scotland.	  	  It	  ended	  with	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Ryswick	  in	  1697.	  	  Queen	  Anne’s	  War,	  as	   it	  was	  known	  in	   the	  colonies,	  was	   the	  War	  of	   the	  Spanish	  Succession	  (1702-­‐13),	   fought	   over	   the	   crown	   of	   Spain	   between	   supporters	   of	   Philip	   V,	   which	   included	   France	   and	  Bavaria,	   and	   supporters	   of	   Archduke	   Charles,	   which	   included	   the	   possessions	   of	   the	   Austrian	  Hapsburgs,	   the	  Dutch	  Republic,	   Great	   Britain,	   Portugal,	   Prussia,	   and	   Savoy.	   	   The	  Treaty	   of	  Utrecht	  resolved	  it	  in	  1713.	  466	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  5868/324	  (1698).	  467	  See	  Douglas	  Bradburn,	  “The	  Visible	  Fist:	  The	  Chesapeake	  Tobacco	  Trade	  in	  War	  and	  the	  Purpose	  of	  Empire,	  1690-­‐1715,”	  in	  The	  William	  and	  Mary	  Quarterly	  68	  (July	  2011),	  361-­‐86.	  468	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8565/	  (1718).	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practices resumed.  
 Despite changes in Virginia and London, Amsterdam remained the dominant 
tobacco market.  Dutch traders availed themselves of the rise in domestic tobacco 
production and continued to import from England as well as from Virginia. 
 Ties between the Chesapeake and the Dutch Republic dated to the colony’s 
earliest days.  The tobacco trade created a significant symbiotic relationship between 
Chesapeake plantation owners and Dutch merchants. The Navigation Acts endeavored to 
transform the Dutch role in trade with the British colonies in North America.  Persistent, 
and drawn to the lucrative tobacco trade, the Dutch found the means necessary to 
continue trade in the Chesapeake. Trade prospered subsequent to the implementation of 
the Navigation Acts.  Although war late in the seventeenth century interrupted a well-
defined trading relationship, trade continued throughout the eighteenth century because it 
was profitable for parties to continue such trading networks. 
 
 
New Profits on the Horizon - South Carolina and the Rice Trade 
 
 Land, as in all of the mainland colonies, was abundant in the Carolinas.  Early 
settlers faced the same questions that settlers in other colonies had faced – what could be 
profitably exported from the colony to launch an economy?  Samuel Wilson, an early 
promoter of the colony, wrote of such concerns in 1682: 
 I have here, as I take it, described a pleasant & fertile Country, abounding in 
 health and pleasure, and with all things necessary for the sustenance of 
 mankind, and wherein I think I have written nothing but truth, sure I am I  have 
 inserted no wilful falshood: I have also told you how men are to have Land, what 
 shall I doe with it? What Comoditys shall I be able to produce that will yeild me 
 mony in other Countrys, that I may be ina bled to buy Negro slaves (without 
 which a Planter can never do any great matter and purchase other things for my 
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 pleasure and convenience, that Carolina doth not produce?469 
 
 Wilson suggested a number of commodities for production, any number of which 
achieved modest success in the early years. His list included: livestock, deerskins, pitch, 
tar, silk, and sassafras.470  In the colony’s early years, settlers used the expanding slave 
population to produce meat exports for the West Indies and to produce naval stores.471 
 The initial commercial investments in livestock and production facilities for naval 
stores encountered tangible and economic hurdles. Once allied with the British, the 
Yamasee peoples confronted encroachment on their lands by colonists and difficulty in 
obtaining the two most important items in their trading relationship with the British – 
deerskins and Indian slaves. The Yamasee War, waged from 1715 to 1717, had a 
considerable impact on the colony’s economy.  The livestock industry, responsible for 
meat exports, was devastated. Yamasee war parties destroyed colonists’ livestock in such 
numbers that the meat trade with the West Indies faced disruption for years.472  In 
addition to the local war, the British bounty on naval stores lapsed in 1724 and thus 
reduced income to colonists.473 Thus, the war and withdrawal of fiscal aid heightened 
interest and concentration in rice cultivation.474 
                                                469	  Samuel	  Wilson,	  An	  Account	  of	  the	  Province	  of	  Carolina	  in	  America,	  Together	  with	  an	  Abstract	  of	  the	  
Patent,	  and	  Several	  other	  Necessary	  and	  Useful	  Particulars,	  to	  Such	  as	  Have	  Thoughts	  of	  Transporting	  
Themselves	  Thither	  (London:	  G.	  Larkin	  for	  Francis	  Smith,	  1682),	  27.	  470	  Ibid.	  471	  Peter	  Wood,	  Black	  Majority,	  55,	  144.	  472	  See,	   e.g.,	  William	   L.	   Ramsey,	  The	  Yamasee	  War:	  A	   Study	   of	   Culture,	   Economy,	   and	  Conflict	   in	   the	  
Colonial	   South	   (Lincoln:	   University	   of	   Nebraska	   Press,	   2008);	   Steven	   J.	   Oatis,	   A	   Colonial	   Complex:	  
South	  Carolina’s	  Frontiers	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  the	  Yamasee	  War,	  1680-­‐1730	  (Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	   2004);	   Alan	   Gallay,	   The	   Indian	   Slave	   Trade:	   The	   Rise	   of	   the	   English	   Empire	   in	   the	   American	  
South,	  1670-­‐1717	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  473	  See	   Converse	   D.	   Clowse,	   Economic	  Beginnings	   in	   Colonial	   South	  Carolina,	   1670-­‐1730	   (Columbia:	  University	   of	   South	   Carolina	   Press,	   1971),	   184-­‐7,	   208-­‐18;	   Wood,	   Black	   Majority,	   127-­‐30;	   Alvin	  Rabushka,	  Taxation	  in	  Colonial	  America	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  699.	  474	  For	   a	   general	   discussion	   about	   the	   development	   of	   South	   Carolina’s	   economy,	   including	   the	  cultivation	  of	  indigo,	  see	  Robert	  M.	  Weir,	  Colonial	  South	  Carolina:	  A	  History	  (Columbia:	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press,	  1997).	  
  
 247 
 As the early settlers in South Carolina cast about for profitable economic 
opportunities, amazing arrays of organic substances were put to the test.  The settlers 
tried various cultigens such as sugar, tobacco, indigo, cotton, and rice – all commodities 
associated with climates similar to South Carolina’s. Rice - a plant that can be grown 
virtually anywhere – was a crop that settlers returned to on several occasions.475   
 The first mention of rice and its production in Carolina appeared in an article 
entitled “A Description of Carolana by a Well-willer” in 1649 in The Modern 
Intelligencer.476  Nevertheless, early efforts to establish a settlement there failed. In 1663, 
King Charles II granted eight members of the English nobility a charter to establish the 
colony of Carolina. Known as the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, the cohort were the 
colony’s ruling landlords. The Duke of Albemarle wrote to Lord Willoughby of Parham, 
explaining that their initial plans for the colony were to produce such commodities “as 
the Kinge hath not yet within his Terrytories in quantity, although his people consume 
much of them to the exhausting wealth of the kingdome, the commodyties I meane are 
wine, oyle, reasons, currants, rice, silke &c.”477  The crop required skill and experience, 
however, for commercial success not yet possessed by planters.  Again, in the 1680s and 
1690s, planters reintroduced the crop with seeds brought from Africa and the East Indies. 
Yet, the colonists still lacked the agricultural skill set to make the crop commercially 
                                                475	  See,	  e.g.,	  Fayrer	  Hall,	  The	  Importance	  of	  the	  British	  Plantations	  in	  America	  to	  this	  Kingdom:	  With	  the	  
State	  of	  their	  Trade,	  and	  Methods	  for	  Improving	  It	  (London,	  1731),	  18-­‐9;	  Peter	  Collinson,	  “An	  Account	  of	  the	  Introduction	  of	  Rice	  and	  Tar	  into	  our	  Colonies,”	  Gentleman’s	  Magazine	  36	  (June	  1766):	  278-­‐9;	  Alexander	  Hewatt,	  An	  Historical	  Account	  of	  the	  Rise	  and	  Progress	  of	  the	  Colonies	  of	  South	  Carolina	  and	  
Georgia	  (London,	  1779),	  1:157;	  David	  Ramsey,	  History	  of	  South	  Carolina	  from	  Its	  First	  Settlement	  in	  
1670	  to	  the	  Year	  1808	  (Charleston,	  1809):	  2:113-­‐4.	  476	  Hugh	  T.	   Lefler,	   ed.,	   “A	  Description	   of	   ‘Carolana’	   By	   a	   ‘Well-­‐Willer,’	   1649,”	   in	  The	  North	  Carolina	  
Historical	  Review,	  32	  (January,	  1955),	  102-­‐5.	  	  477	  William	  L.	  Saunders,	  ed.,	  The	  Colonial	  Records	  of	  North	  Carolina	  (Raleigh:	  State	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1886-­‐1890),	  1:48.	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viable.478  By the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonists had acquired the 
requisite components enabling South Carolina to become a leading rice exporter.479   
 The colony possessed a number of geological, climatic, and economic advantages 
that help to explain why rice proved successful there at that particular time.  Certainly, 
the physical environment of the lower coastal plain of both South Carolina was 
conducive to rice production.  The region’s humid subtropical climate, abundant 
precipitation, seemingly inexhaustible surface water resources, and loamy red clay soil 
provided advantageous growing conditions.  
 Additionally, over time the colonists established an ample and technologically 
skilled enslaved African and creole labor force.  Rice had been grown on the West 
African coast south of the Sahara, especially along the Windward Coast in present-day 
Ghana and Sierra Leone.  Rice plantation owners made a concerted effort to purchase 
slaves from this area assuming a familiarity with rice cultivation.480  
 A powerful class of planters and merchants, eager for profits, had shown itself 
capable of organizing production, particularly the planters and merchants who had had 
                                                478	  See,	  e.g.,	  Judith	  A.	  Carney,	  “African	  Rice	  in	  the	  Columbian	  Exchange,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  African	  History	  42	  (2001),	  377-­‐96;	  Judith	  A.	  Carney,	  Black	  Rice:	  The	  African	  Origins	  of	  Rice	  Cultivation	  in	  the	  Americas	  (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   2001);	   Joyce	   Chaplin,	   An	   Anxious	   Pursuit:	   Agricultural	  
Innovation	   and	  Modernity	   in	   the	   Lower	   South,	   1730-­‐1815	   (Chapel	   Hill:	   Institute	   of	   Early	   American	  History	  and	  Culture,	  1993).	  	  479	  Reports	   on	   the	   increase	   of	   rice	   production	   in	   South	   Carolina	   abounded.	   	   Edward	   Randolph,	  Collector	  of	  Customs	  wrote	  in	  1700:	  “They	  have	  now	  found	  out	  the	  true	  way	  of	  raising	  and	  husking	  Rice.	  	  There	  have	  been	  above	  300	  Tons	  shipped	  this	  year	  to	  England	  besides	  about	  30	  Tons	  more	  to	  the	  Islands.”	  See	  Edward	  Randolph,	  “Letter	  of	  Edward	  Randolph	  to	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade,”	  in	  Narratives	  
of	  Early	  Carolina,	  1650-­‐1708,	  edited	  by	  Alexander	  S.	  Salley,	   Jr.	  (New	  York:	  C.	  Scribner’s	  Sons,	  1911),	  204-­‐10.	   	   	   In	  fact,	  so	  productive	  were	  the	  Carolina	  plantations	  that	  the	  Lords	  Proprietors	  wrote	  that	  the	  colony	  “hath	  made	  more	  rice	  ye	  Last	  Cropp	  then	  we	  have	  Ships	  to	  Transport.	   	  See	  Alexander	  S.	  Salley,	  Jr.,	  ed.,	  Commissions	  And	  Instructions	  From	  The	  Lords	  Proprietors	  Of	  Carolina	  To	  Public	  Officials	  
Of	  South	  Carolina:	  1685-­‐1715	  (Columbia:	  The	  State	  Co.,	  1916),	  131-­‐2.	  480	  Wood,	  Black	  Majority,	   59.	   	   For	   an	   argument	   that	   the	   “black	   rice”	   paradigm	   is	   problematic,	   see	  David	   Eltis,	   Philip	   Morgan,	   and	   David	   Richardson,	   “Agency	   and	   Diaspora	   in	   Atlantic	   History:	  Reassessing	  the	  African	  Contribution	  to	  Rice	  Cultivation	  in	  the	  Americas,”	  in	  The	  American	  Historical	  
Review,	  112	  (2007):	  1329-­‐1358.	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previous plantation management experience in Barbados.481  The infusion of European 
and American merchant capital into various plantation enterprises greatly facilitated long-
distance trade.   
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, relatively stable transport costs, timely 
market information about lapses in European grain production, and a degree of 
integration, of what was still a nascent Atlantic economy, favored this region over several 
other rice-producing areas both within the Atlantic world and elsewhere.482  
  
Dynamics of the Dutch Rice Trade with South Carolina 
 During the first decades of the eighteenth century rice cultivation in South 
Carolina drew the attention of numerous Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchants, including 
some leading Dutch trading houses. With substantial preexisting trade networks in the 
West Indies and in Virginia, the Dutch were aware of South Carolina’s colonization by 
English settlers from Barbados and Virginia, and later French Huguenot refugees. 
Individuals forming such networks brought the attention of Dutch merchants to the newly 
cultivated staple. 
 The Dutch also took cognizance of the agricultural experiments with rice 
cultivation by Carolina colonists, because rice was a valued staple in northern European 
diets. Contemporaneous histories, though, have debated about the reasons for rice’s 
                                                481	  On	   the	   settlement	   of	   Barbadian	   plantation	   owners	   in	   South	   Carolina,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Jack	   P.	   Greene,	  “Colonial	   South	  Carolina	   and	   the	  Caribbean	  Connection,”	   in	  The	  South	  Carolina	  Historical	  Magazine	  88	  (1987):	  192-­‐210.	  482	  On	   transportation	   costs	  of	   rice,	   see	  Russell	  R.	  Menard,	   “Transport	  Costs	  and	  Long-­‐Range	  Trade,	  1300-­‐1800:	  Was	   There	   a	   European	   ‘Transport	   Revolution”	   in	   the	   Early	   Modern	   Era,”	   in	   James	   D.	  Tracy,	   ed.,	   The	   Political	   Economy	   of	   Merchant	   Empires:	   State	   Power	   and	   World	   Trade,	   1350-­‐1750	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  267-­‐9.	  	  On	  other	  rice-­‐production	  areas,	  see	  David	  R.	  Harris,	   The	   Origins	   and	   Spread	   of	   Agriculture	   and	   Pastoralism	   in	   Eurasia	   (Washington,	   D.C.:	  Smithsonian	  Institution	  Press,	  1996).	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popularity. 
 There are two leading explanations as to why demand for South Carolina rice 
increased so substantially during the eighteenth century.  The first suggests that rice was 
an inferior grain that could replace other small grains in the European diet.  This view of 
the commodity was held by the British and colonial merchants who organized the trade, 
and who consistently argued that the poorer urban classes consumed Carolina rice as a 
substitute for cheap bread cereals.483  
 In that context, the critical determinant of demand was therefore thought to be the 
level of European harvests.  Poor harvests forced up the price of inferior cereals, which 
opened the market for rice.  In some decades, poor harvests occurred frequently in 
Western Europe, causing severe shortages in countries with advanced agriculture like 
Holland.484  High cereal prices then triggered demand on the rice market where prices 
rose sharply.  The chief suppliers of rice to the growing market were initially the eastern 
Mediterranean and northern Italy.485 
 Historians too have often characterized rice as poverty crop, a grain that was 
boiled with vegetables to make broth, or ground into meal and mixed with millet or flour 
to make a cheap breadstuff.  In such forms, it was habitually eaten by the urban and 
institutionalized poor, as well as providing in famine years a more widely used 
emergency substitute.486  
                                                483	  Edgar,	  ed.,	  The	  Letterbook	  of	  Robert	  Pringle,	  1:238;	  2:578,	  746,	  811.	  484	  See	  J.G.	  van	  Dillen,	  “Economic	  Fluctuations	  and	  Trade	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  1650-­‐1750,”	  in	  P.	  Earle,	  ed.,	  Essays	   in	  European	  Economic	  History,	  1500-­‐1800	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	   Press,	   1974),	   199-­‐211.	  485	  See,	   e.g.,	   R.C.	   Nash,	   “South	   Carolina	   and	   the	   Atlantic	   Economy	   in	   the	   Late	   Seventeenth	   and	  Eighteenth	  Centuries,”	  in	  The	  Economic	  History	  Review	  45	  (1992):	  684.	  486	  See,	   e.g.,	   Simon	   Schama,	  The	  Embarrassment	  of	  Riches:	  An	   Interpretation	  of	  Dutch	  Culture	   in	   the	  
Golden	   Age	   (New	   York:	   Vintage	   Books,	   1987),	   174-­‐5;	   Peter	   A.	   Coclanis,	   The	   Shadow	   of	   a	   Dream:	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 A second explanation for the demand for South Carolina rice hinges on a 
contention put forth by Peter Coclanis, who asserts that the basis of colonial export 
expansion in 1650-1750 was economic growth in Western Europe.  Growth created 
higher incomes and a changed structure of demand, as consumption in Europe shifted 
from basic items to goods with high and positive income elasticities, such as non-
essential foodstuffs and manufactured goods.  The shift in demand was paralleled by 
shifts in supply.  Resources were reallocated in an international setting: the proportion of 
resources devoted to basic agricultural production in western Europe declined, while 
surplus capital and labor were exported to America, where they were concentrated in the 
production of a number of agricultural staples, including rice.487 Rice harvested in 
America found ready markets in European urban centers that no longer had a proximate 
and ready supply available.  
 A significant percentage of the rice exported from South Carolina ended up in 
Holland and Germany.  The remainder of exported rice went to southern Europe, mainly 
to Spain and Portugal, and to the West Indies to feed slave populations. 488  The 
significance of such countries in the rice trade can be seen in one Charleston merchant’s 
comments in 1752 that the Dutch were “the most considerable buyers” and that they 
                                                                                                                                            
Economic	  Life	  and	  Death	  in	  the	  South	  Carolina	  Low	  Country,	  1670-­‐1920	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  133-­‐4.	  487	  See	  Peter	  A.	  Coclanis,	  “Rice	  Prices	  in	  the	  1720s	  and	  the	  Evolution	  of	  the	  South	  Carolina	  Economy,”	  
Journal	  of	  Southern	  History,	  48	  (1982):	  531-­‐44;	  Peter	  A.	  Coclanis,	  “Bitter	  Harvest:	  The	  South	  Carolina	  Low	   Country	   in	   Historical	   Perspective,”	   Journal	   of	   Economic	   History,	   45	   (1985):	   251-­‐9;	   Peter	   A.	  Coclanis,	   “The	   Rise	   and	   Fall	   of	   the	   South	   Carolina	   Low	   Country:	   An	   Essay	   in	   Economic	  Interpretation,”	  Southern	  Studies,	  24	  (1985):	  143-­‐66;	  Peter	  A.	  Coclanis,	  The	  Shadow	  of	  a	  Dream,	  52-­‐4.	  488	  Henry	  C.	  Dethloff,	  “The	  Colonial	  Rice	  Trade,”	  in	  Agricultural	  History	  56	  (1982),	  236;	  Leila	  Sellers,	  
Charleston	   Business	   on	   the	   Eve	   of	   the	   American	   Revolution	   (Chapel	   Hill:	   The	   University	   of	   North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1934),	  156.	   	  See	   James	  F.	  Shepherd	  and	  Gary	  M.	  Walton,	  The	  Economic	  Rise	  of	  Early	  
America	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1979),	  192,	  198-­‐200;	  James	  F.	  Shepherd	  and	  Gary	  M.	   Walton,	   Shipping,	   Maritime	   Trade,	   and	   the	   Economic	   Development	   of	   Colonial	   North	   America	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1972).	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“ruled the market.”489   
 The continuing successes of rice production for commercial purposes caught the 
attention of the Board of Trade in London.  In 1704, the Board of Trade put rice on the 
enumerated list of commodities that could be shipped only to England.490  Although many 
London merchants transshipped sundry American products to Europe, rice was sold 
almost exclusively to European market centers in the Dutch Republic, Scandinavia, 
Spain, Portugal, and various German states. Had the English population’s dietary 
preferences favored rice over other grains, the outcry from South Carolina planters over 
the Board’s actions that put rice on the enumerated list of commodities might have been 
muted. But English consumers ate rice in a dessert format, rather than as a staple and, as a 
consequence, the commodity was subject to dietary substitution.491   
 As a consequence, the 1704 protectionist provisions required South Carolina 
planters to follow complex legal procedures, identical with other enumerated 
commodities.  Planters shipped their rice to England first and paid duties to the English 
government before having the rice reshipped to a destination in Europe. While a certain 
percentage of the duty would be reimbursed upon transshipment out of England, South 
                                                489	  John	   Guerard	   to	   Thomas	   Rock,	   April	   23,	   1752,	   John	   Guerard	   Letterbook	   (1752-­‐1754),	   South	  Carolina	   Historical	   Society.	   	   See	   also	   H.P.H.	   Nusteling,	   De	   Rijnvaart	   in	   het	   tijdperk	   van	   stoom	   en	  
steenkool,	   1831-­‐1914	   (Amsterdam:	   1974),	   123-­‐79;	   L.	   van	   Nierop,	   “Uit	   de	   bakermat	   der	  Amsterdamsche	   handelsstatistiek”,	   Jaarboek	   Amstelodamum,	   15	   (1917):	   35-­‐110;	   P.J.	   Dobelaar,	  “Statistiek	  van	  de	  in-­‐	  en	  uitvoer	  van	  Rotterdam,	  c.	  1753,”	  in	  Economisch	  Historisch	  Jaarboek,	  7	  (1921):	  210-­‐30.	  490	  The	   1660	   Navigation	   Act	   enumerated	   several	   colonial	   commodities	   that	   could	   only	   be	   sold	   to	  English	  buyers	  and	  exported	   to	  English	  ports	   in	  English	  ships	  with	  English	  crews.	   	  Tobacco,	   sugar,	  cotton,	   indigo,	  ginger,	   fustic,	  and	  other	  dying	  woods	  were	  subject	  to	  the	  restrictions	  pronounced	  in	  1660.	  	  The	  legislation	  of	  1704,	  along	  with	  adding	  rice	  to	  the	  list,	  also	  included	  naval	  stores,	  molasses,	  and	   copper	   to	   the	   list	   of	   goods.	   See	   Lawrence	   A.	   Harper,	  The	  English	  Navigation	  Laws	   (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1939);	  I.K.	  Steele,	  Politics	  of	  Colonial	  Policy:	  The	  Board	  of	  Trade	  in	  Colonial	  
Administration	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1968).	  491	  Carole	  Shammas,	  The	  Pre-­‐Industrial	  Consumer	  in	  England	  and	  America	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  140-­‐44.	   	  See	  also,	  Robert	  May,	  The	  accomplisht	  cook,	  or	  The	  art	  and	  mystery	  of	  cookery	  (London:	  N.	  Brooke,	  1660).	  May	  mentioned	  eight	  recipes	  for	  rice,	  most	  of	  them	  being	  puddings.	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Carolina merchants expressed little disapproval about the payment of imposts.492 Rather, 
they called attention to the time and effort of rice production and dreaded the delaying 
effect a double voyage and assorted administrative measures would have on a crop 
harvested in the fall.  The delaying effect was twofold: first, it could lessen the quality of 
the crop and its fitness for subsequent consumption; and, second, it could diminish the 
available markets for rice.493   
 The South Carolina Assembly accordingly began to petition the British 
government as early as 1714 to remove rice as an enumerated commodity and to allow 
payment of any duty in America, with direct shipment from South Carolina to European 
nations. Unfortunately, Parliament was unresponsive to such petitions and others over the 
ensuing years.494  Finally, in 1730, Parliament yielded to lobbying asserted by South 
Carolina’s special interest group of plantation owners, colonial officials, and London rice 
merchants, permitting colonial rice thereafter to be shipped directly to European ports 
south of Cape Finisterre, Spain.495   
 Despite eliminating the requirement that ships carrying rice alight in England 
prior to embarking for Europe, the new legislation established additional administrative 
procedures.  Colonial customs officials required ships’ captains to secure an export 
                                                492	  Ralph	  Davis,	  “English	  Foreign	  Trade,	  1700–1774,”	  in	  The	  Economic	  History	  Review	  15	  (December	  1962):	  285-­‐303.	  493	  A.S.	  Salley,	  ed.,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Commons	  House	  of	  Assembly	  of	  South	  Carolina,	  1692-­‐1765,	  (Columbia:	  State	   Company,	   1907-­‐1949),	   16:287-­‐8.	   Along	   with	   a	   double	   voyage,	   the	   second	   voyage	   required	  added	   insurance.	   As	   well,	   if	   South	   Carolina	   rice	   was	   not	   available	   expeditiously	   for	   the	   regions	  celebrating	  Lent,	  South	  Carolina	  planters	  expressed	  concern	  that	  merchants	   in	  Italy	  and	  the	  Levant	  would	  supply	  rice	  instead.	  494	  Eugene	  Sirmans,	  Colonial	  South	  Carolina:	  A	  Political	  History,	  1663-­‐1763	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1966),	  107-­‐8.	  495	  Charles	  M.	  Andrews,	  The	  Colonial	  Period	  of	  American	  History	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1934),	  1:98;	  Lewis	  C.	  Gray,	  History	  of	  Agriculture	  in	  the	  Southern	  United	  States	  to	  1860	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Carnegie	  Institution,	  1933),	  1:284-­‐7.	  	  The	  new	  regulations	  benefited	  rice	  production	  and	  prices,	  both	   of	  which	   rose	   in	   the	   1730s	   to	   almost	   double	   the	   levels	   reported	   in	   the	   1720s.	   	   See	   James	  M.	  Clifton,	  “The	  Rice	  Industry	  in	  Colonial	  America,”	  Agricultural	  History	  55	  (1981):	  166-­‐83.	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license for loading and carrying the rice and to give a financial bond for the cargo’s value 
upon issuance of the license.  Before leaving South Carolina, a captain had to show the 
certificate of bond and the license to the colonial tax collector.  Upon arrival in a 
European port, before the captain or supercargo could sell his cargo, he needed to verify 
the landing of the rice in the foreign port. To do so, the 1704 provisions required him to 
obtain the signature of either a British consul assigned to that nation or two known 
British merchants who transacted business from the port, who affirmed the rice’s arrival.  
On returning to England, the captain was to submit the certificate of landing supported by 
the signatures of the consul or merchants and the license endorsed by the colonial officer 
in South Carolina.  The act subjected the rice to a duty equivalent to the net amount owed 
if the merchant had shipped the rice directly to Britain and then re-exported it.496  Hence, 
while the act eliminated the expense of a double voyage and genuine possibility of delay 
to market, it instead required a captain to return to England upon the sale of his cargo, 
and to submit documentation for the release of the bond posted in South Carolina.  No 
doubt, the changing regulations had their disadvantages. 
 Eventually, the Board of Trade accommodated mercantile entreaties and the 
revisions only applied to rice shipments made to ports south of Cape Finisterre.  
Shipments of rice to European ports north of Cape Finisterre still required a vessel to 
touch at a British port and to pay duty on the cargo.497 But, acknowledging landing at a 
                                                496	  Leo	   Francis	   Stock,	   ed.,	   Proceedings	   and	   Debates	   of	   the	   British	   Parliaments	   Respecting	   North	  
America,	  5	  vols.	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  The	  Carnegie	  Institution	  of	  Washington,	  1924-­‐41),	  4:	  57-­‐62;	  Gray,	  
History	  of	  Agriculture	  in	  the	  Southern	  United	  States,	  I,	  284-­‐87.	  497	  As	  late	  as	  1763,	  merchants	  continued	  to	  petition	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  rice	  as	  an	  enumerated	  good.	  	  Their	  appeals	   failed	  to	  convince	  the	  Treasury	  Department	  who	  argued	   for	   the	  revenue	  raised	   from	  the	  duty	  on	  rice,	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade,	  who	  saw	  rice	  as	  part	  of	  British	  economic	  policy,	  and	  Parliament	  who	  had	  concerns	  about	  colonial	  demands.	   	  Thus,	   rice	  remained	  as	  an	  enumerated	  good.	  An	  act	   in	  1765	  attempted	   to	  minimize	  delays.	   	   It	  allowed	  vessels	  with	  rice	  arriving	  at	   specified	  British	  ports	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  sail	  immediately	  to	  Europe	  to	  pay	  half	  the	  duty	  on	  the	  cargo’s	  value.	  	  However,	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British port was the exception rather than the rule by Dutch merchants.  In fact, it appears 
that most Dutch ships sailing from South Carolina sailed directly to Europe, bypassing 
the complicated and burdensome administrative rules and admonitions of the English 
government. As a consequence, evasion of the Navigation Acts occurred with the sale of 
rice to non-English merchants who chose not to comply with provisions of the Acts. 
 As early as 1711, there is evidence of Dutch investment in South Carolina rice.  
Hero Moij, a prominent Amsterdam merchant, contracted for the delivery of rice from the 
Charleston merchants, William Gibbon and Andrew Allen.  The rice was loaded into The 
Dorothe and transported to London.  Moij insured the cargo for 5000 guilders and 
assumed the additional risk for 1000 guilders himself.498   Given the proclivity for 
transshipment of rice cargoes, there was every likelihood that the cargo was eventually 
shipped to Europe from London. 
 Throughout the 1720’s and 1730’s, as the quality and quantity of rice from South 
Carolina improved and increased, the Dutch availed themselves of the opportunity for 
profit the commodity presented.  Typical of voyages in this period was the York.  The 
York appeared to have gone to South Carolina on speculation seeking a cargo of rice, 
rather than having contracted a charter between a Dutch merchant and a plantation owner 
or factor in Charleston acting on behalf of a plantation owner. Dutch merchants sent out 
speculative voyages usually before Christmas, when demand was high in Europe and 
reports suggested that prices in South Carolina were reasonable.  Captains or supercargos 
                                                                                                                                            the	  captain	  or	  supercargo	  was	  required	  to	  give	  a	  bond	  for	  double	  the	  value	  of	  the	  rice	  and	  have	  the	  bond	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   either	   when	   the	   remaining	   duty	   was	   paid	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   60	   days	   or	   when	   the	   rice	   was	  reshipped	  and	  exported	  out	  of	  England.	  	  Under	  this	  legislation,	  the	  rice	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  be	  unloaded	  for	   weighing	   and	   reloaded	   for	   export.	   	   That	   provided	   an	   opportunity	   to	   have	   the	   rice	   reach	   its	  intended	  market	  more	  expeditiously.	  	  5	  Geo.	  III	  c.	  45.	  	  	  498	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  7361/2714	  (1713).	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aboard a speculative voyage attempted to attract business by offering low freight rates to 
plantation owners or their factors, which were crucial to competitive trade.499  
 Transatlantic connections and business organization sustained the commerce in 
rice.  There was substantial interplay between international cooperation and competition 
in the shipping of a staple commodity sent largely from Charleston.  For instance, in 
August of 1730, Archibald and Thomas Hope, noteworthy merchants in Amsterdam, 
received 484 cases of Carolina rice aboard The Homans.  William Jeffrijs [Jeffreys] of 
Bristol had consigned the cargo to the Hope brothers.  Upon inspection, the Hopes 
determined the rice’s quality inferior.  Most probably, in anticipation of the arrival of the 
consignment, the Hope brothers would have had a customer or customers ready to receive 
the rice.  Instead, because of its poor quality, the brothers chose to auction it off rather 
than returning the consignment to Jeffrijs.500  The Hopes mitigated what might otherwise 
have been a greater loss. The situation demonstrated the flexibility, initiative, and 
cooperation on the part of merchants, shippers, correspondents, and factors necessary to 
cope with elaborate legal practices, complex shipping patterns, rapid price fluctuations, 
shifting demand, and the varied uses of rice in different markets.  
 Further evidence of the dominance of Dutch shipping and international 
cooperation is revealed through Robert Pringle’s correspondence to a business associate, 
William Hicks, in Hamburg.  Pringle wrote in August 1740 of existing prices for rice and 
                                                499	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8629/984	  (1727).	  The	  parties,	  in	  this	  instance,	  appeared	  before	  a	  notary	  to	  give	  evidence	  about	  damage	  to	  the	  rice	  because	  of	  rats	  and	  the	  seaworthiness	  of	  the	  vessel.	  	  See	  also	  Robert	  Pringle	  to	  Thomas	  Burrill,	  Pringle	  Letterbook,	  I,	  107;	  II,	  433.	  500	  SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8667/1474	   (1730).	   	   It	   was	   important	   for	   merchants	   to	   demonstrate	   their	  proficiency	  and	  competence	   in	   the	  handling	  of	   rice.	   	  Often,	  merchants	  appeared	  before	  a	  notary	   to	  have	   sailors,	   captains,	   or	   carriers	   declare	   as	   to	   the	   state	   of	   barrels	   or	   crates	   of	  merchandise	   upon	  mooring	   in	   Amsterdam,	   particularly	   if	   there	   was	   damage	   to	   the	   contents.	   	   Most	   often,	   containers	  were	   sighted	   as	   being	   at	   fault.	   	   See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8751/1629	   (1737)	   (description	   of	   the	  condition	  of	  rice	  contained	  within	  barrels	  noted	  as	  damp	  from	  the	  outside,	  suggesting	  leakage).	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shipping in Charleston and currency exchange rates.  He also conveyed his concerns 
about the uncertainty of shipping available in Charleston and suggested that Hicks should  
 order your Friends in London or Amsterdam to Charter there for you what 
 Vessells you may have occasion for to send here and which you may hire on 
 much easier Terms than to hire or take up Vessells here on Freight as it has 
 accordingly happen’d this Last Crop.  Ships have Come Charter’d in Ballast 
 from London & Amsterdam to go back to Holland or Hamburg at £4	   per	   ton	  	   Freight	  when	   at	   Same	   time	  what	   Ships	   Come	   here	   from	  New	   England,	   &c.	  	   obtain’d	   £4.15/	   to	   £5	   per	   ton	   for	   your	   parts.	   London	   &	   Amsterdam	   are	  	   the	   most	   Likely	   places	   for	   Freighting	   Ships	   on	   Easier	   Terms	   for	   our	  	   Plantations	  than	  any	  where	  Else	  I	  know.501	  	  	  
 
 Pringle thus displayed commercial expediency and not any sort of adherence to 
colonial trade policies. In Charleston, commercial practices saw English and Dutch 
merchants employing factors or commercial correspondents.  The arrangement proved 
more flexible and less costly than to send supercargoes aboard ship or maintain 
storekeepers in Charleston.502 As a consequence, Pringle’s correspondence not only 
sought future custom from Hicks, but also sought to establish Pringle’s reputation for 
reliable and cost-effective information, factors important in establishing trust in trading 
networks.  
 Dutch merchants and English shipowners often cooperated with each other to 
provide the necessary financing for a commercial voyage. Rice planters in South Carolina 
rarely shipped anything on their own accounts except through necessity.  In 1732, Robert 
Reaves, from London and captain of D’Experiment Galey, appeared before an 
Amsterdam notary acknowledging receipt of 8000 guilders from Cornelis van Eijk, an 
Amsterdam merchant.  Van Eijk provided the bodemerij, or bottomry bond, for the 
voyage.   
                                                501	  Edgar,	  ed.,	  Letterbook	  of	  Robert	  Pringle,	  I:236.	  	  502	  This	  was	  contrary	  to	  established	  commercial	  dealings	  in	  tobacco	  in	  the	  Chesapeake	  by	  English	  and	  Dutch	  merchant	  houses.	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 The bodemerij was a loan agreement in which a financial institution or individual 
provided a sum of money to the owner of a ship or the shipper.  The ship, or ship’s cargo, 
was taken as security for the loan. When the voyage concluded, the premium was paid 
back with interest.  Should the voyage meet mishap, the insured party was not required to 
refund the value of the bodemerij.  In this instance, Reaves was to sail the ship from 
Amsterdam to New York and then to South Carolina for a cargo of rice.  Upon his return 
to Amsterdam, the agreement required Reaves to repay the bodemerij within eight 
days.503 
 The involvement of firms, including Archibald and Thomas Hope in Amsterdam, 
in widely scattered ports throughout England and northern Europe in financing rice 
shipments underscores the decentralized nature of the rice trade and highlights attempts 
by Charleston merchants to expand their commission business by attracting 
consignments.504  In 1736, Nicholas Fremijn and Louis Fremijn, merchant brokers in 
Amsterdam, sold 368 barrels of Carolina rice at 20 ½ shillings per 100 pounds to Samuel 
Cardose Nunes, a merchant in Amsterdam.  They also had received a consignment of 132 
barrels of Carolina rice, which they again sold to Nunes at 20 shillings per 100 ¼ pounds.  
The consignment of 132 barrels of rice (weighing 55,900 pounds) was damaged during 
the Atlantic crossing aboard The Hannah.505  Appearing before the notary permitted the 
parties to memorialize any potential claims against the other parties. 
                                                503	  SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8689/1207	   (1732).	   	   For	   additional	   bodemerijs	   given	   as	   part	   of	   the	   South	  Carolina	   rice	   trade	   see	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8712/733	   (1734)	   (Levinius	   Clarkson,	   merchant	   in	  Amsterdam	  sought	  payment	  of	  a	  bodemerij	  letter	  to	  Cornelis	  van	  Eijk,	  also	  a	  merchant	  in	  Amsterdam	  regarding	   the	   ship	  D’Experiment);	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	   8713/824	   (1734)	   (appointment	   of	   arbitrators	  resulting	  from	  Van	  Eijk’s	  refusal	  to	  pay	  bodemerij	  letter).	  504	  With	  financing	  of	  the	  rice	  trade	  also	  came	  the	  refusal	  by	  parties	  in	  South	  Carolina	  to	  pay	  indebted	  amounts.	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8701/1362	  (1733);	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8708/2502	  (1733).	  	  	  505	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8740/1059	  (1736).	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 Prominent merchants such as Thomas and Adriaen Hope could employ brokers to 
locate rice for customers.  In 1736, brokers Waijenburgh and Dabenet of Amsterdam 
located 8 vaten (or drums) of rice for the Hope brothers on behalf of their customer, 
Sander van Leuvenigh, an Amsterdam merchant.  Some urgency was associated with the 
undertaking as the rice was to be delivered within twenty-four hours at the Waag, weigh 
house in Nieuwmarkt Square in Amsterdam.506 
 Dutch capital nevertheless still underwrote rice sales.  South Carolinian merchants 
remitted proceeds from transactions to Dutch firms to pay for goods shipped to them on 
credit.  Along with English merchants, Dutch commercial houses played an important 
role in the chartering, outfitting, and insuring of ships in the rice trade. Both Dutch and 
London merchant houses (who sometimes represented British firms in Amsterdam) 
obtained shipping on better terms than their Charleston counterparts.507  
 Most rice from South Carolina was exported overseas.   The concentration of rice 
production in the South Carolina low country made Charleston an important commercial 
center. Occasionally, rice shipments went from Savannah, Georgia, and from Beaufort 
and Georgetown, two small South Carolina ports.  As a consequence, minor commercial 
centers arose in such ports as well and they too had business dealings with Amsterdam 
                                                506	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8744/1976	  (1736).	  507	  For	  instance,	  Amsterdam’s	  marine	  insurance	  market	  was	  Europe’s	  leading	  insurance	  market	  with	  a	  well-­‐defined	  institutional	  framework	  to	  insure	  voyages	  and	  cope	  with	  any	  subsequent	  losses.	  	  The	  only	  marine	  insurance	  available	  in	  South	  Carolina,	   if	  at	  all,	  would	  have	  been	  insurance	  provided	  by	  an	   individual.	   	   Given	   the	   reticence	   of	   South	   Carolina’s	   rice	   planters/merchants	   to	   take	   on	   risk	   in	  shipment	  of	  cargos,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  these	  same	  merchants	  would	  have	  agreed	  to	  privately	  insure	  ships.	  	  For	  comprehensive	  discussions	  of	  marine	  insurance	  in	  Amsterdam	  see	  Frank	  C.	  Spooner,	  Risks	  at	  Sea:	  
Amsterdam	   Insurance	   and	   Maritime	   Europe,	   1766-­‐1780	   (Cambridge:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	  1983);	   Sabine	   Go,	   Marine	   Insurance	   in	   the	   Netherlands,	   1600-­‐1870:	   A	   Comparative	   Institutional	  
Approach	   (Amsterdam:	  Aksant,	   2009).	   	  On	  how	  one	  particular	   rice	   cargo	  had	  been	   insured,	   lost	   at	  sea,	   and	   the	   insurance	   claims	  handled,	   see	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8719/2164	   (1734)	   (Dutch	  merchants	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  shipment	  of	  rice	  from	  South	  Carolina	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  vessel	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Cape	  Faire	  [now	  Cape	  Fear,	  North	  Carolina],	  200	  miles	  from	  Charleston.	  	  The	  insurers	  paid	  the	  sum	  insured	  to	   the	   insured	  and	  received	  all	   rights	  of	  salvage.	   	  A	  power	  of	  attorney	  was	  given	  to	  named	  merchants	  in	  Charleston	  to	  initiate	  a	  lawsuit	  there).	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8755/1492	  (1737).	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merchants.  Amsterdam merchants had less direct contact with rice merchants located in 
the other commercial centers.  Subsequently, established trading networks based on trust, 
reliability, or familiarity were lacking.  When bills of exchange508 were presented from 
the lesser known centers to a Dutch merchant in Amsterdam, the merchant often denied 
them.509  The Dutch term for this was wisselprotest.510 
 Like any commodity, rice needed proper handling and storage. Warehousing 
entailed storage and cooperage expenses, but also risked loss in weight, leakage, bursting 
casks, exposure to rats, weevil, and worm, and the possibility of destruction by fire in 
wooden storehouses.  Rice did not keep well.  By summer, leftovers from the previous 
year’s crop acquired a discoloring dust, leaving it musty and moldy and therefore 
unsuitable for sale. Rice kept aboard ship for some time after arriving in a port suffered 
similar difficulties and could incur losses for all concerned in the transaction before even 
arriving on shore.511   
 Rice was thus a relatively inexpensive, bulky, recurrent, and perishable product, 
subject to wide price variations.  Correspondents in South Carolina and in the Dutch 
                                                508	  A	  bill	  of	  exchange	  is	  essentially	  an	  order	  made	  by	  one	  person	  to	  another	  to	  pay	  money	  to	  a	  third	  person.	  A	  bill	  of	  exchange	  requires	   in	   its	   inception	   three	  parties—the	  drawer,	   the	  drawee,	  and	   the	  payee.	  The	  person	  who	  draws	  the	  bill	   is	  called	  the	  drawer.	  He	  gives	  the	  order	  to	  pay	  money	  to	  the	  third	  party.	  The	  party	  upon	  whom	  the	  bill	   is	  drawn	  is	  called	  the	  drawee.	  He	  is	  the	  person	  to	  whom	  the	   bill	   is	   addressed	   and	   who	   is	   ordered	   to	   pay.	   He	   becomes	   an	   acceptor	   when	   he	   indicates	   his	  willingness	  to	  pay	  the	  bill.	  The	  party	  in	  whose	  favor	  the	  bill	  is	  drawn	  or	  is	  payable	  is	  called	  the	  payee.	  	  A	  bill	  of	  exchange	  may	  be	  endorsed	  by	  the	  payee	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  third	  party,	  who	  may	  in	  turn	  endorse	  it	  to	  a	  fourth,	  and	  so	  on	  indefinitely.	  The	  "holder	  in	  due	  course"	  may	  claim	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  bill	  against	  the	  drawee	  and	  all	  previous	  endorsers,	  regardless	  of	  any	  counterclaims	  that	  may	  have	  disabled	  the	  previous	  payee	  or	  endorser	  from	  doing	  so.	  This	  is	  what	  saying	  that	  a	  bill	  is	  negotiable	  means.	  509	  See,	   e.g.,	   SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8059/21	   (1736)	   in	  which	  a	  bill	  of	  exchange	  originating	   in	  Savannah,	  Georgia	  was	  denied	  by	  the	  Amsterdam	  merchant	  Bernard	  van	  der	  Grift.	  	  	  510	  A	  wisselprotest	   is	   an	   official	   statement	   that	   the	   payment	   of	   a	   bill	   of	   exchange	   is	   denied.	   These	  statements	  were	  filed	  with	  a	  notary	  to	  create	  a	  written	  record.	  511	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10314/300	  (1739)	  (Captain	  John	  Reed	  of	  De	  Faulcon	  with	  637	  barrels	  of	  rice	  filed	  notice	  against	  an	  Amsterdam	  merchant,	  Willem	  van	  Maurik	  demanding	  that	  Van	  Maurik	  make	  provision	  for	  unloading	  the	  vessel).	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Republic worked in tandem to make critical commercial decisions about purchasing, 
transporting, and storing the staple. For instance, in 1739, Robert Pringle asked William 
Hodshon in London to forward correspondence to his brother, Theodorus Hodshon, a 
merchant in Amsterdam.  Pringle’s letter conveyed the current price for rice in 
Charleston, Pringle’s opinion that the price was unlikely to go lower that season, the 
amount that remained available for export from the colony, and the prospects for the 
coming year’s crop.512  Theodorus Hodshon, and other merchants in Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam, might have corresponded with several merchants in Charleston and London in 
order to make commercial decisions based on current information. 
 Prices published in the Amsterdam Courant also reflected information received 
about rice production in South Carolina and the supply available for export. Supply also 
influenced shipping charge expenses. Low prices and a plentiful supply of rice led to high 
freight rates; high prices and a short crop to low rates. Prices were therefore hard to 
predict, as anxious comments by merchants reveal.  High prices for rice also raised 
concerns about theft – particularly theft at the time of loading a cargo or aboard ship. In 
1741, Jan Anthony Corp alleged that the captain of The Dispatch, William Oswald, 
underreported the amount of rice brought aboard his ship.  The cargo was subsequently 
off-loaded from the ship and stored in a warehouse awaiting inspection by two arbitrators 
and the captain in order to settle the matter.513     
                                                512	  Edgar,	  ed.,	  Letterbook	  of	  Robert	  Pringle,	  I:104.	  513	  Robert	  Pringle	  considered	  that	  rice	  varied	  ‘very	  much	  in	  price	  &	  during	  the	  Whole	  Season	  I	  have	  known	   it	   at	   a	   Different	   price	   very	   week.”	   Ibid.	   I,	   3,	   90,	   423;	   II,	   453,	   483].	   See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	  10334/398	  (1741).	  	  Inspection	  by	  rice	  brokers,	  or	  arbitrators	  in	  a	  matter,	  could	  bar	  the	  subsequent	  sale	  of	  the	  rice	  in	  marketable	  form.	  Instead,	  the	  rice	  could	  be	  sold	  as	  damaged	  and	  priced	  accordingly.	  	  See	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   11267/2	   (1741)	   (inspection	   by	   rice	   brokers	   who	   inspected	   a	   portion	   of	   a	  Carolina	   rice	   shipment	   in	   a	   merchant’s	   warehouse,	   determined	   it	   was	   musty	   smelling,	   and	  announced	  it	  could	  not	  be	  sold	  for	  full	  market	  price).	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 As has been noted, rice prices in South Carolina varied with changes in the size of 
the annual rice crop, news about market trends and business conditions in Europe, and, 
the demand for shipping. Unpredictable price conditions added to the worries of South 
Carolina merchants.  Merchants kept a wary eye on Charleston’s harbor, assessing the 
ships, their cargos, and their destinations.  In June 1740, Robert Pringle wrote his brother 
Andrew “Most of the Shipping that are here at present are bound for Cowes and Holland, 
& beleive all the Ships here that will Sail after Capt. Greig are entirely bound for Holland 
which will make a Glutt.”514  In Pringle’s mind, a surfeit of a single commodity in any 
port meant lower net returns. 
 
Compliance with the Navigation Acts? 
 Occasionally, the Dutch made half-hearted attempts to comply with the 
Navigation Acts.  The archives reveal a number of instances when notarial acts 
acknowledged a Dutch ship carrying rice arriving at a British port.  As noted above, 
South Carolina planters, to comply with the Navigation Acts, instructed captains to touch 
at a British port when shipments were bound for European ports north of Cape Finisterre.  
Cowes, on the Isle of Wight, was the most favored.  Cowes had a customs house, but 
lacked harbor facilities or anything other than a roadstead, or a partly sheltered stretch of 
water near the shore in which ships could ride at anchor. Nevertheless, the Isle of Wight’s 
position midway along the English Channel made for convenient transshipment of rice to 
northern Europe.  Sir Richard Worsley acknowledged the importance of the rice trade to 
the local economy and wrote in 1781: 
                                                514	  Edgar,	  ed.,	  Letterbook	  of	  Robert	  Pringle,	  I:	  225.	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 Before the defection of the American colonies, from thirty to fifty vessels  loaded  
 with rice annually arrived at Cowes, from South Carolina and Georgia; their 
 cargoes were from twenty-two thousand to thirty-five thousand barrels, or from 
 five thousand to eight thousand tons of that grain…. The rice, after being landed, 
 opened, skreened, and re-packed, was generally re-shipped on board the vessel in 
 which it came, and carried to Holland, Germany, or some of the French ports in 
 the Channel.  This was a beneficial branch of business to the port of Cowes…515 
  
 The rice trade was the one major branch of transatlantic commerce that involved 
Cowes.  Its location meant that ships could not only avoid the time-consuming journey up 
the Thames to London, but also the overcrowded docks and customs delays associated 
with London.  Captains carrying rice from America expected orders to be lodged by their 
principals at such places, with instructions about destinations.  “England may be 
considered as a great Inn, on the road from America to the Northern parts of Europe,” 
Richard Champion remarked, ”where the Americans may repose themselves, till they 
procure knowledge of the best market to send their goods.”516 Customs officers at Cowes 
checked rice cargoes carefully to ensure that the quantity on board vessels agreed with 
the plantation certificates.  Delays occurred during transshipment whenever fraud was 
suspected 
 As early as 1727, Dutch merchants landed at Cowes in compliance with the 
requisite provisions of the Navigation Acts requiring vessels to touch at a British port.  A 
dispute arising over freight costs, the distribution of profits, and other gains of the ship 
The Good Intent, captained by Walter Kippin, brought parties before an Amsterdam 
notary to avoid litigation and appoint arbitrators.  Both Kippin and the owners of the 
                                                515	  Sir	  Richard	  Worsley,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Isle	  of	  Wight	  (London:	  A.	  Hamilton,	  1781),	  29.	  516	  Richard	  Champion,	  Considerations	  on	  the	  Present	  Situation	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America	  with	  a	  View	  to	  Their	  Future	  Commercial	  Connexions	  (London,	  J.	  Stockdale,	  1784),	  106.	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vessel were English.517 However, the merchants contracting the vessel and the parties 
receiving the rice were all Dutch citizens.518 The voyage was an example of how English 
citizens of Dutch ancestry in New York, in this instance the owners of the vessel, 
maintained trading networks with Dutch merchants.  Their citizenship provided the 
means by which Dutch merchants could so easily comply with the Navigation Acts. 
 The Amsterdam notarial records remain silent about further landings at Cowes 
until 1740.  Then, through 1746, a number of records reference the port.  In 1740, 
Bernard van der Grift entered into a charter agreement for the ship The London, captained 
by John Burleigh.  The charter instructed the captain to take merchandise from 
Amsterdam to Cowes, to unload and reload the merchandise, to proceed to Charleston 
and to unload merchandise there and reload with rice.  The vessel was to proceed back 
through England to London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, or Bremen. 519   In 1743, The 
Merchant of Danzigh was ladened with rice and sassafras from South Carolina bound for 
Amsterdam.  Because of a dispute about property allegedly stolen in Cowes, we know 
that the vessel landed there to have its cargo weighed and reloaded before proceeding to 
                                                517	  Kippin	  was	  made	  a	  freeman	  of	  New	  York	  on	  February	  15,	  1726.	  	  See	  New	  York	  Historical	  Society,	  Collections	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Historical	  Society	  (New	  York:	  Trow	  &	  Smith,	  1868),	  107.	  Kippin	  is	  noted	  as	  the	  captain	  of	  record	  on	  a	  number	  of	  voyages	  in	  various	  American	  ports.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  The	  American	  
Weekly	  Mercury,	   March	   7th	   to	   14th,	   1722/23,	   	   Customs	   House	   New	   York,	   Kippin	   as	   captain	   of	   the	  
Albons	  bound	  for	  Barbados	  (March	  11th);	  The	  American	  Weekly	  Mercury,	  April	  14th	  to	  21st,	  1726,	  Perth	  Amboy,	  Kippin	  as	  captain	  of	  the	  Good	  Intent	  bound	  for	  Lisbon	  (April	  16th).	  	  The	  owners	  of	  the	  vessel	  were	  Abraham	  van	  Horne,	  David	  Provoost,	  and	  Benjamin	  d’Harietten.	  They	  were	  born	  in	  either	  New	  Jersey	  or	  New	  York	  and	  were	  of	  Dutch	  ancestry.	  518	  SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   8655/1373	   (1729).	   	   Archibald	   and	   Thomas	   Hope,	   merchants	   in	   Amsterdam,	  were	  agents	  for	  Archibald,	   John,	  and	  Isaac	  Hope,	  merchants	  of	  Rotterdam.	   	  Mark	  de	  Jong,	  Bernhard	  van	  der	  Grift,	  and	  William	  White	  contracted	  for	  the	  cargo	  of	  rice.	   	  De	  Jong	  and	  Van	  der	  Grift	  (a	  well	  known	   Amsterdam	   diamond	   merchant)	   were	   Jewish	   merchants.	   	   This	   particular	   transaction	   is	  suggestive	   of	   the	   types	   of	   transactions	   invested	   in	   by	   merchants,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   porousness	   of	  merchant	  networks	  that	  ignored	  religious	  boundaries.	  	  The	  arbitrators	  in	  this	  matter,	  Christiaan	  van	  Boneval	   and	  Pieter	  van	  der	  Heijde,	  both	  of	  Amsterdam,	   failed	   to	  bring	   the	  parties	   to	  a	   satisfactory	  conclusion	  and	  further	  declarations	  were	  sought	  about	  the	  seaworthiness	  of	  the	  vessel.	  	  For	  further	  notarial	  material	  on	  this	  particular	  voyage,	  see	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8652/886	  (1729)	  and	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8652/920	  (1729).	  519	  See	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  8784/197	  (1740).	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Amsterdam.520  Also in 1743, The Richard of London reported damage to a cargo of rice 
due to heavy storms they had experienced off the coast of Florida after leaving South 
Carolina.  The ship arrived in Cowes for the obligatory unloading and weighing of its 
cargo for payment of duty before proceeding to Amsterdam.521 
 Similar notarial articles reference incidents occurring aboard vessels loaded with 
rice from South Carolina bound for Amsterdam, including damage to rice due to poor 
weather experienced by The Vernon in 1744; a dispute about unloading of the vessel The 
Dorothe in 1744; damage to the cargo aboard The Catherine (also in 1744); and a dispute 
about the weight of rice and sassafras upon the arrival of The Providence in Amsterdam 
in 1744.522  Each of the vessels made port in Cowes and departed after payment of the 
requisite duties. 
 After 1744, there are no further references in the notarial records to Cowes and 
ships loaded with rice bound for Amsterdam.  Amsterdam did continue to be a significant 
market for rice from South Carolina and Cowes remained the main entrepôt port for rice 
shipments between South Carolina and the rest of Europe until the American Revolution.  
But the cessation of references to Cowes in the Amsterdam archives suggests that 
transatlantic trade by Dutch merchants from South Carolina either was rerouted to 
another English port or Dutch merchants ceased submission to the Navigation Acts 
altogether. Probably the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) disrupted the 
administration of compliance with the Navigation Acts during this period, and the Dutch 
took full advantage of the distraction.  Trade in rice from South Carolina continued to 
                                                520	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10226/411	  (1743).	  521	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10350/1268	  (1743).	  522	  For	  The	  Vernon	  see	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10359/955	   (1744);	   for	  The	  Dorothe	  see	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10361/1387	   (1744);	   for	   The	   Catherine	   see	   SAA,	   Notarial	   No.	   10363/1616	   (1744);	   and	   for	   The	  
Providence	  see	  SAA,	  Notarial	  No.	  10230/991	  (1744).	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Amsterdam.  The impediment of English duties, however, made the trade all that more 
lucrative for Dutch merchants. 
  
Conclusion  
 Rice and tobacco, two plantation staples grown in the colonial south, shared any 
number of similarities.  Both had substantial commercial development as part of the 
Atlantic economy during this period. The evolution of each industry depended on 
growing consumer demand. Such demand was generated in re-export to European 
markets rather than the domestic market of England. The main re-export markets for each 
staple were in France, Germany, and the Low Countries. .                
 From 1664 through 1750, the Dutch responded to the opportunities for trade in the 
Chesapeake and Lower South.  By 1664, the Dutch had established substantial trading 
networks with Chesapeake tobacco growers.  Through 1750, the Dutch maintained 
existing networks and developed additional networks with planters.  Strong linkages 
between the Chesapeake and both Amsterdam and Rotterdam ensured ready markets for 
tobacco and low operating costs for Dutch traders.   
 While trading networks for tobacco between Dutch merchants and Chesapeake 
planters altered with the passage of time, so, too, did the manner in which processing 
centers in the Dutch Republic change.  The initial center of processing had been in 
Middelburg, but soon Rotterdam, with its larger harbor and thriving English immigrant 
merchant population, displaced the smaller, devoutly Calvinist town.  In time, Rotterdam 
lost its supremacy to Amsterdam, which had the allure of the stock exchange, banks, the 
insurance market, and scores of merchants anxious to invest in the noxious weed.   
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 Always keen to pursue an opportunity, Dutch merchants provided shipping and 
financial assistance to South Carolina’s rice producers from its initial successful mass 
production.  As rice production increased exponentially, Dutch shipping provided direct 
access to northern European ports, most often bypassing English administrative 
procedures and duties.  It was a welcome arrangement for both parties. 
 The involvement of some of Amsterdam’s largest merchant houses in the rice 
trade meant that South Carolina rice producers had far greater exposure to southern 
European cultures than the producers of other commodities in North America. The 
populations of Spain, Portugal, and Italy considered rice a staple of their diet. As a 
consequence, the trading networks that developed between South Carolina and those 
European countries as a result of Dutch carriage of rice meant that South Carolina rice 
producers became attuned to the demands for rice that followed religious calendars, 
rather than seasonal production.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 In 1766, Alexander Gillon, a Dutch resident, immigrated to South Carolina and 
settled in Charleston. For over a century, Dutch residents, particularly persons linked to 
trade, had immigrated to various North American colonies. Like many of his fellow 
countrymen, Gillon was also a merchant.  
 As the events of the late 1760’s and 1770’s unfolded, he became an ardent South 
Carolina patriot, loyal to the concerns being expressed by some colonists against the 
British government.  When the royal government collapsed in South Carolina in the 
summer of 1775, Gillon served in the colony’s provincial congress.  On behalf of the new 
nation, he undertook covert military activities in Europe to secure vessels from the 
French.   
 In early 1780, he returned to the Netherlands where he sought financing for 
America’s war efforts. No doubt, he utilized his trading networks to secure introductions 
and the promise of funds.  From there he sent military provisions to the Continental 
Army. He also procured the frigate South Carolina, built at Amsterdam’s Admiraliteits 
Werf, the largest warship under any American’s command during the War of 
Independence. 
 Gillon represented the evolving relationship between the new nation and the 
Dutch Republic.  On the one hand, Gillon was a traditional merchant, concerned about 
crop yields, shipping rates, and the demand for commodities in Europe from the English 
colonies.  His counterparts within his trading networks in the Dutch Republic had similar 
concerns. Then, along came an event such as the American Revolution.  
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 Suddenly, traditional trading roles changed and Gillon used his skills as a 
merchant in an alternative manner for his adopted country.  In many respects, his 
commercial life parallels the transformation that commerce between the Dutch Republic 
and the North American colonies underwent. 
  
 The primary goal of this thesis is to understand the significance of Dutch trade in 
the North American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The North 
American colonies were just one part of the Atlantic World in which European nations 
competed for territory, wealth, trade, commodities, and, ultimately, power.  The Atlantic 
World spanned four continents: Europe, Africa, North America, and South America.  The 
initiatives and conquests of Europeans brought into contact diverse groups of formerly 
isolated peoples throughout this Atlantic World and forever changed the history of the 
world.  
 So often, early American historians speculate on what might have been had New 
Netherland not fallen to the English or whether the Dutch Atlantic Empire might have 
been more formidable, with a larger amount of territory under its control, if the West 
India Company had decided to devote its resources to founding colonies in the Caribbean 
or been more aggressive on the North American mainland. The conjecture about what 
might have been is endless. 
 Instead, I have focused on the commercial realities that existed for Dutch 
merchants trading in the North America colonies.  During the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, the Dutch staple market functioned as a warehouse for the Western 
world, where commodities from almost every corner of the globe were sold, including 
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goods manufactured in the Dutch Republic and commodities received in trade from the 
North American colonies.  The Dutch Republic and the various American colonies were, 
almost inevitably, economically linked to each other: each had relatively free markets for 
commodities; each also had agricultural productivity to sustain labor; and, each had a 
political structure which guaranteed property rights and enforcement of contracts.  But 
most importantly, merchants from the Dutch Republic could offer shipping, commodities, 
and credit to colonial merchants in North America.   
 Long before the America Revolution, several distinct trades developed between 
the North American colonies and the Dutch Republic. This dissertation has followed the 
growth in trade within the various colonies and the relationships that developed with 
Dutch merchants.  As colonies were founded and their leadership sought marketable 
commodities, it inevitably followed that Dutch merchants arrived soon after receiving 
notification of merchantable goods in sufficient quantities to warrant sending a ship to 
investigate.   
  The fur trade first lured the Dutch to North America in the seventeenth century 
and prompted a reassessment of their economic and colonial policies.  The attempt at 
various institutional models to stimulate and sustain trade in New Netherland seemed 
uncharacteristic for the Dutch.  Already in the seventeenth century, the Dutch were global 
leaders in trade.  Yet, here, in North America, they stumbled. They searched for an 
economic model that would maximize the amount of revenue to the government while at 
the same time generate the commercial activity required to do so.  The early models 
offered little to either the government or Dutch merchants.  When finally, out of 
desperation, the government and West India Company assented to a colonial model based 
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on settlement and free trade rather than sparsely inhabited trading posts, the result 
changed the course for future Dutch commercial activities in North America. 
While the Dutch were busy trying to establish New Netherland, the English were 
in the Chesapeake and faltering as well.  Finally, the success of tobacco cultivation 
brought economic prosperity to Chesapeake tobacco planters. Arguably, without tobacco, 
Chesapeake colonists would have engaged in subsistence farming and animal husbandry 
and the colony may well not have survived without some sort of economic viability to 
satisfy investors and the English government.  
Nevertheless, successful tobacco cultivation also drew the attention of Dutch 
merchants who sought out trading opportunities. From 1616, Virginia tobacco arrived in 
large quantities in the Dutch Republic and was processed into spun tobacco and snuff 
tobacco.  In succession Middleburg, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam acquired the title of 
tobacco capital of the world based on the importation and manufacturing of Chesapeake 
tobacco in Dutch commercial centers. And while the importation of tobacco would wane 
during periods of warfare, the importation of tobacco was important for many Dutch 
traders and the Dutch economy. 
Tobacco and furs became the mainstay of Dutch trade during the mid portion of 
the seventeenth century in North America.  Not only were Dutch merchants who resided 
in North America engaging in trade for both commodities, but merchants from the Dutch 
Republic altered their trading routes to the West Indies to incorporate stops in the 
Chesapeake and New Netherland.  A circuitous route developed that enveloped the 
Atlantic World and Dutch merchants in contact with English colonies. 
 The founding of South Carolina caused consternation for its leadership.  
  
 272 
Numerous attempts at growing agricultural products sufficiently in demand in the market 
had failed.  When finally it was determined that rice could grow in sufficient quantities in 
the colony and that there was ample demand for it as a commodity, the colony of South 
Carolina had found its staple product.  The demand for rice was, surprisingly, not in 
England.  Rather, South Carolina’s planters exported millions of pounds of rice to the 
Dutch Republic and Europe annually.  Dutch ships soon arrived at Charleston’s wharfs 
and the merchants aboard were eager to establish their trading networks. Some of the rice 
leaving South Carolina on Dutch bottoms was legally transported via England, but much 
of it was shipped illegally, in contravention to the Navigation Acts.  The significance of 
the Dutch Republic in the Carolina rice trade can be seen in one merchant’s comment in 
1752 that the Dutch were “the most considerable buyers” and that they “ruled the 
market.”  This was particularly true in the years just before the American Revolution.  
 Along with the substantial fur, tobacco, and rice trades, Dutch merchants engaged 
in trade for all manner of commodities produced in North America.  These included 
logwood, timber, timber products, ships, fish, grains, iron, and other agricultural produce. 
And with each commodity, Dutch merchants reacted with established patterns of trade – 
the ability to provide inexpensive and efficient shipping for the commodity, the 
admission to numerous European markets, the reputation for paying more than their 
English competitors, the provision of finance, a willingness to ignore onerous taxes and 
regulations, and the ability for that North American merchant to become part of a 
commercial network that opened the Dutch trading world to them.   
 And in each of the trades, Dutch commercial networks reached out to North 
America and embraced local merchants, regardless of nationality.  The networks 
  
 273 
provided information, resources, shipping, markets, and opportunity to all of the 
participants.  In the decades before the growth of private companies, business networks 
became the catalyst for unification of commercial practices. 
 This work has incorporated individuals such as Isaac Allerton, Alexander Gillon, 
Anna Hack, Jacob Leisler, and countless other merchants based in the various colonies of 
North America into a wider setting beyond local relationships.  As a consequence, their 
commercial actions loose their provincialism – they become part of a broader picture. 
More specifically, they highlight trading networks whose centers more likely than not, 
were based in Amsterdam.  There, merchant houses arose and began establishing radials 
beyond the Dutch Republic and Europe.  North American merchants with trading 
networks to the Dutch Republic became connected to something much larger. By 
reconstructing the networks in which merchants operated during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, we have a much broader understanding of the scope of trade in early 
America.  As well, the prominence and predominance of English trade, so often 
characterized in the historiography of early American trade, diminishes with the 
knowledge that Dutch merchants actively and aggressively transgressed national, ethnic, 
and religious boundaries associated with trade. 
  
From 1750 and Onwards 
 The dominant role, which the Amsterdam staple market had played in European 
trade in the seventeenth century and first half of the eighteenth century, could not be 
maintained. Amsterdam had profited as an entrepôt of trade goods. But, commercial 
traffic, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, tended to proceed directly from the 
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supply source to the point of distribution for consumption, bypassing Amsterdam.  Nor 
was Amsterdam any longer on its own able to regulate prices, freight charges, and 
exchange rates.  London and, increasingly, Hamburg offered competition as commercial 
centers.  The situation which had allowed Amsterdam to draw commodities to its staple 
market because of both its advantageous geographical situation and its wealth of 
shipping, was undercut by the development of direct trade and by growing competition 
from English, French, and German merchants.  Dutch merchants had profited because 
Amsterdam had offered a ready market for the goods of international commerce and 
because financial techniques in use in Amsterdam were sophisticated enough to support 
commercial transactions based upon credit extended for several months.  Dutch 
commission agents advanced money, arranged insurance, discounted bills of exchange, 
and maintained the most elaborate channels of information about supply and demand, all 
of which had enabled Amsterdam in this period to fill an indispensable role in the 
exchange of products.523  When other European nations reached a certain level of 
commercial development, they, too, became attractive for merchants. 
 As Amsterdam lost its focal position as a center of trade, the same Dutch 
commercial firms which were already involved in active trade moved into the 
commission business, dealing in bills of exchange, both on the basis of the commodity 
trade and as a separate branch of business.  Thus, many Dutch merchants became 
bankers, with the understanding that their banking functions did not include the 
acceptance of deposits, the lending of money on security, or other transactions beyond 
                                                523	  Charles	  Wilson,	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  Commerce	  &	  Finance	   in	   the	  Eighteenth	  Century	   (Cambridge,	   1941);	  Charles	  Wilson,	   “The	   Economic	  Decline	   of	   the	  Netherlands,”	   in	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  9	   (1939),	  111-­‐27.	  	  On	  the	  financing	  of	  international	  commerce	  in	  Amsterdam,	  Hamburg,	  and	  London,	  see	  Kurt	  Samuelsson,	   “International	   Payments	   and	   Credit	   Movements	   by	   Swedish	   Merchant-­‐Houses,	   1730-­‐1815,”	  in	  Scandinavian	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  3	  (1955),	  163-­‐202.	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the range of the bill of exchange. Negotiating loans, however, did fall within the scope of 
the merchant-banker.524 
 All was not lost for ordinary Dutch merchants who traded in commodities and 
provided shipping to their American colleagues. War once again interceded and Dutch 
merchants made enormous profits during the American Revolution by running supplies to 
the revolutionary army from the Caribbean island of St. Eustatius.   
 Nevertheless, the war could not be won only by trading surplus commodities in 
exchange for a few arms and some ammunition. The rebellious colonial governments in 
North America, faced with expenditures that they were unprepared to match with 
available sources of revenue, turned naturally to the Amsterdam capital market as a 
source of long-term credit.  The same Dutch firms which had been unprepared to extend 
long-term credit to American merchants were willing, after initial hesitation, to extend 
such credit to the national government and to some of the states.   
 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Amsterdam capital market had been a 
source of loans for many European states and principalities.  As the Dutch staple market 
faltered, the capital market and the techniques associated with extending credit developed 
even further and merchant/bankers turned to the service of foreign governments, among 
others the new American Republic.525 
 The credit of the United States proved better than expected.  It was thus easy to 
float new American loans on the Amsterdam market.  The American government paid 
interest regularly on its debts to Dutch lenders. And, a policy of regular redemption was 
practiced by the American Treasury to bolster its credit even more. 
                                                524	  E.E.	  de	  Jong-­‐Keesing,	  De	  Economische	  Crisis	  van	  1763	  te	  Amsterdam	  (Amsterdam,	  1939),	  69.	  525	  Wilson,	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  Commerce	  &	  Finance,	  119f.	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 After the American Revolution, the new nation began to attract the particularly 
vigorous attention of Dutch investors.  Merchant/banking houses sent agents to America 
to investigate and explore every practical possibility for investment and profit making.  
Dutch merchants had three aims: to speculate on rising values; to search for profitable 
long-term investments; and to make Amsterdam the center of America’s credit 
requirements. 
 Before long, Dutch merchants were speculating in bank shares, industrial pursuits, 
and internal improvements including bridges, roadways, and canals.  Soon, land 
speculation in upstate New York brought about the formation of the Holland Land 
Company.  The Dutch assisted with the financing for the Louisiana Purchase.  And, when 
plans were formulated for the Erie Canal and the introduction of railways, the Dutch 
provided financing for such projects as well. 
 Unhampered by legislative constraints such as the Navigation Acts which were 
meant to implement economic polices, trade between Dutch and American merchants 
flourished.  Trading networks extended beyond Europe and the Caribbean to include 
locations in Asia. 
 It is arguable that the subsequent participation by Dutch merchants and financiers 
in the new nation would have occurred regardless of previously established networks and 
commercial activity in New Netherland and the English colonies.  Dutch commercial 
culture would not have permitted such business opportunities to be taken up by another 
nation. Nevertheless, numerous trading networks did build up over the decades between 
Dutch merchants and, in chronological order, New Netherland merchants, English 
colonial merchants, and, finally, American merchants.  The nationality of such merchants 
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physically located in North America might have changed over the years, but the 
commercial relationships with Dutch trading partners endured for, quite literally, 
centuries.   
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